High Court orders surrender to UK under TCAW warrant despite parole hearing and sovereignty concerns.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 346

BETWEEN Record No 2024 237 EXT

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

APPLICANT

v.

OWEN JOHN MAUGHAN

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Patrick McGrath delivered on the 5 June 2025

1. The applicant seeks an order for the surrender of the respondent to the United Kingdom on foot of one Trade and Co-Operation Agreement warrant (‘TCAW’).

2. This is a conviction warrant and the surrender of the Respondent is sought in order that he might serve the balance of a sentence of 14 years imposed by the Crown Court on the 21 December 2017 for two offences of Attempted Burglary, one offence of Burglary, three offences of Aggravated Burglary and one offence of Taking a Vehicle without the Owners Consent.

3. Having served the custodial part of this sentence the Respondent was released on licence on the 19 December 2023. This licence was thereafter revoked, and he was recalled into custody on the 7 June 2024.

4. The TCAW was endorsed on the 13 January 2025. The Respondent was arrested and produced before this Court on the same date. The Respondent has been admitted to bail pending the outcome of these proceedings.

Uncontroversial Matters

5. I am satisfied that the TCAW, issued by District Judge George Conner sitting at Laganside Court, Belfast Magistrates Court, was issued by a ‘judicial authority’ in the United Kingdom within the meaning of s. 10 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2023.

6. No issue is taken in relation to identity, and I am satisfied the Respondent is the person named in the Warrant.

7. I am satisfied that there are sufficient particulars set out in the Warrant such that it complies with s. 11 of the 2003 Act and the requirements of the Framework Decision.

8. I am satisfied that none of the matters referred to in sections 22, 23 and 24 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, as amended (“the 2003 Act”), arise for consideration in this application and surrender of the respondent is not precluded for any of the reasons set forth in any of those sections.

Correspondence

9. The TCAW is a Warrant issued in accordance with Article LAW.SURR.112 of the Trade and Co-Operation Agreement. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate correspondence in accordance with s. 38 of the 2003 Act.

10. Section 5 of the 2003 Act provides:-

‘For the purposes of this Act, an offence specified in a European Arrest Warrant corresponds to an offence under the law of the state, where the act or omission that constitutes the offence so specified would, if committed in the State on the date on which the European arrest warrant is issued, constitute an offence under the law of the State’.

11. The relevant principles for showing correspondence are now well established. In assessing correspondence, the question is whether the acts or omissions that constitute the offence in the requesting state would, if carried out in this jurisdiction, amount to a criminal offence – Minister for Justice v Dolny [2009] IESC 48

12. The TCAW relates to seven offences and a full narrative description of the conduct underlying such offences is set out in paragraph (e) of the Warrant. There is also set out therein the nature and classification of the said offences and the applicable statutory provisions in Northern Ireland as follows:-

(i) Attempt to enter a building as a trespasser within intent to steal therein contrary to Article 3(1) of the Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy (Northern Ireland) Order 1983 and section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969. I am satisfied that this offence would correspond with an offence of Attempted Burglary under Irish Law;

(ii) Entering a building as a trespasser and stealing therein various items and at that time having a weapon of offence, contrary to section 10(1) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969. I am satisfied that this offence corresponds with an offence of Aggravated Burglary contrary to Section 13 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001;

(iii) Entering a dwelling house and stealing various items therefrom and at the time having a weapon of offence contrary to section 10(1) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969. I am satisfied that this offence corresponds with an offence of Aggravated Burglary contrary to Section 13 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001;

(iv) Attempt to enter a dwelling as a trespasser within intent to steal therein contrary to Article 3(1) of the Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy (Northern Ireland) Order 1983 and section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969. I am satisfied that this offence would correspond with an offence of Attempted Burglary under Irish Law;

(v) Entering a part of a building as a trespasser with intent to steal therein contrary to Section 10(1) of the Theft (Northern Ireland) Act, 1969. I am satisfied that this offence would constitute an offence of Burglary in this jurisdiction contrary to Section 12 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001;

(vi) Entering a dwelling house and stealing various items therefrom and at the time having a weapon of offence contrary to section 10(1) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969. I am satisfied that this offence corresponds with an offence of Aggravated Burglary contrary to Section 13 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001;

(vii) Knowing that a motor vehicle had been stolen, allowing himself to be carried therein contrary to Article 172 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order, 1981.

