High Court dismisses judicial review of visa refusal where minor reasoning flaws do not vitiate the overall decision.

[2025] IEHC 389

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2023/452 JR]

BETWEEN:

PIYUSH VAID

APPLICANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 9th day of July, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1. In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant sought to quash a decision made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 10 February 2023 refusing to grant the applicant a Long Stay visa. The initial application for leave to commence the judicial review was made on the 9 May 2023 and leave was granted by the High Court on the 3 July 2023.

2. The case made by the applicant engaged issues relating to the adequacy of the reasons given in the impugned decision, the reasonableness of the decision and the fairness of the procedures involved in the reaching of the impugned decision. Part of the applicant’s argument focused on the fact that he had been granted an employment permit by the Minister for Business that allowed him to take up an offer of employment in this State. The applicant had argued not only that the visa decision maker had to take the permit into account, but that it was unreasonable to find that he lacked the requisite qualifications and experience to take up that position in light of the earlier grant of an employment permit.

3. For the reasons that are explained below, the court is not satisfied that the applicant can succeed in this application. Notwithstanding certain identified and admitted flaws in aspects of the impugned decision, the court was satisfied that the decision was reached fairly and was reasonable.

4. The case took some time to get on for hearing. In large part, this was because the parties considered that an appeal on a similar case before the Court of Appeal was likely to shed light on the legal issues in these and other similar proceedings. As it transpired, the decision in question, A.A., W. M. and M.A. (A Minor) v. Minister for Justice, [2024] IECA 57 (A.A.) clarified a great many of the general principles that will have to be applied by the court in this case and accordingly warrants close consideration.

5. Accordingly, before addressing the underlying facts and legal arguments in this case it would be helpful to set out what emerged from the decision of the Court of Appeal as in many respects that decision is determinative of certain issues in this case.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DECISION IN A.A.

6. In A.A., the applicant was an Egyptian national who had an offer of employment from a business in Dublin, as a “Software Application Developer”. The applicant had been granted a Critical Skills Employment Permit by the Minister for Business, on foot of the employment offer. The letter which accompanied the permit inter alia advised that the permit “relates to employment only and it is not a residence permit or a permission to enter Ireland” and that nationals of visa-required countries were required to apply for a visa.

7. The applicant applied for visas for himself and family members to enter the State so that the appellant could take up his offer of employment. The application was refused at first instance and on review. At first instance, the refusal was explained using what were described by the Court of Appeal as “codified” or “shortform” reasons. As part of the review application, the applicant addressed what he understood to be the concerns expressed in the first refusal, and he attached further information and documents.

8. The review decision affirmed the first instance refusal of the appellant's visa. Three shortform reasons were provided, but at that stage there was also an additional narrative explanation that shed some light on the shortform reasons. In the proceedings before the High Court the applicant’s challenge was grounded on three arguments: (i) he challenged the adequacy of the reasons given; (ii) he also argued that issues arose and were dealt with on review that had not been in issue at first instance, and the applicant contended that this was unfair as he was not afforded a proper opportunity to address those issues; and (iii) the applicant argued that the decision was unreasonable. The High Court found against the applicant. On appeal, the arguments focused on the adequacy of reasons issues, the fair procedures issues and the question of how the Minister ought to treat the Critical Skills Permit.

9. In framing the proper approach to be adopted, Faherty J. began by noting that cases of this type are not “rights” cases but rather concern the exercise by the Minister of the sovereign power of the State to permit a non-national to enter the State. By reference to the judgment of Clarke C.J. in A.P. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESC 47, the Court noted that the extent of the reasons required to explain a decision can depend on whether the decision involves rights and obligations on the one hand, or benefits or privileges on the other. As Clarke C.J. had observed in A.P., where the decision involves the exercise of a broad discretion then it may be sufficient for only broad and general reasons to be given.

10. This led Faherty J. to note at para. 44, for the purposes of this case, the first general applicable principle: “It follows from the foregoing that the respondent's reasons do not need to be as precise or detailed as may perhaps be required of a tribunal or board or other body exercising a statutory power, particularly if the exercise of that power resulted in making a decision which affects persons' rights.”

11. Second, the Court of Appeal noted with approval that in Basit Ali v Minister for Justice [2021] IEHC 494, the High Court (Burns J.) referred to the very wide discretion of the respondent in exercising the power to grant a visa. Faherty J. noted that the corollary of that is that the scope for challenging a decision to refuse a visa in the exercise of the State's executive power is thus narrower than applies to a challenge to a statutory or other administrative power in which the decision maker is bound by the particular vires deriving from the relevant statutory scheme.

12. Third, the Court of Appeal also approved the description of the standard of review to be employed provided by Burns J. in Basit Ali. The applicable standard was whether the

decision sought to be impugned “equates to a decision which flies in the face of fundamental reason and common sense” (para. 14) (i.e. the test set out in O'Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39 and The State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642). In that regard, because cases about visas engage the exercise of an executive discretion, a significant amount of deference must be afforded to the decision maker. That was subject to the caveat added by Faherty J. that to benefit from that deference the decision-maker should have provided reasons for the decision that are “easily discernible and comprehensible.”

