High Court dismisses late judicial review application where applicant failed to appeal planning consent properly and withdrew proceedings.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe applicant sought leave to challenge a planning consent after failing to submit a valid appeal to the Planning Board due to a missing receipt. He subsequently withdrew his application for judicial review and attempted to re-enter proceedings months later. The court dismissed the application, ruling that voluntary withdrawal cannot be reinstated without exceptional circumstances and that the applicant failed to exhaust remedies by not organizing a proper initial appeal.
Legislator headnote
AI generateds. 33 of the Planning and Development Act 2000; s. 34 of the Planning and Development Act 2000: An order cannot be made in withdrawn proceedings unless they are reinstated, and reinstatement is truly exceptional; furthermore, a failure to exhaust remedies by not organizing a valid appeal precludes recourse to judicial review.
Keywords
AI generatedCited Legislation
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AI generatedFull text
[2025] IEHC 18
THE HIGH COURT
PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT
[H.JR.2024.0000448]
PHILIP GAFFNEY
APPLICANT
AND
AN BORD PLEANÁLA
RESPONDENT
AND
KILSARAN CONCRETE UNLIMITED COMPANY (BY ORDER)
NOTICE PARTY
JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Monday the 20th day of January 2025
1. The applicant objected to a planning consent granted to the notice party by the council in
September 2022. He tried to appeal that to the board, but his appeal was invalid due to his failure
to include the necessary receipt – improperly the applicant failed to disclose that to the court and I
only found out about it from the notice party. The applicant sought leave to challenge the board
decision, made in the appeal in February 2024. He withdrew that application before it was listed in
open court. He then wandered back into court in January 2025 seeking to somehow move the leave
application. There can only be one possible answer to that.
Geographical context
2. The matter relates to construction of entrance, three mass concrete storage bays and one
concrete reclaimer unit at Naul townland, Clashford, Naul, Co. Meath.
Facts
3. On 23rd September 2022, the council granted the impugned permission.
4. The applicant sought to appeal that to the board, but his appeal was declared invalid (see
https://www.pleanala.ie/en-ie/case/314881 – the applicant didn’t inform the court of this until the
notice party raised it). The reason for the invalidity was apparently because the applicant failed to
include the correct receipt for the submission to the council (so the applicant informed me after the
notice party had raised the issue of the invalid appeal). That’s his responsibility although he
implausibly sought to blame the board for not giving him more notice that he had not submitted a
correct appeal.
5. The board granted permission on appeal on 14th February 2024.
6. The eight-week period to challenge that expired on 9th April 2024.
Procedural history
7. The applicant’s grounding affidavit is as follows:
“I Philip Gaffney A Gentleman of ... in the County of Meath being eighteen years and
upwards. Being the applicant in these proceedings make oath and say as follows:
I am acting as a litigant in person in This case. I have read this statement.
So much of this statement as relates to my own acts and deeds is true, so much of it as
relates to acts and deeds of any and every person I believe to be true.”
8. The affidavit and statement were filed on 28th March 2024.
9. The applicant wrote to the regular judicial review list registrar on 28th March 2024, applying
for a date for an ex parte hearing.
10. The registrar replied on 8th April 2024 stating that the matter would be listed in the Planning
& Environment List on 13th May 2024. In fact given the need to apply in open court at the time in
order to stop the clock, the applicant should have been advised of that requirement forthwith and
facilitated in coming before a judge straight away, rather than having the matter put off to a later
date that was so far removed that his application became out of time. As an official act or omission,
that is something my side of things will have to take responsibility for, so that delay should not be
attributed to the applicant.
11. The rules of court were changed on 26th April 2024 to provide that the clock would stop on
filling of papers rather than on mentioning the matter to the court, but that didn’t apply at the time
(and the eight weeks had expired by that stage anyway).
12. The matter was administratively listed in the predecessor to the current List for hearing of
an ex parte leave application on 13th May 2024.
13. But on 7th May 2024, the applicant contacted the court to withdraw the matter. The emails
state as follows (most recent first, as usual):
“On Wed, May 8, 2024 at 12:57 PM phil gaffney <[address]> wrote:
Hi ...
Thank you for your assistance with this matter. Kind Regards
Philip
On Wed, May 8, 2024 at 11:08 AM Commercial Planning&Strategic Infrastructure
<cpsid@courts.ie> wrote:
Good morning,
This case will be deemed withdrawn. No further action is required on your part.
Kind Regards,
...
