High Court dismisses self-represented plaintiff's hardship plea, ordering defendants to recover legal costs under default position.

APPROVED [2025] IEHC 417

THE HIGH COURT

2019 8090 P

BETWEEN

PATRICK (OTHERWISE PADDY) ROCHFORD

PLAINTIFF

AND

PATRICK (OTHERWISE PAT) KELLY

COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM

ATTORNEY GENERAL

IRELAND

JOHN HUNT

RORY SHERIFF

JOHN MCDONALD

RICHARD DALY

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 25 July 2025

INTRODUCTION

1. The principal judgment in these proceedings was delivered on 8 May 2025, Rochford v. Kelly [2025] IEHC 251. This supplemental judgment determines the incidence of the legal costs of the proceedings, following an exchange of written legal submissions between the parties.

NO REDACTION REQUIRED

2. The Plaintiff filed his submissions on 3 June 2025 and the Defendants filed their replying submissions on 2 July 2025.

3. These proceedings take the form of an action in tort. The Plaintiff had advanced a claim for false imprisonment (wrongful arrest); malicious prosecution; and malicious procurement of a search warrant. The Plaintiff had claimed damages in the sum of €500,000. The action was at hearing over nine days. The action was ultimately dismissed for the reasons set out in detail in the principal judgment.

4. The default position under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 is that the Defendants, having been entirely successful in resisting the claim, would be entitled to recover their (measured) legal costs as against the Plaintiff as the unsuccessful party. The court has a discretion to make a different form of costs order having regard, in particular, to the matters identified under that section. See, generally, Word Perfect Translation Services Ltd v. Minister for Public Expenditure & Reform [2023] IECA 189.

5. The Plaintiff seeks to resist a costs order on the grounds that it would impose a disproportionate burden on him as a self-represented, elderly litigant who acted in good faith. The Plaintiff emphasises that he is 78 years of age, with no financial income other than a State Pension. The Plaintiff submits that a costs order would cause him “genuine hardship” and would be financially ruinous for him. The Plaintiff further submits that he had a genuine belief that he had suffered mistreatment at the hands of certain members of An Garda Síochána, and that he brought the proceedings in good faith, with no ulterior motive other than vindication. The Plaintiff acknowledges that the general rule is that costs follow the event; and further acknowledges that “the law must discourage frivolous claims”, but suggests his claim was not frivolous.

6. The Plaintiff has also made an open offer to withdraw other proceedings (Rochford v. Kissane & Ors, High Court 2023 1734 P).

DISCUSSION AND RULING ON COSTS

7. The principal ground upon which the Plaintiff seeks to resist a costs order is financial hardship. The question of whether financial hardship is a relevant consideration in determining the incidence of legal costs has been addressed by the Supreme Court in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53. The Supreme Court expressed the view that, in the context of civil proceedings between private parties, it would be doubtful whether this factor alone would justify the court in exercising its discretion against the winning party.

8. The Supreme Court went on to observe that financial hardship might be one of a number of factors to be considered in the context of public interest litigation. See paragraph 60 of the judgment as follows:

“However, it is equally clear from the factors I have earlier

observed as relevant to the exercise of the discretion not to

order costs against an unsuccessful party in public interest

proceedings, that there is a potentially important question to

be put in the balance in determining whether to exercise that

discretion in favour of the unsuccessful party that overlaps

with the question of hardship. That is the question of

whether the case falls into a category in which the subject

matter of the litigation is such that costs are likely to have a

significant deterrent effect on the group of persons affected

by the legal issue. […]”

9. The criteria which are germane in determining whether proceedings can be characterised as “public interest litigation” are summarised at paragraphs 34 to 36 of the Supreme Court judgment. The following three criteria are of immediate relevance to the present case. First, the proceedings must involve a claim against the State or an organ or agency of the State (including a statutory body). Second, the proceedings must seek relief in public law. Third, the proceedings must raise directly a point of law of general public importance.