13. With regard to the adequacy of reasons issues, the Court of Appeal considered that the shortform or codified reasons – which are a feature of the present case – of themselves added little to the understanding of why the appellant was refused a visa. Hence, they needed to be interrogated against the backdrop of the additional narrative. The Court of Appeal noted that the codified reasons approach to visa applications had been considered by McDermott J. in T.A.R. v Minister for Justice [2014] IEHC 385 (T.A.R.) and by the Court of Appeal in Mukovska v. Minister for Justice [2021] IECA 340 (Mukovska).

14. The “OC” (observe the conditions) reason given in A.A. was that the applicant “has not satisfied the visa officer that such conditions would be observed.” The applicant argued that this was not explained in the narrative explanation – which said that the applicant did not have the qualifications or experience for the role. The respondent argued that it was sufficiently clear that if the applicant did not have the qualifications or experience then it followed that the “OC” conditions could not be observed. The Court of Appeal noted that in T.A.R. the shortform reason in that case was found to be deficient as there was no explanation for the reason – which was presented as a conclusion. This was found to be unfair, and it also led to a reasonableness difficulty. The High Court found that: “[t]here is no evidence available from the decision-maker as to how or why the extensive evidence advanced on behalf of the applicants fell short of proof on the balance of probabilities that they would return home after their visit. Attempts to identify potential inadequacies that may have formed part of that

decision highlight the lack of clarity in the reasons given and render it extremely difficult for the court to exercise its jurisdiction to determine whether the

decision was unreasonable or irrational”. (para. 24)

15. In Mukovska, a “CP” reason was stated to be “Need to undertake the course in this State not demonstrated or warranted”. In that case, the reason did not reveal the essential rationale of the decision. In A.A., Faherty J. quoted from para. 41 of the Mukovska decision where Hunt J. stated: “What is now crystal clear is that the reason given on both occasions did not properly communicate the essential rationale of either decision. Just as in the case of the applicants in TAR, she did not know how or why the extensive evidence submitted fell short of establishing the necessary need in this context. The “CP” reason furnished on both occasions is insufficient to enable a proper exercise of the power of judicial review in the precise context of this case.”

16. The Court in Mukovska also disagreed with the argument made by the Minister that a deficiency in one of the shortform reasons could be remedied by a consideration of the other reasons and that the decision should be read holistically. As noted by Faherty J. in A.A., Hunt

J. was not satisfied to find that it followed that a conclusion that “an applicant who fails to meet a very narrow concept of need in the ‘CP’ field can be used to justify a further inference that such an applicant will necessarily turn into an overstayer or will breach some other visa condition”. In Hunt J.'s view, that was “a defective chain of reasoning”.

17. The Court of Appeal noted that similar difficulties were identified with shortform reasons by the High Court in S. v Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 578, where Bolger J. stated at para. 28: “The format of the decision at issue here rendered it very difficult for the applicant (and indeed for this Court) to understand why and on what basis the

decision was made. As well as its brevity the decision suffers from providing three reasons followed by a narrative containing multiple purported bases for those reasons. The reasons and narrative provided are so interlinked that I do not consider that they can be severable in the event that some, but not all, are found to be vitiated by an error of law or fact or both”.

18. In S, the shortform reason identified an “ID” reason that documents were missing from the application. The High Court held that it was not reasonable for the decision maker to condemn the applicant for not providing documentation on the basis, inter alia, of “the Minister's failure to advise the applicant of the need for the form in spite of their solicitor's appeal letter listing off all the documents they have identified on the visa office's website and their request that the Minister advise them of any further documents required”.

19. In addressing the specific issues in A.A., the Court of Appeal found that the shortform reasons in that case, the “OC” reasons, were flawed for the reasons identified in the earlier cases that had been summarised: “In essence, no reasons or explanation for the conclusion are given (and none are to be found in the additional narrative), and the conditions that the decisionmaker considered might not be observed by the appellant are not identified in any part of the decision.”

20. The Court found, in a similar way to the findings of a “defective chain of reasoning” in Mukovska, that it was not sufficient for the Minister to justify the absence of reasons for how the “OC” conclusion was arrived at by reference to the decision maker's findings on the “ID” field.

21. In respect of the reasonableness arguments in A.A., the remaining reasons were found to be connected to the additional narrative explanation in the review decision. However, the reasons given then had to be interrogated to ascertain if they would be treated as reasonably and rationally deriving from the information that was before the decision maker. There, the applicant had provided information showing he had completed a five-year degree in engineering, in which he completed modules relating to computing. The applicant also had completed an ICDL certificate. The Court of Appeal found that in the applicant’s documentation and information there was little to show qualifications or experience as a software engineer or a software developer. Hence the “INCO” and “ID” reasons were found to be adequately reasoned when considered with the narrative explanation, and those reasons, on their face, were rational.

