High Court remits estate dispute to Circuit Court to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and save costs.

THE HIGH COURT

Record Number 2023/0006024

[2025] IEHC 411

MICHAEL CORRIGAN

Plaintiff

-and-

MICHAEL REDMOND and EDWARD CORRIGAN

Defendants

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Nessa Cahill delivered electronically on 18 July 2025

1. This judgment addresses the Defendants’ motion seeking to remit the proceedings to the South Eastern Circuit to be prosecuted before a judge in the Circuit Court in County Wexford.

OVERVIEW

2. The Defendants (“the Executors”) are executors of the estate of Mr Michael Redmond, deceased. By this motion, they seek to have these proceedings remitted to the Circuit Court pursuant to Order 49, Rule 7 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“the Rules”).

The primary reason for the application is that the orders sought by the Plaintiff in these proceedings mirror almost exactly the orders sought by him (and his daughter) by way of counterclaim in Circuit Court proceedings issued against them by the Executors in 2022. The only noticeable difference is that an alternative claim for damages is made in both proceedings, with a larger sum of money claimed by in these proceedings (€286,000) by contrast with the damages claimed in the counterclaim made in the Circuit Court (€60,000).

3. It is stated in the Circuit Court counterclaim that “the parties have agreed in writing to unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the First Defendant’s counterclaim”. The Executors have confirmed their consent to the Circuit Court having unlimited monetary jurisdiction in the Circuit Court Proceedings. The remittal of these proceedings would also result in the unlimited monetary jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. The difference in the quantification of the Plaintiff’s claim in this Court and the Circuit Court is not therefore a material matter in the circumstances of this case as the Circuit Court can deal with an unlimited monetary claim.

4. For these reasons, and in the interests of avoiding unnecessary and undesirable multiplicity of proceedings seeking substantially the same orders and dealing with the same claims and the same property (being situate in the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to which remittal is sought), I am satisfied that these proceedings could have been commenced (if at all) in the Circuit Court and that it is appropriate to grant the order sought remitting these proceedings to that jurisdiction.

5. This judgement sets out the reasons for this decision and addresses certain other questions that arose during the hearing.

NON-ATTENDANCE BY THE PLAINTIFF

6. The Plaintiff did not attend the hearing of this motion on 11 July 2025. His daughter, Ms Shinead Corrigan was present in Court and sought to make submissions on his behalf. However, Ms Corrigan is neither a legal practitioner nor a party to these proceedings. She indicated that the Plaintiff was in the Four Courts and was aware that the motion was listed for hearing but would not attend. Her position was that he had been directed to attend court for the hearing of the motion and was (apparently)

attending a different court to the court in which the motion was being heard. She asserted a constitutional right to speak on his behalf; sought to rely on a power of attorney; and suggested that the Plaintiff wanted time to obtain legal representation.

7. Ms Corrigan indicated that the directions that had been made to fix the hearing date for this motion were under appeal and a handwritten notice of appeal dated 10 July 2025 was furnished to me.

8. Counsel for the Executors opened to me the judgment of Humphreys J in Walsh v.

Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] IEHC 323 which refers to the established rule that, absent exceptional circumstances (or statutory provision), only professional advocates can represent another person in court.

9. It is significant that the Plaintiff was not present in Court and there was no attempted justification or explanation for his absence (other than the bizarre statement that he was directed to attend court, but not specifically the court in which the motion was being heard). It must be very seriously doubted how a person can assert to be a McKenzie friend at the hearing of a civil matter of this nature, if the party they are purporting to assist is not present. Moreover, Ms Corrigan did not identify any exceptional circumstances to justify her attempts to advocate for the Plaintiff, insisting instead on a constitutional or legal right to do so (which simply does not exist). Insofar as she referenced the need for legal representation, this motion was assigned a hearing date on

27 June 2025 and was then listed in Court again on 3 July 2025, when the Plaintiff was specifically directed to attend. There was no basis for adjourning it and I saw no justification whatsoever for the motion not to proceed.

10. Having considered the facts, I was satisfied that the Plaintiff was properly on notice of the hearing of the motion but decided not to attend the court in which the motion was listed for hearing. No “exceptional circumstances” were identified and there was no basis to even consider giving permission to Ms Corrigan to address the court, within the meaning of the High Court Practice Direction on McKenzie Friends (CP HC72).

The appeal that has been filed has no bearing on this question.

11. For these reasons, I made a ruling at the commencement of the hearing of the motion that Ms Corrigan had no right of audience and no right to make submissions to the Court.