10. In ease of the Plaintiff, and notwithstanding that he has not raised this issue himself, I have given careful consideration to whether his proceedings might be characterised as public interest litigation by reference to those criteria. For the reasons which follow, these proceedings cannot be so characterised.

11. First, the principal reliefs sought are private law remedies rather than public law remedies. Whereas the defendants are either public law bodies or individuals who had been employed by such bodies, the proceedings are an action in tort. The principal reliefs sought are for damages for wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution and malicious procurement of a search warrant. The Plaintiff has not sought to set aside any public law decision. Moreover, the Plaintiff chose to name a number of individual members of An Garda Síochána as personal defendants to the proceedings, rather than to confine himself to a claim for damages for vicarious liability against the Commissioner. This was consistent with the Plaintiff’s earlier threats to pursue proceedings against Garda Kelly “as a man” and not as a guard.

12. Second, the proceedings do not raise any point of law of general public importance. The principles governing the asserted torts are well established. The resolution of the proceedings entailed the application of these principles to the specific factual circumstances of the case. The proceedings did not result in the clarification of the law: the principal judgment does not resolve any significant legal issue which transcends the facts of the case.

13. Third, the proceedings are not of a type where costs might be expected to have a significant deterrent effect on potential litigants. The concept of a deterrent effect is typically used to describe circumstances where proceedings are unlikely to be brought for the want of a litigant with a large enough financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings to justify his or her incurring the risk on costs. This may arise where the legislation, which is the potential subject of litigation, is directed to a class of persons of modest financial means, such as is the position in respect of social welfare legislation or employment rights legislation. A person who asserts that they have been wrongfully denied, say, a social welfare payment might be deterred from pursuing litigation because the financial benefit to them if successful is out of all scale to the costs exposure were they to be unsuccessful. If some adjustment were not to be made to the costs rules in such circumstances, this might skew constitutional litigation towards cases the outcome of which have significant financial implications for the litigants, such as, for example, cases asserting property rights in land or in commercial contracts. Those with more modest concerns might not be able to afford to litigate. No such considerations apply to the present proceedings. The asserted torts are not ones which might be expected only to affect an impecunious class of litigant. Moreover, damages in these types of action, if successful, can be significant. The Plaintiff had valued his claim at €500,000.

14. In summary, these proceedings cannot be characterised as public interest litigation. It follows, therefore, that, certainly in the absence of any additional factors, financial hardship alone is not sufficient to justify a departure from the default position that costs follow the event.

15. It should be emphasised that, at this stage, the court is only addressing the incidence of legal costs. The subsequent execution of a costs order is a separate matter. The question of financial hardship may become relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion in respect of certain types of enforcement action such as, for example, an order under the Civil Debt (Procedures) Act 2015 directing a deduction from a social welfare payment. The order will be fashioned to leave a sufficient amount to the debtor to maintain himself and anyone dependant on him.

16. The next argument made by the Plaintiff is that he pursued the proceedings in good faith. The factors to which the court is to have regard in the exercise of its discretion, under section 169 of the LSRA 2015, include the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties. Relevantly, the court is to have regard, inter alia, to whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues in the proceedings.

17. It should be explained that the concept of reasonableness in this context means more than simply that the party pursued an issue in good faith (MV Lady Madga [2021] IECA 51). Something more is required. It might, for example, have been reasonable for a party to pursue an issue in circumstances where the law on the point had not been clear. It will also be relevant to consider whether the pursuit of the issue on which the party was unsuccessful had any meaningful effect on the length of the hearing or entailed the parties incurring additional costs.

18. The pursuit of the present proceedings was not reasonable in this narrow sense. The law in relation to the asserted torts is well settled. In particular, it is well settled that, in an action for malicious prosecution, the onus of proof lies with the claimant to establish that there was no reasonable or probable cause for the institution of a criminal prosecution. As explained in the principal judgment, the Plaintiff made no meaningful effort to address this onus. Having regard to the uncontradicted evidence, it should have been apparent to the Plaintiff that his claim had little prospect of success and that it was unreasonable to pursue same.