22. The fair procedures issues focused first on the question of whether the applicant should have been afforded an opportunity to address alleged inconsistencies in his application. The Court of Appeal held that there is no obligation per se on the Minister to give advance warning to an applicant about perceived deficiencies or contradictions in the documentation submitted with an application.

23. However, at para. 80, the Court went on to consider whether “in the particular circumstances of this case” to determine whether the Minister's findings on the applicant’s qualifications and work experience was fairly arrived at, it was necessary to consider what actually occurred following the first instance decision. In that regard, the Court noted that the first instance decision referred to insufficient documentation. The applicant considered the Minister’s website and concluded that he had omitted documents showing proof of accommodation in the State and travel insurance. He sought to address those matters as part of his submission at the review stage. The Court of Appeal noted that the applicant “had no idea from the first instance decision” what the exact problems were. The Minister did not attempt to disabuse the applicant of his misapprehension and went on to find that he had not submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate his qualifications and experience for the position he had been offered. This was found to be unfair, the Court noted at para. 85: “The function of the High Court in a judicial review (and of this Court on appeal) is to address the process whereby the respondent reached the impugned

decision. It is not for the courts to decide whether the appellant's work experience is capable of demonstrating the necessary qualifications and experience for the job in question and it would certainly not be appropriate for an applicant in judicial review proceedings to contend for the invalidity of a

decision by reference to additional material which was not put before the

decision-maker. The point here is that the reasons given by the respondent did not enable the appellant to realise that this is the type of material which was required but which was not included in his original application.”

24. Finally, the Court also made an important finding on the manner in which the grant of a Critical Skills Employment permit interacted with the visa application process, and resolved what appeared to be two conflicting views from the High Court. This can be dealt with shortly. The Court found that the permit process clearly identified that a grant of a permit did not impinge on the requirement for a visa and that the two processes were separate. The Minister could not ignore the permit, but it did not amount to prima facie evidence that the applicant was qualified for the position that had been offered. As noted at para. 95: “It follows, therefore, that the respondent was free to consider whether the person applying for a visa has the requisite qualifications and experience. The function of the Minister for Business, Enterprise and Innovation under the 2006 Act is wholly separate from the role of the respondent in the granting of visas to enable non-nationals (i.e. those from visa-required third countries) to apply to enter the State. In the exercise of the respondent's discretion to grant visas, where the purpose of the person entering the State is to take up a particular employment, the qualifications of that person for the role is one element of the assessment to be carried out. As already stated, the appellant was advised of this by the Minister for Employment, Enterprise and Innovation when he obtained his Critical Skills Employment Permit.”

25. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal found that the frailties attaching to the Minister’s

decision were such that it could not be upheld. I will now turn to the factual backdrop to the issues that have to be determined in this case.

BACKGROUND FACTS

26. The applicant is an Indian national who lives in New Delhi. He secured an offer of a position with an Irish company, MR Cuisine, in Dublin. The applicant’s prospective employer sought and obtained a General Employment Permit, which was granted on the 30 May 2022. In June 2022 the applicant applied for a visa to enter the State and take up his employment. The applicant was refused at first instance on the 6 October 2022, and that decision was affirmed on the 10 February 2023.

27. According to the applicant’s account, his father, who is in Ireland, recommended him to his employer MR Cuisine. In turn the applicant was interviewed and offered a position. The relevant employment contract was dated the 11 November 2021, and it described the job position as an “IT & Software Management Executive”. The role was described as requiring a person who had “an understanding of the restaurant business throughout Ireland and the patron requirements from our establishment”. Among the tasks required by the role were data management, use of Excel, re-design of the website, social media management and payroll management tracking. The contract noted that the applicant had experience from working at the Marriott Hotel in Guragon, India, where he had worked from August 2019 to the date of the letter, and noted that he held qualifications from Bharathiar University and the International Institute of Hotel Management. Notably, for what follows, the document from MR Cuisine does not refer to the applicant having worked for a company, Delvegsco Sales Private Limited (Delvegsco).

28. The employment permit was dated the 30 May 2022 and made clear, inter alia, that the permit was “not a residence permit or a permission to enter Ireland. Persons who are nationals of countries that are visa required for travel to Ireland must make a visa application through www.inis.gov.ie. In the visa application you will be required to submit evidence of your professional qualifications, if required, as well as evidence of your previous work experience, if required.”

29. In the visa application form, the applicant identified his current employer as Marriott International India Private Limited, and stated that he had been employed by that entity for 3 years and 1 month. The applicant was assisted in preparing the visa application by a company, PC Immigration Ireland. That entity wrote a letter to the visa office at the Irish Embassy in New Delhi on the 15 June 2022. The letter attached certain documents. In his affidavit the applicant stated that the documents submitted included his CV, however a number of those documents are not referred to in the letter from PC Immigration Ireland. This was potentially significant as an affidavit was sworn on behalf of the respondents confirming that after making inquiries they were satisfied that they had not been sent a copy of the CV as part of the process under review.

