High Court awards €64,800 to Garda plaintiff for PTSD and physical injuries from traumatic scene.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 388

[Record No. 2023/3698P]

BETWEEN

MARY JANE SOMERS

PLAINTIFF

AND

THE COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEFENDANTS

Ex-Tempore Judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Micheál O’Higgins on the 14th day of May 2025

Introduction

1. This is my ex-tempore judgment in the matter of Mary Jane Somers v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others which I heard two days ago on the opening day of the Personal Injuries sessions here in the High Court in Cork on the 12th of May 2025. The case proceeded as an assessment. Now, I propose to divide my judgment into the following broad sections: firstly, a description of the incident; secondly, the applicability of the new Guidelines - new Personal Injuries Guidelines as recommended by the PIG Review Committee, chaired by Ms Justice Elizabeth Dunne; thirdly, an assessment of the four elements of the plaintiff's injuries; fourthly, the relevant legal principles to be applied which are not in any significant dispute; and fifthly, my conclusion.

The incident in question

2. Now, dealing firstly with the incident and the background to the claim itself, the plaintiff is a member of An Garda Síochána and she has been in the gardaí for upwards of 18 years I think. She trained at Templemore. She was on a student placement in Cork. She was based in Anglesea Street. She has worked on a full-time basis on various rosters. She took up a new role in 2022 in the divisional protective services unit dealing with sexual and domestic crime. She was on a panel for that role. She worked for a number of years in Anglesea Street Station and then in Watercourse Road, which is a busier station. She enjoys her job and impressed me as a witness and is very anxious to continue in her current role in An Garda Síochána.

3. Now, the incident the subject of this case was, undoubtedly, a traumatic incident for the plaintiff and would indeed be traumatic for any person. It had been a busy night. She was working on a night-shift with a colleague, Eugene. In the early hours of the morning, she and her colleague got a call, and she was given to understand that there was a body of a male hanging outside a nightclub, The Great Escape. She drove the vehicle and got to the scene. Initially, she and her colleague were unable to see where the man was, and they saw a man hanging from scaffolding there near the building. She was anxious - she and her colleague were anxious to get him down from the scaffold, obviously, and maximise the possibility that he could be saved. She was able to reach his hand, and it was cold. They wanted to get him down so they could perform resuscitation on him. She got a shatter hammer from the vehicle and, unfortunately, there was no ligature cutter in the car. She tried and did her best to climb up on a car to get at the ligature, but her diminutive stature meant that she couldn't reach that high. Her colleague then tried to reach up and he managed to cut the ligature, but everything happened quite quickly and faster than they had expected.

4. When the ligature was cut or perhaps snapped, the unfortunate man's weight fell and hit the plaintiff with a direct trauma to the head and the deceased's body then fell to the ground and impacted heavily with the ground, the relevance of which will be apparent later. The plaintiff immediately felt a sensation in her head but, nonetheless, she and her colleagues worked on and moved the man's body so they could perform compressions on him. She doesn't feel she lost consciousness. However, she felt blood on her hand when she put it to her scalp, and it was bleeding badly. A sergeant came along and then she was subsequently brought to the Mercy Hospital emergency department where she was dealt with quickly, being a garda member in uniform, where the wound was cleaned, and glue was applied and she was given emergency treatment.

5. That's the gist of the incident which, from that brief description, it will be apparent that that would have been an extremely shocking event for anybody. The plaintiff told the court that she, in fact, had a degree of experience of matters involving death and serious injury and had built up a level of resilience. But, understandably, in circumstances where she was involved in the, if you like, mechanism of the last stage of the incident and owing to its macabre and visceral nature, this particular incident, undoubtedly, got in on her and that was abundantly apparent from her evidence, and I'll come back to that.

