High Court dismisses challenge to surrender to Portugal for minor pornography offence citing mutual trust.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 394

[2025 No. 4 EXT]

BETWEEN

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

APPLICANT

AND

OLIVER FRANCIS O’GRADY

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Patrick McGrath delivered on the 4 July 2025

A. BACKGROUND

1. By this application, the applicant seeks an order for the surrender of the respondent to Portugal pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant dated 28 November 2024 (“the EAW”), for the purpose of serving a sentence of one year’s imprisonment imposed upon him in respect of one offence. This EAW was issued by Judge Antonio da Costa Martina, a Judge of Law in Faro.

2. The Warrant was endorsed by this Court on the 13 January 2025. The Respondent was arrested on the 21 January 2025 and was subsequently admitted to bail pending the outcome of these proceedings.

3. Part (b) of the EAW states that the decision on which the warrant is based in an enforceable judgment of the 14 November 2024, following on from a judgement of the 20 June 2024. Part (c) indicates that a one-year custodial sentence was imposed in respect of one offence of ‘pornography of minors unforseen’.

4. I am satisfied that the person before the court, the respondent, is the person in respect of whom the EAW was issued. No issue was raised in that regard.

5. I am satisfied that none of the matters referred to in section 22, 23 and 24 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, as amended (“the 2003 Act”), arise for consideration in this application and surrender of the respondent is not precluded for any of the reasons set forth in any of those sections.

6. I am satisfied that sufficient particulars have been provided in the Warrant to comply with the provisions of s. 11 of the 2003 Act.

7. I am further satisfied that the EAW was issued by a judicial authority within the meaning of the Framework Decision and the 2003 Act.

Correspondence and Minimum Gravity

8. The particulars of the offence in respect of which surrender is sought are set out at Part (e) of the EAW. It is stated therein that the Respondent, on the 21 October 2019 had, at his then place of residence in Loule, Portugal, a computer, external hard drive and several pen drives. This equipment was found to contain 29 video files, 9167 photo files, 55 animation files and 1193 image files, which contained images of minors of both sexes, partially or totally naked, exhibiting their genitalia and in some instances engaging in sexual acts.

9. This is not an offence which is one of the categories of offences under Article 2.2 of the Framework Decision and it is therefore necessary to establish correspondence with an offence under Irish law pursuant to s.38(1)(a) of the 2003 Act.

10. Section 5 of the 2003 Act provides:-

‘For the purposes of this Act, an offence specified in a European Arrest Warrant corresponds to an offence under the law of the state, where the act or omission that constitutes the offence so specified would, if committed in the State on the date on which the European arrest warrant is issued, constitute an offence under the law of the State’.

11. The relevant principles for showing correspondence are well established. In assessing correspondence, the question is whether the acts or omissions that constitute the offence in the requesting state would, if carried out in this jurisdiction, amount to a criminal offence – Minister for Justice v Dolny [2009] IESC.

12. I am satisfied that the offence described in the Warrant corresponds with an offence of possession of child pornography, contrary to s.6 of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, 1998, as amended by s.14 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences)

Act, 2017

13. As the Respondent is sought to serve a sentence of one year, the requirements of minimum gravity have been met.

B. GROUNDS OF OBJECTION

14. In the Notice of Objection filed by the Respondent, two grounds of objection are set out:

(a) The surrender of the Respondent is prohibited by s. 45 of the 2003 Act (as amended) and / or s. 37 (1)(a) thereof, or by virtue of a combination of both sections, as he was tried, convicted and sentenced in absentia in respect of the offence the subject of this Warrant and his defence rights were not adequately protected in that process. The Respondent also pleads that, if surrendered, there is a real risk of a breach of his defence rights and / or his right to a fair trial as guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights [‘ECHR’]; and / or

(b) His surrender is prohibited pursuant to s. 37(1(a) of the 2003 Act, as there are substantial grounds for believing that his surrender would expose him to a real risk of inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment if detained in a Portuguese prison. His surrender would therefore be incompatible with the ECHR and / or the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the EU [‘the EU Charter’].