The decision at first instance

30. The first instance decision was set out in a letter dated the 6 October 2022. The application for a visa was refused and the reasons were provided by reference to certain codified or shortform headings together with a narrative. The shortform reasons were: “ID:- Insufficient documentation submitted in support of the application: - please see link to our website – www.irishimmigration.ie IH:- Immigration history of the applicant. INCO:- Inconsistencies e.g. contradictions in the information supplied OC:- Observe the conditions of the visa – the visa is sought for a specific purpose and duration:- the applicant has not satisfied the visa officer that such conditions would be observed. SP:- Previous educational or employment background is at odds with the course applied for”

31. The narrative stated: “Applicant previously applied for a Join Family visa, which was withdrawn on

29.09.21 as applicant was not eligible for this visa type. In that application the applicant stated that they were not employed and they were a student. In the current employment visa application, applicant has included documents stating that they have been employed with Marriott hotels since 2019. The job that the applicant wishes to take up employment in is for an IT Software Manager. The applicant has been working in Marriott hotels as a Sales and Service Associate. They have not provided any evidence to show that they have the IT skills necessary to undertake this role in Ireland. Applicant has not shown that their work experience involved social media and marketing campaigns, web design as well as experience and knowledge of various IT programmes. The father of the applicant works at the company where the applicant intends to work. The applicant has failed to provide sufficient evidence that they have the necessary experience.” [emphasis added] The response to the first instance decision

32. The letter noted the right to appeal the decision, and the applicant submitted an appeal through Abbott Solicitors under cover of a letter dated the 5 November 2022. The letter addressed the various issues in the first instance refusal decision. In relation to the previous visa application, the letter referred to the history of that application and contended that it had been withdrawn voluntarily by the applicant’s father – who seems to have been the visa applicant in that situation – following correspondence with the visa office. As such, it was argued, the withdrawal could not be construed as a form of prior adverse decision.

33. In relation to the applicant’s qualifications and experience for the position with MR Cuisine, the letter sets out the applicant’s educational and employment history, which included a certificate from the “vocational and computer training division” from the Himalaya Institute, and a post graduate diploma in Business Management with the Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies. The letter asserted that the applicant had worked as an “IT Management Manager” with Delvegsco, which involved managing the company’s website, social media and marketing operations management and use of various software systems.

34. The letter addressed the shortform reasons that were engaged in the first instance

decision. In relation to the “ID” or insufficient documents reason, the letter set out the applicant’s qualifications and experience and how that connected to the position in MR Cuisine.

The letter attached a number of documents including qualification documents and correspondence from previous employers including the company Delvegsco.

35. In relation to the “IH” immigration history criterion, the letter asserted that when the applicant’s father was informed of a difficulty with the applicant’s eligibility for a family reunification type visa, the application was withdrawn. It was stated that the previous application should not impact the more recent application as the applicant now fulfilled the criteria for this visa.

36. In relation to the “INCO” inconsistencies criterion, the letter stated that the earlier application was made on the basis that if he was permitted to enter the State, the applicant would be dependent on his father. The current application involved taking up an offer of employment. The letter asserted that at the earlier stage the applicant had been a student and working part time with Marriott hotels.

37. In relation to the “OC” – observe the conditions of the visa - criterion, the letter stated that there was no reason to support the contention that the applicant would not comply with his undertaking to observe the conditions of his visa.

38. In relation to the “SP” criterion – which focused on a stated disconnect between the position on offer and the qualifications and experience of the applicant – it was said that the applicant was qualified for the position he had been offered. It can be noted that the applicant’s then legal representatives did not take issue with the wording at this part of the first instance

decision which referred to the applicant’s qualifications and experience for the “course applied for”, and treated it is as a reference to the position applied for.

39. The letter went on to make legal arguments about the appeal. This included an argument that the Minster had not taken proper account of the fact that the applicant had been granted an employment permit; and a consequent argument that where the job had been offered and a permit granted, the applicant’s skills and experience were not relevant. Without prejudice to that position – which clearly is incorrect in light of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in A.A.

– the letter asserted that in fact the applicant had the necessary qualifications and experience.

40. The letter also asserted that the first instance decision was unreasonable. In part this argument was grounded in an assertion that the decision on the visa application was required not only to take account of the grant of the employment permit but that it was in some sense bound to assume that the applicant must be qualified for the position if the permit had been granted. An additional argument was made to the effect that it was irrational for the deciding officer to conclude that the applicant was not qualified or lacked the necessary experience for his position in light of the evidence that was available.

41. Among the documents submitted as part of the appeal process was the applicant’s CV, which appeared to suggest that in addition to working as a “Loyalty and Care Services Associate” for Marriott hotels from 2019 to date, the applicant worked for Delvegsco from August to November 2020 as an “IT Software Management Manager”. It can be noted that this section in the CV appeared to suggest that this was an “Online Course”. There was also a letter on Develgsco headed paper which seemed to confirm that he worked with that company. The contact information in the letter gave an individual email address and a mobile number, which appeared to be for an identified person within that company. However, the letter does not expressly identify the author or their precise role in the company.