Personal Injuries Guidelines as recommended by the PIG Committee

6. Moving then to the second part of the judgment, I now deal with a submission that Mr Downing, senior counsel for the plaintiff, made with respect to the applicability of the new guidelines as recommended by the PIG Review Committee. Mr Downing SC submits that when assessing the appropriate level of damages in this case, the court should take into account, at least in a general sense, the fact that subsequent to the meeting of the Judicial Council in January of 2025, proposed amendments to the Personal Injury Guidelines were submitted to the Minister for Justice pursuant to section 7(2)(b) of the Judicial Council Act 2019. It's well known that the Review Committee concluded that the existing guidelines from the 6th of March 2021 were somewhat out of date and had been overtaken by a number of social developments, including inflation, and that, broadly speaking, the Committee recommended a 16.7% increase in the valuations. While acknowledging that the necessary statutory instrument has not yet been made by the Government, counsel for the plaintiff submits that the court should, nonetheless, have regard to the fact that the existing guidelines are out of date and submits that this might be reflected, for instance, in where the court lands within existing damages brackets provided for within the ranges in the existing guidelines. Counsel for the defendant, Mr Lucey SC opposes this and submits that for the court to proceed on the basis proposed by the plaintiff would be legally unsound and liable to bring the court into choppy constitutional waters.

7. In fairness to Mr Downing SC's submission, it was not suggested that the court should simply apply the new valuations as if it were the new law but rather should take account of developments in a general sense, mindful that the PIG Committee completed its review in March of 2024, over a year ago. In my view, this is an issue that needs to be taken carefully. The court ought recognise that in line with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Delaney v. PIAB [2024] IESC 10, the statutory architecture and procedures have yet to be finalised with respect to the applicability of the new valuations and, therefore, the proposed amended guidelines do not yet have the force of even soft law. Adopting the statutory analogy of a Bill versus an Act, it would in my view be an error of law to apply the Bill as if it were an Act as passed by the Oireachtas. The Supreme Court emphasised in Delaney the importance of the applicable constitutional procedures and, in my view, these should not be elided or overlooked. Accordingly, I propose to take into account as the applicable guidelines the current version from March 2021.

8. At the same time, the guidelines, it should be borne in mind, are what they say they are, namely, guidelines, albeit binding with a small “b” in the manner indicated in Delaney. I take the view that it would not be appropriate for the court to simply close its eyes to the important development whereby the body responsible for formulating the guidelines has itself determined that they have not kept abreast of inflation and are now, to an extent, out of date.

Assessment of the four elements of the plaintiff's injuries

9. So, proceeding then to the third area, the assessment of the four discrete elements of the plaintiff's injuries. Broadly speaking, there are four such headings. I'll deal firstly with the psychological injuries. Mr Downing, senior counsel, says the psychological injuries fall into the “Moderate PTSD” bracket at the upper end of the range and, in some respects, possibly into the higher bracket (b) of “Serious PTSD” on page 15 of the current guidelines. Mr Lucey, for the defendant, does not dispute the diagnosis of PTSD, but says that the case falls into bracket (d), namely, “Minor PTSD” and not bracket (c), namely, “Moderate PTSD”. Mr Lucey also submits that, if the court views the injury as continuing and makes it into category

(c) for moderate PTSD, then counsel submits that, at most, this should be at the lowest end of the range close to the €10,000 end rather than the €35,000 end.

10. Now, the incident, the subject of this claim, occurred, as I've said, on the 26th of February 2021, some four years and three months ago. Dr Hurley, psychiatrist, saw the plaintiff in February of 2024 at approximately three years post-incident. At that consultation the plaintiff became visibly distressed describing the events of the night. Giving her evidence before me on Monday, now at four years and three months post-incident, the plaintiff also became upset, not in a wailing or dramatic way, but in a way that impressed me that the effects of the incident are not yet fully behind her. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that the effects of the incident have stayed with her up until the present day and that she remains preoccupied with it. She no longer thinks about it every day, but she deliberately has to avoid discussions of suicide in conversations with family members or with friends and, also, on the TV or radio. She did not have the benefit of discussing the issue through with family members as she largely wanted to avoid discussion about suicide and also did not want to burden them.