I am satisfied that correspondence can be established between this offence and an offence under Irish Law contrary to Section 112 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 (as amended)

13. The minimum gravity requirement under the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended) [‘the 2003 Act’] is met.

Grounds of Objection

14. The Respondent objects to surrender on the following grounds:-

(i) The Respondent asserts that the Part D Certification has only been provided for the Court of First Instance and not the Tribunal responsible for the revocation of his licence;

(ii) The Respondent asserts that there has not been compliance with the requirements of section 16(1)(c) and / or section 45 of the 2003 Act;

(iii) The Respondent awaits proof of correspondence in relation to all offences;

(iv) The surrender of the Respondent would amount to an impermissible compromise of Irish sovereignty under the Constitution, in circumstances where the warrant is predicated upon an attempt by the issuing state to regulate the conduct of the Respondent within this jurisdiction and to impose a form of preventative detention upon him which is fundamentally at odds with the Constitution and his right to liberty under the European Convention on Human Rights

Affidavit of Respondent

15. The Respondent has sworn and filed an Affidavit, dated the 13 February 2025. He states therein that, having been released on licence, he engaged with probation services in Mullingar in accordance with the terms of his licence. He states that he did not receive any notification of a revocation of his licence or any notification or communication to inform him of a hearing in relation to the revocation of his licence.

Requests for further Information

16. Two requests for further information were sent to the issuing judicial authority [‘IJA’], pursuant to s. 20 of the 2003 Act.

17. In the first request this Court asked:-

‘1. The warrant states in Part (c) that ‘this licence was subsequently revoked by the Department of Justice on 7th June 2024 under Article 28 of this order. This decision was taken as it was considered by the Department that the level of risk of harm posed by him to the public could not be managed in the community.’ a. Can the issuing judicial authority explain what led to the revocation of the Respondent’s licence?

b. What were the conditions attached to the Respondent’s licence?

c. Was the Respondent informed of any hearings in relation to the revocation of his licence? Please furnish details of same.’

18. In their response, dated the 17th of February 2025, the IJA stated:-

‘1. The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland considered that Maughan’s behaviour since his release from custody had increased the harm he posed to the public as evidenced by his involvement in further offending. The Police Service of Northern Ireland have evidence that Maughan was involved in an alleged armed robbery on 14th April 2024. Further information has been received from An Garda Siochana advising the Maughan has been charged and remanded in custody in Northern Ireland. The Department of Justice also considered evidence from the Probation Board in Northern Ireland which indicated that Maughan displayed a clear disregard for the conditions of his licence.

2. A copy of Maughans Article 17 licence is attached which states the conditions of same.

3. Article 28 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 which governs the recall of prisoners released on licence is copied below for ease of reference. The legislation allows a prisoner to make representations in respect of his recall upon his return to prison…’

19. A second request for information was sent to the IJA on the 12 March 2025. In the reply thereto the Northern Ireland authorities:-

(a) Set out the licence conditions imposed on the Respondent upon his release on the

19 December 2023;

(b) Stated that Mr Maughan’s alleged offending behaviour within the community clearly evidences disregard for his licence conditions. Reference is then made to a PBNI extract from the recall report sent to the Parole Commissioners in Northern Ireland recommending revocation of his licence and detailing reasons for same:- ‘Recall has been initiated on 4.6.24. This action has been taken following PBNI becoming aware Mr Maughan has been identified as a suspect in an armed robbery on 14.04.24. This information came via contact from the PSNI who noted that Mr.