15. In his affidavit of the 26 February 2025, the Respondent inter alia stated:

a. He had moved to Portugal in 2017 and rented an apartment in Loule;

b. On the 22 October 2019, he was arrested by Portuguese police on foot of an EAW from Ireland and was detained thereon in Prisonal de Setubal prior to his surrender to this jurisdiction. Whilst incarcerated there, he was not provided with his medication, the facilities were unhygienic and, as a segregated prisoner on remand in respect of sexual offences, he was abused and had apples thrown at him;

c. Having consented to surrender to Ireland, he pleaded guilty to a sexual offence and was sentenced to 22 months in prison, which he served in the Midlands Prison. He was released in October 2022 and, as required of a person subject to the registration requirements of the Sex Offenders Act 2001 (as amended), he had kept the authorities updated in relation to all addresses and relevant events in his life;

d. In October 2023, he received a communication from the Portuguese Public Prosecutor, Dr Pedro Rodrigues de Figueiredo, in relation to this matter. He notified the Respondent of the appointment ex officio of a lawyer, Juliana Silva, to represent him but he has mislaid this notice;

e. He was advised by his solicitor that she had made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Ms Silva on his behalf, both via telephone and indeed also on one occasion when Ms Horan called to Ms Silva’s office whilst in Portugal;

f. In February 2024 he was served with a document in Portuguese, translated as ‘The Request’ and this document informed him of an upcoming Court date in relation to this matter in Portugal on the 7 May 2024. He says that he found the English translation difficult to understand.

g. He unsuccessfully attempted to contact the said Ms Silva and thereafter, on the

11 April 2024, sent an email to the prosecutor in Portugal asking that another lawyer be appointed to represent him. He states that in that email he asked for information as to what would happen on 7 May 2024. No response was received h. He asked Ms Horan to again seek to make contact with the said Ms Silva but this was unsuccessful;

i. On the 13 August 2024, he was served by Gardai with a document headed ‘Judgment’ and this indicates that the trial went ahead in his absence, and he was sentenced to one years imprisonment j. In that document he was advised of his right to appeal within 30 days but was unable to avail of that opportunity as, despite repeated efforts, he was unable to contact Dr Silva.

16. Following the filing of the said affidavit, a request for further information [‘a s. 20 request’] was sent to the issuing judicial authority. In that request, information was sought as to: -

a. The prison in which the Respondent would be detained or, if not known, the prison in which he was likely to be detained;

b. Outline the general conditions as regards the prison regime including matters such as personal space, food and hygiene standards, medical facilities and available medical treatment, out of cell time, hygiene, access to light and fresh air, measures for personal safety;

c. Informing the IJA that the Respondent had indicated that he had unsuccessful attempted to contact the assigned lawyer in relation to this matter and any records it may have as to such contacts;

d. Whether the IJA had any record of the email which the Respondent says he sent to the Prosecutor in April 2024;

e. Whether he was represented at the trial and the system for the appointment of State appointed lawyers in the issuing state

17. A copy of the documents and attachments provided to the Respondent on the 16 February 2024 was again sought.

18. In its reply, dated the 11 April 2025, the IJA:- a. Stated the Respondent would be sent to Carregueira Prison if surrendered as that is a prison for the housing of offenders such as Mr O’Grady; b. Referred to various works and improvements carried out recently in Portuguese prisons, set out the internal procedures for the safety of prisoners, confirmed that the Respondent would be subjected to medical evaluation and be given all necessary and appropriate medical treatment;

c. Indicated the Respondent did not contact Ms Silva and she has no record of any contact or attempted contact by him;

d. Said that the Prosecutor has no record or memory of contacts made by the Respondent on the 11 April 2024 concerning alleged difficulties contacting Ms Silva or seeking the appointment of another defender;

e. Indicated that he was represented at trial as a trial could not proceed in Portugal without a defendant being represented by a lawyer of their own choice or an appointed lawyer;

f. The lawyers appointed as public defenders are lawyers enrolled in the Bar Association and have the same duties and responsibilities as lawyers appointed by the defendant;

g. The documents and annexes supplied to the Requested person in February 2024 were again provided.

19. An affidavit was filed by Ms Horan in which she confirms that she previously acted for the Respondent in the domestic criminal proceedings which resulted in him receiving a sentence of 22 months imprisonment as referred to in his Affidavit.