12. Two affidavits were filed on behalf of the Plaintiff in reply to this motion and I proceeded to deal with the motion in his absence. BACKGROUND

13. These proceedings concern the estate of Mr Michael Redmond, who passed away on

29 December 2021 (“the Deceased”). By his last will and testament of 22 June 2015, the Deceased left his estate to be divided between his nieces and nephews. There are

38 beneficiaries ranging in age from 50 to 79 years of age.

14. The estate includes a dwelling house known as “The Bungalow” and located at Iskabeg, the Ballagh, Enniscorthy, County Wexford, and contained in folio WX13998 (“the Property”), which belonged to the Deceased.

15. The Executors issued proceedings against the Plaintiff and his daughter, Shinead Corrigan, in the Circuit Court on 17 November 2022 seeking to secure possession of the Property (“the Circuit Court Proceedings”). The Plaintiff and Ms Corrigan delivered a defence and counterclaim in the Circuit Court Proceedings on 7 August 2023. By that counterclaim, they sought various orders, including an order for specific performance of an alleged agreement with the Deceased that the Property would be left to the Plaintiff; an order that the Plaintiff is legally and beneficially entitled to the Property; damages; and payment of the specific sum of €60,000 by way of quantum meruit. It is stated in that counterclaim that “the parties have agreed in writing to unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the First Defendant’s counterclaim” and that “the market valuation does not exceed €3,000,000.00”. The latter is the threshold prescribed for proceedings of this type under the Third Schedule of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 (as amended).

16. These proceedings were issued by the Plaintiff on 2 December 2023 and were served on the Executors almost 12 months later, on 1 December 2024 (served electronically a few days previously). Appearances have been entered, but no further steps taken, in these proceedings. It may be noted however that the plenary summons that was served is more in the nature of a statement of claim than a plenary summons. The relief sought are directed to securing the Plaintiff’s ownership of the Property. Alternative orders are sought, including damages and payment of the specific sum of €286,000 by way of quantum meruit damages.

17. The orders sought in these proceedings are almost identical to the orders sought by the Plaintiff and his daughter by way of counterclaim in the Circuit Court Proceedings. Like in the counterclaim, it is stated in the plenary summons that “the market value does not exceed €3,000,000.00”.

THE MOTION

18. By this motion, the Executors seek an order pursuant to Order 49, Rule 7 of the Rules.

19. The motion is grounded on the affidavit of Annette McCarthy which recites the relevant background, as summarised above, and points to the near-identity between the reliefs sought in these proceedings and the Circuit Court Proceedings. She confirms the Executors’ consent to the Circuit Court having unlimited monetary jurisdiction in the existing Circuit Court Proceedings, a matter which was set out in correspondence to the Plaintiff on 14 March 2025.

20. Counsel for the Executors confirmed that the Circuit Court Proceedings are ready to be heard and have been assigned a hearing date, but that trial has been adjourned owing to the issue of two appeals against procedural decisions by the Plaintiff (and Ms Corrigan)

which will be heard in April 2026. Subject to this, the Circuit Court Proceedings are ready to proceed.

21. The position of the Executors is that these proceedings are unnecessary, as the Plaintiff has a claim for the same reliefs in the Circuit Court and is not prejudiced by the remittal.

It is said that these proceedings add to the costs being incurred by the parties and by the estate of the Deceased; contribute to further delay; and that it is in the interests of all parties (including the Plaintiff) and the beneficiaries of the estate for these proceedings to be remitted and dealt with together with the Circuit Court Proceedings. It is pointed out that the witnesses and the Property are all located in Wexford.

22. Counsel for the Executors also referred to their duty as executors to seek to minimise the costs and expenses being incurred. He points to the fact that the Property is part of a larger estate, and that the administration of the entire estate is being hindered by the filing of a caveat by the Plaintiff (and Ms Corrigan). Further delay is said to be unnecessarily prejudicial to the interests of the 38 beneficiaries, aged up to 79 years old.

23. A replying affidavit was sworn by Ms Corrigan. In this affidavit, she states that she is “acting on behalf of and with full permission of” her father. I have already rejected her asserted entitlement to act on behalf of the Plaintiff, but, given her means of knowledge of relevant facts, I did consider the affidavit. It should be noted however that there is no explanation or reason given as to why the Plaintiff did not swear an affidavit on his own behalf.

24. In her affidavit, Ms Corrigan makes allegations of wrong-doing, misleading statements, misinformation, falsehoods, harassment and assault. She addresses the Circuit Court Proceedings, but does not dispute that unlimited jurisdiction has been agreed for the purpose of those proceedings. Much of her affidavit is concerned with the merits of the underlying dispute, which is of little relevance on this motion. She states that the status quo should be maintained and the motion refused.