Maughan was subject to licence. Following liaison with the Probation Service Ireland it has been confirmed that he was remanded in custody on 17.04.24 for alleged offending on 21.03.24 and 19.04.24 and has been in custody in Cloverhill Prison since 17th April. As such, Mr Maughan is alleged to have been involved in the commission of several offences, both in the Republic of Ireland, and in Northern Ireland, over a brief time frame, with the alleged use of a handgun in the Armed Robbery offence. Mr Maughan has a prolific history of offending for financial gain, which is reflected in the index offences and it is concerning that he has allegedly targeted church premises again, and his offending has potentially escalated given the alleged brandishing of a gun’

(c) The application to revoke his licence was initiated following the PBNI becoming Aware of the alleged offending above. The PBNI also made contact with the Probation Service in Mullingar and were made aware that he had initially attended weekly appointments with his local probation office and was offered support with training and employment but declined same. His contact was then reduced to monthly, and he last attended an appointment in March 2024.

Opinion of Conan Fegan B.L.

20. An affidavit was filed on behalf of the Respondent exhibiting the Opinion of Mr Conan Fegan, Barrister at Law practising before the Courts of Ireland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales. In this opinion he describes the recall system in Northern Ireland and how the Courts in that jurisdiction have interpreted the same.

21. Having set out the background, including the terms of Mr Maughan’s licence and Articles 17 & 28 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 which provide for the release on licence of a ‘fixed term prisoner’ after service of the requisite custodial period (Article 17) and the recall of such a prisoner and revocation of his or her licence (Article 28), Mr Fegan then states that it would seem that in this case a single Parole Commissioner made a recommendation for recall to the Department of Justice pursuant to Article 28(2) of the Order.

22. After recall, the Parole Commissioners are required either to release the prisoner again on licence or, within 7 days, fix a hearing for the review of the case by them: Article 29(2) of the 2008 Order and rule 6(1) of the Parole Commissioners Rules (Northern Ireland) 2009. At that review, the merits of the decision to recall the prisoner will be considered and will usually proceed by way of oral hearing with witnesses of fact heard and legal representation granted: R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2014] AC 1115.

23. Mr Fegan thereafter sets out a precis of case law concerning the basis upon which a recall decision may be triggered focusing on cases concerning post release behaviour.

The cases cited include:-

(i) RE Kieran Smyth [2021] NIQB 14 where it was held that recall decisions can be triggered by sensitive information which cannot be made public or scrutinised in the normal way. Furthermore, the information upon which a

decision maker can act need not be imbued with the qualities of evidence admissible before a court;

(ii) Hegarty v Department of Justice & Ors. [2018] NIQB 20 where the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland approved the approach that the lawful basis for revocation of a licence did not depend upon proof that the prisoner had breached a licence condition but the barometer was whether the decision maker ‘…could reasonably think that the claimant was in breach of his licence conditions’.

Furthermore, the intensity of the review of recall decisions for a prisoner still subject to a determinate sentence, though on licence, lies at the lower end of the scale;

(iii) Re Gavin Coyle v Parole Commissioners [2018] NIQB 29. The court there found that whilst the rules permit the admission in principle of hearsay evidence in such matters, such hearsay should not be overly relied upon without reflection and care;

(iv) In Re Edgar’s Application for Judicial Review [2018] NIQB 29, the triggering event for recall was the applicant being charged with but not yet convicted of a burglary. Keegan J there held that the test for recall is a matter for judgment taking into account all matters including : his background, the licence conditions and current circumstances including the trigger for recall. The decision whether to recommend a recall does not require the full adjudicative panoply and, although the applicant is entitled to the presumption of innocence, the circumstances surrounding an alleged offence may be considered and recall decisions are not based upon ‘proof of another offence’ but rather an assessment of risk

24. Counsel also refers to a number of cases from England and Wales, approved of in the Northern Ireland Courts, which caution against using allegations of re-offending alone as a basis for recall. A prisoner is entitled to a fair hearing before the Board and the

decision maker cannot therefore simply rely upon the fact of charge and pending prosecution, without more, to justify a risk of re-offending R (Broadbent) v Parole Board of England and Wales [2005] EWHC 1207.