20. Ms Horan also indicated that various attempts were made by her and her office unsuccessfully to contact Ms Silva. Exhibited to her affidavit is an email to that office is which a zoom consultation in relation to the case was suggested to by Ms Horan to Ms Silva. She received no reply to that email. She does not however say that she personally visited Ms Silva’s office in Portugal as stated by the Respondent in his affidavit. She also confirms that she had been provided by Mr O’Grady with a copy of the documents served on him in February 2024 in relation to the upcoming case. She said she was unable from the documents to advise him as to the allegations against him and what might happen on the trial date.

21. At the hearing of the action Mr O Grady produced what he says is a copy of the email sent to Dr Figueirdo, the Public Prosecutor in this case. Having set out in that email the difficulties which he and his solicitor were having in contacting the appointed lawyer and seeking the appointment of a different lawyer, this email continues:-

‘One of the important questions I need clarification on is if I did appear in Portugal on 07-05-2024, will I be retained in the country until the Court date following this date. Has a date been set for the trial as yet? If I were to be retained in Portugal until the court date would I be in custody for that length of time. Depending on the Court calendar I might be in custody for quite some time. If I know that I might be kept custody, I might not choose to go to Portugal on 07-05-2024 and allow my Mandatory Solicitor to represent me and later inform me of the information from the Court for that day including the next Court date. I hope you understand my situation. I will of course keep you informed on this matter and follow legal procedure if I cannot attend the Court on 07-05-2024. I would like to attend the Trial when it is planned.

(emphasis added)

22. The Respondent thereafter in the said email suggests some possible alternative way of dealing with the matter, for example if he were to ‘admit and sign’ papers and to offer a fine or compensation.

C. DISCUSSION ON S45 ISSUE

23. The following is established in evidence:- a. The Respondent was informed in advance of these proceedings in a Notice served personally upon him by An Garda Siochana in February 2024. In that ‘Request’, which is at Exhibit ‘OOG-1’ to the Respondent’s affidavit it is stated ‘the defendant must appear in this court on the next 07-05-2024, to be heard in a hearing of an action, related to the judicial proceedings above mentioned above, being warned if you fail to attend, the trial might take place in your absence, being represented by all possible effects by your defender’.

b. He was therefore expressly informed firstly of his obligation to attend at a hearing of this matter at the Court on the 7 May 2024. c. He was also expressly informed that, if he failed to attend, the trial might proceed in his absence.

d. He did not attend on that date or on any subsequent date and the trial proceeded in his absence, resulting in his conviction and sentence to a term of one year’s imprisonment;

e. He was represented at those proceedings by a lawyer appointed to act on his behalf;

f. He was thereafter, on the 13 August 2024, personally served with a copy of the Judgment of the Court of Trial by a member of An Garda Siochana and again this is exhibited to his affidavit at ‘OOG-04’.

g. He was also advised of a right to appeal within 30 days of being notified of the Judgment and that, for this purpose, he was required to contact and co-operate with the said Dr Silva. No appeal was lodged.

24. Applying the principles of mutual trust and confidence, I must accept the information provided by the IJA unless there is good reason to the contrary. The IJA have clearly stated that:

a. The Respondent did not contact the Public Defender Dr Silva and there is no register of contacts or attempts to contact or communications between her and Mr O’Grady;

b. Similarly, the Public Prosecutor has no memory or record of any contact or attempted contact by the requested person with him on the dates he allegedly sent an email to Mr Rodrigues de Figueiredo, being the 11 April 2024;

c. The Respondent was at all times represented by a lawyer assigned to him.

25. I accept this information as provided by the IJA as accurate and reliable. Neither the Public Defender nor the Public Prosecutor Magistrate have any record of any attempted contact by or on behalf of Mr O’Grady. It may be that, due to some language difficulty or some breakdown in communication, in the offices of Ms Silva the communication made by Ms Horan on Mr O’Grady’s behalf (which I accept were made by Ms Horan) did not come to the attention of Ms Silva or that she did not reply to such communication. It may also be the case that Mr O’Grady did attempt to speak with Ms Silva in relation to the case, but these attempts were unsuccessful.

26. The email produced at the s. 16 hearing, which is allegedly the email sent by Mr O’Grady to the Public Prosecutor on the 11 April 2024, is said to be a copy of the email which Mr O Grady had previously stated on affidavit be could not find.

Although he refers therein to ‘some problems’ he was then having in speaking with Ms Silva, it is clear therefrom that he is fully aware of his obligation to attend Court in Portugal on the 7 May 2024.