Commercial Planning & Strategic Infrastructure Development List Registrar, High Court
Prisoner Applications Registrar, High Court
An tSeirbhís Chúirteanna, Na Ceithre Cúirteanna, Cé Inns, Baile Átha Cliath 7
The Courts Service, The Four Courts, Inns Quay, Dublin 7
[contact details]
courts.ie
From: phil gaffney <[address]>
Sent: Tuesday, May 7, 2024 3:59 PM
To: Commercial Planning&Strategic Infrastructure <cpsid@courts.ie>
Subject: Ref HJR 2024448
Dear Registrar
I would like to withdraw my application for Judicial Review record number HJR 2024448
where as I know I am right and have a good case. I am simply overwhelmed by all that this
entails and my health is more important than breaches in planning.
I thank the court for your assistance with this matter.
Kind Regards
Philip
Philip Gaffney Litigant in Person”
14. The applicant has more recently produced correspondence about medical appointments on
29th and 31st May 2024.
15. On 6th January 2025, the applicant emailed the court to seek leave, and I directed that the
matter be relisted, but on notice. The email states:
From: phil gaffney <...>
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2025 12:04 PM
To: Commercial Planning&Strategic Infrastructure <cpsid@courts.ie>
Subject: Re: Ref HJR 2024448
Cyber Security Notice: This email originated from outside the organisation. Do not click links
or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe.
Hi ...
Happy New Year. I trust you enjoyed the Christmas break. I am looking to reactivate my
application for leave to appeal the decision. do I need to start the process all over again or
can i restart this one
Kind Regards
Philip
Philip Gaffney
Litigant in person”
16. On 13th January 2025, the matter was listed for hearing.
17. The applicant didn’t indicate any basis to reinstate the matter and had no motion or evidence
in this regard before the court. He essentially focused on the merits and sought leave and addressed
the merits in his oral submissions. The developer asked to be joined as a notice party which I
granted without objection. The applicant said that he had notified the council but they communicated
that they had not received information about it and did not get involved.
18. The applicant also asked for the DAR and complained about a number of irrelevant
procedural matters. There is no basis for access to the DAR during the course of the proceedings,
as distinct from thereafter, even leaving aside the off-the-cuff nature of the request.
19. I announced the order at the conclusion of the hearing and said that reasons would follow
later. The opposing parties didn’t apply for costs so the order was to be perfected with no order in
that regard.
20. Part of the applicant’s complaint was the alleged non-existence of the original permission.
Following the hearing on 13th January 2025, the developer sent what it said was a copy of the
original permission to the applicant:
“As discussed at today’s hearing of this matter, we attach a copy of Meath County Council
Planning Permission Ref. 80/572.”
21. The applicant replied:
“Dear …
Thank you for forwarding me the pieces of paper. They are not a valid planning permission
as I have already stated in my sworn affidavit which I gave to your barrister yesterday and
are uploaded onto the share file I also note they are not supported by a sworn affidavit by
your client which is the appropriate response in this matter.
Yours
Philip Gaffney
Litigant in Person”
22. I record this matter but don’t need to resolve it and indeed can’t do so as of now because I
wasn’t copied on the first of those emails so haven’t seen the alleged permission.
23. On 15th January 2025, the applicant emailed the registrar in the following terms:
“Hi ...
I am following up from the proceedings
I understand the courts position in relation to time and withdrawal. I want to thank the
court for giving me the opportunity. I do appreciate as a lay litigant I don't understand all
the nuances of procedures. I should say that had I been given the legal reference by the an
board pleanala before the hearing I would have been adequately prepared to respond. That
been said, we are where we are. I am looking for the order for the DARS as I requested in
court and there was no objection. I am working on a plenary action as the substantive issue
was not addressed; it was merely procedural. I need the DARS as a lay litigant has no
standing court whereas the DARS can clearly show what was argued. It will also show the
court asked Kilsaran to provide Their Planning Permission and they said they had it and they
would provide it. I am happy to lodge a motion requesting the DARS if the court feels it is
necessary however I don't want to take up any more of the courts time than is absolutely
necessary and as a self employed artist I don't need the expense.
I am at the mercy of the court
Kind Regards
Philip
Philip Gaffney
Litigant in Person”
Access to the DAR
24. It is not clear to me what the proposed plenary action is about but I don’t need to consider
that now. I requested the registrar to reply to the effect that if the other parties consented an order
for the DAR could be made on the papers, and if they didn’t, the applicant could bring a motion. It
was subsequently pointed out to the applicant that an order for the DAR would not normally be made
until 28 days from the perfection of the order. The basic point is that while there is generally access
to the DAR on provision of a plausible reason once the case is over, it isn’t generally provided during
the hearing (because that lengthens the hearing due to the DAR becoming an additional agenda
item for discussion and analysis) or during the period for invoking appellate involvement (because
that results in an expansion of that process and a manufacture of points that might not otherwise
be made based on transcript-trawling). But once that period is over the DAR is generally available
if there is any reasonable basis to ask for it.