25. Finally, it is noted that the recall of a prisoner is not a punishment and not the determination of a criminal charge for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR R(West)

v Parole Board [2005] 1 WLR 350 and that the purpose of recall is protect the public against risk.

Submissions of Respondent

Failure to comply with s45 of the 2003 Act

26. The Respondent claims that ‘given the complete uncertainty as to the circumstances in which the licence was revoked’ the Court cannot be satisfied that the requirements of s45 have been met.

27. In this regard the Respondent seeks to argue that the decision to revoke the licence in this case was part of the ‘trial resulting in the decision’ and that therefore the Court cannot order surrender as the Respondent was not informed of that hearing and / or given an opportunity to attend at that hearing.

Extraterritoriality

28. The Respondent refers to and distinguishes the facts of this case from those under consideration in the decision of the Supreme Court in Minister for Justice v Balmer [2017] 3 IR 562.

29. In Balmer the Respondent had been convicted of the offence of murder in the United Kingdom and had received a mandatory life sentence. He was required to serve a minimum period of 15 years in custody prior to being considered for parole and this reflected the ‘punitive’ element of his sentence. Mr Balmer was subsequently released on licence, a condition of which was that he did not travel outside the UK. His licence was revoked, and he received a revocation notice identifying the reasons for revocation.

30. The Respondent submitted that his extradition should be refused as his surrender was being sought in order to serve a sentence which, at that point in time, was purely preventative in nature and this was a constitutionally impermissible form of detention. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and found that in order for a surrender to be refused on this basis, the perceived unconstitutionality of a requesting state’s legal system would have to be so egregious as to show a fundamental defect in that system, or to depart so markedly from the scheme and order envisaged by the Constitution as to require a Court to intervene and refuse surrender.

31. The Respondent seeks to distinguish the facts of the present case from those under consideration in Balmer, referring to the following:-

(a) Firstly, the Respondent there received a life sentence, whereas here he received a fixed term of 14 years with 7 years in custody and 7 years on licence;

(b) Secondly it was a term of his licence that he reside in the UK and not leave the jurisdiction. Here the Respondent was allowed to leave Northern Ireland and was required to live in this jurisdiction and engaged with the Probation Service in Mullingar;

(c) In Balmer, considerations of sovereignty led the Supreme Court to the view that it is only in cases where there were egregious and fundamental defects in the justice system of the issuing state, or where surrender would result in a manifest breach of constitutional rights, that the Irish Courts may justifiably refuse extradition, whereas the Respondent says that in this case ‘the sovereignty analysis points in the other direction’

32. The Respondent claims that, given the terms and conditions of the Respondent’s licence which required that he live in this jurisdiction and engage with probation services in this state, the issuing state had relinquished authority over his supervision and reintegration as long as he remained in Ireland complying with the conditions of his licence. The issuing state has therefore, as long as he complies with these conditions, no lawful basis to assert supervisory authority over his conduct in this state.

33. The Respondent submits that any attempt to assert such control would constitute an ‘unwarranted interference with Ireland’s sovereign prerogative to regulate and oversee individuals within its territory’ and this would amount to an ‘affront to Irish sovereignty and a disregard for the jurisdictional autonomy of the State.’

34. The Respondent furthermore argues that contrary to the principles in Balmer, the requesting state is seeking to impose a form of preventative detention on the Respondent in respect of conduct and matters arising from his presence in Ireland.

Submissions of Applicant

Compliance with s. 45 of the 2003 Act

35. The Minister submits that the Respondent wrongly seeks to rely on the decision of the CJEU in Ardic [Case C-571/17 PPU]. The revocation of the licence by the Northern Ireland authorities does not ‘modify either the nature or quantum of the sentence’ originally imposed for the offences in question. As such that decision did not form part of the ‘trial resulting in the decision’ and any failure to inform the Respondent of such hearing is of no relevance to the issue of compliance with s. 45 of the 2003 Act.