25. A replying affidavit was filed by Ms McCarthy, in which she refutes many of the allegations made and states that “the Defendants have consistently indicated a willingness for the Circuit Court to deal with the case with unlimited monetary jurisdiction”. Ms Corrigan handed a replying affidavit into court at the commencement of the hearing of the motion on 11 July 2025, which I have read.

DECISION

26. Section 25 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 addresses the power of the court to remit a case from the High Court to the Circuit Court:

“When any action shall be pending in the High Court which might have been commenced in the Circuit Court, any party to such action may, at any time before service of notice of trial therein, apply to the High Court that the action be remitted or transferred to the Circuit Court, and thereupon, in case the court shall consider that the action is fit to be prosecuted in the High Court, it may retain such action therein, or if it shall not consider the action fit to be prosecuted in the High Court it may remit or transfer such action to the Circuit Court or (where the action might have been commenced in the District Court)

the District Court, to be prosecuted before the Judge assigned to such Circuit or (as the case may require) the Justice assigned to such District, as may appear to the High Court suitable and convenient, upon such terms, in either case and subject to such conditions, as to costs or otherwise as may appear to be just:

Provided that the High Court shall have jurisdiction to remit or transfer any action, whatever may be the amount of the claim formally made therein, if the court shall be of opinion that the action should not have been commenced in the High Court but in the Circuit Court or in the District Court if at all.”

27. This formulation is paraphrased in Order 49, Rule 7(1):

“Where any action or proceeding is pending in the High Court which might have been commenced in the Circuit Court or the District Court, any party to such action or proceeding may apply to the High Court that the action be remitted or transferred to the Circuit Court or the District Court (as the case may be), and if the High Court should not consider the action or proceeding fit to be prosecuted in the High Court it may remit or transfer such action or proceeding to the Circuit Court or the District Court (as the case may be) to be prosecuted before the Judge to such Circuit or (as the case may require) the justice assigned to such District as may appear to the Court suitable and convenient, upon such terms and subject to such conditions as to costs or otherwise as may appear just.”

28. The effect of these provisions is that an action which “might have been commenced in the Circuit Court” may be remitted if the court “shall not consider the action fit to be prosecuted in the High Court”. There is the additional power conferred by section 25 to remit any action, regardless of “the amount of the claim formally made” if the court is of the opinion that it “should not have been commenced in the High Court… if at all”.

29. The power so conferred by section 25 (and paraphrased in Order 49, Rule 7) must be read in light of section 11(2) of the Courts of Justice Act 1936:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in section 25 of the Principal Act the following provisions shall have effect in relation to the remittal or transfer of actions under that section, that is to say:—

(a) an action shall not be remitted or transferred under the said section if the High Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances, and notwithstanding that such action could have been commenced in the Circuit Court, it was reasonable that such action should have been commenced in the High Court;

(b) an action for the recovery of a liquidated sum shall not be remitted or transferred under the said section unless the plaintiff consents thereto or the defendant either satisfies the High Court that he has a good defence to such action or some part thereof or discloses facts which, in the opinion of the High Court, are sufficient to entitle him to defend such action.”

30. Section 11(2)(b) is not relevant here, there being no basis to claim liquidated damages.

31. A final legislative provision of relevance is section 20(1) of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 (as amended) which provides that “…where an action claiming unliquidated damages is remitted or transferred by the High Court to the Circuit Court, the Circuit Court shall have jurisdiction to award damages in excess of €75,000.”

32. The legislative policy of decentralisation has long been recognised by the courts. In Hosie v. Lawless [1927] IR 464 the Supreme Court overturned a decision of the High Court (Meredith J.) refusing to remit a case to the Circuit Court. Kennedy CJ (Fitzgibbon and Murnaghan JJ. delivering concurring judgements) interpreted section

25 as follows:

“The policy to which the Oireachtas gave legislative effect in the Act was that, not only for the convenience of the litigants in a country like this, but indeed in mercy to the parties, the ordinary every-day actions, those not involving very large sums of money or raising exceptional questions for determination, should be in the ordinary course tried in the local venue by the Circuit Court, or in very small cases by the District Court. The policy was decentralisation of jurisdiction, though, no doubt, the High Court has, under the Constitution, and still keeps, original jurisdiction, which may be exercised in any case; but, as we have stated in this Court on many occasions, if an action is primâ facie within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and there are no special circumstances indicating that it ought to be withdrawn from that Court, then it ought to be tried in the Circuit Court.”