25. Parenthetically, the logic of avoiding transcript-trawling for appeals is also applicable to
avoiding such trawling for judicial review. In O'Neill v. Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors [2025]
IEHC 8 (Unreported, High Court, 13th January 2025), Simons J. disagreed with Judge McNulty who
had refused an application for the DAR for the purposes of judicial review on the basis that the
application was a fishing expedition. While I agree with the point made by Simons J. to the extent
that if a judicial review is actually instituted, the DAR should be provided if sought so that a record
is available for the court (para. 43), and while I recognise that there was a lot of context to that
case arising from other grounds in those proceedings which might have rendered Simons J. less than
usually sympathetic to the approach taken at the trial in the District Court on this particular point,
unfortunately I would respectfully disagree that a bona fide intention to bring such proceedings at
some point in the future is enough. The problem with demanding the DAR for a proposed judicial
review is that the DAR becomes a fertile source of new grounds, not just evidence of points that the
applicant was going to make anyway. Judge McNulty’s “fishing expedition” point is fundamentally
correct, and is just as valid in that context (provided that the DAR is furnished after the judicial
review is instituted) as in the context of postponing access to the DAR of the High Court until the
appellate window has closed, but providing it at that point.
26. Judge McNulty’s point comes squarely within the logic (albeit in a different procedural
context) of the point made by the Supreme Court in People v. C.P. [2024] IESC 26 (Unreported,
Supreme Court, 20th June 2024) per O’Malley J. (Dunne, Charleton, Woulfe and Murray JJ.
concurring) at para. 7:
“Thus, the standard rule is that transcripts are not provided until grounds of appeal have
been lodged. As will be seen, the rationale for this is the prevention of the practice of
‘transcript trawling’, whereby lawyers (typically practitioners who did not act in the trial),
have meticulously combed trial transcripts for potential grounds of appeal relating to matters
that were not were not argued in the trial. However, the Court has a discretion to make an
order for the transcript where it considers it to be appropriate.”
27. For clarity, this isn’t a case of uncertainty due to conflicting High Court judgments – the
position articulated in O’Neill is per incuriam because it does not take into account the logic of the
Supreme Court decision in C.P. So of course an appellant from the Circuit Court in a criminal matter
can get the DAR – after lodging grounds of appeal; of course an appellant from the High Court can
get the DAR – after lodging the appeal or after the time for appeal has expired; and of course a
would-be judicial review applicant can get the DAR of the District or Circuit Courts – but only after
lodging the judicial review or the expiry of the time to do so. The logic is the same. Prior to that it
is a fishing expedition as Judge McNulty quite correctly said.
28. Presumably in the present case the applicant will get the DAR in due course unless some
reason emerges to the contrary. In any event I am now giving reasons for the order previously
announced.
Statement of grounds
29. The statement of grounds provides as follows:
“Applicants Description; A Gentleman acting as a litigant in Person.
Relief Sought; Certiorari Quash The decision of Bord Pleanala and Meath County Council
reference number ABP 314881-22
Mandamus to compel the performance of a duty. To compel the applicant Kilsaran unlimited
to apply for Proper planning permission for of use of the unauthorised development.
To compel Meath County Council to provide planning records including ledgers microfiche
for the year 1980 and 1987.
To compel the applicant Kilsaran unlimited to provide all paperwork and documents relating
to its acquisition of the site from P& B Connolly Limited
Prohibition Prevent action being taken. To prevent any further works on the site
Injunction to compel the taking of action. To compel the applicant to reinstate works already
carried out particularly the removal of ground and changing of ground levels which has
adversely affected my property.
A stay on the on the planning permission
Grounds upon which relief is sought
I am acting as a litigant in person in This case. That I should be granted leave to seek a
judicial review of the decision of An Bord Pleanala case ref ABP31488 l-22 on the following
grounds
The decision is contrary to law. The parent permission upon which this decision has been
granted does not exist. The plant is has been [sic] operating without planning permission
and as such is an unauthorised development under planning law.
No benefit can be obtained from an unauthorised development for the operator of such
development under planning law. The planning reference number used relates to a planning
application that was withdrawn planning reference number 80572 simply does not exist as
a planning permission.
