Irish court grants ancillary relief for foreign divorce, ordering property transfer and maintenance credit.

[2025] IEHC 343

Record No. 2022 101M

THE HIGH COURT

FAMILY LAW

BETWEEN/

D. F.

Applicant

AND

C. K.

Respondent

Judgment of Ms. Justice Nuala Jackson delivered on the 15th May 2025.

1. It is regrettable that matrimonial litigation has at this point been ongoing between the parties to these proceedings for in excess of six years, across two jurisdictions. It is truly unfortunate that, following a long marriage, respectful resolution might not have been achieved more efficiently and expeditiously. I do not doubt the toll, emotional and financial, which this has caused to both parties. Many of the facts are not in dispute. Those that are and my findings in this regard will be set out below.

Divorce proceedings and proceedings for relief ancillary to such divorce concluded in England in October 2021 and ancillary relief orders were made. This case amply demonstrates the very considerable difference which sometimes arises between obtaining a court order and implementing/enforcing such order. This hugely significant difference is reflected in the legislation under which the proceedings before me are commenced, being Part III of the Family Law Act, 1995 (“the 1995 Act”), section 23(4) of the 1995 Act referencing the court having “regard to the extent to which the order [of the foreign jurisdiction] or agreement has been complied with”

and section 26(e) referencing “the financial relief given by the order [of the foreign court] and the extent to which the order has been complied with or is likely to be complied with, …”. It is also important to confirm from the outset that, while enforcement or implementation of the English financial provision orders was the clear objective of the Applicant herein, these proceedings are not enforcement proceedings simpliciter but rather are proceedings for relief after a divorce outside the State, invoking the complex legislative framework applicable to such claims.

AGREED OR SUBSTANTIALLY UNDISPUTED FACTS

2. The parties married in England in September of 1997. The Applicant had previously been married and had two children in the context of her first marriage, very sadly, only one of whom is surviving. She was divorced from her first husband, also in England, in or about 1980. There are two children of the marriage between the Applicant and the Respondent, both of whom have ceased to be dependent. Although both are of Irish origin, the Applicant and the Respondent resided primarily in England throughout their married life although, it would appear, with regular and frequent contact with Ireland, maintaining interests and accumulating assets here.

Unhappy differences between the parties caused the Applicant to leave the then family home of the parties in or about December 2017. In or about February 2018, she moved to reside in a property jointly owned by her and one of the children of the marriage. She commenced divorce proceedings before the Courts of England and Wales in May of 2019. A Decree Absolute of Divorce was granted in September 2020.

3. Reflective of the different divorce process between England and this jurisdiction, it was after the granting of the Decree Absolute that the proceedings for financial relief in the context of the said divorce came to be determined. Ancillary relief proceedings commenced before the Family Court subsequent to the commencement of the divorce proceedings, later in 2019. These proceedings resulted in final orders being made on the 8th October 2021. Despite such ancillary relief orders being made and, at this point, being in excess of three and a half years old, the Applicant herein has received extremely meagre financial provision to date. She continues to reside in the property aforementioned, held jointly with the parties’ daughter, but she has received little further by way of provision. She is reliant upon State pension provision for her support.

4. There is an extant freezing order in place in respect of the Respondent’s worldwide assets, made by the English courts (HHJ Tolson QC) on the 29th October 20211.

There is also a freezing order in place, made by me, consequent upon my determination of a reviewable disposition of shares having been made by the Respondent in the immediate aftermath of the making of the ancillary relief orders in England and my having reversed such disposition.

5. In the context of the ancillary relief orders made by the English court not having been complied with, the Applicant instituted the within proceedings seeking relief after a foreign divorce pursuant to Part III of the Family Law Act, 1995.

6. As is required by section 23(3)(a) of the 1995 Act, leave to issue the within proceedings was sought by the Applicant on the 22nd July 2022 and was granted by this Court (Jordan J.) by Order of the 29th July 2022. In her Affidavit sworn on the 13th April 2022 which grounded the leave application (the Order incorrectly references this Affidavit as having been sworn on the 30th May 2022, this later date being, in fact, the date of filing of such Affidavit), the Applicant set out the history of the marriage of the parties and the circumstances leading to the institution by her of divorce proceedings. She exhibited and referenced in detail the ancillary relief order granted by District Judge Raggett on the 8th October 2021.

7. The Special Summons issued on or about the 10th August 2023 and an Order deeming service of proceedings good and directing service of all subsequent proceedings by email on the Respondent was granted by this Court (Jordan J.) on or about the 12th December 2022.

8. I believe that it is appropriate to reference the relevant English proceedings and orders in some detail at this point. In so doing, it is appropriate to expressly state that the Respondent profoundly disagrees with the orders made in the English proceedings and he takes substantial issue with the manner in which those proceedings progressed.

During the course of these proceedings, he repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the failure to amicably resolve the matrimonial difficulties between the parties.

All of these matters will be considered below but these dissatisfactions do not alter the undisputed factual circumstances which resulted from the English proceedings.

Freezing orders were also made in the course of the English these having been made on the 17th and 21st September 2021.

9. A Decree Nisi of Divorce was granted on the 5th August 2020 and this became Absolute on the 21st September 2020. The final ancillary relief order was made on the 8th October 2021and the said order states that it was made following a four day hearing which occurred on the 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th October 2021. It is common case that the Respondent did not participate in the said hearing as he had made the decision to cease to have any involvement in the said litigation prior to the hearing as he was dissatisfied with the manner in which the said proceedings progressed, particularly in relation to discovery/disclosure obligations and orders made in this regard.

10. The Order of the 8th October 2021 is a very detailed Order. In the recitals thereto, it is set out that the assets of the parties comprise a number of listed accounts with financial institutions, two jointly owned apartment properties and a number of car parking spaces in Tenerife (the Respondent acknowledged the apartments but disputed the parking spaces). It recites the Respondent to be the beneficial owner a number of properties in England and Ireland which properties are listed in the Order. The recital states: “The Court has found that, notwithstanding the arrangements made for companies or other individuals to hold the legal title to the following properties, these properties are owned beneficially by the Respondent: …”

11. The Irish properties listed under this category are:

i. [REDACTED] Dublin 5 ii. [REDACTED] Dublin 17 iii. [REDACTED] Dublin 17 iv. [REDACTED] Dublin 17 v. [REDACTED] Dublin17 vi. [REDACTED]Dublin 12 vii. [REDACTED] Dublin 13 viii. [REDACTED] Dublin 5 ix. [REDACTED] Dublin 5 x. [REDACTED] Dublin 17 (Unregistered title).

All of these properties will be individually considered below.

12. It is important to state at this point that it appears that steps have been taken by the Applicant’s English solicitors to enforce the Order of the English Court as against the English properties recited in the judgment but this would not appear to have yielded any success to date. I was provided with a number of orders and court applications seeking to advance the sale of certain English properties by way of enforcement of the ancillary relief lump sum order granted in favour of the Applicant. Documentation indicates that Orders for sale have been sought from the English courts in respect of [REDACTED](dated the 20th February 2024) and in respect of [REDACTED](dated the 20th February 2024). It appears that charging orders were previously obtained in respect of these two properties and also in respect of a property[REDACTED]. The Respondent denied to me that he was the beneficial owner of these referenced English properties. The evidence of the Applicant’s English solicitor is that these properties are beneficially held by the Respondent (and the English court would appear to have so determined in the ancillary relief proceedings) and that steps are being taken to pursue these but that such litigation is complex and slow. As these are real property situate outside the jurisdiction of the State and in respect of which there are ongoing legal steps being taken by the Applicant’s English solicitors in the context of enforcement, I do not intend to make any determinations in respect thereof save to note that the enforcement steps are ongoing but have not resulted in any monetary benefit accruing to the Applicant (although they have, obviously, added to the financial burdens incurred by her in the context of legal costs). The evidence adduced in relation to the status and, indeed, progress of the English enforcement proceedings relating to them was somewhat opaque. It is clear that no financial provision or benefit has inured to the Applicant from them and the position of the Respondent (being that he is not the beneficial owner of them) is such that provision being made from these properties appears fraught with difficulty.

13. The 8th October 2021 order continues on to state that arrears of maintenance have accrued, consequent upon an interim maintenance order of the 1st February 2020, in the sum of £6,000.

14. The Order proceeds to make the following ancillary relief orders:

A. A lump sum order in the sum of £6,554,736 in favour of the Applicant to be paid by the 3rd December 2021. No such sum has been paid.

B. If the Respondent was not able to pay the full sum due per A. by the stated date, proposals for discharge thereof by way of a series of lump sum payments and/or the transfer of property(ies) to the Applicant by the Respondent could be made by the 12th November 2021. No such proposals were made.

C. If the sum at A. was not paid by the date stated and no alternative arrangement was made by way of variation as envisaged by B, Courts interest would be payable to the extent that the sum or sums ordered remained undischarged. It is to be assumed that such interest has been accumulating since the 3rd December 2021. Evidence was provided to me as to the current sum due and owing inclusive of interest.

D. Upon compliance with A or B above, the Applicant was to transfer the Tenerife apartments and other properties to the Respondent.

E. The Respondent was to transfer to the Applicant any beneficial interest which he might have in the property in which the Applicant resides (being the property into which she moved in February 2019 which is held jointly by her and one of the children of the marriage).

F. The Respondent was to be entitled to the sums in joint bank accounts and the Applicant was to remove her name from same.

G. Pending compliance with the terms of the Order by the Respondent resulting in at least the payment of £1,000,000 to the Applicant, interim periodical payments in the sum of £3,500 per month, payable by standing order, were to be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant, such payments to commence on the 15th October 2021.

No such sums were paid. There was no financial provision made by the Respondent for the Applicant until there was partial compliance with an interim maintenance order made by me in the course of the within proceedings.

H. An Order for the payment of the maintenance arrears sum of £6.000 was made. This was not complied with.

I. The Respondent was directed to discharge tax liabilities arising from property disposals necessary for compliance with the Order and to indemnify the Applicant in respect of same. This has not arisen as no steps have been taken to comply with the order.

J. The Order makes it clear that the terms of it are intended to result in a clean break situation as between the parties.

K. The Respondent was ordered to pay a sum of £85,121.74 to the Applicant in respect of legal costs. This related partly to the costs of the October 2021 hearing and in part to previous costs orders made. No such sum was paid to her.

The Applicant’s English solicitor notified the Respondent of the terms of the Order on a number of occasions, the first of which would appear to be by email of the 11th October 2021.

EVIDENCE

15. Order 70A of the Rules of the Superior Courts lists, at Rule (1)(1)(i), as included within the definition of “family law proceedings” to which it applies:

“(i) an application to institute proceedings for relief subsequent to a divorce or separation outside the State pursuant to section 23 of the Family Law Act, 1995”.

While the Special Summons procedure with verifying and replying Affidavits is provided for, Order 70A, rule 13 Hearing provides:

“13(2) Save where the Court otherwise directs, the hearing of any application under the Acts shall be on oral evidence of the parties.”

