High Court appoints receiver for open space and awards costs to Promontoria against Corcorans.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 359

2008 547S

BETWEEN

JOSEPH CORCORAN

PLAINTIFF

AND

EASSDA GROUP LIMITED, EASSDA IRELAND LIMITED AND ALISTAIR

JACKSON

DEFENDANTS

AND

PROMONTORIA EAGLE LIMITED AND KEN FENNELL

NOTICE PARTIES

2016 6043P

BETWEEN

KEN FENNELL

PLAINTIFF

AND

JOSEPH CORCORAN AND KATHERINE CORCORAN

DEFENDANTS

2020 4050P

BETWEEN

JOSEPH CORCORAN AND KATHERINE CORCORAN

PLAINTIFFS

AND

PROMONTORIA EAGLE LIMITED AND KEN FENNELL

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Brian O’Moore delivered on the 1st day of April 2025

1. In December 2024 I delivered a lengthy judgment dealing with the wide range of issues in dispute between the parties to these various proceedings. Later that month, there was a hearing to deal with any outstanding matters. On foot of that hearing, and at the request of the Corcorans, I provided them with time to put in written submissions on the question of costs. Further directions were also given with regard to submissions on the form of the order (about which there was a dispute). The third issue which remained outstanding from my judgment, namely the question of the appointment of a receiver to certain open space on the Glenair Manor Estate, was significantly advanced at the hearing on the 13th December 2024. On that occasion, Mr. Corcoran was able to provide me with correspondence from Wicklow County Council giving, in some detail, the position of the local authority on Mr. Corcoran’s application to appoint a receiver to the relevant parcel of open space. It will be remembered that, in my substantive judgment, I had a level of concern about the effectiveness of any notice provided to Wicklow County Council in respect of a motion to appoint such a receiver.

2. Following an exchange of submissions on the costs issue and the form of the order, I am now in a position to deliver judgment on the question of costs, the application to appoint a receiver, and the form of the order. I should state, however, at this stage that there is one final matter to be resolved in respect of the last of these headings.

Costs

3. The Promontoria interests sought their costs of the plenary proceedings and the motion to appoint a receiver to no. 6 Glenair Manor on the basis that they had been entirely successful in each of these matters. The Corcorans submitted, in a 17 page written submission, that costs should not follow the event. Instead, they argue that it would be “inequitable and unjust” to award any costs against them for a number of reasons. These were set out at para. 3 et seq. of the submission, and in that section the Corcorans set out a variety of cost and sexpenses which they had incurred. These included the cost of acquiring the original McHenry judgment, the cost of upgrades to no. 6, and the possible loss of their deposit. I will return to the deposit issue separately. In addition, it was argued that there should be no order for costs against the Corcorans because the Promontoria interests were now in a position to sell no. 6 Glenair Manor and profit significantly from the upgrades installed by the Corcorans some years ago. A high level of detail of these upgrades was provided in the written submissions.

4. Unfortunately for the Corcorans, all of these adverse consequences flow from their own refusal to close the sale when ordered to do so by Mr. Justice Murphy. That failure has been described in great detail in my substantive judgment, but put simply the Corcorans were called upon in accordance with the order of Mr. Justice Murphy to complete the purchase of no. 6, they did not do so, and instead they unsuccessfully fought these proceedings. The losses suffered by the Corcorans which they identify in their submissions, and any financial benefit to Promontoria interests, result solely from the decision of the Corcorans not to close the sale. These financial considerations, therefore, provide no reason to depart from the ordinary rule that costs follow the event.

5. As to the question of the deposits, I have already found that Ms. White did not defame Mr. Corcoran’s character with lies (as was suggested at para. 3.c of the written submission) nor did she consciously misrepresent facts to the court. With regard to the proceedings in which the Corcorans seek the return of their deposits (bearing record no. 2020/4363P and taken by the Corcorans against Ms. White and Mr. Peter Stapleton) I know little or nothing about these. The existence of these proceedings, however, is of some significance with regard to one of the issues to be decided under the heading of the form of the order.

6. The second strand to the Corcorans’ submissions on costs is that the Promontoria interests should not be entitled to their costs because of the provisions of s. 169(1)(a), (b) and

(c) of the Legal Services Regulation Act, 2015. Those provisions stipulate that a party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against the unsuccessful party unless the court orders otherwise. In considering whether or not to do so, the court should take into account: - “(a) conduct before and during the proceedings,

(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues in the proceedings,

(c) the manner in which the parties conducted all or any part of their case.”