27. I entirely reject the claim that the ‘Request’ served upon him was in any way confusing or ambiguous. His obligation to appear in Court on the 7 May 2024 was set out plainly and clearly, as was the information that the trial could proceed in his absence were he not to attend on that date. It is clear from that email that Mr O’ Grady’s concern was whether he might or might not be admitted to bail pending the outcome of the proceedings and indeed he went so far as to indicate in that email that, were there such a risk, ‘I might not choose to go to Portugal on 07-05-2024 and allow my mandatory solicitor to represent me and later inform me of the information from the Court for that day including the next court date.’

28. Aware of his obligation to attend Court and of the possibility of the case proceeding in his absence, he was in effect seeking to negotiate his being released on bail pending

conclusion of the case were he to attend (with the indication that he would not attend if this was not likely) and furthermore suggesting some methods of dealing with the case in a non-custodial manner.

29. Even if the Respondent did have difficulty in contacting the lawyer nominated to act for him in this case, this did not in any way effect his obligation to answer the summons and his awareness that the case could proceed in his absence. He was at all times aware of the proceedings and of his obligations and of the possible consequences of non-attendance under Portuguese law.

30. I find the Respondents evidence disingenuous and self-serving. At no point does he says that he was not aware of his obligations under Portuguese Law and of the consequences of his non-attendance. Nor does he say that there was any impediment to him attending the Court hearing on the 7 May 2024 in Portugal. Indeed, it should be noted that in the Notice personally served upon him in February 2024 reference is made not only to the nominated lawyer, Ms Silva, but also any other lawyer he might personally instruct. Furthermore, he is a man who has some familiarity with the Court system generally and must have been aware that an inability to contact a nominated lawyer in advance of a hearing does not absolve an accused, whether in Portugal or Ireland, of an obligation to attend.

31. The mindset and attitude of the Respondent in relation to these proceedings is perhaps revealed by his own email of the 11 April 2024 wherein he indicates an awareness of the hearing date and suggests he might not attend if he was not satisfied, he would be admitted to bail. This is not the mindset of a person who is unaware of a duty to attend at court and of the possible consequences of non-attendance, but rather shows a person who is trying to control the outcome of proceedings.

D. DECISION

Section 45 Issue

32. The Respondent did not attend in person at the trial which proceeded in his absence.

He was notified in advance of the date and place of the trial and that, should be not attend, the case might proceed in his absence. The trial proceeded in his absence and with the assistance of a nominated lawyer. The Judgment of the Court was served personally on the Respondent, and he was specifically informed therein of his right of appeal.

33. I reject the contention made by the Respondent that there was some unfairness in the process owing to his apparent inability to contact a nominated lawyer in Portugal in advance of the hearing. He had an obligation to attend and was aware of the possible consequences of non-attendance and this was not in any way affected by any difficulties in contacting a lawyer in advance. He was clearly trying to manipulate the system (as evidenced by his ambiguous comments in the email of the 11 April 2024 as to whether he would attend on the date of trial) to try to secure a certain outcome.

34. The applicant has relied upon box (d) 3.1(a) in this case, namely ‘the person was summonsed in person on 16-02-2024 and thereby informed of the scheduled date and place of the trial which resulted in the decision and was informed thqt a decision may be handed down if he or she does not appear for the trial’

35. The evidence in this case clearly shows that this box was correctly ticked by the Issuing Judicial Authority.

36. The Respondent complains that he was not afforded effective legal assistance in the process leading to his conviction in Portugal. As submitted by the Respondent, the mere nomination of a legal aid lawyer may not ensure effective assistance as required by Article 6 of the ECHR. This would occur if a lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes shirked his or her duties [Artico v Italy [1981] 3EHRR 1]. He also says that, owing to his inability to contact the nominated lawyer in advance of the trial date, he was unable to confer with his defence lawyer in order to prepare his defence [ Bonzi v Switzerland 12 July 1978]. He also says, that having brought his inability to contact the nominated lawyer to the attention of the authorities, they failed to appoint a different lawyer or ensure she carried out her duties.

37. As noted above, the Prosecutor has no record of any such email complaining about difficulties Mr O’Grady allegedly had in securing the services of Ms Silva and nor does Ms Silva have any record of his attempts to contact her. Furthermore, the nominated lawyer attended at the hearing and acted on behalf of the Respondent albeit without instructions.