The appeal decision

42. The appeal decision was communicated by a letter dated the 10 February 2023 from the visa section of the Irish embassy in New Delhi. Having informed the applicant that the appeal was unsuccessful, the operative part of the decision provided: “Your application has been re-examined by the Appeals Officer and having taken all documentation and information provided into consideration, it was decided that the original decision to refuse the visa should be upheld.”

43. The reasons for refusal were set out in the form of shortform or codified reasons followed by some narrative elaboration. The codified reasons were: “ID:- Insufficient documentation submitted in support of the application:- please see link to our website:- www.irishimmigration.ie INCO:- inconsistencies e.g. contradictions in the information supplied OC:-Observe the conditions of the visa – the visa is sought for a specific purpose and duration:- the applicant has not satisfied the visa officer that such conditions would be observed SP:- Previous educational or employment is at odds with the course applied for”

44. The letter went on to provide the following narrative, in which the spelling / grammatical errors are in the original: “Initial visa deciding officer was dissatisfied with applicants previous employment experience and questioned if the applicant had the IT skills necessary to undertake this role in Ireland. On appeal the applicant provided a letter purporting to be from “Delvegsco.com” alleging that the applicant worked as an “IT Software Management Manager”. The information provided on the certificate purporting to be from “Delvegsco.com” such as office phone number and e-mail address contradicted those available on www.delvegsco.com. Visa officer e-mail publicly available e-mail address sales@delvegsco.com from “Delvegsco.com” on the 16/01/2023 and received an acknowledgement email on the 21/01/2023. Visa officer sent follow up e-mail to same address on the 23rd, 30th and finally 8th of February 2022 but did not receive any responses. Visa officer reviewed applicants original “Supplementary Employment Form” and by applicants own admission he states he worked for the “Marriott International India” from 13th May 2019 to Present” which is during the same time period the applicant allegedly worked for “Delvegsco Sales”. Visa officer believes this to be a clear attempt to provide false and misleading information. Applicant has not provided sufficient documentation/information at appeal stage to warrant a visa approval. Appeals Officer agrees with decision at first instance to refuse the applicant a visa.”

THE PLEADINGS

The applicant’s grounds

45. As noted above, the applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review on the 3 July 2023. The legal grounds set out in the statement of grounds can be summarised as: a. The failure to have sufficient regard to the employment permit.

b. Where the applicant had been granted an employment permit in relation to the offered position, it was unreasonable to find that he was not properly qualified for that position. c. The appeal decision referred to the applicant not being qualified for a “course”, when he was not applying for a study visa. This was said to be a significant error of fact. d. There was no reasonable or evidential basis for the contention that the applicant failed to provide sufficient documentation. e. No adequate reasons were provided for the finding that the applicant would not comply with the conditions of the visa sought. f. The finding that the applicant provided “false and misleading” information was an error of law and fact. g. The failure to afford the applicant an opportunity to respond to the concerns about his employment with Delvegsco was a breach of fair procedures, given that the issue arose for the first time at the review stage. In addition, the applicant challenged as unfair the decision of the Appeals Officer to contact Delvegsco using the sales@delvegsco.com address and not to use the contact information that had been provided by the applicant.

The response from the respondents

46. The respondents filed a statement of opposition on the 24 May 2024. In addition to denials, the respondents contended: a. The decision maker properly considered all the documentation, including the employment permit.

b. The decision maker was not obliged or entitled to treat the grant of the employment permit as comprehensive evidence that he was appropriately skilled or qualified for the position he had been offered. c. The reference to “course” under the shortform SP part of the decision was a typographical error and it was clear from the substance of the decision that the decision maker was under no misapprehension as to the nature of the visa application. d. The ID reason was rational and lawful. e. The OC reason was flawed because inadequate reasons were given to explain it. However, that flaw should not lead to the vitiation of the

decision having regard to the other substantive reasons, which were said to be “independent and free-standing”. f. The decision maker was entitled to find that the applicant had attempted to provide false and misleading information. g. The applicant was afforded fair procedures: (i) there was no obligation to forewarn the applicant of potential flaws in his application, and (ii) there was no obligation to use the contact details for Delvegsco instead of the publicly available contact information. h. The essential rationale for the decision was clear and accorded with the duty to give reasons.

47. The respondent’s statement of opposition was verified by an affidavit dated the 14 May 2024 and sworn by Melissa Brennan, a Higher Executive Officer in the Visa Division, Immigration Service Delivery, at the Department of Justice. Ms. Brennan exhibited the papers associated with the Join Family visa application submitted by the applicant’s father in early 2021. Ms. Brennan emphasised that the reference to employment with Delvegsco only arose in connection with the appeal and that it was not a feature of the application dealt with at first instance. In that regard, Ms. Brennan exhibited a “Supplementary Employment Application Form” completed by the applicant on the 11 July 2022. The applicant was required to set out his employment history and current employment circumstances in that document, and there is no mention of the employment with Delvegsco in his completed form. Furthermore, Ms. Brennan noted the general policy of the Minister to seek to verify employment letters by using publicly available information, and that this policy is reflected in the information available from relevant part of the Minister’s website.