Extraterritoriality

36. The Applicant firstly refers to the often-cited comments of Murray CJ in Minister for Justice v Brennan [2007] 3 I.R. 732 where he cited Ireland’s devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality as recognised in Article 29 of the Constitution. Consistent with these comments and the underlying principles, this Court must start with a presumption that the IJA has acted in good faith.

37. The Minister says that there are clear similarities between the case of Balmer and this case. Both men were released on licence and in both cases, they were recalled following a revocation of such licence. The applicant also points out that the Court in Balmer was clear that to surrender the respondent in that case to face a form of preventative detention did not amount to a breach of his constitutional rights.

38. Finally, he says there is no evidence that the Requesting state have failed or will fail to adhere to fair procedures in relation to the matters raised.

Decision

Compliance with s. 45 of the 2003 Act

39. I am satisfied that no issue in this regard arises on the facts of this case. The ‘trial resulting in the decision’ was the trial which took place when the Respondent was convicted and sentenced for the seven offences for which his surrender is now sought.

On that date a total sentence of 14 years was imposed in respect of the seven offences and, owing to the sentencing regime in place in the issuing state, such a sentence (described under the law of Northern Ireland as a ‘fixed sentence’) was divided into a custodial period of imprisonment of 7 years and a period of 7 years thereafter where the offender serves the remainder of the sentence on licence.

40. Owing to his alleged failure to comply with the lawfully imposed conditions which attached to his release on licence following his completion of the custodial period of seven years, his licence has been revoked and he has been recalled to custody to continue serving this 14-year sentence in prison. Following recall the Parole Commissioners must again release him on licence or, within 7 days of his recall, fix a date for the review of the matter and the Respondent is entitled to representation at any such hearing.

41. I am in agreement with the submissions made by the Minister on this issue. There have been a number of decisions of both the Irish Courts and the CJEU which have considered the question of whether, or in what circumstances, the activation of a suspended sentence might be considered as part of the ‘trial resulting in the decision’ within the meaning of Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision or might otherwise give rise to a right to be informed of and / or attend at such an activation hearing.

42. The following principles of law have emerged from the case law on this topic:- a. The ‘trial resulting in the decision’, as used in Article 4a of the Framework

Decision, is a concept which has an autonomous and uniform interpretation and meaning throughout the Union – Ardic;

b. For the purposes of Article 4a of the Framework Decision, the activation of a suspended sentence will ordinarily not be considered ‘the trial resulting in the

decision’. In cases where an activation hearing takes place in the absence of a Respondent (or without him receiving due notification of the same) surrender is the rule and the question is whether or not an individual respondent can bring himself within some exception to that rule;

c. The fact that a Court, when considering whether to activate a suspended sentence enjoys a margin of discretion such that it might not activate a suspended sentence at all or activate it in whole or in part, does not alter the nature of such a hearing and does not mean that such a hearing is a ‘trial resulting in the decision’ and therefore one to which the requirements of Article 4a apply. In other words, as made clear at paragraph 80 of Ardic and re-affirmed at paragraph 54 of LU & PH [Cases C-514/21 and C-515/21], there is no requirement that a respondent be present at or have notification of such a hearing under Article 4a of the Framework Decision as it is not a ‘trial resulting in the

decision’;

d. Where a Court can modify the quantum or nature of the penalty imposed, for example Gurgiudiani v Spain [ECtHR 15 December 2009] (where a new penalty was imposed at this further hearing), Ezeh & Connors v United Kingdom [ECtHR 9 October 2009] (where an increased period of detention was imposed following the later hearing) or Zdziaszek Case C – 271/17] (where a new cumulative sentence was imposed at a further hearing), then such further hearing is ‘the trial resulting in the decision’ as the nature or quantum of the penalty imposed has been or may be modified and the requirements of Article 4a apply to such a hearing;

e. Where the suspended sentence originally imposed is or may be activated as a result of a further offence (‘the triggering offence’) then the respondent must have been present or have had proper notification of the hearing of the triggering offence. In other words, the fair trial rights under Article 6(1) of the ECHR and the requirements of Article 4a of the Framework Decision must be met in relation to this triggering offence and if this did not happen then surrender may be refused.