7. Before considering the basis upon which the Corcorans argue that the Promontoria interests have behaved inappropriately or unproperly by reference to these three categories, it is worth remembering findings in my substantive judgment which reflect badly on the Corcorans. While a number of examples of these are set out at para. 16 of the replying legal submissions on costs delivered on behalf of the Promontoria interest, it is unnecessary to go into detail at this stage. It is, I think, sufficient to observe that Mr. Corcoran made profoundly damaging, harmful and baseless allegations against a number of individuals which should never have been advanced and (at the very least) should have been withdrawn during the course of the trial. This raises the interesting question as to whether or not, in considering the factors identified by s. 169(1) of the 2015 Act, the court can or should also take into account any want or inappropriateness in the way in which the parties seeking to rely upon that subsection themselves behaved. As a matter of logic, it seems to me that this is an exercise which can be carried out by a judge considering who should bear the costs of a particular piece of litigation. It would be unreal, and contrary to the purpose of the legislation which is at least in part to discourage the inappropriate or senseless conduct of litigation, to refuse to award costs to a successful party on the basis of its conduct while turning a blind eye to equally pernicious (or worse) conduct on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.

8. However, I have not decided the costs issue on that basis. Instead, I have carefully considered each of the allegations made by the Corcorans under this heading and find them wanting.

9. The first complaint by the Corcorans about the behaviour of the Promontoria interests is the delivery of a substantial amount of documentation in advance of the hearing. The Corcorans say that these documents “would only have [been] received… on the Monday before the hearing on Tuesday, had I not insisted on getting a courier to deliver them to me on Saturday.” However, the delivery of this documentation (three days before the trial commenced) is not in itself the sort of unreasonable and inappropriate conduct which is referred to in s. 169(1) of the 2015 Act. The adjectival contention by the Corcorans, that this documentation shows that a witness lied in her evidence, is not supported by any finding of fact made by me in the substantive judgment.

10. Secondly, the Corcorans complained that it was “unreasonable conduct” to seek to undermine the order made by Mr. Justice Murphy. However, no such attack was launched at the hearing. It is also incorrect to suggest, as the Corcorans do, that Ms. Grainne White “concocted a story to change the meaning of the Order…”; it is even more erroneous to suggest that I was in some way confused as to the meaning of the order made by Mr. Justice Murphy and the evidence of Ms. White in that regard. The meaning of the order of Mr. Justice Murphy has been limpidly clear from the outset.

11. Thirdly, the Corcorans complain about the evidence of Mr. Conor Maher of BCM. The evidence of Mr. Maher was accepted by me in my judgment. The complaints now made by the Corcorans are more appropriate to an appeal rather than a dispute about who should bear the costs of the proceedings. With regard to the timing of the delivery of the documentation, the Corcorans say that the booklet provided by the solicitors for the Promontoria interests in support of Mr. Maher’s evidence arrived “without notice and without providing any opportunity to examine its contents.” In fact, Mr. Corcoran sought a period of ten or fifteen minutes to examine the documentation, and instead I gave him an hour to do so. After that break, Mr. Corcoran showed himself well able to put what he felt was relevant in the documents to the witness. Even now, the Corcorans have not identified any detail of the financial records which they wished to put to Mr. Maher but had no opportunity to do so because of the limited time they had to consider the documentation.

12. Fourthly, the Corcorans complained that A&L Goodbody “failed to exhibit the High Quality Colour version…” of the “Deed of Assurance of Mortgage”. However, ultimately a high quality colour scan was produced. The substantive points made about the alleged absence of the NAMA seal on the document has been considered by me in my judgment. I found this to be an un-pleaded issue which, even if the seal was absent, I havd not been persuaded to be of any legal or factual significance. In light of these findings, this argument provides no basis for varying the ordinary rule that costs follow the event.

13. Fifthly, the Corcorans argue that Mr. Fennell was not validly appointed over all the assets of Eassda Ireland Limited in that “he had no right to make any claim in relation to the Building Contract.” Again, this is a matter which I have decided against the Corcorans in my judgment. In as much as the written submissions of the Corcorans suggest (incorrectly) that I was “confused” on this point, that again is a matter to be pursued on the appeal.