19. For completeness, it should be observed that even if there were a general “good faith” exception to the default position in relation to costs—and there is no such general exception—the Plaintiff would not be entitled to avail of same. As outlined in the principal judgment, the Plaintiff’s evidence on the primary factual dispute was rejected as dishonest and the Plaintiff was criticised for making the most serious allegations against individuals, only to contradict those allegations subsequently himself.

20. Finally, the Plaintiff has made an open offer, in his written legal submissions, to withdraw other proceedings (Rochford v. Kissane & Ors, High Court 2023 1734 P). Section 169 of the LSRA 2015 indicates that one of the factors to which a court is to have regard in allocating costs is whether a party made an offer to settle the matter the subject of the proceedings, and if so, the date, terms and circumstances of that offer. This provision ensures that a court is entitled to have regard to any offer of settlement made without prejudice save as to costs. The court can assess whether it was reasonable for the offeree not to have accepted the offer of settlement. If, for example, the successful party, by accepting an unconditional offer of settlement at an earlier stage, could have achieved the same or a better result than that ultimately achieved at trial, then the court might decide to withhold some or all of the costs incurred subsequent to the date of the offer. Equally, if the unsuccessful party had been offered an out from the proceedings at an earlier stage, then this is something which would be relevant to any attempt by them to resist a costs order. There is a public interest in the amicable resolution of legal proceedings where possible and the courts will carefully consider the reasonableness of any earlier offer of settlement in determining the incidence of costs (at least where the offer was made on a “without prejudice save as to costs” basis).

21. No such considerations arise in the present proceedings. Here, the only offer made is one to withdraw other proceedings. This offer was only made subsequent to the dismissal of the present proceedings in the principal judgment and, accordingly, the acceptance of same could not have resulted in a saving in costs. Matters might have been different had the Plaintiff made an offer prior to trial to withdraw both the present proceedings and the other proceedings. The court would then have to assess whether it was reasonable for the Defendants not to accept this (hypothetical) offer. As matters stand, however, an offer only made for the first time subsequent to the Plaintiff’s claim having been dismissed cannot justify a departure from the default position in respect of costs.

CONCLUSION AND FORM OF ORDER

22. The default position under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 is that the Defendants, having been entirely successful in resisting the claim, would be entitled to recover their (measured) legal costs as against the Plaintiff as the unsuccessful party. The court has a statutory discretion to make a different form of costs order. This discretion is guided by the criteria identified, in particular, at section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

23. For the reasons explained, the Plaintiff has not put forward any grounds which would justify this court in exercising its statutory discretion to depart from the default position. Accordingly, an order will be made dismissing the proceedings and directing that the Defendants are to recover as against the Plaintiff the costs of and incidental to these proceedings. The costs are in respect of nine hearing days: no costs are recoverable in respect of the day lost due to illness on the part of the Plaintiff. The costs are to include the costs of the written legal submissions, all reserved costs, and the costs of the written legal submissions on costs. In default of agreement between the parties, costs are to be “adjudicated”, i.e. measured, by the Legal Costs Adjudicator in accordance with Part 10 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. There will be a stay on the execution of, but not the adjudication of, the costs order in the event of an appeal to the Court of Appeal or an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The stay will remain in place until the determination of the appeal / application for leave or further order.

24. It should be emphasised that, at this stage, the court is only addressing the incidence of legal costs. The subsequent execution of a costs order is a separate matter. The question of financial hardship may become relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion in respect of certain types of enforcement action such as, for example, an order under the Civil Debt (Procedures) Act 2015 directing a deduction from a social welfare payment. The order will be fashioned to leave a sufficient amount to the debtor to maintain himself and anyone dependant on him.

25. The parties have liberty to apply.

Appearances

The Plaintiff appeared as a litigant in person

Jarlath Ryan SC and Mark Finan for the Defendants instructed by the Chief State Solicitor