No express application was made to me in the context of the within proceedings for a hearing otherwise than on oral evidence but, in the context thereof, further affidavits were provided to me and were referenced by the parties. I am mindful that the Respondent was a litigant in person (although he was accompanied by a McKenzie Friend at the first tranche days of the hearing but not subsequently) and crossexamination was limited in this context. I have considered all of the affidavits sworn and filed in this matter and also the oral testimony heard by the court in fairness to all concerned although I believe that the contents of the affidavits were very substantially, if not entirely, acknowledged, confirmed, endorsed and repeated in oral testimony. I will now reference these but any reliance upon or conclusions from these affidavits, save insofar as they demonstrate agreement between the parties, must be subject to the usual caveats in relation to affidavit evidence.

16. Affidavit Evidence

Affidavit of Applicant (10th March 2023)

This Affidavit avers that she married the Respondent in the United Kingdom on the [REDACTED] September 1997. She states that they were living in [REDACTED], England. She moved out this residence in December 2017 and moved to [REDACTED] in February 2018. Divorce proceedings were instituted by her on the 24th May 2019. The Respondent was served with unsealed copy of the ancillary reliefs order by email on the 11th October

2021. A sealed copy was served upon him shortly thereafter on or about the 12th October 2021 by email and by post. Reference is made to a valuation of Irish properties carried out by [REDACTED] Auctioneers, dated the 8th July 2021. for the purposes of the English proceedings and the valuation is exhibited. She avers to a number of Irish properties not referenced in the English Order :[REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; and [REDACTED]and avers beneficial interests held by the Respondent in these properties, stating that he resides in[REDACTED]. Her income is stated to be limited to social welfare payments, being a combination of Irish and English benefits.

Affidavit of A. J. (23rd May 2023)

The 2021 property valuation by [REDACTED] Auctioneers is exhibited together with a list of updated valuations as of 2023. It would appear that these are the valuations relied upon by the forensic accountant in the preparation of his expert report. Mr. A. J., the Applicant’s solicitor in these proceedings, exhibits Companies Registration Office (CRO) documents and folios of various properties. There is reference to the continual and regular the use of the [REDACTED] address by the Respondent. There is a further averment concerning [REDACTED] (being one of the properties listed in the English ancillary relief order) being registered name of J. F. on 7th February 1986 but the deponent proceeds to aver that he says and believes that Respondent is the beneficial owner. No other evidence in support of this beneficial ownership is averred to, neither is the basis of the deponent’s belief in this regard. I will return to this below. This affidavit has a chronology of the English proceedings and also exhibits the relevant English Court orders.

Affidavit of Respondent (8th June 2023)

In this Affidavit the Respondent says that he has instructed lawyers and wants extension of time to file replying affidavit.

Thereafter, an Appearance was entered by solicitors for the Respondent on the 8th June 2023. An application by the said solicitor to come off record issued on the 11th July 2023 returnable for the 24th July 2023. Such relief was granted to the solicitor concerned.

Affidavit of A. J. (10th June 2023)

This Affidavit

- References a planning application made in respect of [REDACTED] where the Respondent refers to himself as “owner”. The exhibit in support of this is dated the 12th May 2023. The letter accompanying this planning application, dated 5th April 2023, is signed by the Respondent and in it he describes himself as “the rightful owner and landlord” of this property. The address of the Respondent in this context is an English address –[REDACTED]– being one of the English properties ascribed to the Respondent in the English ancillary reliefs order.

- References the use of the [REDACTED] address by the Respondent on CRO documents and exhibits same.

- Contains proposal that a third party solicitor act as receiver and Lisney Commercial Real Estate as estate agent in the sale of the relevant Irish properties alleged to be beneficially owned by the Respondent.

- References borrowings of the Applicant to fund legal fees, a legal fees loan having been replaced by private funding.

Affidavit of Respondent (12th July 2023)

This Affidavit makes reference to an agreement which the Respondent contends was made between the parties in or about 2017. There is no documentation exhibited in this regard and it is to be assumed that it is contended that this was an oral agreement between the parties. This is sometimes called an “interim settlement”. The Respondent avers that he was going to reside in Tenerife and that the Applicant moved into the [REDACTED] property, a property in the joint names of the Applicant and one of the daughters of the marriage. The Respondent says that monies (£50,000) were spent on the renovation of this property and maintenance arrangements were made. The Respondent contends that this was on the basis that no divorce proceedings would be brought by the parties and that they would continue to be married, albeit living separate lives. The Respondent alleges that thereafter, in breach of the agreement between them, monies were taken by the Applicant from a joint account of the parties in the sum of approximately £9,500 in or about May 2019. This would appear to be in or about the time that Divorce proceedings were instituted. The Respondent avers to the confiscation of his records by the Applicant. He describes himself as “her closest confident for 35 years”. He acknowledges in this Affidavit that he is the beneficial owner of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. He avers that he is “a shareholder” in [REDACTED] Limited (“DJL”). He avers to indebtedness to third parties, being the estate of one N. R., estate of his own brother L. K., (both of these people died in or about 2019) and to N. R. Junior, son of N. R. (“N. R. Jnr”). The Respondent references only his own emails and his own narrative to support this and there are no independent documents so doing. The Respondent seeks a stay on proceedings for negotiations to take place. It should be stated that the avers in this Affidavit were substantially contested by the Applicant in her oral testimony before me.

Affidavit of the Respondent (29th September 2023)

Herein, the Respondent makes allegations against D. F., the daughter of the Applicant from her first marriage. These allegations relate to events concerning the properties at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] which events occurred in or about 2017. This would appear to relate to issues concerning the said property being rented out to third parties involving extremely poor accommodation standards which resulted in action by Dublin City Council, litigation and adverse media comment. The Respondent avers that the premises concerned were the responsibility of Ms. D. F. and his son, H. K., while Ms. D. F. contends that the premises were at all times controlled by the Respondent and that she found herself implicated in a situation to which she was essentially a stranger. The relevance of these events to the present proceedings is questionable but, in this Affidavit, the Respondent states that these difficulties gave rise to a ‘vendetta’ being waged against him by the Applicant, encouraged and propelled by Ms. D. F.. The allegations which he makes and avers to concerning the alleged 2017 agreement (interim or otherwise), the withdrawal of a sum of cash from a joint account and the retention of records are repeated. However, he avers “… I am fortunate to have extensive electronics records, which I have withheld from the UK family court in the hope of achieving an out of court settlement by negotiating with the applicant.” No such records are exhibited and they were not produced during the course of these proceedings. He further references the duration of the relationship between the parties as being from 1982. He avers that he challenged the jurisdiction of the English court but that this was not successful. Furthermore, there is a reference to “Marks and Spencer/Shell

shares”. There was no further reference to such shares in the course of the proceedings before me and they did not appear in the Affidavits of Means of either of the parties.

Affidavit of Means of the Applicant with vouchers attached (October 2023)

This is unmarkable save that it references the lien in favour of D. C. in relation to legal fees (Mr. D. C. having loaned funds to the Applicant to enable her to discharge the legal fees loan). Her dependence upon social welfare (Irish and UK) is deposed to.

Statement of Means of the Respondent (per direction of Jorden J. 24th July 2023)

This avers to a 40% shareholding in DJL. It avers to a total of six Irish plus three Tenerife properties. There is a reference to certain of these properties being held by companies. This Statement refers to debts to the estates of N. R. and L. K. and to Dublin City Council, there is no vouching of these alleged liabilities. There is reference to a modest salary from DJL, the Respondent being a director of this company, evidenced by payslips. It appears that this income is taxed in Ireland.

The swearing of updated Affidavit of Means was directed by me on or about the 7th March 2024 and the parties did so with such Affidavits of Means being before me at the hearing on the 19th March 2024. This Affidavit of Means of the Applicant was unremarkable. The Affidavit of Means of the Respondent was most unsatisfactory with known and acknowledged assets (including directors’ loans and shareholdings) omitted. I indicated these obvious shortcomings at that time. No revised Affidavit of Means was sworn by the Respondent.

At this point, it is appropriate to state that the requirement of vouching of Affidavits of Means is clearly provided for in the Rules of the Superior Courts and Order 70A rule 6. Vouching requests were made in this case and orders were made in respect of queries to be replied to. It must be said that so far as the Respondent is concerned, nothing close to adequate vouching of his financial circumstances was provided to me and directions and orders in this regard were not complied with.

Over the course of the 6th/7th March 2024, I made directions he to respond to the letter from the Applicant’s solicitors by the 14th March 2024 indicating time required for reply to each query with a view to such replies and vouching relating to them being provided. Additionally, both parties were to do up to date Affidavits of Means. These Affidavits of Means have been considered previously herein. I made an Order made for the discovery by the Respondent of all documentation pertaining to alleged share transfer in DJL and documentation relating to any such share transfer which has been recorded in the Register of Beneficial Ownership. No documentation was provided save for unstamped share transfer forms. These are dated the 18th October 2021, 10 days after the English ancillary relief order. Unstamped share transfer forms relating to the previously reviewed share transfers to Ms. Z. and N. R. Jnr were produced but no stamping documentation or revenue documentation relating to same were produced. In any event, the reviewable disposition hearing was heard by me and determined long since and judgment given.

(It should be stated at this point that Respondent asserted that the R family and the estate of

N. R. had various interests in the assets held by him and in contention in these proceedings. No evidence was given in this regard save for his own testimony. Despite N. R. being deceased since in or about 2019, no correspondence from the estate was produced. Shares had been transferred by the Respondent to N. R. Jnr more or less contemporaneously with the English substantive order being made. N. R. Jnr was put on notice of the reviewable disposition application and attended court and did not oppose the review of the disposition. This matter was determined by me in the context of an interlocutory application and judgment was given. No appeal from this judgment ensued.)

During the period when the hearing was ongoing (on the 1st November 2024), the Respondent did produce some documentation to me. This consisted of (a) statements for a DJL PTSB account for the period November 2023 - July 2024. The lodgements to the account do not seem to account for all of the rental properties but impossible to know as no leases or rental details were provided. The income which the Respondent received as a director per payslips does not now appear to come from this account, this having ceased since April 2024. This account seems to fund a small degree of day to day personal spending. Interestingly there are significant payments out to Z Limited (for what reason is unknown – many such are delineated as “loan”) and also a number to J. F. who is referenced as the registered owner of a property which the Applicant asserts is beneficially owned by the Respondent. There are payments to the Revenue Commissioners from this account but I have seen no tax documentation pertaining to this. There is a management fee relating to the [REDACTED] property paid from this account; (b) tax return DJL 1/8/22 – 31/7/23 – shows profits of €184,819; (c) incomplete financial statements DJL y/e 8/7/2018 and following. These initially list the Applicant and Respondent the directors. This appears to have since altered. The Respondent’s director’s loan account balance (credit) as of 31/7/2023 €2,031,390 (with €102,811 having been repaid to him from the previous year’s balance). The signatures of Applicant on these financial statements do not appear to be hers and she denies signing them. Given the nature of the relationship of the parties on the dates in question, it seems unlikely that she signed these documents.