14. Sixthly, the Corcorans make various claims about the position of Mr. Stapleton as the Statutory Receiver appointed by NAMA. Again, my judgment records findings on these issues which are at odds with the Corcorans’ submissions. If I am wrong in these conclusions, they can be upset by the Court of Appeal. However, on this point I also agree that there is force in the written submissions made on behalf of the Promontoria interest to the effect that Mr. Stapleton is not a party to the proceedings and inaccuracies in his evidence would not necessarily constitute a reason to make a costs order adverse to the Promontoria interests.

15. Seventhly, the Corcorans argue that the Promontoria interests made “new claims in relation to the 2008/2759P proceedings that were both false, hearsay and not in evidence in any of the affidavits or testimony before the Justice Murphy hearing in December 2012.” However, the fact that evidence was given in these proceedings which was additional to evidence provided (on affidavit) in the trial before Mr. Justice Murphy is not necessarily in any way inappropriate. In two of the three examples given by the Corcorans under this heading, they asked me to find that evidence given by Ms. White was incorrect and to prefer the evidence of Mr. Jack Roundtree – which I have not done in my substantive judgment – or the purported evidence of Mr. Denis Handy – which was not evidence given before me, and who as a witness I have simply had no opportunity to observe in giving his testimony. Not surprisingly, I will not make any such findings that Ms. White’s evidence was “false”. The third example is that senior counsel for the Promontoria interest had stated during the trial that the order of Mr. Justice Murphy was “against the Corcorans”. I understand that the Corcorans have limited access to the transcripts, and it is therefore possibly asking too much for them to identify exactly at what point in a lengthy hearing this statement was made. However, consistently throughout the hearing it was accepted by the Promontoria interests that the order of Mr. Justice Murphy directed both sides to specifically perform the agreement with regard to the sale of no. 6 Glenair Manor.

16. Separately, the Corcorans maintained that “someone else was running these proceedings”. I have already dismissed this suggestion in my substantive judgment. I will decide the costs application in accordance with that judgment.

17. The final four arguments raised by the Corcorans relate to the manner in which the Promontoria interests conducted all or part of their case. The first of these is to challenge once again the evidence of Grainne White, this time by stating that the “Family Home Declaration” had to be signed by Ms. White’s client (Alistair Jackson) and this could not be executed under power of attorney. This proposition was not put to Ms. White, and in order for me to accept that her evidence was false this would have to have been done. It would be unfair now to disbelieve Ms. White’s evidence simply on the basis of a proposition not actually put to her.

18. The Corcorans then claim that Ms. White stated that she had agreed to reduce the Terms of Settlement “to a snag list”. I do not believe that this was the evidence of Ms. White. In any event, the critical findings made Mr. Justice Murphy were to the effect that the Terms of Settlement had been complied with by the vendors, and that it was the Corcorans who had breached them. This was done without any reference to the evidence which Ms. White gave some years after the Murphy judgment.

19. Thirdly, the Corcorans repeated the argument that Mr. Fennell was not validly appointed. As counsel for the Promontoria interest point out in their replying written submissions, this involves a collateral attack on my substantive judgment which rejected the claim that Mr. Fennell had not been validly appointed. As is the norm, this decision on costs proceeds on the basis that the substantive judgment is correct. Any challenge to that judgment is more properly made by appealing it.

20. Finally, under this heading, the Corcorans refer to a difference in evidence between Ms. White and Mr. Roundtree. As recorded at para. 67 of my judgment, it was not put to Ms. White that Mr. Roundtree had sent no letter to her in October 2022 requesting a copy of the power of attorney (the claimed difference in the evidence between the two witnesses). Given that this proposition was not put to Ms. White, and given that she had therefore no opportunity to address it, it would not be appropriate to make any finding contrary to Ms. White on that point.

21. The final complaint made by the Corcorans about the way in which the Promontoria interests conducted the litigation again relates to Ms. White. My findings with regard to Ms. White’s evidence are set out fully in the judgment, and are not supportive of the complaints made by the Corcorans (in particular) at paragraph 16 of their written legal submission.

22. The Promontoria interests have succeeded fully in the plenary proceedings listed for hearing before me and in the motion with regard to the application to appoint a receiver to no.