11. The plaintiff told Dr Hurley, and I accept, that her anxiety continues but has eased and she is no longer as anxious all the time. Significantly, however, she told the court and her psychiatrist that she is not fully over it and she has not fully returned to her same level of functioning or confidence. In my view, losing partially one's sense of confidence is a significant matter for any individual, but it is particularly problematic for a serving member of An Garda Síochána whose day-to-day role exposes them to challenging and dangerous situations. The plaintiff's current role in the divisional protective services unit involves dealing with sexual crime and domestic abuse, as I've said. It is less interventionist and more investigatory than her previous roles, but it is still a very challenging role that will, undoubtedly, call on a garda's confidence and would require a high level of functioning. I accept the statement in Dr Hurley's report that the plaintiff continues to be less carefree than she was before the incident, and the diagnosis that the plaintiff, as a result of this incident, suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, and a range of other ailments and symptoms which I will presently describe with the benefit of Dr Hurley's detailed report. On page two, Dr Hurley records her opinion that the plaintiff suffered from heightened anxiety and preoccupation with the incident, heightened emotionality, increased startled response, low mood with associated feelings of guilt, social withdrawal, disturbed sleep, nightmares, flashbacks, decreased confidence, headaches and I think, quite significantly, avoidance behaviours.

12. Now, the plaintiff relayed not just to the court but also to Dr Hurley and, indeed, to Dr Corby, the psychiatrist who saw the plaintiff for the defendant, that she found giving evidence in the inquest for the deceased very difficult and distressing. She became emotional at the inquest even though she had had prior experience of such matters, but this particular incident has, as I've said, affected her far more than others. Adding to her distress was the fact that the gardaí, as she saw it, had to account for bruising on the body of the deceased which occurred as a result of the ligature snapping and the deceased's body impacting heavily with the ground. Having to explain this to the family members and to the Coroner's Court was difficult and, the plaintiff felt, embarrassing. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that she underwent some

10 sessions of counselling. To my mind this addresses in large measure the point made by Mr Lucey concerning the absence of a GP's report or a report dealing with matters on an ongoing basis. I accept too that the plaintiff was not prescribed psychotropic medication which, of course, I take into account. However, she followed the recommended course of counselling sessions, and this has benefited her. These sessions started, according to Dr Corby's report, about three to four months after the incident.

13. Now, it's recorded as well in the medical evidence before me that when the deceased's body was taken to the morgue, as I've mentioned, the shoulder was marked from the fall. The plaintiff told the psychiatrist that she began to question as to whether she did the right thing, although she knew there was nothing else she could have done. The incident dented her confidence in her ability to make the best decision in a difficult situation and that has ongoing ramifications. She tried to carry on as normal but, unfortunately, she began to suffer from poor sleep and the combination of matters led to a situation where she became socially withdrawn and found it hard to face her colleagues, and found it difficult going to calls involving fatalities particularly. While she looked fine on the outside, she told the psychiatrist that she felt very distressed inside. She informed her psychiatrist that since the incident she avoids watching any scenes on television where there are ligatures or ropes. She finds it upsetting if people ask her about the incident or the night itself and, insofar as she can, she simply avoids talking about it. Rethinking through the incident reminds her that this was a life or death incident. She was exercising less in the months after the incident, and this resulted in a degree of weight gain because of her inactivity. She had regular nightmares and, as I've already mentioned, had disturbed sleep.

14. Now, Dr Corby saw the plaintiff in February 2024 at three years post-incident. However, Dr Corby's view that the plaintiff's symptoms weren't in a categorisation of mild PTSD does not, as a matter of logic, and could not, take account of the evidence given to the court concerning the plaintiff's ongoing symptoms to date, including her continuing anxiety, withdrawal symptoms, distress and loss of confidence in the 15 months since Dr Corby saw her. While Dr Hurley does not use the categorisation of mild, moderate or serious, I'm satisfied that the overall psychological profile falls into the upper end of the moderate category. I don't think it goes into a higher bracket than that, having regard to the nature of the reports before the court and their contents and the reasonably low-key evidence of the plaintiff which I accept in full. Taking everything into account, it seems to me that the moderate bracket is from €10,000 to €35,000. The notes in the Guidelines say in these cases that the injured person will have largely recovered, and any continuing effects will not be grossly disabling. Based on the evidence that I've heard, it is difficult to be certain that both indicators are met here. The continuing effects of the stress disorder are not grossly disabling but, in my view, it is a stretch to say the plaintiff has "largely recovered" because it seems to me this incident is not fully behind her. She continues with avoidance behaviour, continues to become somewhat emotional and tearful while recounting the events of the night and continues to exhibit anxiety and decreased confidence. I conclude, therefore, that the psychiatric injuries fall short of the serious PTSD bracket but fall at the upper end of the moderate bracket on page 15 of the Guidelines. I therefore assign a notional value of €35,000 for this element of the injuries, being the dominant injury.