POST HEARING EVIDENCE

48. At the hearing an issue arose as to whether the applicant’s CV had in fact been provided as part of the visa application process. In that regard, I permitted the parties an opportunity to file further short affidavits. For the respondents, Mary Sheridan swore an affidavit on the 3 April 2025 in which she explained that following a full review of the applicant’s file, the respondents were of the view that no copy of the applicant’s CV had ever been received. The applicant’s solicitor, Imtiaz Khan, swore an affidavit on the 8 April 2025, where he noted that his firm of solicitors did not act for the applicant in connection with the visa appeal. He contacted the solicitor that had been dealing with the matter in Abbot Solicitors and was sent a copy of the pdf file that comprised all the documents accompanying the visa appeal submission and that was sent to the visa office in New Delhi as part of the visa appeal. The CV is included in that pdf of the collected documents.

DISCUSSION OF THE ARGUMENTS

The cv issue

49. The CV’s primary relevance is that it contains a reference to the employment by Delvegsco. Thus, whether, and, if so, when the CV was furnished to the respondents is relevant to their consideration of the applicant’s skills and experience. The question of whether the applicant’s CV was received by the respondents is a matter to be proved by the applicant. In light of the evidence submitted by the respondents there is a serious question as to whether it was submitted: the position of the respondents is that they have reconsidered their files and have not located the CV. The applicant cannot say with certainty that the CV was in fact sent to the respondents, other than to have his current solicitor aver that he was told by the former solicitor that it was sent.

50. It is striking that the Delvegsco issue was not referred to until after the applicant received the first instance decision, and that it was not adverted to in his submission through an agent of material information in support of the visa application or in the “Supplementary Employment Application Form.” While those matters suggest that the respondents are likely correct in their contention on this issue, a further issue is that to a very large extent the CV is simply a written statement by the applicant of his qualifications and experience. The question for a decision maker is whether there is sufficient material to support or corroborate that statement.

51. In this case it appears to be common case that even if the CV had been forwarded to the respondents at first instance, the applicant did not provide any material at that stage to support his contention that he had been employed in a software management capacity by Delvegsco.

The letter on Delvegsco headed paper was only submitted as part of the review stage. For that reason, it seems to me that (a) the applicant has not proved that the CV was in fact sent to the respondents for the purposes of the first instance decision, and (b) even if it was, on its own, it did not constitute sufficient evidence of what it stated in relation to his employment by Delvegsco.

The treatment of the employment permit

52. The status and proper treatment of an employment permit in the context of this type of visa application has been decided conclusively for the purposes of this court by the Court of Appeal in A.A. The visa decisionmakers were required to consider or have regard to the fact of the permit, but in no sense can the grant of the permit be treated as conclusive evidence that the applicant was qualified for the position that he had been offered.

53. In addition, in confirming the continued vitality of the observations of Hardiman J. in GK v. Minister for Justice [2002] IR 418, the Supreme Court in Rana & Ali v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 has made clear that a statement by a decisionmaker to the effect that all documents and submissions have been considered must be taken at face value unless there is some evidence to call the statement into question. Here, given the limited importance of the existence of the employment permit to the decision to be made on a visa application of this type, there is nothing to suggest that the permit was not taken into account by the Appeals Officer.

54. In those premises the arguments by the applicant grounded on the assertion that the Appeals Officer did not consider or attach proper weight to the employment permit cannot succeed.

The reference to “course” in reason “SP”

55. The applicant argued that the use of the word “course” was a material error of fact such that the court ought to invalidate the decision. I do not agree. Clearly this was an error, and the error was acknowledged by the respondents. However, when viewed in the overall context of the process there is no indication that the respondents were under any misapprehension that the applicant sought the visa to study in Ireland. It is fully clear from the decision at both stages that the decision makers were aware of and addressed their consideration to an application for a visa to take up a position in MR Cuisine. Significantly, it was clear that the applicant’s representatives were not in the slightest bit confused by the error. The error first appears in the first instance decision and appears to have been carried over into the appeal decision. When the appeal was submitted on behalf of the applicant, the arguments in relation to this issue clearly were predicated on an understanding that the reason related to the qualification of the applicant for the position in MR Cuisine, and this is reflected is the part of the submission where it was contended that the decision was unreasonable for the Minister “to find that the Applicant wasn’t in fact properly qualified for the position he applied for” [emphasis added].

56. In the premises, I consider that the use of the word “course” was an error but that it was in no sense a material or significant error, and it does not provide a basis for impugning or vitiating the decision.

Fair procedures

57. The applicant argued that the finding that he submitted false and misleading information was reached unfairly in two respects. First, that they were based on concerns that had not been flagged at first instance with the result that the applicant did not have the chance to address the concerns. Second, the applicant complains about the manner in which the respondents sought to contact Delvegsco and that the Appeals Officer did not attempt to make contact via the contact information in the letter that he had submitted. The applicant relied primarily on observations by Faherty J. in A.A. and by Bolger J. in S.