I say and believe that I visited the offices of Meath county council over twenty years ago to
verify the planning reference number 80572 given to Naul Community Council as the
planning permission for the Plant. After extensive searching I found a file reference that
stated there was an application that had been withdrawn.
I then searched the records for any permissions in Meath that mentioned Kilsaran in case
they had been miss labelled I found 13 permissions for Kilsaran none of which related to
Naul in anyway.
I then did an extensive geographic search through the planning files to find any reference
to a concrete or ready-mix plant. I found one application that was lodged by the same
applicant as the 80572. The application number was 871056 upon further inspection it was
noted further information was requested on that application and never provided therefore
deeming the application invalid.
This number was then used by the applicant to claim they had planning permission for
another application.
All of these points I have continually raised with Meath County council and public
representatives to no avail. This should have been investigated further by an Bord Pleanala.
I also say and believe that not all the files and documents relating to this application were
provided to an Bord Pleanala by Meath County Council as requested. There are no mentions
of the microfiche files or the planning ledgers which would clearly confirm there is no existing
permission.
There is also no mention of my correspondence with Meath County council in particular the
letter of March 23 2004 when I outlined the material change of use on the site the
intensification of use all of which would require planning permission.
I also say and believe that further investigation should have been carried out in relation to
the points made when I was Chairperson of the Community Council in relation to the non-
registering of a septic tank no rates being paid for the business damage being done to a
historic bridge and the overall effect on the community not to mention this is incremental
planning as the previous application refe no. AA191263 by Kilsaran for a quarry adjacent to
the site was refused as there was no base line information for the batching plant. This is at
odds with the current decision.
I would also like to make the following points
Part of the infrastructure intended to serve the proposed development is registered in Fingal
(falls outside of the Planning Authority's area of Meath County Council the issuing authority)
1. One of the two registered abstractions serving the Kilsaran site is actually registered in
Fingal (Dublin) as per a request to the EPA for a copy of the 'EPA Abstraction Register' on
29/09/2022.
This was registered following a complaint made about abstraction from the river in 2019
Subsequently, metering indicated that more than 25m3 a day was being abstracted and
Kilsaran bore a ground water well
I understand Kilsaran's agent states that the river abstraction is only used in emergency
situations when the '[yield] is low' from the groundwater well, however, there is an argument
to be made that it is intended to serve the proposed development and as it falls outside of
the planning authority's area (registered in Dublin) then Fingal County Council should have
been notified by Meath County Council and their input sought (there is a section under the
Planning and Dev Act which lists who notified bodies are and in what
instances they apply).
an investigation of a complaint of water flowing from the site forms part of the documents.
This is a record of a past occurrence at the site, which is important in the context of the
recent collapse of the Lime Kiln and the ABP's Inspector Report which states 'an embankment
prevents surface water from flowing from the site to the Delvin River' - The embankment
clearly does not resolve this situation and may have been constructed whilst the Appeal was
active.
The Facility is not connected to the Sewer Network
Within a 2022 FOI to Uisce Eireann, the body categorically states that the Kilsaran facility is
not connected to the sewer network.
• ‘A copy of correspondence regarding a Pre-Connection Enquiry (PCE) between
Kilsaran Concrete International (Naul Concrete Batching Plant) and Irish Water regarding
the connection of the Kilsaran industrial facility at Naul, Co. Meath to the Naul Agglomeration
sewer network (/Naul WWTP).
The FOI decision-maker in Irish Water's Connection & Developer Services (CDS) section has
advised that there is no record of a Pre-Connection Enquiry for the Kilsaran industrial facility
at Naul, Co. Meath to the Naul Agglomeration sewer network.
• Confirmation of the connection of the Kilsaran Batching Plant facility at Naul (located
on the Meath side of the river) to the sewer network (Naul Agglomeration) serving Naul
Village, including a date when the facility was connected or a request to connect the facility
to the Naul Agglomeration.
There is also no record of a Connection Application for the Kilsaran industrial facility at Naul,
Co. Meath to the Naul Agglomeration sewer network on Irish Water's CDS system. I have
checked with personnel in Irish Water's Asset Operations section and can confirm that this
facility is not connected to the sewer network.