33. The Supreme Court disagreed with what was termed the “permissive” view taken by the High Court judge, finding instead that “Broadly speaking, all actions within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court are fit to be tried in that Court, and, if not commenced in it, they ought to be transferred, unless some circumstances appear in the case by which it becomes apparent that the action is more fit to be tried in the High Court; for example, a serious question of law for decision, or some special reason for a direct appeal to this Court.”

34. This dicta is interesting as it reflects how section 11(2)(a) of the 1936 Act (enacted some 9 years after Hosie v. Lawless) was later interpreted and applied (as examined below).

35. The question to be asked under section 25 was framed by the Supreme Court as follows:

“the question for the Court—the action being one primâ facie capable of being commenced in the Circuit Court—is whether there is anything in the action which takes it out of the general policy, and makes it more fit to be tried in the High Court than in the Circuit Court. If not, it should be transferred.”

36. The same view of the legislative policy underlying section 25 was adopted by the Court of Appeal in AIB plc v. Gannon [2018] 2 IR 239 (a case which was cited by counsel for the Executors). There, Hogan J. (Finlay Geoghegan and Peart JJ concurring) observed:

“It is clear that s. 25 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 ('the 1924 Act') reflected a legislative policy of what might be termed a form of legal decentralisation, so that litigants are thereby encouraged and facilitated in commencing their proceedings at the lowest level of the legal system appropriate to those proceedings.”

37. It is a simple but important proposition that parties should not engage in forum shopping between the different court jurisdictions and certainly should not be free to take up the time and resources of courts of two different jurisdictions to simultaneously agitate the same claims.

38. The judgment of Hogan J. in Gannon included some indication of the types of reasons that may justify commencing proceedings in the High Court for the purposes of section 11(2)(a):

“There may well be cases where for any number of reasons it was reasonable to commence the proceedings in the High Court in the sense contemplated by the sub-section. Thus, for example, the proceedings may be linked or otherwise bound up with existing High Court proceedings or where all the witnesses were based in Dublin where the alternative was a Circuit Court hearing at a rural venue or where the case raised an unusually important point of law suitable for adjudication by the High Court. Depending, of course, on the facts of the particular case, these examples might well amount to instances where the High Court might be satisfied within the meaning of s. 11(2)(a) of the 1936 Act that it was reasonable to commence the proceedings in that forum.”

39. No such circumstances were found to exist in that case.

40. This judgment was cited by Simons J. in Noel Moran Trading v. Black Star Management Limited [2024] IEHC 138, a case in which a specific claim was made for the award of damages in the amount of € 263,073.04 for breach of contract. This sum comprised fees which the plaintiff claimed to be entitlement to for storage of vehicles post-termination of the agreement in question.

41. Simons J. noted that there were no factors in that case which indicated it was reasonable to commence the action in the High Court (such as those identified in AIB v. Gannon)

and that the motion fell to be assessed on the basis of its monetary value. He concluded that the range of damages that might reasonably be awarded did not exceed the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and the case was remitted. It was emphasised that this was a provisional view as to recoverable damages for the purpose of the application to remit and was not binding on the Circuit Court judge ultimately hearing the matter (the jurisdiction of that court being unlimited following remittal pursuant to section 20(1)

of the Court of Justice Act 1936).

42. The following passage is directly relevant to the motion before me: “The fact that the plaintiff has sought damages in excess of the Circuit Court's monetary jurisdiction is not determinative. Rather, the court hearing the application to remit is entitled to make some limited assessment of the value of the plaintiff's claim. This is apparent, in particular, from the judgment in Ronayne v. Ronayne where the members of the Supreme Court took the step of viewing the scarring, the subject-matter of the personal injuries action in those proceedings, for the purpose of evaluating the reasonable range of damages. Of course, an application to remit should not be elevated to a dress rehearsal of the trial of the action. It is a summary application which is heard and determined on affidavit evidence. Within these confines, however, the court hearing the application to remit is entitled to consider whether there is a credible basis for a particular head of damages.” (para 13)

43. I agree with this analysis and approach. It cannot be correct that a litigant can rely on an arbitrarily quantified damages claim as an unanswerable defence to an application to remit a case which is otherwise more fit to be determined in the Circuit Court.

Indeed, this is confirmed by the final lines of section 25 which confer a jurisdiction to remit

“whatever may be the amount of the claim formally made therein, if the court shall be of opinion that the action should not have been commenced in the High Court but in the Circuit Court or in the District Court if at all.”

44. There are several important factors in this case which point firmly towards it being an appropriate case to be remitted to the Circuit Court.