38. Having considered the cases cited by the Respondent, which arise in very different factual circumstances, I do not consider that there is evidence in this case of a failure on the part of the authorities in Portugal to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Respondent had effective legal assistance for the purposes of this trial. A lawyer was nominated, and that lawyer attended and represented the Respondent at the trial.

39. I accept the assurance received from the Portuguese authorities that they were unaware of any difficulties which the Respondent might have had in making contact with his lawyer. It is at the very least surprising that, having had no response to his email of the 11 April 2024 complaining inter alia of an inability to contact the nominated lawyer, the Respondent did not either make further attempts to contact the Prosecutor or, as he should have done, attend in person at the date nominated for the hearing being the 7 May 2024.

40. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary this court can also presume that, had he attended on the 7 May 2024 in answer to the summons served upon him by An Garda Siochana, the trial would have proceeded in a manner which vindicated the rights of the Respondent under Article 6 of the ECHR. In other words, the trial would have only proceeded on that date if he had had the benefit of proper legal assistance before entering a plea or the conduct of any hearing and this may well have resulted in the matter being adjourned for such purpose. His failure to obtain effective legal assistance in relation to this case flows from his failure to attend in answer to the summons and any difficulties which he allegedly had in contacting a court appointed lawyer in advance of the hearing does not mean that the Portuguese authorities had failed to ensure the provision of effective legal assistance for this case.

41. This is not a case where the Court needs to look beyond s. 45 as I am satisfied that the Portuguese authorities have demonstrated compliance with the box ticked at Paragraph (d) 3.1(a) of the EAW. But if I am wrong in that regard, it is my opinion that it is clear from the facts of this case that the Respondent waived his right to attend at his trial and this waiver was unequivocal, knowing and intelligent and done in circumstances where he was aware of the possible consequences of such waiver – having been specifically told by the Portuguese authorities the case could proceed in this absence.

42. I therefore conclude that, even if the case had not fallen within the terms of Paragraph d in Section 45 of the 2003 Act, this is one of those cases where the rights of the defence were upheld in the process leading to his conviction and sentence – Minister for Justice v Zarnescu [2020] IESC 59, Minister for Justice v Szamota [2023] IECA

143 and Minister for Justice v Szlachcikowski [2021] IECA .

43. I therefore dismiss this ground of objection. Prison Conditions

44. The Respondent argues that there are systemic and generalised deficiencies in Portuguese prisons and furthermore that there are deficiencies that affect certain groups of people and certain places of detention in that State.

45. The Respondent has cited a number of decisions from the ECtHR which have found violations of Article 3 of the Convention in various Portuguese prisons. The Respondent refers to the decision in Petrescu v Portugal [App No 23190/17] as the ‘most noteworthy decision of recent times’ and this concerns violations on account of conditions of detention in two prisons in Portugal between 2012 and 2016. He has also referred to other judgments which criticise conditions and found violations in four prisons in various periods between 2012 and 2024.

46. The Respondent has also cited a CPT Report from 2020 which criticised conditions for sex offenders in Caixas and Setubal Prisons as ‘particularly dilapidated and dirty’ and that such conditions could be considered inhuman and degrading. He also referred to inter alia a EU Fundamental Rights Agency [‘FRA’] report published in 2024 which highlights concerns about overcrowding and poor living conditions. It was also noted that the situation for those charged with or convicted of sexual offences in the Lisbon Prison was ‘challenging’

47. As noted above a s. 20 Request was sent to the IJA seeking assurances in relation to prison conditions for this Respondent. The response received from the IJA indicates that the Respondent will be sent to Carregueira Prison and sets out a series of assurances in relation to prison conditions.

48. Carreguiera Prison is not one of the prisons which was the subject of criticism in any of the cases or reports submitted by the Respondent, save for a criticism in the FRA report of 2024 of this establishment owing to its focus on programmes for individuals convicted of sexual offences. It should also be noted that in this report it is stated that certain prisons, like Torres Noves and Carregueira ‘distinguish themselves in terms of the custodial treatment and programmes offered’.