The ABP Inspector report seems to accept the applicant's claims that they are however
connected to the sewer network (and abstraction from the Delvin is in emergency
situations):
(iv) Water
Under further information, the applicant confirmed that the welfare facilities that serve the
existing concrete batching plant are connected to the public water mains and foul sewerage
system. The applicant also confirmed that water for the concrete batching plant itself is
drawn from private wells with a daily maximum abstraction rate of 60 cubic metres. If the
pumps for these wells malfunction, then the applicant is registered with the EPA to abstract
water from the River Delvin on an emergency basis only. Given this basis of operation, no
significant effect on water levels in the River ensues.
The ownership of the land covered by the permission is not clear the applicant claims the
land is unregistered Planning permission does not give you ownership or the right to exercise
the permission without clear consent from the owner.
These are just some of the points that should have been thoroughly examined by an Bord
Pleanala before granting permission and I would ask this honourable court to grant me leave
to seek a judicial review of this decision as this has and has had a material impact of the
value of my home the quality of life of my self and my family and none of these factors have
been considered by an Bord Pleanala
I would also ask the court to issue an order for discovery for planning ledgers and all relevant
documents relating to the planning application 80572 which are in the custody of Meath
County council. I would also ask the court to allow me to expand on these points once those
documents have been secured.
I thank the court for its time.”
The law
30. As stated in Delany and McGrath on Civil Procedure, 5th Ed., 2023 (Chapter 17 –
Discontinuance, Section C. - Effect of Discontinuance or Withdrawal of Proceedings), the withdrawal
of proceedings brings them to an end:
“17-27 The discontinuance of proceedings has the effect of bringing the action, including
any pending applications or appeals, to an end. [Waliszewski v McArthur and Co. (Steel and
Metal) Ltd [2015] IECA 298; Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v Farrington [2018] IEHC 331;
Conybeare v Lewis (1880) 13 Ch D 469.] In Egan v Fenlon, [[2021] IEHC 75 at [45].] Allen
J observed that a plaintiff who serves a notice of discontinuance ‘rings a bell which cannot
be unrung’. However, it does not follow that the proceedings cease to be in existence for all
purposes and another party may still be entitled to apply for relief to which he is entitled.
So, in Gold Reefs of Western Australia Ltd v Dawson, [[1897] 1 Ch 115.] it was held that
the service of a notice of discontinuance after a company named as co-plaintiff had brought
a motion to strike their name out of the proceedings, on the basis that their name had been
used without their authority, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to make such an order.
Similarly, in Newcomen v Coulsen, [(1878) 7 Ch D 764.] The discontinuance of the
proceedings by a plaintiff who had obtained an interim injunction did not deprive the
defendant of the damages to which he might be entitled on foot of the undertaking as to
damages given by the plaintiff.”
31. In the case of withdrawal of a leave application, the effect of that is that an applicant cannot
simply come back at a later stage to move the leave application. The proceedings would have to be
re-entered first, and the only basis to re-enter withdraw proceedings could be in truly exceptional
circumstances and then only when there was no undue prejudice to other parties. It’s hard to
imagine what such exceptional circumstances might be outside of matters such as procurement of
the withdrawal by duress, fraud or the like. But people can be creative in the situations they get
into so there’s no point trying to be too prescriptive, but it needs to be something of that order.
32. The tight eight-week limit for judicial review of planning decisions also reinforces all of this
significantly. The notion that an applicant can withdraw an application and then wander back into
court and re-apply for leave to challenge it is totally incompatible with the whole scheme of the 2000
Act.
33. Not an exact analogy, but Indaver Ireland v. An Bord Pleanála [2013] IEHC 11 (Unreported,
High Court, Kearns P., 21st January 2013) illustrates the point that an applicant can’t play fast and
loose with the court and the parties when it comes to withdrawing proceedings. There, the applicant
only withdrew the proceedings at a late stage, imposing costs on the defence:
“26. It is clear from the background facts at paragraphs 4 – 7 that the applicant did not act
promptly and instead it acted in such a way as to allow the legal costs on behalf of the Board
and CHASE to escalate almost as if the proceedings were going to run to a full hearing and
judgment. Indaver NV prolonged the case without intending to continue them and withdrew
the proceedings at the last moment. From the facts it can be ascertained that the applicant
had no bona fide belief in the case after a certain point in time which the Court finds to be
10th September, 2012. Its conduct of the proceedings thereafter can only be seen as an
abuse of the court process and the statutory exemption from liability for costs cannot be
availed of on the findings of fact which I have made.”