Affidavit of A. J. (29th February 2024)

This Affidavit addresses the disclosure deficits on part of Respondent and requests made in this regard, as advised by Mr. Liam Grant. Correspondence in this regard is exhibited including a detailed letter of the 28th February 2024. This continued to be addressed during the ongoing hearing and directions were made. Disclosure remained entirely inadequate.

Affidavit of C. E. (14th November 2024)

This Affidavit detailed the English proceedings, the Orders of the English courts and the steps which have been taken to date in relation to enforcement. Mr. C. E. gave oral evidence at the hearing and, in this context, confirmed his evidence as set out in the Affidavit. This detailed that charging orders had been sought and obtained relating to two of the English properties and such application is in train relating to [REDACTED], England. This is the address used by the Respondent in the context of the recent planning application to Dublin City Council concerning the [REDACTED] properties. It appears that applications for orders for sale in respect of the two properties in respect of which charging orders have been obtained are in train but this litigation would appear to be progressing slowly.

17. Oral evidence

J. I., forensic accountant

Mr. Grant proved his report and went through the contents thereof. He repeatedly referenced the total inadequacy of documentation provided, which deficit made his task much more difficult. The contents of the report are separately considered below but it must be said that one of the most difficult aspects of this case has been my complete inability to make any determination in relation to net values of properties/assets. Indeed, it has been most difficult to event identify the assets in order to attribute market values of them. No fault can be attributed to the Applicant or Mr. Grant in this regard. The net position could only be known if the relevant documentation was made available in order to calculate the tax liabilities in the event of a disposal of such assets. No such documentation was provided. The Respondent informed the court of the identity of his accountant is somewhat vague terms and no accountancy or valuation evidence was called by him. Mr. Grant relied upon the valuations (updated) from [REDACTED] Auctioneers. No objection was made to the valuation report or its update being provided to me. No valuation evidence of any kind was adduced by the Respondent although he did dispute certain of the valuations of the Applicant, some to a greater degree than others. Of course, the Respondent is not a valuation expert although I do accept that he is a business man who has undertaken properties transactions over a very considerable period of time. The Respondent did cross-examine Mr Grant but this largely consisted of factual matters arising between the parties, matters of which Mr. Grant could have no knowledge. There was some disagreement with property valuations put to Mr. Grant who, understandably, indicated that he was not a property valuer and had relied upon the valuations of [REDACTED] Auctioneers.

C. E., Applicant’s English solicitor

In oral testimony he confirmed the contents of his Affidavit. He was cross-examined relating to the circumstances prior to the English divorce hearing and it was clear that there was considerable animus on the part of the Respondent towards Mr. C. E.. Mr. C. E. also gave evidence relating to the progress of the efforts to sale English properties. He confirmed that no funds had yet been realised.

The Respondent

The Respondent gave evidence of the 2017 agreement which he alleged the Applicant had breached. He gave evidence of the refurbishment of the property of the Applicant and of her having taken funds covertly from a joint account (it appeared to me from his evidence that the Applicant removed one half of the funds held in such joint account). He indicated that he owned [REDACTED] but that he transferred it into the joint names of his son and the Applicant’s daughter in or about 1994. He seems to have wished to retain control and benefit of the property until his death and that this agreement would not operate until such time.

He seems to have written a letter later seeking to reverse this position and stating that he was taking back ownership. It seems to me that at all material times this property was in the control of the Respondent and everybody acted on the basis that he was the beneficial owner thereof. He also referenced [REDACTED] and said that this premises belonged to his deceased brother. However, his evidence in this regard was somewhat at odds with his subsequent cross-examination of his sister, Ms O., who is the personal representative of the deceased brother, at which time he contended that [REDACTED] were inseparable as properties and that he had been in control of both over very many years.

There was evidence of monies allegedly owed to the estate of his brother and monies owed to him by that estate. Ms. O.’s evidence will be set out below. In any event, the Respondent clearly has some share in this property through the estate of his deceased, unmarried brother who died intestate. The Respondent gave evidence of the events of 2017 and the difficulties in relation to tenants occupying the premises. He referenced a “vendetta” on the part of Ms D. F. being responsible for all difficulties. He gave evidence in relation to the [REDACTED] property having been bought for N. R.

Jnr, a person with vulnerabilities, and that it was in the names of the two daughters of the marriage on trust. No explanation as to why this arrangement was put in place was given. No trust deed or documentation relating to such alleged trust was provided. The Respondent repeated that his documents and records had been retained by the Applicant but he did not provide any explanation as to why he had not or was unable to reconstruct these from alternative sources. It was clear from his evidence that no written demand for monies allegedly owed has been received from the estates of either N. R. or L.

K. in circumstances in which they died in 2019. He vaguely referenced oral conversations with the R. family. He gave evidence and DJL purchased properties from in or about 2012. He indicated that funds to do so were provided by himself and the Applicant, N. R. and his brother, L. K.. No documentary evidence was provided to support this. His evidence was that N. R. and L. K. would have provided their contributions directly to the solicitor concerned in the purchase but no evidence from this solicitor or the firm concerned was adduced. No explanation was provided as to why the director’s loan in the financial statements of DJL attributed the entirety of the said loan to the Respondent and no one else save to say that the accountant knew the true position.

No accountancy evidence was called by the Respondent. This position pertained over very many years. In cross-examination, the Respondent distanced himself from the workings of the various companies and businesses and the management of the properties concerned. He said that this was all controlled by Ms.

Z. He did not call Ms Z. to give evidence. He denied any beneficial interest in [REDACTED], a property owned by a company, Z Limited (incorporated 2018) held as to 50% each by the Respondent and Ms. Z. purchased by that company in or about 2019. He indicated that the director’s loan in Z Limited was entirely due to Ms. Z. No evidence of the provision of these funds by Ms. Z. was provided and it should be noted that the very limited bank statements from DJL provided to me show regular payments being made by DJL (100% owned by the Respondent) to Z Limited. It is therefore definitively not the case that the full director’s loan was provided by Ms. Z. As was usual in this case, no clarity was provided by the Respondent in circumstances in which the documentation clearly would be available to the Respondent or Ms. Z. who he informed me was his good friend and supportive partner. There was reference to further monies being owed to N. R. in relation to the purchase of the property at [REDACTED], occupied by the Applicant. Again, no documentation was provided and it would not appear that any demand in this regard has been made by the estate of Mr. N. R.. The Respondent denied ownership of any English properties.

D. F., daughter of the Applicant

Ms D. F. gave evidence in relation to the events of 2017 concerning the properties at [REDACTED] and the Respondent cross-examined disagreeing with this. There was dispute as to the use and control of the funds from these properties. There was evidence of generosity of the Respondent towards the witness and her family in the past.

The Applicant The Applicant gave evidence of the accommodation of the parties over the course of the marriage. She gave evidence of bullying, controlling and unilateral behaviour on the part of the Respondent. She particularised a situation in which a family home apartment had been leased under a 30 year lease by the Respondent to his friend without her knowledge or consent and with little notice. She gave evidence of a history of marital disharmony and that she had separated from him dozens of times. She gave evidence of two apartments in the same complex with one being the family home which she was forced to leave in the circumstances above.

I am unclear what became of the second apartment. She indicated that she left the family home apartment in December 2017 and stayed with her daughter over Christmas before moving into her current residence. She did give evidence of this property being renovated for her to move into it, these works taking two months and she moved in in or about February 2018. She denied the agreements contended for by the Respondent. She gave evidence of filing for a Decree of Divorce filed in 2018 (I believe this to have been May 2019) with the Decree being made in 2020.

She informed me of having sought ancillary financial reliefs and issuing proceedings to that end. She gave evidence to the English court and an Order was made on the 8th October 2021. She confirmed that she had not received any of the English award. She expressed the view that she did not want instalment payments as the Respondent would not pay if instalments were ordered. She confirmed the contents of her Affidavit of Means. She told the court that from her knowledge of N. R., he was not a wealthy man and his financial circumstances would not have permitted him to engage in the business/financial activities attributed to him by the Respondent.

She indicated that N. R. had had business difficulties, that he had worked for the Respondent when his original business failed or declined, that he had downsized his house in order to fund his lifestyle in the context of his financially diminished circumstances. She gave evidence of the return of documents to the Respondent having been videoed. She indicated that she was completely unaware of sums being owed to N. R. or L. K. her or by the Respondent. She said that such claims were a fabrication by the Respondent. She referenced that the Respondent regularly “bragged” of being a multi-millionaire.

She referenced that she had heard nothing from the

R. family which would support the indebtedness alleged by the Respondent. She indicated that N. R. Jnr was the only person from the R family who seemed to have contact with the Respondent and that despite N. R. having many children, only N. R. Jnr seemed to have any involvement with the Respondent. (I must remark that no evidence was provided to me by N.

R. Jnr.) Her evidence was likewise that there was nothing due to the estate of the Respondent’s brother and she referenced that the Respondent had used his brother’s name on accounts operated and beneficially owned by him using the address of the apartment in England which was never the address of the brother concerned. This brother lived in Dublin, originally at [REDACTED] and later in a nursing home. She stated that the Respondent transferred some accounts to L. K. with English apartment (the family home of the parties) address. She gave evidence of the proceedings having had an awful effect on her. She stated that even before divorce she did not have a happy life with the Respondent. She stated that he was a bully and narcissist. The cross-examination was brief and rehearsed the issues previously raised by the Respondent.

Ms. O. – sister of the Respondent and personal representative of L. K., deceased The witness impressed as a most sensible person. Like the Applicant, she appeared exhausted by the obstructive behaviour which she asserted she had experienced at the hands of the Respondent, her brother. She stated that she simply wished to administer the estate and that this was being frustrated by the Respondent such that she had had to get solicitors involved and had to issue proceedings. She stated that her solicitors in such proceedings spent “a year or two” attempting to serve papers on him.

She is personal representative of the estate. She has issued proceedings on behalf of the estate trying to sell the property and divide the property between the lawful beneficiaries. The primary asset of the estate was her brother’s property at [REDACTED]. She simply wanted to take possession of property. New locks which she put on were, on each occasion, changed by the Respondent and the last time she visited the premises, metal shutters had been installed. Her investigations led her to believe this had been done on the instruction of the Respondent.

The work of installation had been arranged by a company, Z Limited, her investigations revealed. She was refused access to be building. Her evidence was that the upstairs of the building was being rented out on “booking.com” for up to 8 persons on short term rental. Her evidence was that the Respondent was getting the income thus created and she is barred from the premises. She stated that she wants to sell and divide. She gave evidence that her brother died intestate. She stated that [REDACTED] did not appear to have shuttering and appeared to be occupied by a business.