43. The decision to revoke the licence upon which the Respondent was conditionally released was solely part of the management of a sentence of 14 years, half to be served in custody and half to be served non-custodially provided the Respondent complied with conditions imposed as part of the licence regime. The criminal process, which concluded with the imposition of sentence by the Crown Court on the 21 December 2017, was the ‘trial resulting in the decision’ and there is no suggestion that process did not comply with the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR.

44. This is not a case where the revocation of sentence in any way altered or modified the ‘quantum or nature’ of the penalty imposed by the Crown Court in 2017. Nor is it a case where some additional penalty or new form of sentence was imposed as a result of revocation. Nor is it a case where the licence period was ended due to the conviction of the Respondent for another offence.

45. This ground of objection is therefore dismissed.

Extraterritoriality

46. The relevant facts include the following:-

(i) A sentence of 14 years was imposed on the Respondent in respect of a series of offences by the Crown Court in Belfast on the 21 December 2017;

(ii) By virtue of the laws of the Requesting State, specifically Article 17 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland were obliged to release the Respondent on licence once he served 50% of that sentence in custody;

(iii) Having served the custodial part of that sentence, the Respondent was released on licence on the 19 December 2023;

(iv) A decision was made to revoke that licence and recall the Respondent to prison on the 7 June 2024;

(v) The IJA have informed this Court of the reasons why the Respondent was subject to recall and the conduct which led to this recall includes his suspected involvement in offending both in Northern Ireland and in this State during the period of time whilst he was serving his sentence in the community; and

(vi) Upon return to prison, he must either be again released on licence, or a hearing must be conducted by the Parole Board at which he will have the benefit of legal representation. There is no suggestion that this process will not comply with the requirements of fair procedures and that the rights of the Respondent will not be upheld in the course the same.

47. In Balmer the Supreme Court held that, where it is submitted that surrender ought be refused on the basis of an unconstitutionality in the legal system of a requesting state, a court had to consider whether such putative unconstitutionality is so egregious as to amount to a fundamental defect in that legal system, or departs so markedly from the scheme and order envisaged by the Constitution as to require the Court to refuse to surrender a person under a European arrest warrant either for trial or sentence.

48. In the course of his Judgment, O’Donnell J considered whether the putative unconstitutionality in that case was so egregious or departed so markedly from the scheme and order envisaged by the Constitution as to require the court to intervene and refuse surrender. In that case the Court was considering the surrender of the Respondent to serve that part of a life sentence which was, by that time, wholly preventative in nature. Mr Balmer had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and had been released following the conclusion of the ‘tariff’ period of imprisonment imposed by the trial judge. Under English Law a recall to prison after the service of such tariff was done for wholly preventative purposes.

49. Even assuming (without deciding this question) that such a form of continued preventative detention would be impermissible under the Irish Constitution, O’Donnell J concluded that that surrender should not be refused remarking at paragraph 65:

‘The regime for life sentences in the UK has considerable similarities to the scheme in this jurisdiction. Decisions on release are, as Hogan J observed, in practice perhaps little different from those made in this jurisdiction. The Irish objection to preventative justice is more nuanced, particularly in the field of sentencing and release, than a statement of blanket incompatibility might suggest. The constitutional concepts of sovereignty and friendly cooperation with other nations means that Ireland is in general unwilling to apply its constitution to another sovereign state or to object to the application by another friendly state of its own laws to crimes committed to or by its own citizens within its territorial jurisdiction. In the comparable case of surrender by an ECHR country to a non-Convention country, the ECtHR has held that due regard must be had to the fact that sentencing practices vary greatly between states, and it will, for example, be in only very exceptional cases that an applicant will be able to demonstrate that a sentence in a non-contracting state would be grossly disproportionate and thus contrary to the Convention. In the circumstances, I do not consider that the life sentence regime, even assuming it would not be permissible in this jurisdiction, should be considered to be a fundamental defect in the justice system so as to require surrender must be refused under s.37(1)(b).’