6 Glenair Manor. None of the submissions made on behalf of the Corcorans pursuant to the provisions of s. 169(1) of the 2015 Act provide any reason not to award the Promontoria interest their costs of these proceedings. In addition, the financial issues upon which the Corcorans rely do not provide any basis for me to refuse the costs as sought by the Promontoria interest. These financial consequences, in the main, flow exclusively from the

decision of the Corcorans not to comply with the order of Mr. Justice Murphy. The financial consequence which does not flow directly from the failure to comply with the order of Mr. Justice Murphy – namely the refusal of the application to appoint a receiver – flows in part from the misplaced belief on the part of the Corcorans that they could acquire no. 6 by applying a set-off in respect of the McHenry judgment.

23. Before I move on to consider the other matters to be determined in this ruling, I should correct a small error at para. 2 of the submissions of the Corcorans. The Corcorans suggest that para. 14 of my judgment was incorrect in referring to four sets of proceedings as opposed to three. In fact, paragraph 14 of my judgment refers to “four different matters listed for hearing before me.” I have set out at para. 14 of the substantive judgment what those four different matters were. There is no inaccuracy in the judgment in that regard.

The form of order

24. It is unusual to have a dispute about the form that an order takes. When I was first told there was such a dispute at the hearing on the 13th December 2024 I gave the Corcorans the opportunity to set out in writing what issues they had with the form of order proposed by A&L Goodbody.

25. Mr. Corcoran, in a letter sent on behalf of both himself and his wife, identified two issues.

26. The first issue is that the judgment “was not based on the reading of all the Affidavits and other papers presented in the booklets for the hearing and in particular the reading of the transcript of the Murphy Hearing.” Mr. Corcoran very fairly stated that that was simply his opinion and it was a matter for me to decide what to include in the orders on this issue.

27. The second issue raised by the Corcorans, which is far more problematic, is whether or not it would be “inequitable” not to deal with the question of the deposits paid in respect of the two contracts given that my judgment declared that the two contracts were at an end.

The Corcorans ask that I decide whether or not they are entitled in these circumstances to the return of the two deposits, and what interest should be paid on the deposits.

28. In response, counsel for the Promontoria interests point out that the draft orders proposed by them state that the applications were determined on “oral evidence” along with documents “adduced in evidence”. This refers back to para. 15 of the judgment. This characterisation of the relevant section of the judgment is not entirely accurate.

29. In fact, paragraph 15 in the judgment makes it plain that I would decide “the plenary proceedings by reference to the oral evidence and such documents as were properly admissible at the hearing”. That paragraph concluded: - “Having decided the issues raised in the plenary proceedings, I will then decide the motions.”

30. The order in respect of the plenary proceedings, therefore, should record the fact that they were decided on oral evidence and the documents which were put before the court and which were properly admissible at the hearing. Having decided the issues in the plenary proceedings, I then determined the motions. The motions were decided on the affidavit evidence, as would be normal, but also in the light of my determination of the issues raised in the plenary hearing. So, for example, I refused the motion to appoint a receiver to no. 6 primarily because of my decision (made in the context of the plenary proceedings) that Mr. Fennell was already validly appointed as receiver over the same property. The second reason why that motion was refused was (as set out in paragraph 363 of the judgment) the stated position of the proposed receiver that he intended to close the sale to the Corcorans by applying a set-off which, I found, could not “legally or properly be done.”

31. Equally, the motion to appoint a receiver to the open space in the estate was made having considered the affidavits filed int that motion (in the light of any relevant determinations by me in the plenary proceedings).

32. The orders will therefore reflect the fact that the plenary proceedings were determined on the basis of the oral evidence, the pleadings, the proceedings had herein and the documents adduced in evidence together with the written submissions. With regard to the motions, the orders will refer in addition to the affidavits filed in respect of each individual motion.

33. I should say that the response on behalf of the Corcorans is consistent with the approach which I intend to adopt. On this issue, the response concludes: - “Again I state that the Order and its contents belongs to the Judge, and only the Judge knows what documents he read, in relation to the production of his Judgment.”