She referenced the previous difficulties with these premises (both) when operated as a hostel leading to the 2017 litigation and notoriety. In cross-examination, the Respondent put it to the witness that he has possession of both [REDACTED] and that he has occupied the entirety as one building for 40 years. He put it to the witness that the two premises were integrated and that he has occupied the entirety for 40 years with the consent of his brother. He put it to her that one could not be sold without the other. He said that he is in possession.

The witness indicated that she did not want to be bullied and harassed. She was only trying to do the work of estate administrator properly. I was perplexed as to why there was no reference to his possession of [REDACTED] or the income from these premises in the Affidavits sworn by the Respondent.

IRISH PROPERTIES AND COMPANIES

18. The properties listed below are the Irish properties recited in the Order of the 8th October 2021. During the course of the hearing, I was provided with the folios referenced as well as some other folios. Details arising from such folios are set out following the reference to each property. The valuation was far from satisfactory as recited above.

a. [REDACTED] Dublin 5 – the owner per the folio is DJ Limited, [REDACTED], Dublin 5. The property is unencumbered. The date of registration of this ownership is the 12th May 2016.

b. [REDACTED] Dublin 17 – the owner per the folio is DJ Limited, [REDACTED], Dublin 5. The property is unencumbered. The date of registration of this ownership is 21st April 2015.

c. [REDACTED] Dublin 17 - the owner per the folio is DJ Limited, [REDACTED], Dublin 5. The property is unencumbered. The date of registration of this ownership is the 19th November 2015.

d. [REDACTED] Dublin 17 - the owner per the folio is DJ Limited, [REDACTED], Dublin 5. The property is unencumbered. The date of registration of this ownership is the 19th November 2015.

e. [REDACTED] Dublin 17 - the owner per the folio is DJ Limited, [REDACTED], Dublin 5. The property is unencumbered. The date of registration of this ownership is the 30th May 2016.

f. [REDACTED] Dublin 12 – the title to this property is most confused. It will be considered separately below.

g. [REDACTED]Dublin 13 h. [REDACTED], Dublin 5 – this is the registered office of DJ Limited, the owner of many of the properties listed.

i. [REDACTED] Dublin 5 – the folio produced in respect of this property indicated that

J. F. C/O [REDACTED], Solicitor, [REDACTED], Dublin 6 is the full owner and the registration date is the 7th February 1986. j. [REDACTED], Dublin 17 (unregistered).

19. During the course of the hearing, evidence was also adduced that DJ Limited is the full owner of Folio [REDACTED] County Dublin (registered 9th June 2014). This property is also unencumbered; that UF Limited (of which the Respondent is a 50% shareholder) is the full owner of [REDACTED] and is the full owner of Folio [REDACTED] with a registration date of the 10th December 2008 (I was unclear whether these are the same or different properties). This property is unencumbered;

that Z Limited (the Respondent is a 50% owner of this company) of [REDACTED], County Dublin was the full owner of Folio [REDACTED] with a registration date of the 14th February 2019. I understand this to be the Folio in respect of [REDACTED].

This property is unencumbered.

20. Folio [REDACTED], which was provided to me, appearing to be owned by [REDACTED] Company Limited would not appear relevant to the within proceedings. Folio [REDACTED], appearing to be owned by [REDACTED] would not appear relevant to the within proceedings. Folio [REDACTED], appearing to be owned by [REDACTED] would not appear relevant to the within proceedings. I will give liberty to apply and to re-enter in relation to these properties in the event that a connection with the Respondent is contended for and evidence in support of this is produced.

21. It has previously been determined by me in the context of a reviewable disposition application heard during the course of the within proceedings that the Respondent is the 100% shareholder in the company DJ Limited. It is clear that this company owns extensive unencumbered properties which are rented. Despite numerous orders being made and opportunities being given to the Respondent in the course of the within proceedings to vouch the rent received by DJ Limited in respect of these properties, no clarity was achieved in this regard save that there is clearly a valuable rent roll coming in.

22. A number of other company interests/shareholdings of the Respondent were also asserted, some with greater clarity than others.

Z Limited – evidence was provided that the Respondent is a 50% shareholder of this company with Ms. Z. They are also the directors of this company. It is understood that Ms. Z is a partner/close friend of the Respondent. The Respondent has an address at [REDACTED], Dublin. This is an address used by him in documentation submitted to the CRO. This property would appear to be owned by Z Limited. There is also a substantial director’s loan owed by Z Limited. Despite Mr. J. I. (the forensic accountant) referencing the need for vouching and an analysis of this director’s loan, no such evidence was forthcoming. The Respondent asserts that this loan belongs to Ms. Z. I was entirely dissatisfied with the evidence in this regard and I noted that payments to Z Limited, some referenced as loans, were paid from the bank account of DJL. On balance, having regard to the totality of the evidence, it appears likely that this loan is likely due to the Respondent. The property owned by this company is itself unencumbered. It was purchased (or at least Z Limited became the registered owner) in or about 2019 for the sum of €585,000 approximately. The current value (the only valuation was provided by the Applicant and this was not substantially challenged by the Respondent) is in or about €630,000. The property is unencumbered and its acquisition would appear to have been funded by a director’s loan in the sum of €600,648. This director’s loan has increased over the years and in 2022 stood in the sum of €748,097. This was not explained or vouched in any manner. The substantial increase in this loan would appear to have occurred between 2021 and 2022 and is attributed in the company accounts to “improvements to leasehold”. What leasehold asset of the company was improved is not known to me and no evidence was advanced. It seems likely that the initial director’s loan was advanced by the Respondent or from his resources or entities beneficially owned by him and that further advances were made from his resources also. In this regard, I must record the entirely unvouched and unexplained usage of the very significant rental income being earned by DJL over the years.

[REDACTED] Limited – the registered office of this company is [REDACTED] . The directors are the children of the marriage but they would not appear to have any involvement with it. It was dissolved many years ago.

[REDACTED] Limited – the registered office of this company is [REDACTED]. The Applicant and the Respondent are the directors. It was dissolved many years ago.

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

23. The evidence heard by me was relatively brief in the context of the complexity of the factual, particularly financial, issues arising and involved repeated themes.2

24. The Respondent asserts an agreement in October 2017 that there would be no divorce sought, that the family home would be transferred to the Applicant with improvement expenditure of £50,000 on the property with some additional maintenance provision for the Applicant. This agreement is disputed by Applicant although it appears the parties did separate and the Applicant moved to reside in another premises. Her account of the circumstances is very different to that of the Respondent. It is clear that a property [REDACTED] was transferred into the names of the Applicant and one of the daughters of the parties [REDACTED] in or about early 2018. Whether or not there was such an agreement as is contended for by the Respondent (and on the assets of the Respondent it would appear to be extremely modest provision for the Applicant), the Applicant was undoubtedly entitled to seek a divorce and ancillary reliefs and such agreement and provision thereunder would be a factor for consideration in the context of such divorce litigation. Additionally, email correspondence furnished in the course of the hearing herein makes it clear that there was no finalised agreement as to separation terms between the parties long after the transfer of the [REDACTED] property to the Applicant and the parties’ daughter (by way of illustration only by email of the 2nd October 2018 the Respondent wrote to the Applicant stating “I can see no reason why we cannot arrive at a mutually acceptable and beneficial arrangement before the end of January 2019.” This is 10 months after the transfer of the family home).

25. The Respondent appears to me unwilling to move on from his perceived view of events and his conviction that the institution of divorce proceedings by his wife ought not to have been entertained. Regrettably, I formed the view that this perspective was not with a view towards preserving the marital relationship but with a view to their being no intervention in or interrogation of his assets and financial circumstances.

Numerous emails relating to settlement were provided to me. It seems to me that

This case was heard before me over a period of 9 days but it must be remembered that included within these hearings were (a) a challenge by the Respondent to recognition of the Applicant’s first divorce; (b) a challenge by the Respondent to recognition of the divorce between the Applicant and the Respondent; (c) a maintenance pending relief application under section 24 of the 1995 Act and (d) a reviewable disposition application under section 35 of the 1995 Act, the latest of these involving two notice parties.

these were likely entitled to “without prejudice” protection and, in any event, clearly, no final agreement was reached.

26. The Respondent indicates that he wished to make proposals for amicable resolution and that this had always been his desire. Obviously, the courts strongly support such resolution and I so informed Mr C. K., but such resolution is a matter for party agreement and is not a matter for the court. Efforts to amicably resolve cases are, properly, supported, encouraged and ought to be facilitated by the courts in all litigation but agreement cannot be forced or mandated. I did form the view, albeit without any full involvement in the process but from submissions made to me by Mr

C. K., that his proposals and expectations in this regard were somewhat unrealistic and insufficient.

27. Mr C. K. also complained about the English proceedings and the progress of discovery/disclosure in that context. I do not intend to make any comment on this save to re-iterate what I indicated to Mr C. K. during the hearing - once a court has jurisdiction to determine an issue, a litigant withdraws from that process at his/her peril. The relevant court systems under discussion have inbuilt safeguards in case of dissatisfaction, being the entitlement to appeal. These safeguards were available to the Respondent in the context of the English proceedings but he opted to opt out. This was his choice but was, perhaps, an unwise choice. It is clear that interlocutory applications (including committal applications) were brought before the English court in the context of the ancillary relief proceedings seeking enforcement of disclosure orders made against the Respondent with which he had not complied.

Without going into these in detail, I must reference the inclusion in judgment of the 9th November 2020, in the context of such a committal application, where the court stated:

“The Court cannot keep giving Mr C. K. time to comply with its Court Orders.

The Court does not fall for the “I am a simple person pensioner who doesn’t understand what’s going on” … This is a wilful and deliberate noncompliance.”

In the context of that application, a six months sentence was imposed, suspended on terms that the Respondent complied with the ordered disclosure obligations within one month. It would not appear that this occurred as the Respondent withdrew from the process.

28. Likewise, Mr C. K. complained of an alleged breach of orders made by the English Court on the part of the Applicant in relation to the return of his documentation to him. He asserted that his shortcomings on disclosure were due to such failure. There was a dispute as to whether there was such failure to return documents or not. I was shown video evidence in this regard.

29. It would appear to be the case that an order for the return of documents to the Respondent by the Applicant was made in the course of the English litigation. It is undoubtedly true that there were, at least, two occasions when returns took place. I was provided with videos of these occasions. It is also undoubtedly true that not all documents were returned as some such were produced in the course of the hearing before me (I reference the 1994 agreement which related to [REDACTED]). It would also appear to be the case that no enforcement or breach application was brought by the Respondent before the English Court.

I agree with the Respondent that a list of such returned documentation prepared by the parties contemporaneously with the return would have been most useful. I do not know if the order of the court required this. Indeed, if not prepared by the Applicant and Respondent jointly (as the Respondent indicated was the obligation), it would have been useful to have this prepared by the Respondent on a unilateral basis. It is understandable that it is difficult to prove matters if denied access to papers. However, having stated the above, it is my conclusion that this alleged breach by Applicant in relation to the return of papers does not explain the paucity of disclosure and failure on the part of the Respondent to address disclosure orders made in these proceedings.