58. The respondents disputed that there was any want of fair procedures. They argued that A.A. makes clear that the Appeals Officer is under no obligation to give advance warning to an applicant of any potential or perceived difficulties with the materials that were submitted. With regard to contacting Delvegsco, the respondents contend that there was nothing unreasonable about the Appeals Officer contacting the company using publicly available details. The respondents note that the relevant website that sets out how visa applications should proceed states that the general policy of the Minister is to verify employment letters by using publicly available contact details.

59. In considering this issue it can be recalled that in A.A. the Court of Appeal started from the principle that the Minister was not obliged to alert the applicant to inconsistencies or difficulties in the documentation in advance of a refusal decision. However, the Court was clear that the overall fairness of the process that led to a refusal decision still needed to be addressed. In A.A. the Court of Appeal expressed concern that the initial decision was framed by reasons that gave the applicant no intimation of the matters that he was obliged to address in his review. In addition, it was clear in that case that the applicant apprehended that the only issues to be addressed on review was the provision of documents relating to his travel and accommodation arrangements, and the respondents had not disabused him of that misapprehension when he submitted his further documentation and submissions.

60. It must be recalled that the unfair process asserted by the applicant in this case related to the contention that he was not aware from the first instance decision that there were issues relating to his skills and experience that needed to be addressed. As a result, the emphasis in the review decision on his lack of skills and experiences was argued to be unfair.

61. As I read it, the primary substantive basis for the review decision refusing a visa was that the applicant had not persuaded the Appeals Officer that he had sufficient software management experience or qualifications for the position in MR Cuisine. The reasons given at first instance on that issue clearly are distinguishable from the reasons at first instance in A.A. In A.A. the first instance decision was expressed only by reference to the codified reasons. In this case, the first instance decision, inter alia, included the narrative statement that the applicant “failed to provide sufficient evidence that they have the necessary experience”.

62. At the review stage, the applicant sought to argue that he had the necessary experience by introducing the assertions in relation to Delvegsco. That can only be understood as confirming that he understood from the reasons given at the first instance the matters that he was required to address. It was a matter for the applicant to address those concerns and he was afforded a proper opportunity to do so.

63. Moreover, it must be emphasised that the question of the applicant’s experience with Delvegsco only emerged at the review stage because the applicant had not flagged it at first instance: it was not referred to in the “Supplementary Employment Application Form”; it was not referred to in the contract document from MR Cuisine; and it was not referred to in the letter submitted by PC Immigration Ireland. I have found for the reasons given that there is a serious question about the applicant’s contention that his CV was sent to the visa section at first instance.

64. It is very difficult to understand, if the applicant indeed had obtained comparable experience and skills working for Delvegsco, why that was not flagged clearly as part of the first instance decision. The reasonable inference is that the Delvegsco issue only arose at the review stage because it had not been referred to earlier by the applicant. In all the premises, the court cannot find that there was any unfairness in this aspect of the process.

65. The second element in the fair process argument related to the manner in which the Appeals Officer sought to clarify the position with Delvegsco. The applicant submitted that the Officer ought to have used the contact information in the referral letter and the failure to do so was unfair. I disagree. There is no unfairness in not taking employment references at face value, and the applicant was on notice from the references to website information maintained by the Minister that there would be an attempt to verify employment references by using publicly available contact information.

66. As recorded by the Appeals Officer, there were multiple attempts to contact Delvegsco. The first contact produced an acknowledgement email from that company, however there was no further contact despite follow up emails on three occasions between the 23 January and the

8 February 2023. This contrasts with the situation that was criticised by Bolger J. in S, where the respondents had dismissed two work references where there was no attempt to check them despite some avenues for contact being available. Here, while the Minister did not send a direct email to the then unidentified person who appears to have written the reference for Delvegsco; on the 16 January 2023, the Appeals Officer emailed the address on the public website of Delvegsco and received an acknowledgement. The Appeals Officer made efforts in the subsequent two weeks or thereabouts to follow up the inquiry but there was no response.

67. The authorities opened to the court suggest that efforts should be made to contact employment referees but they do not suggest that as a matter of principle the decision maker is obliged to go further than make reasonable inquiries. In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the Appeals Officer made reasonable efforts – in the manner that had been published to visa applicants – to contact the referee, and there was no unfairness in proceeding to make the decision when the emails did not produce a substantive response from Delvegsco.

Reasonableness

68. The applicant argued that the review decision was unreasonable in two respects. First it was said the decision that he did not have the requisite experience and qualifications ignored the evidence that he was so qualified. In that regard, the applicant highlighted that aside from the question of his role in Delvagsco, his academic records showed that he had engaged in education courses or modules relating to software management. Second, it was said to be unreasonable to conclude that he had submitted misleading documentation or information without affording him an opportunity to establish the contrary.