34. On the question of the return of the deposits, the Promontoria interests are opposed to any determination of that issue. They make the point that there was no dispute in respect of the deposits, that Sanfey J. had (as I found) given both sides “an ideal opportunity to make sure that every point they wished to raise was properly before the court …” and that nowhere in the pleadings is the status of the deposits canvassed by either side and in particular by the Corcorans. They go on to say that it appears to be the case that this issue has been litigated in other proceedings. These proceedings were described by the Corcorans in their written submissions on costs describing “another set of proceedings 2020/4353P against Grainne White and Peter Stapleton to recover our deposit”. The Promontoria interests further submit that, as no issue with regard to the deposits was decided by me, this cannot be recorded in the form of the order. I should comment that this is undoubtedly correct, as far as it goes. However, I believe that I should treat the Corcorans’ request with regard to the deposit as something that transcends the issue of the form of the order. Rather, it raises what the Corcorans say would be a more significant inequity in that the contracts would have been found to be at an end without any determination as to the status of the deposits which they paid some considerable time ago.

35. Finally, and most importantly, the Promontoria interests submit that I am bound by pleadings which seek no relief with regard to the return of the deposits to the Corcorans. They refer to the trenchant statement by the Court of Appeal in RL v Henehan [2015] IECA

120 to the effect that: -

“18. … The Court obtains its jurisdiction from the issue that is brought before it by the litigants for decision by means of originating summons or notice or pleadings. This serves the important purpose of defining the issues between the parties and ensuring that, in the words of FitzGerald J. in Mahon v. Celbridge Spinning Co. Ltd. [1967] I.R. 1, 3: ‘The trial may proceed to judgment without either party being taken at a disadvantage by the introduction of matters not fairly to be ascertained from the pleadings. In other words, each side should know in advance, in broad outline, the case he will have to meet at the trial.’

19. This principle is fractured when the court makes an order which was not sought by either party and where that order cannot be regarded as consequential or ancillary to the issues which were before the court.

36. In their response, the Corcorans argue that decision on the question of the deposit is something which is “consequential or ancillary” to the issues which were before me. They say (at paragraph 4) that it is only at this stage that they are in a position (or have the opportunity) to seek the return of the deposits from the Promontoria interests. My decision on the status of the contracts (it is argued) “opens the door for our application that the Court now Order the return of the deposits with interest.”

37. It is worth noting that the un-pleaded order in RL v Henehan (ultimately set aside by the Court of Appeal for want of jurisdiction on the part of the Circuit Court judge) was an order contained in the substantive judgment of the trial judge. It did not involve an application to argue a completely separate point which arose from the trial judge’s original ruling.

38. In the current proceedings, it is accepted by the Corcorans that they have not made any claim for a return of the deposit. They could have done so. The pleading of matters in the alternative is well known. It would have been open to the Corcorans to claim that, if the contracts were at an end, their deposit should be returned. That would have allowed the matter to be ventilated in evidence and, possibly more importantly in the context of this case, have legal submissions on whether or not (in principle) the deposits were to be returned and, if so, on what terms. However, what is sought in the current application by the Corcorans is that after a lengthy trial and the delivery of a reserved judgment an entirely fresh un-pleaded issue should be decided by me. This is not an immediately attractive prospect.

39. In addition, other proceedings have been issued seeking the return of the deposits. While the Corcorans argue that these proceedings may now be “nearly… impossible” for them to succeed in giving the findings in my substantive judgment in the current litigation, it is not explained why that would be so.

40. In the event I do not decide on whether the Corcorans are entitled to the return of their deposits and (if they are) the terms applicable to such return, the litigation launched in 2020 against Ms. White and Mr. Stapleton may well proceed. Even if they do not proceed, there is at least the possibility that the Corcorans will institute proceedings against the Promontoria interests in light of the belief expressed by the Corcorans at para. 12 of their supplemental submissions on the form of order (to the effect that the Promontoria interests have placed themselves as “representative” of the original counterparties to these agreements). Such litigation against the Promontoria interests could encounter difficulties. For example, it is entirely possible that the rule in Henderson and Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 would be deployed in defence of such a claim. However, the mere fact that those proceedings may well be launched means that there could be a further spur to this unfortunate saga.

41. As a matter of practicality, there is one way in which matters might be short circuited. I have a significant level of knowledge of the dispute between the Promontoria interests and the Corcorans. I have delivered a lengthy judgment dealing with those disputes. In terms of the use of the resources of the courts, and the interests of the parties, the most sensible thing may be for me to conduct a limited and focused hearing on the question of the return of the deposits and to decide upon that issue.