It appeared to me that many of the documents generated before that time might have been resourced from third party sources by the Respondent. It appeared to me that he had made little, if any, effort to do so. Witnesses who might have evidenced matters (accountants, solicitors etc.) were not called. Third parties allegedly involved in the transactions concerned who might be expected to have documents to prove same would not appear to have been asked to assist. I am not in a position to say whether or not any material documents were retained by the Applicant.

Clearly, she had the 1994 document but I do believe that there were two courses open to the Respondent – he could have invoked the aid of the English court or taken steps to, at least partially, obtain the documents from other sources. He did neither. In addition, such documents as may be covered by the English court order cannot address or be relevant to post separation documents which clearly could not have been left behind by the Respondent upon separation. Documents relating to events long after that date were not disclosed herein despite their relevance and their being ordered by me.

30. I found the evidence of the Respondent to be unfocussed as to the issues relevant before me. In many respects, his evidence was contradictory particularly so in the context of the disposition of a portion of his shareholding in DJL and also in relation to issues concerning the [REDACTED] properties where his cross-examinations of Ms. O. seemed to introduce an entirely new narrative of events. I found his evidence as to his circumstances both as to his residence, his financial circumstances and as to his knowledge of his own affairs to be unconvincing. If such was the position, I fail to understand why he would not have called evidence to support his contentions.

31. In the context of the evidence before me, I have found of particular relevance in determining the true financial position of the Respondent the following information:

- The documents from the CRO and the contents thereof;

- The designation of the DJL director’s loan to the Respondent consistently in the accounts of that company;

- The clear advance of funds by DJL to Z Limited;

- The occupation and control of the [REDACTED] properties by the Respondent – I was provided with a photograph showing that a foundation which the Respondent admits he has established operated from this premises at some time;

- The registered ownership of properties established from the folios produced to the court;

- The actions of the Respondent in relation to the DJL shareholding in the immediate aftermath of the English ancillary reliefs hearing

- I must also have regard to the determinations made by the English court in the context of the ancillary reliefs hearing and to the Order of that court.

FORENSIC ACCOUNTANCY EVIDENCE

32. During the course of the hearing herein, I was provided with a forensic accountant’s report prepared by Mr. Grant and I heard oral testimony from Mr Grant which was most helpful. Additional to the evidence of Mr. Grant referenced previously, he referenced an apartment owned by the Respondent and held in his sole name in the United Kingdom valued at £480,000. I did not hear any evidence as to steps which had been taken (if any) by the Applicant in respect of this property in the context of the English lump sum order which she has in her favour. Mr. Grant analysed the alleged properties and other assets of the Respondent and his Affidavits of Means filed in the within proceedings. I have set out my analysis of these in this judgment also.

33. Valuations (the valuations provided to me by the Applicant were a 2023 update of those carried out by [REDACTED], valuer, in 2021 for the purposes of the English proceedings). In the course of the hearing before me, there was some issue taken by the Respondent with these valuations attributed and with the identification of properties related to particular folios. I must have regard to the fact that it was entirely within the power and control of the Respondent to adduce evidence to clarify these matters. Despite ample and numerous opportunities, he chose not to do so.

34. The following are the valuations produced:

Tenerife 50,000 euro x 2 apartments + 30,000 euro car parking spaces.

[REDACTED] Dublin 12 €420,000

[REDACTED] Dublin 12 €420,000

[REDACTED], Dublin 13 330,000 euro

[REDACTED], Dublin 5 750,000 euro

[REDACTED], Dublin 5 450,000 euro

[REDACTED], Dublin 17 475,000 euro

Company property values:

DJ Limited (five properties) valued at 5,700,000 euro (see page 13 Report of forensic accountant) – the company would appear to own six properties per the Statement of Means of the Respondent of the 8th September 2023 - he is the 100% shareholder

- [REDACTED] (Date of Purchase (DOP) circa 12.5.2016)

- [REDACTED] (DOP circa 21.4.2016)

- [REDACTED] (DOP circa 19.11.2015)

- [REDACTED] (DOP circa 30.5.2016)

- [REDACTED] (leasehold)

- [REDACTED] (leasehold)

There is some lack of clarity as to whether or not these last two properties correspond with Folios [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] which are held by DJL. DJL became the registered owner of these folios on the 9.6.2014 and the 19.11.2015 respectively.

Z Limited, of which the Respondent is a 50% shareholder (owns [REDACTED] with a value of 575,000 euro)

UF Limited– 50% shareholder (owns [REDACTED] with a value of 1,000,000 euro).

Mr. J. I.’s report references a sale agreement in respect of this property dated 2004 which states the purchaser to be “C. K. in trust of [REDACTED]”. The purchase price is stated to have been €850,000. However, UF Limited (an Irish company) is the registered owner of Folio [REDACTED], the date of registration being 10th December 2008.

35. [REDACTED] – on the evidence before me, I find that the Respondent is the beneficial owner of this premises and always has been. It seems to me that he has always controlled the premises and he has gained an income therefrom which he retained (I accept that this may have been used for the discharge of family expenses during the marriage and that the Applicant may have benefitted from such income which was lodged to a joint account of the parties). It is clear that the legal owners derived no benefit from it and knew little about the property. It seems to me that the 1994 agreement was aimed at distancing the Respondent from the property and, perhaps, with some sort of informal inheritance arrangement in mind. It is clear that the Respondent, when relations altered, felt perfectly entitled to unscramble the arrangements which had been allegedly previously put in place. It is clear that he to steps to and controlled the process of sale of the property and the only role of the legal owners was viewed as facilitating these transactions by the Respondent in circumstances where legal title was in their names. It is clear that the legal owners experienced very consider distress and a adverse publicity arising from their connection with the premises where, in truth, they had little de facto role regarding same.

36. [REDACTED] – the evidence of the Respondent in relation to this property was inconsistent. He had told me that this was the property of his deceased brother but, when cross-examining the personal representative of this estate, he asserted 40 year possession of the property, that it was inseparable from [REDACTED] and that he was entitled to control this property. On the evidence before me from Ms O., it is clear that the Respondent has derived and continues to derive an income from this property. It does appear from the evidence of Ms. O. that this property belonged to

L. K., deceased, but, even in those circumstances the Respondent will be entitled to a share thereof, equal to those of the deceased’s other siblings.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

37. I received relatively sparse submissions from both sides. The Applicant says that leave was properly and correctly granted (this is not challenged by the Respondent and no set aside application was brought or addressed at any time). The Applicant references the reliefs available in the context of a Part III application (these are set out in detail below). She refers in particular to section 23(4) of the 1995 Act and the extant English Order which has not been complied with. The interim order made by me on the 8th July 2024 appears to have been substantially complied with as to the periodic payments and not complied with at all as to the lump sum payment. The Applicant addresses each of the factors to be taken into account under Section 26 of the 1995 Act, in particular section 26(a), (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i). The jurisdictional constraints of sections 27 and 28 of the 1995 Act are addressed.

38. The Respondent in this case is a litigant in person. These are complex proceedings involving complex legal issues. It is understandable that he experiences some difficulties in comprehending the legal issues arising. His submissions did not address the law, the evidential shortcomings or the factual property and financial issues. Yet again, as was a hallmark of these proceedings, he asserts his grievances that his then wife embarked upon the route of divorce proceedings and his assertion of an interim agreement on the basis that divorce would not be pursued. He makes allegations in relation to his wife’s behaviours (encouraged by others) before, during and since the divorce hearing. He references the difficulties relating to obtaining his papers. He re-asserts his desire for amicable settlement and his assertion of sums due to the estates of his late brother and another person. The lack of vouching and the complete paucity of evidence to support the asserts of the Respondent and, indeed, their contradiction by the actions or inactions of the estates concerned are not addressed.

39. I believe it appropriate at this point to express my agreed with the dicta from the judgment of HHJ Gordon-Saker of the 9th November 2020 in the context of a committal application against the Respondent in the course of the English divorce proceedings:

“26. This is a rather sad case. [Ms. D. F.] is seventy-one; [Mr C. K.] is eighty. They married many years ago. It was a long marriage, and it was proceeded by a long period of cohabitation. There are probably (and I say “probably” because he is doing his very best to keep them hidden) substantial assets that [Mr. C. K.] owns or controls through third parties. This matter could be resolved by an amicable resolution if he provided the information and then [Ms. D. F.] could provide a proper considered suggestion of the amount of money she would be willing to settle for and he too would make his proposals.”

This judgment resulted in the six month sentence suspended on the basis of compliance by the Respondent within one month. He thereafter withdrew from participating in the English proceedings.

PART III of the FAMILY LAW ACT, 1995

40. Part III of the 1995 Act provides for the grant of relief after a Decree of Divorce granted outside the State. This is a complex and infrequently used provision. There are a number of proofs required before the issue of the appropriate reliefs to be granted can be considered.

A. Section 23(1) requires that the divorce concerned must be one which is “entitled to be recognised as valid in the State”. On the second day of the hearing herein, the Respondent challenged the validity of the marriage of the parties on the basis that the first divorce of the Applicant was not such as was entitled to recognition under Irish law and therefore, he contended, the marriage of the parties was never valid under Irish law. Additionally, he challenged the jurisdiction of the English court to hear and determine a divorce herein. These arguments were heard and determined by me and an ex tempore judgment was given, oral evidence having been heard from the Applicant. I determined that the first divorce of the Applicant was one which was entitled to recognition under Irish law and that the English court had jurisdiction in divorce proceedings brought by the Applicant. This matter having been determined, I do not have to re-visit it at this point.

B. Section 23(2)(a) of the 1995 Act provides for the making of relief orders being “any order under Part II” (of the 1995 Act)3 that this Court “could have made if the court had granted a decree of judicial separation in relation to the marriage.”

C. Section 23(3) of the 1995 Act has a pre-application leave requirement. Such leave was granted by this Court (Jordan J.) on the 29th July 2022. No application to challenge such leave was brought, the entitlement so to do having been confirmed by this Court (Sheehan J.) in PWY v. PC [2007] IEHC 400 and, on the evidence before me, it would not appear that there would be any grounds for so doing but it must be remembered that, leave having been granted, it must be concluded that this Court, in granting such lease, determined pursuant to section 23(3)(a) that there was a substantial ground for so doing i.e. for granting such leave and that a requirement specified in section 27 of the 1995 Act is satisfied. Section 27 will be considered further below. There are no conditions attaching to such leave.

D. Section 23(4) is of particular significance in this case. It states:

“(4) In determining, for the purposes of this section, the financial resources of a spouse or a dependent member of the family in a case in which payments are required to be made or property is required to be transferred to the spouse or to the member by the other spouse under an order of a court of a country or jurisdiction other than the State or an agreement in writing, the court shall have regard to the extent to which the order or agreement has been complied with or, if payments are required to be made, or property is required to be transferred, after the date of the order made by virtue of this section under Part II , is likely to be complied with.” (underlining added)

There are certain exceptions which are not relevant in the context of this judgment. These are listed in Section 23(2)(b).