50. At paragraph 86 of her judgment, referring to the temporary release regime in this jurisdiction, Dunne J said that ‘not surprisingly’ one of the matters to which the Minister must have regard under s2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1960 (as amended)

when considering temporary release is ‘potential threat to the safety and security of members of the public should the person be released’.

51. At paragraph 95 she dismissed the idea that it would be a form of impermissible preventative detention to return a person released on temporary release on the grounds that he or she then constituted a potential risk to the safety of the public. She also remarked that the mandatory life sentence does not end because someone is released on licence and the person always remains subject to the sentence.

52. In my view, the recall of the Respondent to prison in this case and his imprisonment thereafter as a result of his breach of the conditions upon which he was released, would not result in his being subject to a form of preventative detention. He would be continuing to serve the sentence imposed by the Court in 2017. The fact that he was recalled and incarcerated because he breached the conditions of his licence, Thand a

decision was made that he serve the balance of his sentence (or some portion thereof)

in prison does not mean that he is serving any form of preventative detention. The

decision to revoke the licence and recall the Respondent is part of the management of his sentence by the executive and not the imposition of any form or preventative detention.

53. Even if I am incorrect in this regard and his continued incarceration following recall and the revocation of his licence is considered a form of preventative detention as would be impermissible in this jurisdiction, I do not consider that the operation of such a regime in Northern Ireland in respect of ‘fixed term’ prisoners is so egregious or amounts to such a defect in the system of justice in that jurisdiction as to require this court to refuse surrender.

54. In Balmer the Supreme Court held that where (as in that case) it was sought to recall a person serving a life sentence who had been released on licence, the provision of information and the capability to review or appeal the decision to recall were sufficient to comply with any requirement of fair procedures under either the Constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights. It is clear that a similar regime of review or appeal is available to the Respondent in Northern Ireland upon recall.

55. The Respondent’s submission that the actions or putative actions of the Northern Ireland authorities in this case constitute an impermissible interference with the sovereignty of this State is misconceived.

56. There is no reason to believe or even suspect that the authorities in Northern Ireland, in breach of the Rule of Specialty, are seeking his surrender for some purpose other than that identified in the Warrant. There is no question of the Respondent being charged with or convicted of any offence relating to any alleged criminal wrongdoing on his part in this jurisdiction.

57. The issue to be considered at that parole hearing is whether, on the basis of the evidence adduced, the board concludes to the requisite standard that the Respondent has breached the conditions upon which he was released on licence and he ought therefore be required to continue to serve his sentence in prison.

58. It is for the authorities in the requesting state to consider whether, as a matter of Northern Ireland law, they are satisfied that the actions and conduct of the Respondent (including his conduct in this State during the period of his release on licence), amount to a breach of the conditions upon which he was released.

59. The parole hearing is not a criminal trial and cannot result in the imposition of some additional sentence on the Respondent. As noted in the Opinion of Mr Fegan, the recall of a prisoner is not a punishment and not the determination of a criminal charge for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR R(West) v Parole Board [2005] 1 WLR 350.

60. In the recall of the Respondent and / or the conduct of this parole hearing, therefore, the Northern Ireland authorities are not seeking to apply the criminal law of Northern Ireland to inter alia the actions and conduct of the Respondent in this state. The fact that the Northern Ireland Parole Commissioners, when considering the post release conduct of the Respondent and whether his licence should remain revoked, may take into account conduct in this jurisdiction does not mean that they are seeking to apply the criminal law of Northern Ireland to the Respondent in respect of that conduct.

61. There is no basis to suggest some putative breach by the Northern Ireland authorities of Irish sovereignty or some territorial over-reach on their part.

62. For these reasons, this point of objection is therefore also dismissed.

63. I will therefore make an order for the surrender of the Respondent to Northern Ireland pursuant to Section 16 of the 2003 Act.