42. I would therefore invite the parties to consider whether or not they would agree that I would decide all relevant issues with regard to (a) the claim by the Corcorans that they are entitled separately to a return of their deposit in respect of the land purchase and the return of their deposit with regard to the building contract, (b) if they are so entitled whether any return should be accompanied by the payment of interest and (c) if so to calculate the interest payable on any such returned deposit. It is clear that the Corcorans have no objection to me deciding that issue, as they have asked me to do so. It may well be that the Promontoria interests have their own reasons as to why I should not decide this issue. As things stand, their submissions are quite trenchantly to the effect that I have no jurisdiction to do so but, of course, jurisdiction can be provided if the parties agree to do so.

43. I should add that, while I am agreeable in principle to carrying out this function, it will only be in the event that these questions could be decided on the basis of a focused and restrained approach where real efforts are made to agree any evidential issues and where the legal issues are addressed in a manner which is relevant. It is also dependant on my availability, but that is a matter that can be addressed in the event that the parties agree that I would be asked to decide these issues.

44. I am going to fix 5pm on the 17th April 2025 for the parties to revert to me on this issue. I am giving this somewhat extended period as I understand from their communications with my registrar that the Corcorans are out of the country until the 10th of April. It is, of course, open to the parties to state their position well before the 17th of April. In the event that agreement is not reached, I will then issue a four paragraph judgment on whether or not to accede to the Corcorans’ request that I determine the question of the return of the deposits. There is, however, no purpose in doing so (particularly since whichever way this is decided it could well lead to an appeal on this point alone) without inviting the parties to consider their position in the light of the scenario I have described.

Appointment of receiver to open spaces in Glenair Manor

45. At the hearing of the 13th December 2025, Mr. Corcoran made available correspondence from Wicklow County Council which sets out with considerable care and detail the approach which that local authority has towards this application. This is not an application which concerns the Promontoria interests, though I have taken into account the submissions that they made as to the relevant legal principles in the context of the application to appoint a receiver to no. 6 Glenair Manor. I am satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case, Mr. Corcoran should be granted an order appointing Gerard Murray as receiver by way of equitable execution over specified lands at Glenair Manor, namely the open space ringed in red and marked as “A” in the map to be appended to the Order. The map is the document bearing the date of the 12th March 2025, and provided to my Registrar by Banahan Surveyors on the instructions of Mr. Corcoran. I have not been asked to make any order in respect of the costs of this motion, but will grant Mr. Corcoran liberty to apply in that regard. As I have already indicated to Mr. Corcoran, I am going to direct that he serves copies of the Order (to include the map) on the occupants of the Glenair Manor estate as they may have a practical interest in the appointment of Mr. Murray as receiver over an open space area. He is also to serve a copy of the Order on Wicklow County Council. The Order is to be served on all of these individuals within four weeks of its perfection. The inhabitants of Glenair Manor, and Wicklow County Council, are to be told that they have ten weeks of the service of the Order to apply to me to seek to have the Order set aside or varied in any way. The letter enclosing the Order, and informing these parties have liberty to apply, is to give the email address of the registrar dealing with these proceedings (Ms. Mary Kelly) as the person to whom notice is to be given if any such application is to be made.

46. Mr. Corcoran, or the person serving the documentation on the persons to be notified, is to file an affidavit of service within 5 weeks of the date of perfection of the order. This is to be simultaneously copied to Ms. Kelly.

Conclusion

47. In summary, I have decided the following: -

(1) The Promontoria interests are to recover against the Corcorans the costs of the plenary proceedings and the motion to appoint Mr. Murray as receiver to no. 6 Glenair Manor. This is to include reserved costs and the costs of legal submissions.

(2) With regard to the plenary actions, the order will record the fact that my

decision was based on the oral evidence and the documents adduced in evidence. With regard to the motions, the relevant order will record that the

decision was based on the motion papers (to include affidavits and exhibits) and the oral evidence as well as the documents produced in evidence during the course of the trial.

(3) On the question of the return of the deposits, I am inviting the parties to agree that I would decide this issue, subject to fairly strict stipulations as to how and when that might be done. If the parties do not agree within the time I have specified that I would decide this issue then I will deliver a brief ruling on the Corcorans’ application that I would do so.

(4) I appoint Mr. Murray as receiver over the relevant open space at Glenair Manor, subject to detailed directions as to the service of the order on relevant parties. Those relevant parties are to have a period within which they can apply to set aside or vary the order appointing Mr. Murray.