Financial relief orders were made by the English court as between the parties to this litigation. These orders required the payment by the Respondent of substantial sums of money as detailed above. There has been no compliance by the Respondent with those orders. It is clear that steps towards enforcement have been commenced and progressed in relation to certain assets allegedly owned by the Respondent in England (the Respondent disputes such ownership) but these steps have not so far been successful in recovering sums due to the Applicant under the English orders. The arrangements ordered by the English courts pending compliance with the lump sum order have not been complied with either.

There is no dispute in this regard. The evidence is concerning in relation to the failure to make financial provision for the Applicant by the Respondent whether in accordance with the order of the English courts or otherwise. She has incurred considerable expense and indebtedness in endeavouring to enforce the ancillary relief orders made by the English court, such indebtedness has included having to taken on borrowings to discharge legal fees which she has incurred and continues to incur in the context of advancing these matrimonial proceedings. I made a maintenance pending relief order pursuant to section 24 of the 1995 Act in the course of the within proceedings. This order has been partially complied with as regards periodic payments. The interim lump sum payment which I ordered has not been paid although I accept that this has been hindered and rendered more difficult by the freezing order currently in place as granted by the English court.

Neither party made application for revision of this freezing order such as would permit compliance with the section 24 order of this Court. Having considered the terms of the freezing order, I am not sure that it would in any event preclude such payments being made but this is not a matter for me. Relevant to my considerations in this instance is the non-compliance with the ancillary relief orders made. The Applicant made specific reference to the provisions of section 23(4) in her submissions. None compliance with the English order is also a matter to which I must have regard under section 26(e) of the 1995 Act.

E. Jurisdictional provisions Section 27 of the 1995 Act sets out the jurisdictional rules applicable to the exercise of Part III provisions. Three such jurisdictional rules (expressed to be in the alternative) are set out in the legislation. On the evidence before me, it appears that all three such grounds are satisfied herein.

(a) Domicile of either of the spouses

(b) Ordinary residence of either of the spouses throughout the period of one year ending on the date of the application to this court or ending on the date upon which the foreign divorce took effect

(c) A beneficial interest in land situated in the State on the date of the institution of the proceedings.

41. At an earlier stage in the within proceedings, the Respondent sought to challenge the recognition of the foreign divorce on the grounds that there had never been a valid marriage between the parties based upon the Applicant having been previously married and the divorce obtained in respect of such previous marriage not being one which should be recognised within the State. He so contended on the basis that the Applicant was domiciled in Ireland. I rejected this contention in the context of a preliminary application on the basis that the English divorce granted to the Applicant and her former husband was one which would be recognised based upon the domicile of her first husband in England. The Respondent contested the English court exercising jurisdiction in the divorce proceedings on the basis that he was domiciled in Ireland and, he argued, ordinarily resident in Tenerife. These preliminary matters were previously ruled upon and do not arise for reconsideration in the context of this judgment but it is relevant insofar as a central plank of the Respondent’s arguments in this regard was that the domiciles of the Applicant and of the Respondent are and were at all material times in Ireland. I heard evidence in this regard and I was satisfied that the Applicant’s first husband had at all material times been domiciled in England. However, this argument of the Respondent supports the jurisdictional competence of this court in the context of the within proceedings. The terms of section 27(1)(a) of the 1995 Act is satisfied. In the alternative, I believe that the provisions of section 27(1)(b) of the 1995 Act are also complied with as the evidence supports a determination that the Respondent was ordinarily resident in Ireland at a relevant time being the year prior to the date of the application under section 23(3) of the 1995 Act. The independent documentation from the CRO, the extensive property and business interests of the Respondent in Ireland and his residence and activities in Ireland support this conclusion. In this regard, in particular, I wish to refer to:

o Irish telephone number at conclusion of email and he specifically requests to be telephoned on this number (emails 14th September 2022 and 27th September 2022)

o CRO documentation uses the Dublin address – [REDACTED] repeated used.

Used as his address long before acquired by Z Limited. As far back as at least 2013.

o DJ Limited used the [REDACTED] Dublin addresses and former was also used in CRO documents for the Applicant.

o [REDACTED] Foundation Limited incorporated in February 2023 – the Respondent in evidence/submission referred to this entity as “my foundation”

– the Respondent’s address stated as [REDACTED](Dublin address). It would appear to have operated from the [REDACTED] for at least some period of time.

o UF Limited CRO return 9th May 2023. His address is given as the [REDACTED](Dublin) address.

42. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the jurisdictional grounds provided for at (c) above or, in consequence, the curtailments contained in section 28 of the 1995 Act.

HOW TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF ORDERS TO BE MADE?

43. Section 23(2)(c) provides for the application of section 16 of the 1995 Act in relation to the granting of relief orders with certain stated modifications provided for in that provision. Section 16 is the legislative checklist of factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate reliefs to be granted. It is a section which is widely applied in the context of judicial separation proceedings and is similar to the provisions similarly applied in the context of divorce applications set out in section 20 of the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996. Section 16 has the general provision to be found in sub-section (1) thereof mandating that the court “shall endeavour to ensure that such provision exists or will be made for each spouse concerned and for any dependent member of the family concerned as is proper having regard to all of the circumstances of the case.” This is followed by a list of specific factors, set out in sub-section (2) to which the court must have regard. I will now proceed to apply the provisions of section 16 of the 1995, subject always to the modifications provided for in section 23(2)(c) of the 1995 Act.

44. Section 16(2) provides:

“When considering the making of relief post foreign divorce orders the Court is required to have regard for the twelve factors set out in section 16(2) of the 1995 Act as follows:-

(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the spouses concerned has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, (the Applicant resides in a property jointly owned with a third party.

She has incurred indebtedness in order to fund matrimonial litigation. She is dependent upon State social welfare pension payments. She has no other assets save for those legally or beneficially jointly owned with the Respondent. The Respondent is an elderly person. I am unable to conclude as to his precise financial circumstances save that the evidence before me indicates to me that he is a person of considerable wealth which he has gone to considerable lengths to hide and render entirely opaque. He has exclusive use and benefit of the jointly owned properties in Tenerife.)

(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the spouses has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future (whether in the case of the remarriage of the spouse or otherwise), (the parties do not have any dependent children or other dependents. They are in the retirement stage of their lives with the financial needs and potential financial needs which ensue.)

(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family concerned before the proceedings where instituted or before the spouses separated, as the case may be, (I do not have significant evidence in this regard save that it would appear that the Applicant had access to a joint account for funds to be used in discharge of her personal care needs. From the evidence, it appears that the parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle. They had property in multiple jurisdictions, foreign holidays, there was evidence of meals out and socialising and they were able to provide financial assistance to family members, including grandchildren. The evidence of the Applicant indicates a controlling and furtive nature on the part of the Respondent in relation to his financial affairs.)

(d) the age of each of the spouses and the length of time during which the spouses lived together, regard is to be had to the duration of the marriage pursuant to section 23(2)(c)(i) of the 1995 Act, (the parties are both elderly (the Respondent being a small number of years older than the Applicant) and their relationship and marriage have been of long duration.)

(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the spouses, (this, fortunately, does not appear relevant save that the parties display the usual restrictions that arise in the context of advancing years.)

(f) the contributions which each of the spouses has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by each of them to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other spouse and any contribution made by either of them to looking after the home or caring for the family, (both parties made contributions over the course of a long marriage and previous relationship. Until unhappy differences arose, they would appear to have negotiated a blended family with relative success.)

(g) the effect on the earning capacity of each of the spouses of the marital responsibilities assumed by each during the period when they lived together and, in particular, the degree to which the future earning capacity of a spouse is impaired by reason of that spouse having relinquished or foregone the opportunity of remunerative activity in order to look after the home or care for the family, (I did not have evidence before me in this regard.)

(h) any income or benefits to which either of the spouses is entitled by or under statute, (both parties are entitled to modest statutory pension provision.)

(i) the conduct of each of the spouses, if that conduct is such that in the opinion of the court it would in all the circumstances of the case be unjust to disregard it, (the Applicant give evidence of negative conduct on the part of the Respondent. I do not believe that the conduct of the Respondent during the marriage is such that I ought to take into account. There is no doubt that there has been litigation misconduct by the Respondent in terms of disclosure in the context of the English ancillary relief proceedings and in the context of the proceedings before me. I have had regard to this in my orders herein. I am entitled to do so having regard to the decision of Irvine J. in Q.R. v. S.T.

[2016] IECA 421 paragraphs 59 – 64.)

(j) the accommodation needs of either of the spouses, (the accommodation needs of the parties are such that they are both in accommodation. The Respondent has accommodation in Ireland held through a company in which he has a 50% shareholding and also has accommodation in Tenerife – the accommodation available to him appears to exceed his needs there being two apartments there. The Applicant’s accommodation is jointly held with a third party and she has indebtedness arising from these proceedings.)

(k) the value to each of the spouses of any benefit (for example a benefit under a pension scheme) which by reason of the decree of judicial separation (here to be construed as a reference to the foreign divorce – section 23(2)(c)(ii) of the 1995 Act) concerned that spouse will forfeit the opportunity or possibility of acquiring, (this is not applicable)

(l) the rights of any person other than the spouses but including a person to whom either spouse is remarried'. (the Respondent sought to have the court have regard for the positions of Ms. Z. and Mr. N. R. Jnr. I am not of the view that the evidence before me supports these persons having rights such as are envisaged in this clause. I am of the view that the orders which I am making herein permit the Respondent to implement such moral obligation as he believes himself to have in relation to Mr. N. R. Jnr. I do so having regard to the vulnerabilities of this person.)

45. Additional to the foregoing, section 26 of the 1995 Act states that a relief order shall not be made unless the court is satisfied that “in all the circumstances of the particular case it is appropriate that such an order should be made by a court in the State.” The section proceeds to set out a list of particular matters to which a court should have regard in determining whether or not to make such a relief order. The list of such matters states: “(a) the connection which the spouses concerned have with the State,

(b) the connection which the spouses have with the country or jurisdiction other than the State in which the marriage concerned was dissolved or in which they were legally separated,

(c) the connection which the spouses have with any country or jurisdiction other than the State,

(d) any financial benefit which the spouse applying for the making of the order (“the applicant”) or a dependent member of the family has received, or is likely to receive, in consequence of the divorce or legal separation concerned or by virtue of any agreement or the operation of the law of a country or jurisdiction other than the State,

(e) in a case where an order has been made by a court in a country or jurisdiction other than the State requiring a spouse, or the spouses, concerned to make any payment or transfer any property for the benefit of the applicant or a dependent member of the family, the financial relief given by the order and the extent to which the order has been complied with or is likely to be complied with,

(f) any right which the applicant or a dependent member of the family has, or has had, to apply for financial relief from a spouse or the spouses under the law of any country or jurisdiction other than the State and, if the applicant or dependent member of the family has omitted to exercise any such right, the reason for that omission,

(g) the availability in the State of any property in respect of which a relief order in favour of the applicant or dependent member of the family could be made,

(h) the extent to which the relief order is likely to be enforceable,

(i) the length of time which has elapsed since the date of the divorce or legal separation concerned.”

