Court of Appeal dismisses appeal on costs, affirming respondent's entitlement under Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

THE COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

Approved

No Redactions Needed

Record Number: 2022 291

High Court Record Number: 2021 122 SP

Neutral Citation Number [2025] IECA 92

Costello P. Noonan J. Pilkington J.

IN THE MATTER OF JOE MILEY AND PARTNERS (DUBLIN) LIMITED (IN

LIQUIDATION) AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 25 AND 26 OF THE TRUSTEE ACT 1893

BETWEEN/

AIDAN GARCIA DIAZ (LIQUIDATOR OF JOE MILEY AND PARTNERS

(DUBLIN) LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION))

APPLICANT / RESPONDENT

-AND-

JOHN BRETT, EAMONN BRETT AND JOSEPH MILEY

RESPONDENTS

-AND-

EAMONN BRETT

APPELLANT

JUDGMENT (Costs Ruling) of Ms Justice Pilkington delivered on the 2nd day of May 2025

1. This judgment deals solely with the issue of costs, following the judgment cited at [2025] IECA 25.

2. At paragraph 113 of that judgment, after dismissing the appeal, I indicated that, having due regard to Order 99 RSC and the fact that the appellant had been “entirely successful” in this appeal within the meaning of s. 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act, 2015, the respondent is entitled to an award of costs, such costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement.

3. In the following paragraph, in the usual fashion, I also stated that if the appellant wished to contend for an alternative costs order, then written submissions were to be exchanged, and both parties have done so.

4. The appellant is a litigant in person and his submission, in large part, seeks to raise issues which are outside the parameters of my provisional view on the award of costs. The terms of the judgment are clear; the only issue upon which submissions were sought is in respect of costs.

5. The appellant seeks an alternative order that no costs be awarded pending a resolution of what he styles his perjury complaint against the liquidator and his legal team or, alternatively, an agreement between the parties.

6. The basis of this perjury complaint appears to arise from his contention that certain matters contained within one of the affidavits sworn by the liquidator is false and that from this he asserts that both he and his counsel have misled the court. He maintains that this in turn has implications for this court’s judgment and it appears this also extends to the High Court judgment.

7. He also refers to the fact that his offer to the respondent regarding using various dispute resolution procedures was met with no response. His submission concludes as follows;

“if a compromise solution can be agreed the Applicant will be agreeable not to appeal”.

8. The respondent seeks to uphold this Court’s provisional view on costs. He argues that much of the appellant’s submission is simply an attempt to re-open this litigation, in circumstances where these issues have already been comprehensively considered by the Court. He also contends that the appellant is seeking to re-litigate decided issues and the filing of complaints against legal representatives is designed to frustrate the administration of justice or certainly to delay the final resolution of these proceedings.

9. The respondent cites Order 99 RSC and ss. 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (‘the 2015 Act’). S.169(1) is straightforward in its terms and states;

169. (1) “A party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against a party who is not successful in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties,…”

10. In addition, he makes reference to the well-known authority of Chubb European Group SE v The Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 183 where Murray J. emphasised at paragraph 10 that the default position is that the successful party is entitled to its costs, even if it has not prevailed on every issue. He stated: "As a matter of both fairness and of principle, where a party has had to institute legal proceedings in order to obtain relief, the starting point should be that he recovers all of the legal costs in securing that benefit (Godsil v. Ireland [2015] IESC 103, [2015] 4 IR

535 at para. 20). Moreover, in many cases the splitting of costs as between different issues and arguments in a case is likely to create satellite applications around costs which will not usually represent an economical use of the time and cost of either the parties or the Court."

11. Clarke J. (as he then was) in Veola Water UK plc v Fingal County Council (No 2) [2006] IEHC 240 (para.2.5) said: "…the overriding starting position should remain that costs should follow the event. Parties who are required to bring a case to court in order to secure their rights are prima facie entitled to the reasonable costs of maintaining the proceedings. Parties who successfully defend proceedings are, again, prima facie entitled to the costs which they have put in to defending...”

12. In this case the liquidator sought reliefs as to the company’s legal ownership of property and how, as legal owner, title might vest in the company. This was resisted by the appellant. This Court upheld the judgment of the High Court as to the company’s entitlement to the legal interest in the property. The only variation to the order of the High Court was the means by which, pursuant to the Trustee Act 1893, title might be transferred from the partnership to the company, as those terms are defined within the principal judgment.

Conclusion

13. In my view the appellant has raised no basis upon which the Court should deviate from its provisional view as to costs. The appellant has failed to persuade the court that any variation to the well-recognised principles of costs following the event as determined by statute and the cases quoted above should be applied in this case. The decision on costs proceeds on the basis that the decision of the Court is correct and so the appellant’s submissions which seek to reargue points decided against him are simply irrelevant to the Court’s discretion to award costs.

14. Accordingly, this Court affirms the Orders of the High Court and confirms its indicative order as to costs that, having due regard to Order 99 and the provisions of s. 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act, 2015 the respondent is entitled to an award of costs against the appellant, such costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement.

15. As this judgment is being delivered electronically Costello P. and Noonan J. have indicated their agreement with it and the cost order I have proposed.