45. First, the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff are virtually identical to those he seeks by way of counterclaim in the Circuit Court. The only material difference is that the damages claim (which is put forward by way of an alternative claim only in both proceedings) is asserted to be more than four times higher in the High Court (€286,000) than the claim made in the Circuit Court (€60,000). This is so despite the basis for this claim to quantum meruit damages being pleaded in the counterclaim in the Circuit Court Proceedings (para. 41) in identical terms to how it is pleaded in the plenary summons in these proceedings (para. 14).

46. Second, there is no justification stated on affidavit or in the pleadings for this significant jump in the quantum of the damages claim. I am not satisfied that it is or can be regarded as reasonable for a litigant to make a claim for damages in the Circuit Court at a level within the jurisdiction of that Court, and then issue High Court proceedings based on precisely the same alleged claims and rights, but inexplicably quantifying the damages at a level several multiples of the same claim previously made.

47. Third, an additional and important factor here is that Plaintiff has already pleaded in the Circuit Court that “the parties have agreed in writing to unlimited jurisdiction in respect of [his] counterclaim”. This has also been confirmed by the Executors. I note that the plenary summons includes a statement that “the defendants did not agree to the unlimited jurisdiction of the Wexford Circuit Court of which the property of the subject matter is situated”, but that statement is at odds with the Plaintiff’s own pleadings in the Circuit Court Proceedings and is contradicted by the Executors and by the affidavit of Ms. McCarthy. On the basis of the Plaintiff’s own pleaded counterclaim, his claim

– at whatever monetary level he wished to make it - could have been made (and indeed was already being made) in the Circuit Court. There was therefore no reason to issue the proceedings in the High Court and I am satisfied that the claims sought to be advanced in these proceedings could have been issued in the Circuit Court (if at all).

48. Fourth, the Plaintiff’s claim, the Property, the parties and witnesses, all have a closer connection to the Circuit Court sitting in the County of Wexford than to the High Court.

49. Fifth, there is no apparent reason (such as identified in Gannon) for these proceedings to have been commenced in the High Court: for example, there is no factual connection with existing High Court proceedings and no complex question of law raised.

50. Sixth, it is always necessary to be mindful of the need to be economical with the use of scarce and valuable court resources. Given the near-complete overlap with the existing Circuit Court Proceedings, there is immediately a serious question to be asked about the necessity of these proceedings.

51. Seventh, the status of the two actions is notable. While the trial of the Circuit Court Proceedings has been adjourned owing to procedural appeals brought by the Plaintiff (and Ms Corrigan), those proceedings were assigned a hearing date. These proceedings, by contrast, have not gone beyond the delivery of a plenary summons (albeit one that resembles a statement of claim).

52. In light of the foregoing considerations, the following conclusions fall to be drawn:

53. These proceedings might have been commenced in the Circuit Court and are not fit to be prosecuted in the High Court. This court therefore has jurisdiction to remit the matter pursuant to section 25 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924.

54. In addition, I am of the opinion that the action should not have been commenced in the High Court “if at all” within the meaning of section 25 and I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to remit the matter on that basis, “whatever may be the amount of the claim formally made therein.”

55. I see no reason to conclude that it was reasonable within the meaning of section 11(1)(a)

of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 for this action to have been commenced in the High Court. There was no suggestion of any reason of the type contemplated in AIB v.

Gannon. Indeed, I have significant misgivings as to whether these proceedings should have been issued at all, given the case pleaded by the Plaintiff in the existing Circuit Court Proceedings.

56. However, the motion before me is a motion to remit. In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on me, I have considered each of the factors identified above and am satisfied that they weigh overwhelmingly in favour of making the order sought.

57. In addition to those specific factors, it is plainly not in the interests of the estate or its beneficiaries (including the Plaintiff) for more costs or time than are absolutely necessary to be taken up with disputes regarding the ownership of the Property or related claims. Furthermore, it is not in the interests of the parties, the beneficiaries or the public to have parallel proceedings in different jurisdictions taking up valuable court time and resources in the pursuit of near-identical claims. The imperative must be to have all disputes related to the estate of the Deceased resolved, so the estate can be administered without further undue delay or unnecessary costs being incurred. CONCLUSIONS

58. For the reasons given in this judgment, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make the orders sought by the Executors remitting these proceedings to the South Eastern Circuit to be prosecuted before a judge in the Circuit Court in County Wexford.

59. As the Executors have been entirely successful, I am of the provisional view that the Executors are entitled to recover the costs of the motion. If the Plaintiff wishes to contend for a different costs order, he may deliver a written submission of no more than 1,000 words in length by 5 September 2025; the Executors then have until 3 October 2025 to deliver any replying submissions (of the same length); and I will list the matter before me at 10.30am on 16 October 2025 for the purpose of hearing submissions in relation to costs and making final orders.