46. On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to grant relief. As regards the section 26 factors:

i. Re (a) above, these parties have had a strong bond and history with Ireland over many years. They were both born in Ireland and continued throughout their lives to have a strong connection with Ireland and assets were acquired and business carried out in this jurisdiction with which they were both involved over many years.

ii. Re (d) and (e) above, the Applicant has had a large lump sum order made for her provision by the English courts but has received but meagre sums due to a complete failure on the part of the Respondent to comply with the terms of such order. I accept that her financial circumstances have been hugely constrained in consequence. While enforcement steps are being pursued in England, progress has been slow and the fact remains that three and a half years post judgment, the Applicant is without anything which might reasonably be considered adequate provision in the circumstances of this family.

iii. The Applicant has continued to try to enforce the English order and has incurred indebtedness in this regard. It is clear that there are substantial assets in Ireland and these are assets which are available for the purposes of making provision. While I doubt that enforcement will be easy, I see no reason why she should not be in a position to enforce the orders of this Court.

iv. I have referenced before the very considerable time which has elapsed since the making of the English ancillary relief orders. It is simply unfair that the Applicant has had to wait as long as she has for provision to be made and that she has been obstructed in her pursuit of provision by the refusal of the Respondent to engage in the English proceedings and his refusal to make any reasonable or arguably any attempt to make adequate disclosure in the context of either the English or these proceedings.

CASELAW

47. The provisions of Part III have been considered by this Court in written judgments on two occasions. In MR v PR [2005] IEHC 2, Quirke J. considered these statutory provisions. Having considered the statutory proofs required (which were satisfied), the Court proceeded to consider the factors listed in section 26 and section 16(2) of the 1995 Act. I have done so above. The factual circumstances in that case were somewhat different to the present. There the Applicant sought relief under Part III in circumstances in which she asserted that the provision made for her by the foreign court (Spain) was insufficient and that further provision should be made. Here the Applicant has no difficulty with the provision made by the English Court rather she simply wishes to receive what was ordered therein. Quirke J. referenced the similar, but not identical, provisions in the English Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act, 1984 and cited with approval the dicta of Purchas LJ in the English Court of Appeal

decision of Holmes v. Holmes [1989] Fam 47 where he stated:

“...the purpose of this Act is generally apparent, namely, that it is there to remit hardships which have been experienced in the past in the presence of a failure in a foreign jurisdiction to afford appropriate financial relief. The obvious cases are those jurisdictions where there simply are not any provisions to grant financial relief to wives or children or, maybe husbands and children. In such cases, although the dissolution of the marriage has taken place in a foreign jurisdiction according to foreign laws, then the courts in this country are empowered by Parliament to step in and fill the gap. For my part I do not believe that the intention of Parliament in passing this Act was in any way to vest in the English courts any power of review or even correction of orders made in a foreign forum by a competent court in the whole matter had been examined in a way exactly equivalent to the which examination which would have taken place if the application had been made in the first instance in the courts here. That is not the object of this legislation at all”.

48. Quirke J. determined that the purpose of relief orders was to achieve justice and he stated:

“126. This court in granting the relief seeks to redress the apparent injustice which has resulted from the failure on the part of the respondent to disclose the full extent of his means and financial resources in 1996.

127. In the circumstances of this case it is not appropriate for this court to grant relief based upon the concept of what would in 1996 have been “proper provision” for the applicant’s upkeep, maintenance and welfare arising out of the dissolution of the marriage.

128. The court is required to take into account all of the circumstances of the case (including the statutory factors identified in sections 16 and 26 of the Act of 1995).It should do so as they exist and can be considered at the date of the grant of relief and not at the date of divorce.

129. The statutory relief granted is not intended to compensate the applicant for past financial or other hardship or inequity. It is intended to alleviate present inequitable financial or other hardship or reduced circumstances caused by a seemingly unjust outcome resulting from divorce proceedings in another jurisdiction where no comparable remedy is now available to the applicant. It is intended to do so in a just and equitable fashion.”

(underlining added)

49. The provisions of Part III were further considered by O’Hanlon J. in MY v AA [2017] IEHC 227. The issue of personal hardship being suffered by the Applicant was held to be of particular relevance. However, as with the previous decision, the focus was on whether reliefs additional to those granted by the foreign court could be ordered and it was clearly provided that this could only occur in exceptional circumstances.

The court was also influenced by circumstances of failure of financial disclosure.

50. While these decisions support the relevance of hardship, non-disclosure and the principle of achieving a just outcome, the factual circumstances are very different to the present where there has been overwhelming non-compliance with the ancillary orders of the foreign court, there has been no evidence of any effort to comply, even in part, with the ancillary relief orders and the Applicant is undoubtedly suffering hardship. In essence here, Part III is being invoked in aid of enforcement. This, in my view, is a circumstance especially reflected in the provisions of Part III and in this regard I refer to section 23(4) and section 26(e) of the 1995 Act.

51. As previously stated herein, the applicable legislation in England (Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act, 1984) contains a similar, although not identical, provision to Part III. This provision was considered by the Supreme Court of England and Wales in Agbaje v. Agbaje [2010] 1 AC 675. Lord Collins, at p. 676 of his judgment, provides useful guidance in relation to it:

"71 To take up some of the points made in the preceding paragraphs, the proper approach to Part III simply depends on a careful application of sections 16, 17 and 18 in the light of the legislative purpose, which was the alleviation of the adverse consequences of no, or no adequate, financial provision being made by a foreign court in a situation where there were substantial connections with England. There are two, interrelated, duties of the court before making an order under Part III. The first is to consider whether England and Wales is the appropriate venue for the application: section 16(1). The second is to consider whether an order should be made under section 17 having regard to the matters in section 18. There are two reasons why the duties are interrelated. First, neither section 16(2) nor section 18(2)(3) refers to an exhaustive list of matters to be taken into account. Section 16(1) directs the court to have regard to "all the circumstances of the case" and section 16(2) refers the court to certain matters "in particular". Second, some of the matters to be considered under section 16 may be relevant under section 18, and vice versa. An obvious example would be that section 16(2)(e) refers the court to the financial provision which has been made by the foreign court. Plainly that would be relevant under section 18. So also the direction in section 18(6) to the court, in considering the financial resources of a party, to have regard to whether an order of the foreign court has been complied with would plainly be relevant in considering whether England is the appropriate venue.

72 It is not the purpose of Part III to allow a spouse (usually, in current conditions, the wife) with some English connections to make an application in England to take advantage of what may well be the more generous approach in England to financial provision, particularly in so-called big-money cases. There is no condition of exceptionality for the purposes of section 16, but it will not usually be a case for an order under Part III where the wife had a right to apply for financial relief under the foreign law, and an award was made in that foreign country. In such cases, mere disparity between that award and what would be awarded on an English divorce will certainly be insufficient to trigger the application of Part III. Nor is hardship or injustice (much less serious injustice) a condition of the exercise of the jurisdiction, but if either factor is present, it may make it appropriate, in the light of all the circumstances, for an order to be made, and may affect the nature of the

provision ordered. Of course, the court will not lightly characterise foreign law, or the order of a foreign court, as unjust.

73 The amount of financial provision will depend on all the circumstances of the case and there is no rule that it should be the minimum amount required to overcome injustice. The following general principles should be applied. First, primary consideration must be given to the welfare of any children of the marriage. This can cut both ways as the children may be being supported by the foreign spouse. Second, it will never be appropriate to make an order which gives the claimant more than she or he would have been awarded had all the proceedings taken place within this jurisdiction. Third, where possible the order should have the result that provision is made for the reasonable needs of each spouse. Subject to these principles, the court has a broad discretion. The reasons why it was appropriate for an order to be made in England are among the circumstances to be taken into account in deciding what order should be made. Where the English connections of the case are very strong there may be no reason why the application should not be treated as if it were made in purely English proceedings. The full procedure for granting ancillary relief after an English divorce does not apply in Part III cases. The conditions which can be attached to leave, together with the court's case management powers, can be used to define the issues and to limit the evidence to be filed, as was done by Munby J in this case. This enables the jurisdiction to be tailored to the needs of the individual case, so that the grant of leave does not inevitably trigger a full blown claim for all forms of ancillary relief."

52. I have found these dicta most useful in the context of the present case and the approach and principles set down would appear to me to be equally applicable in the context of the Irish legislative provisions. The whole purpose of Part III is to alleviate adverse consequences of no, or no adequate, financial provision being made by a foreign court in a situation where the parties had substantial connections with the State. As is stated by Errignton, Harriet in her article “Part III applications – striking the right balance” The Law Society Gazette 27th October 2023, referencing the English statutory provisions:

“The intention when the law was drafted in the 1980s was to protect vulnerable parties to a divorce, whose spouse had used another jurisdiction which was favourable to him/her in order to obtain a divorce and a financial award which simply did not meet the needs of the weaker spouse.”

53. In this case, the “adverse consequence” to the Applicant is not as to the quantum of the award made in England but rather its inadequacy derives from the complete lack of compliance with the said award which has had the consequence of leaving the Applicant in a position of vulnerability. It seems to me that the appropriate approach to applications such as the present is:

(a) What connection does the case have with Ireland?

(b) What are the appropriate relief orders to be made?

(c) There is no condition of exceptionality but disparity of award as between the foreign jurisdiction and Ireland is not usually sufficient;

(d) Hardship or injustice is not a pre-condition but these factors are relevant;

(e) The extent of provision depends upon all of the circumstances –

(i) It is not appropriate to make an order giving more than would have been received if all of the proceedings had taken place in Ireland;

(ii) Provision should be made for the reasonable needs of each spouse;

(iii) The Court has a broad discretion.

I will now apply these principles to the facts of the present case.

TAXATION TREATMENT

54. The Applicant and the Respondent have been divorced in England which Decree is recognised in Ireland. In these circumstances, the parties are no longer spouses under Irish law. What therefore are the taxation implications of financial relief orders made between them by me, post-divorce, under Part III of the 1995 Act? In this regard, I refer to the Finance Act, 1997 which affords equivalent neutral capital tax treatment to relief orders as apply in the case of ancillary relief orders in other matrimonial proceedings

Capital Acquisitions Tax

142.—(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Principal Act, a gift or inheritance (within the meaning, in each case, of that Act) taken by virtue or in consequence of an order to which this subsection applies by a spouse who was a party to the marriage concerned shall be exempt from any capital acquisitions tax under that Act and shall not be taken into account in computing such a tax.

(2) Subsection (1) applies—

(a) to a relief order or an order under section 25 of the Family Law Act, 1995 , made following the dissolution of a marriage, or

(b) to a maintenance pending relief order made following the granting of leave under section

23 (3) of the Family Law Act, 1995 , to a spouse whose marriage has been dissolved,

(c) to an order referred to in section 41 (a) of the Family Law Act, 1995 , or an order under section 42 (1) of that Act made in addition to or instead of an order under section 41 (a) of that Act, in favour of a spouse whose marriage has been dissolved, and

(d) to an order under Part III of the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996 .