15. The next aspect is the plaintiff's complaint of headaches, and this is the least significant element of the plaintiff's injuries. The first thing to say is it is not at all surprising that the plaintiff would suffer headaches as a result of this incident. She felt dazed at the time of the incident, received a head wound, and lost blood. The wound had to be glued and dressed and, unfortunately, she developed an infection at the site of the wound. In addition, it is clear that she suffered a direct trauma to the head when the body of the unfortunate man impacted the left side of her head, as she told Dr Corby, when it fell from the height. Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the headache symptoms fall into the “Minor… head injury” bracket on page 12 of the Guidelines, but towards the top of the bracket at (d) (iv), which is headed: "Substantial recovery within six months". This has a damages range of €500 to €3,000. Mr Lucey, for the defendant, doesn't hugely disagree but contends it should be at the low end of that range.

16. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that the headaches were ever present for about two months and intermittent for approximately six months. In common with her description as to her other injuries, I found her to be stoic and, if anything, understated in describing her injuries and symptoms. An aspect that, in my view, corroborates the reported headaches is the fact that in describing to Dr Hurley how the headaches affected her, she relayed that for almost six months post-incident she was more irritable and easily startled. In crossexamination the plaintiff did not demur when it was put to her by Mr Lucey that the personal injuries summons mentioned that her headaches persisted for no more than two weeks postincident and that the summons was prepared in July of 2023, which would have been about two and half years post-incident. In my view it can be difficult for patients to parse and analyse precisely how long specific symptoms may endure. What is clear is that the plaintiff relayed the history of her symptoms with respect to the headaches to both Dr Hurley and to Dr Corby and, though differing estimated durations are given, I'm disposed to accept the plaintiff's evidence given to the court that the headaches, once the initial severity wore off, continued intermittently for approximately another six months or so. Nonetheless, this is the least significant aspect of the plaintiff's injuries. Taking all matters into account, I assign a value for the purposes of the first part of the exercise of €2,000 in respect of this aspect.

17. The third element is the scar to the plaintiff's scalp. I've been provided with a report from Professor Jack Kelly, Consultant Plastic Surgeon, who saw the plaintiff on the 27th of March 2024. The plaintiff relayed to Professor Kelly that at that point she had, broadly speaking, two aspects to her complaints with respect to the scar. There was ongoing tenderness in and around the scar on the left side of the scalp. Secondly, she was concerned about the scar and there was loss of hair, and the scar was obvious when her hair was wet. The report notes that on examination there was a three-centimetre C-shaped scar on the left scalp. At the stage of the consultation the scar was quite mature. The scar did not adhere to the underlying tissues. Professor Kelly notes in his summary that the area was treated in the emergency department at the Mercy Hospital and, unfortunately, the wound had become infected. As a direct consequence, there was a three-centimetre permanent white C-shaped scar on the left scalp. In the opinion of the specialist, further surgery will not improve the result over and above that already achieved.

18. Looking at the Guidelines, Mr Downing SC submits that it falls into section A (b) on page 57 which has a damages range of €1,000 to €40,000, which is, obviously, a pretty broad range. The notes, insofar as material, say this is the applicable band where there's a “single noticeable scar, or several superficial scars… with some minor cosmetic deficit." Obviously that, as I've said, is a broad range. The defendant submits the scar valuation should be in the lowest bracket at the bottom end of the range on the basis that the scar is non-facial and is located halfway back into the hairline and is not at this point visible in an obvious way. I do not fully agree. The plaintiff is undoubtedly conscious of the scar and remains concerned about it, notwithstanding the bald patch improving from the 18 months post-incident stage which is captured in the photographs that were provided to the court.

19. The photographs appear in a Holmes O'Malley Sexton Solicitors booklet and there are some 11 photographs. I will give the booklet, for record purposes, an exhibit number - exhibit one. Photographs seven and eight give an above-head view of the scar as it stood at 18 months and, obviously, the other photographs are relevant as well. Professor Kelly notes the scar is C-shaped and that is evident from the photographs, and located on the scalp and it's about three centimetres in length. At the time the photographs were taken, the plaintiff had a bald spot in her hair consequent upon the incident. The scar was, undoubtedly, visible and was an understandable source of distress and disappointment for the plaintiff. The photographs show an obvious bald patch and C-shaped scar which, in my view, is plainly noticeable. An injury of this nature would affect most men, but for a woman I think this injury is more significant again.