34. Finally, as adverted to above, the duty to exhaust remedies includes the obligation to
correctly observe the legal conditions for such remedies. In general, failure to validly avail of appeal
processes deprives one of standing to seek judicial review. For this purpose, an invalid botched
attempt to appeal doesn’t put an applicant in a superior position to someone who doesn’t even
attempt to appeal. Making an invalid appeal by failing to include proper paperwork constitutes a
failure to exhaust remedies such as to preclude recourse to judicial review. A person who makes an
invalid appeal isn’t legally in a better position than someone who doesn’t appeal at all, and neither
person has exhausted remedies such as to entitle them to apply for judicial review. Absent
exceptional circumstances, the requirement to exhaust remedies means to actually take the
necessary steps in that regard, not to lie idle or to fail to operate the remedy properly. Either of
those routes deprives the would-be applicant of the necessary standing. Again one might add an
exceptional circumstances caveat but it doesn’t have any relevance here.
Application of the law to the facts
35. The application for leave, which was the essential focus of the applicant’s submission, must
be refused.
36. By way of context, the applicant’s understanding of the process was somewhat incomplete
as he himself acknowledged. In particular, he regarded the application as one for “leave to appeal”
from the board as referred to in his email of 6th January 2025. But judicial review is not an appeal.
37. Insofar as this is to be interpreted as meaning that he was challenging the invalidation of
his appeal to the board, no basis for this is set out in the pleaded grounds.
38. The applicant also produced a notice of motion (seeking leave for substantive reliefs) and
another affidavit but neither of these documents appear to have been filed and in any event they
don’t progress the relevant issue any further. The relevant issue is not the merits but the status of
the proceedings post-withdrawal. The proposed notice of motion doesn’t seek to re-enter the matter
but baldly simply seeks leave. That reflects the application actually moved orally and thus reflects
the order set out at the end of this judgment. The applicant appears to have served these unfiled
documents on the opposing parties rather than serving the original statement of grounds and
affidavit in my request to make his application on notice.
39. At one point in oral submissions he also seemed to be of the view that he was free to arrange
for further grounds to be introduced at some undefined later point, but that isn’t the way it works.
40. The first problem for the applicant is that the proceedings are over, having been
withdrawn, so leave can’t be sought unless the proceedings are re-entered, which they haven’t been.
Indeed the primary focus of the applicant’s submissions was even to formally apply for reinstatement
still less to acknowledge the need for that or to make a detailed case in that regard, but simply to
argue the case for the grant of leave (for example – by reading out the statement of grounds in a
manner that appeared to be fairly verbatim). However, there is no jurisdiction to grant leave unless
the withdrawal is somehow set aside.
41. The second problem is that there is in any event no basis to reinstate the proceedings.
The fact that the applicant had medical appointments in May 2024 may explain why he withdrew
them but that isn’t a basis to re-enter the proceedings. The applicant says he is now well and this
is a “material change of circumstances”. While obviously that is good to hear, it isn’t the sort of
development that comes anywhere remotely near allowing a case to be reinstated (out of time) that
has been previously withdrawn.
42. The applicant also says the developer has made a further planning application. That in itself
doesn’t provide a basis to reinstate a withdrawn case. The fact that the new application was based
on the planning history including the impugned permission doesn’t change that. A process moves
on if an unchallenged or unsuccessfully challenged decision is made. That’s the nature of any
ordered system.
43. There is also the obvious massive prejudice to the notice party which precludes the notion
that the proceedings could be allowed to spring back to life almost a year on in respect of a
permission which was ostensibly granted, not successfully challenged within time, and actually acted
upon.
44. A final problem that looms over the whole thing is that the applicant failed to exhaust
remedies by not organising himself to make a valid appeal to the board in the first place. So even
if the matter could be reinstated, leave should be refused. That however is obiter because we don’t
actually get to that point.
Summary
45. In outline summary, without taking from the more specific terms of this judgment:
(i) With limited exceptions of which a leave order is not one, an order cannot be made
in withdrawn proceedings unless the proceedings are reinstated.
(ii) Reinstatement of voluntarily withdrawn proceedings is truly exceptional and no such
exceptional circumstances arise here.
(iii) Prejudice to third parties is also a significant factor and precludes reinstatement here
even if that counterfactually was otherwise appropriate.
(iv) In any event, the duty to exhaust remedies includes the obligation to correctly
observe the legal conditions for such remedies. Making an invalid appeal by failing
to include proper paperwork constitutes a failure to exhaust remedies, legally
equivalent to not appealing at all, such as to preclude recourse to judicial review of
the board’s decision here in any event.
Order
46. For the foregoing reasons, the order made on 13th January 2025 was that the application
for leave to seek judicial review be dismissed with no order as to costs.