69. In relation to the latter point, I consider this to be more in the nature of an issue regarding the procedural fairness of the approach adopted by the Appeals Officer, and I have already found that the process was fair. I do not consider that the authorities suggest that every potential adverse finding must be put to the applicant. In fact, the general position is to the contrary. The Court of Appeal in A.A. made clear that the general proposition is that there is no obligation on the Minister to give advance warning to an applicant of perceived deficiencies or contradictions in the documentation or information submitted by him. I consider that it follows a fortiori that the Minister likewise is not under an obligation to provide advance notice to an applicant of an adverse decision.

70. In relation to the reasonableness of the finding that the applicant lacked the requisite qualifications or skills for the position with MR Cuisine, it is important to recall that the starting points in a case such as this, as found by the Court of Appeal in A.A., are that (a) the Minister exercising this executive power enjoys a wide discretion, and (b) that significant deference is owed to the decision maker having regard to that wide executive discretion.

71. In my view the decision here did not fly in the face of common sense or fundamental reason but rather was a decision that was legitimately available to the Appeals Officer and that can be characterised as connected to and flowing from the underlying facts. While the material submitted by the applicant included some reference to his having completed modules in “computer application” at the National Institute of Hotel Management, and “Computer Applications in Hotel industry” at Bharathiar University, these were individual modules where it is clear from the additional modules on his transcript that the overall focus was on hospitality and hotel management. There was no substantial material other than the Delvegsco material to support the contention that the applicant was qualified or experienced for the position as an “IT Software Management Executive”. That finding, which in my view is the rationale for the findings at “ID” that insufficient documentation had been submitted, and at “SP” that the applicant’s previous educational and employment background was at odds with the position applied for, was reasonable.

72. Insofar as the decision involved a finding at “INCO” that there were contradictions in the information supplied, it is clear that there was an unexplained inconsistency in the applicant initially stating that he had worked for Marriott International from May 2019 to the date of application and then on review asserting that during that same period he was also employed for a time by Delvegsco. This called for explanation, and the need for explanation was apparent from the applicant’s own materials and did not need to be drawn to his attention prior to a

decision being made.

73. Finally I consider that the finding in the narrative section of the review decision that the approach of the applicant to the role of Delvegsco was “a clear attempt to provide false and misleading information” in light of the nature and standard of review under this heading falls to be treated as reasonable in the sense that it was one open to the decision maker and that flowed from the materials and information that had been submitted. That is particularly so given that the applicant did not reveal any connection with Delvegsco until the first instance

decision expressly called into question the extent of his qualifications and experience for work as a software manager.

74. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded by the applicant’s arguments that the decision was unreasonable.

The admitted flaw with the OC reason

75. As noted above, the finding that the applicant would not observe the conditions of the visa is simply presented as a conclusion. No explanation is provided, and it is not possible to discern the reasons why that aspect of the decision was reached. It follows that in the complete absence of any reasons it is not possible for the reasonableness of the decision to be considered.

The respondents have admitted that this aspect of the decision-making process was flawed. The applicant submitted that the result must be that the overall decision is vitiated, whereas the respondents contend that the overall decision can be upheld by reference to the fact that the other reasons are independent and valid. The respondents argue in effect that the “OC” element amounted to a minor part of the overall decision, and that its invalidity is not sufficiently weighty to warrant quashing the overall decision.

76. I am not satisfied that the admitted error in failing to provide any or any reasons under this heading was sufficiently material to the overall reasoned findings to warrant quashing the

decision. As set out above, having considered the review decision in considerable detail it was clear to me that the primary substantial basis for the decision was the finding of the Appeals Officer that the applicant had not shown that he had the qualifications or experience for the particular position offered by MR Cuisine. It may well have been that the applicant was well qualified to work in the hospitality sector, but it was not at all clear that he had any qualifications or experience working as an IT Software Management Executive. In those premises, my view is that the decision remained robust and valid even if the “OC” element in the decision was entirely disregarded; and, as such, I do not consider that the decision can be quashed as contended for by the applicant.

CONCLUSION

77. As can be seen, the court was faced with a decision that had been reached on a number of grounds. One of the shortform grounds, “SP”, contained what I consider was an inconsequential administrative error. Another ground, “OC” was accepted by the respondents to be flawed. I am not satisfied that those flaws in the decision properly amount to a reason to consider that the overall decision should be quashed. It is clear from my reading of the decision

– both by reference to the remaining shortform reasons and the narrative element – that the substantial and driving reason for the decision not to give a visa to the applicant was that the Appeals Officer was not satisfied that the applicant had shown that he had the qualifications and experience for the position he had been offered with MR Cuisine. I consider that that

decision was adequately reasoned, rational, and that the process leading to the decision was fair. In the premises, I will refuse the relief being sought.

78. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, I express the provisional view that the respondents should be entitled to their costs. I will list the matter before me for final arguments on the form of the order and the question of costs at 10.30am on Tuesday, the 15 July 2025.