49. In Minister for Justice v Radu Iancu [2020] IEHC 316, Burns J set out the principles applicable when an argument about prison conditions and potential infringement of rights under Article 3 as follows:-

‘From the review of the relevant authorities carried out by McDermott J in Minister for Justice v Pal, the following non-exhaustive list of principles emerges:-

(1) The cornerstone of the Framework Decision is that member states, save in exceptional circumstances, are required to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust (ML);

(2) A refusal to execute a warrant is intended to be an exception (ML);

(3) One of the exceptions arises when there is a real or substantial risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to article 3 of the ECHR or article

4 of the Charter (ML);

(4) The prohibition of surrender where there is a real or substantial risk of inhuman or degrading treatment is mandatory. The objectives of the Framework Decision cannot defeat an established risk of ill-treatment (Davis);

(5) The burden rests upon a respondent to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial/reasonable grounds for believing that if he (or she)

were returned to the requesting country, he (or she) will be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 of the ECHR (Rettinger) (Davis);

(6) The threshold which a respondent must meet in order to prevent extradition is not a low one. There is a default presumption that the requesting country will act in good faith and will respect the proposed extraditee’s fundamental rights. Whilst the presumption can be rebutted, such a conclusion will not be reached lightly (Davis);

(7) In examining whether there is a real risk, the Court should conduct a rigorous examination. The Court should consider all the material before it, and, if necessary, material obtained of its own motion. The Court may attach importance to reports of independent international human rights organisations or reports from government sources (Rettinger);

(8) The relevant time to consider the conditions in the requesting state is at the time of the hearing (Rettinger);

(9) When the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m of floor surface (excluding space for sanitary facilities) in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons, the lack of personal space is considered so severe that a strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises. The burden of proof is then on the issuing state to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that there are factors capable of adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal space and this presumption will normally be capable of being rebutted only if one of the following factors are cumulatively met:-

(a) The reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor;

(b) Such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; and

(c) The detainee is confined to what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention (Mursic);

(10) A finding that there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment by virtue of general conditions of confinement in the issuing member state cannot lead, in itself, to a refusal to execute a European arrest warrant.

Whenever the existence of such a risk is identified, it is then necessary for the executing judicial authority to make a further assessment, specific and precise, of whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned will be exposed to that risk. The executing judicial authority should request of the issuing member state all necessary supplementary information on the conditions in which it is envisaged that the individual concerned will be detained (Aranyosi and Caldararu);

(11) An assurance provided by the competent authorities of the issuing state that, irrespective of where he is detained, the person will not suffer inhuman or degrading treatment is something which the executing state cannot disregard and the executing judicial authority, in view of the mutual trust which must exist between the judicial authorities of the Member States on which the European arrest warrant system is based, must rely on that assurance, at least in the absence of any specific indications that the detention conditions in a particular detention centre are in breach of article 3 of the ECHR or article 4 of the Charter (ML);

(12) It is only in exceptional circumstances, and on the basis of precise information, that the executing judicial authority can find that, notwithstanding such an assurance, there is a real risk of the person concerned being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment because of the conditions of that person’s detention in the issuing member state (Dumutriu- Tudor Dorobantu).’

50. The IJA has, in its reply of the 14 April 2024, provided general assurances as to the conditions in which the Respondent will be held which indicate that he will be detained in conditions which would appear to comply with the requirements of the ECHR. A specific assurance has been given by the issuing state that the Respondent will be detained in Carreguiera Prison if surrendered. None of the cases cited by the Respondent contain any criticism of conditions in that establishment. There is some minor criticism of the programmes offered there in one Report, but this report also commends that prison for custodial treatment and programmes offered.

51. Applying the principles so helpfully summarised by Burns J in Iancu, I am satisfied that there is no real risk that the Respondent will be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment if surrendered to Portugal. In arriving at that conclusion and applying the principles of mutual trust and confidence, I rely upon the general assurances from the IJA as to prison conditions for this Respondent. I also rely upon the fact that the Respondent will be detained in a particular prison which has not been the subject of any real criticism to date. There is no evidence presented which would persuade me that this is one of those exceptional cases where, despite such assurances, there is precise information that indicates there is a risk that the Respondent would if surrendered be exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment.

52. In those circumstances I reject the submission that surrender would be contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR and / or Section 37 of the 2003 Act.

53. I will therefore make an order for his surrender pursuant to s. 16 of the 2003 Act.