20. The scar was and remains to this day sensitive and sore to touch. The plaintiff told Dr Hurley that she was fearful of touching it, of getting highlights in her hair and having her hair styled. She would not put a hat on her head for about three months because the scar was so sensitive. The plaintiff gave evidence that the hair has since grown back almost fully and she's relieved about that. She also says and I accept that she continues to be conscious of it, that the scalp around the area of the scar is dry and sensitive, and sore if she brushes against it when brushing her hair which is, obviously, something a person proud of their appearance, as the plaintiff is, is going to be doing on a frequent basis. A person's hair appearance undoubtedly impacts how they feel and appear, and all the more so for a woman I think I'm allowed say. Hair appearance will affect confidence, a sense of a person's attractiveness, indicate their personal hygiene to a degree, impact first appearances and, undoubtedly, impact mood.

21. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that she remains conscious of the bump on her scalp where the scar is, and I detected the bump myself when examining the plaintiff's scalp with the plaintiff's permission. I also noted that there are patches of reddened area at the scar site, though, thankfully, with the return of the hair cover, the scar is not as noticeable as it was, as captured in the photographs. Unfortunately, this aspect of the plaintiff's injuries and the fact that it continues to cause soreness and sensitivity when brushing is likely to be an everpresent reminder of the traumatic event itself. In all the circumstances, I assign a value of €30,000 in respect of the scar element of the injuries.

22. Moving then to the fourth element, the injury to the scalp itself and the damage to the plaintiff's hair. The plaintiff, undoubtedly, suffered a nasty injury at the time involving blunt trauma to the scalp, as described, resulting from the deceased's body directly impacting her head, possibly by way of a belt or other hard edge. The wound was treated in the emergency department at the Mercy Hospital. As a mark of her resilience and dedication to her duties, Garda Somers returned to work after being treated in hospital to help with processing the details concerning the unfortunate deceased man. Unfortunately, the scalp wound became infected, as the reports indicate, in the ensuing days, necessitating antibiotic cream and fresh dressings. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that her head was very sore as a result and that this was made worse by the fact that she couldn't clean her hair properly at the time. A pharmacist advised her to go to her GP and she was also given painkillers and cream. I think the plaintiff was quite conservative and stoic in the way she estimated how long the wound infection lasted - she believed, no more than a week. This was in keeping with the rest of her evidence which, as I've said, was given in a low-key and straightforward manner without exaggeration or drama.

23. One aspect that is in dispute between the parties concerns the plaintiff's claim for the cost of future hair transplant treatment. This is broken down in the claim for special damages as €350 for the initial consultation and €2,500 for approximately 500 hair grafts at €5 per graft. The plaintiff stated in her evidence that she is anxious to explore the possibility of getting a hair transplant and she had researched the issue online and learned that this would be the approximate cost of hair transplant treatment, mindful of the possibility that the bald patch may return and make the scarring more visible once again and, also, to improve the volume of her hair in that area which she feels is not the same as it was pre-incident.

24. When assessing damages in the case, the court has to, of course, be fair to both sides. That's the central principle. It seems to me that Mr Lucey makes a valid point when he says that the claim for hair transplant treatment in the future has not been evidentially or professionally supported. There is no report from a GP, he points out, or specialist recommending such treatment, nor medical opinion of any sort that such treatment would work or that the transplants would take. It's also contended that there's inadequate vouching of the sums claimed. All told, I am not satisfied that this element of the special damages claim has been proved to the required standard and, therefore, I will confine the special damages to the agreed sum of €1,800. Having said that, I accept the plaintiff's evidence that her hair has not fully regrown in that area of the scalp and there is not the same volume of hair abundance in that area. From my own brief examination during the hearing, I noted that there remains a slight gap in hair cover proximate to the scar bump.