(3) Section 51 of the Family Law Act, 1995 , and section 34 of the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996 , are hereby repealed.

Capital Gains Tax

72.—(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Capital Gains Tax Acts, where by virtue or in consequence of—

(a) an order made under Part II of the Family Law Act, 1995 , on or following the granting of a decree of judicial separation within the meaning of that Act, or

(b) an order made under Part II of the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, 1989 , on or following the granting of a decree of judicial separation where such order is treated, by virtue of section 3 of the Family Law Act, 1995 , as if made under the corresponding provision of the Family Law Act, 1995 , or

(c) a deed of separation, or

(d) a relief order (within the meaning of the Family Law Act, 1995 ) made following the dissolution of a marriage,

either of the spouses concerned disposes of an asset to the other spouse then, subject to subsection (2), both spouses shall be treated for the purposes of those Acts as if the asset was acquired from the spouse making the disposal for a consideration of such amount as would secure that on the disposal neither a gain nor a loss would accrue to the spouse making the disposal.

(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply if, until the disposal, the asset formed part of the trading stock of a trade carried on by the spouse making the disposal or if the asset is acquired as trading stock for the purposes of a trade carried on by the spouse acquiring the asset.

(3) Where subsection (1) applies in relation to a disposal of an asset by a spouse to the other spouse, then, in relation to a subsequent disposal of the asset (not being a disposal to which subsection (1) applies), the spouse making the disposal shall be treated for the purposes of the Capital Gains Tax Acts as if the other spouse's acquisition or provision of the asset had been his or her acquisition or provision of the asset.

(4) Section 52 of the Family Law Act, 1995 , is hereby repealed.

(5) This section shall apply and be deemed to have effect as on and from the 1st day of August, 1996.

CONCLUSION

55. I reach the end of this hearing with little confidence that I have any comprehensive knowledge of the assets, income or liabilities of the Respondent. I am satisfied that he does own the following:

1. 100% of shareholding in DJL

2. 100% of the director’s loan owed by DJL to him (beneficial ownership of this loan would appear to be accepted by the Respondent to be joint as between him and the Applicant although he does assert that he holds this loan as to 50% on trust for the estate of N. R.. I did not find such assertion of trust to be proved on the evidence before me).

3. 50% of Z Limited

4. 100% of the director’s loan owed by Z Limited

5. 50% of shareholding in UF Limited

6. I have formed the view that the Respondent is the beneficial owner of [REDACTED], Dublin 13.

7. I have formed the view that the Respondent is the beneficial owner of [REDACTED], Dublin 5.

8. I have formed the view that the Respondent is the beneficial owner of [REDACTED], Dublin 12. It would appear that [REDACTED], Crumlin forms part of the estate of L. K., deceased, brother of the Respondent and, in this context he will have a share of that property.

9. Jointly with the Applicant, the Tenerife properties

56. Having regard to the factors to be applied as set out above and being mindful of provision for both parties, I consider the following orders appropriate:

57. I am transferring the full beneficial interest in director’s loan DJL to the Applicant … she arguably owns 50% of this already and I am transferring the beneficial interest in the entirety to her in the context of the other orders herein.

58. I am transferring 100% of the shareholding in DJL to the Applicant and I am directing in this context that the said company be liquidated, sold or otherwise disposed of in most financially and tax expeditious manner. The director’s loan and other lawful creditors will have to be discharged and thereafter the net funds are to be divided as to 75% to the Applicant and 25% to the Respondent. An independent accountant is to be appointed to advise in relation to the most expeditious manner of achieving the division directed. If such accountant cannot be agreed between the parties, I will make an appointment in this regard. This order is to encompass all assets held by DJL whether identified in this judgment or not.

59. I order joint carriage of sale to the Applicant’s solicitors in the within proceedings and such solicitors as the Respondent may nominate (such nomination to take place within seven days of this judgment) with the Applicant’s solicitors to be the lead solicitor in such sales, at their option. Likewise, a joint auctioneer should be appointed and if such professional cannot be agreed between the parties, I will make such appointment.

60. I am directing the sale of [REDACTED], Dublin 5 with the net proceeds of sale to be divided 75% to the Applicant and 25% to the Respondent. The arrangements in relation to financial and tax advice, legal carriage of sale and auctioneer to be appointed to be as provided above in relation to DJL.

61. I am making no order in respect of [REDACTED], Dublin 13. In so doing, I am providing for the moral obligation expressed by the Respondent in relation to N. R.

Jnr.

62. I am directing the sale of [REDACTED], Dublin 12 with the net proceeds of sale to be divided 75% to the Applicant and 25% to the Respondent. I am putting a stay of 4 weeks on this order in the following circumstances: it would appear that steps in relation to a transfer of ownership were made by the Respondent in favour of H. K.

and D. F. in or about 1994. I do not, on the evidence before me, consider that the Respondent ever intended to or considered himself to have given up his beneficial interest in this property. I will lift the in camera rule to allow H. K. and D. F. to be made aware of the making of this order and that they have liberty to apply in this regard within the said 4 week stay period. In the context of such application being made, the stay may be extended or this order vacated. In the absence of such application, the stay will be vacated at the said time and the Order for sale shall

operate. The arrangements in relation to financial and tax advice, legal carriage of sale and auctioneer to be appointed to be as provided above in relation to DJL.

63. In relation to the property contained in Folio [REDACTED], referable to J. F., the only evidence provided to me indicating a link between the Respondent and J. F. was the reference in the late discovered bank statements of DJL of payments made to a person of this name and the averment of Mr. A. J.. No evidence in relation to the beneficial interest of the Respondent in this property was adduced at trial. Ms J. F.

was not called or sought to be joined. I will give liberty to apply in relation to this property but there is no current evidence before me which would cause me to deal with the matter otherwise than in accordance with the folio.

64. I am not satisfied on the basis of these links only and in circumstances in which the registered owner was not on notice of the proceedings or brought before the court to give evidence to make orders in respect of this property. I will, however, give liberty to apply and to re-enter in this regard. Additionally, this is a property which may be mentioned to me on the for mention date referenced below.

65. Any income from the properties/companies listed above is to be divided in accordance with the percentage entitlements of the parties thereto from the date of this judgment.

I am ordering full vouching in this regard in order that any arrears which may arise may be taken into account in due course in the division of the proceeds of sale of the various properties or shareholdings.

66. The division of the sale proceeds of the properties aforementioned and the transfer of the entirety of the director’s loan in DJL to the Applicant is on the basis that I consider that a broadly equal division of assets to be appropriate herein having regard to, inter alia, the duration of the marriage and the ages of the parties and the litigation history between them. However, I can have no confidence whatsoever that the totality of the assets of the Respondent have been disclosed, whether in this jurisdiction or abroad.

Additionally, I was not provided with tax calculations in order to achieve net values in respect of assets, most of which are subject to complex holding mechanisms from a taxation perspective. The division is on the basis, inter alia, that the Respondent retains his 50% shareholding in Z Limited (and the consequent property), the benefit of the entirety of his interest in the director’s loan in Z Limited, his 50% interest in UF Limited, his interest, whatever it may be, in [REDACTED] and the Tenerife properties, which have been transferred to him under the English Court Order. In so doing, I have also had regard to the wholly unsatisfactory nature of the disclosure by the Respondent in these proceedings. It was entirely within his power to provide such clarity and he chose not to do so, a repetition of his position before the English court.

I must acknowledge the engagement of the Respondent in these proceedings to their completion and his courtesy and respectful demeanour throughout. However, I have little confidence that I have any full picture of his business and financial affairs. I must also have regard to the fact that the Applicant, having pursued English proceedings and having obtained orders in that context remains unprovided for many years later. Huge legal costs have been incurred by her in consequence. Such legal costs are a factor which I have taken into account in the context of my substantive orders herein. I was minded to grant to the Applicant a greater percentage in the assets concerned but I believe that it is important to ensure provision is made for both parties having regard to the legal principles applicable and, in particular, to their ages and circumstances and, additionally, I believe that the achieving of some level of provision for the Applicant within any reasonable time period is less likely to be achieved if the Respondent is going to derive nothing or a but trivial sum from the disposition of the assets concerned.

67. While I have very considerable doubts on the evidence before me that there are debts due and owing to the estates of N. R. and/or L. K. or to Dublin City Council (as there was no evidence of such indebtedness before me save the narrative of the Respondent) but, for the avoidance of doubt, I am making a declaration that, if arising, they are the liabilities of the Respondent only and he must indemnify the Applicant in relation to same.

68. I am going to make an Order pursuant to section 35 of the 1995 restraining both parties from dissipating, disposing of or otherwise dealing with their assets save in accordance with the terms hereof pending compliance with the terms of these orders.

The current freezing order made by me will continue until perfection of the Orders consequent upon this judgment. Of course, I cannot interfere with any extant freezing order of the English courts and it is for the parties to make application to that court in respect of that order if they deem this necessary or appropriate.

69. I order that all documentation relating to the companies and properties concerned be provided by the Respondent to the Applicant in order to enable her to advance fulfilment of the orders made herein. This documentation is to be provided within 7 days of the date of this judgment.

70. I will lift the in camera rule in so far as is necessary to enable the orders made by me herein to be carried out. It is for the parties to make such applications to the English courts as are required in respect of the freezing order(s) made by that court and still in operation as may be necessary to enable the terms of this Order to be carried out.

71. I will make an Order authorising the Principal Registrar of the High Court to sign on behalf of the Respondent all documents necessary to give effect to the terms hereof in the event of a default on the part of the Respondent in so doing within 7 days of written request.

72. I will grant liberty to apply. I will grant liberty to re-enter. In respect of any properties in which it is asserted that the Respondent has a legal or beneficial interest which are not expressly encompassed within the Orders made herein (whether directly or through company holdings), I will grant liberty to address the Court in respect of same at the for mention date referenced below.

73. My interim orders in respect of maintenance (periodic and lump sum) made pursuant to section 24 of the 1995 Act remain good and effective and are not in any manner superseded or replaced by this order save that the periodic maintenance shall continue until this order is complied with in full (or until she has full control of DJL rent roll)

with credit for such maintenance payments to be given as against the Applicant’s share in the rental income from the properties as provided for herein.

74. I am not interfering in any manner with the English order but sums received by the Applicant in the context of this Order will go to the credit of the Respondent in the orders made in those proceedings. The within proceedings, as I have previously stated, are not enforcement proceedings and I make no determination in respect of any enforcement application, extant or in the future, whether in this jurisdiction or elsewhere, save that the sums received by the Applicant consequent upon the Orders herein are to go to the credit of the Respondent in any such enforcement proceedings.

75. I will list this matter for mention on the 27th May 2025 at 10.30 am in order to address any matters arising and to hear any submissions as to the precise format of the Orders to be made herein to reflect the provision set out above.