25. The concept of damage to hair is dealt with briefly in the Guidelines on page 58. The defendant submits that the case falls into the lower category (b) in section 11, attracting a damages range of €500 to €12,000. In the absence of a medical report dealing specifically with the issue, I'm inclined to agree that that is the applicable range. Nonetheless, I must take into account the bald patch evidenced by the photographs at the 18 months stage, the fact that at post-incident 18 months the plaintiff remains conscious of the damage to her hair, her fear of the alopecia returning, the reduced volume in her hair and the slight gap in cover evident on close examination. I won't repeat what I said already as to the importance of good hair appearance for a person's well-being and sense of personal style. Taking account of the rather modest figures mentioned in the Guidelines for this category, I assign a value towards the top end of the lower bracket, and I assign a value of €10,000 under that heading.

26. The four assigned values, therefore, are €35,000 for the PTSD and associated psychological injuries, including sleeplessness, nightmares, social withdrawal, ongoing anxiety, flashbacks and avoidance behaviours; €2,000 for the headaches which have now resolved; €30,000 in respect of the scar injury and disfigurement to date and into the future; and €10,000 for the hair damage to date and into the future. On the facts of the case, it seems to me that there was an anatomical overlap between the scar disfigurement and the hair damage and scalp wound. However, these elements were separate from the headaches complaint and, most certainly, separate from the PTSD and psychological injuries.

27. The case law speaks of the necessity to take account of the “roll-up factor” and the overlap of injuries in cases such as the Court of Appeal's decision in Meehan v. Shawcove Limited [2022] IECA 208. Taking account of these matters and the required roll-up factor, I propose to discount the non-dominant injuries in this particular case by one-third. Judge Noonan for the Court of Appeal has made it clear that only the non-dominant injuries should be discounted, not all of the injuries. The discount to be applied is in the discretion of the court and may be as much as 50%, depending on the facts of the case. The Court of Appeal judgment emphasises that each case falls to be decided in accordance with its own individual facts. In the present case, I think the scar and the associated hair damage stand out in the plaintiff's evidence and occupy a higher order of significance within the overall injury profile. Mr Justice Noonan in the case of Zaganczyk v. Pettit Wexford Unlimited Company [2023] IECA 223 explained that whatever approach is adopted, a plaintiff is still entitled to be compensated for all of her injuries, be it from one source or many. One looks at the global injury profile and one shouldn't airbrush out or ignore the discrete injuries.

28. Applying, therefore, the two-thirds uplift to the valuation for the dominant injury, namely, the PTSD and psychological injuries, the non-dominant injuries then are €30,000 for the scar, as I've said, €10,000 for the hair damage and €2,000 for the headaches. That totals €42,000. Two-thirds of that is €28,000, which means that that is the uplift to be added to €35,000 for the dominant injury. That totals, by my calculations, €63,000.

29. That isn't the end of the exercise because, as the case law makes clear, it is sometimes necessary to step back from matters and form a view on whether that global figure represents a fair and reasonable amount, applying the proportionality principle. As the Court of Appeal made clear in Meehan, it may be necessary to stand back from the compilation of individual figures in order to assess whether the global aggregate figure for pain and suffering and loss of amenity would be proportionate both to the maximum cap of €550,000 and to awards made to plaintiffs in other cases. Applying that approach here, I take the view that the overall award proposed here for general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity in the past and into the future represents an outcome that is fair to both sides and proportionate in the sense indicated.

30. It seems to me that the incident has impacted the plaintiff's life in a significant way, albeit she has done her best to put it behind her. While she had previous experiences of dealing with death, as I've said, and was able to process those earlier experiences in a resilient and compartmentalised fashion, this incident, quite understandably, got in on her, continues to affect her, though not as severely as previously, continues to impact her socially as well as professionally and, as she has told her psychiatrist, may, ultimately, never leave her mind. There is a basis in my view for the psychiatrist's concern that she may never return to her former level of functioning. For a serving member of the force, that represents a significant loss.

Conclusion

31. In conclusion, therefore, there will be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of €64,800, including the agreed specials of €1,800, together with costs.

Signed: Micheál O’Higgins

Appearances: For the plaintiff: Henry Downing SC and Jack Nicholas BL instructed by Holmes O'Malley Sexton LLP. For the defendants: John Lucey SC and Denise Mulcahy BL instructed by TJ Hegarty Solicitors LLP.