Court of Appeal dismisses appeal where appellant cannot escape binding settlement despite new allegations of fraud and illegality.

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Approved

No Redactions Needed

Commercial Court of Appeal Record Number: 2024/149

High Court Record Number: 2015 2044S

Neutral Citation Number [2025] IECA 90

Noonan J. Pilkington J. O’Moore J.

BETWEEN/

ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC

PLAINTIFF

-AND-

PHILIP MORRISSEY

DEFENDANT

AND

Commercial Court of Appeal Record Number: 2024/150

High Court Record Number: 2017 2361P

BETWEEN/

PHILIP MORRISSEY

PLAINTIFF

-AND-

DAN MORRISSEY (IRL) LIMITED (IN RECEIVERSHIP), STEPHEN

TENNANT, PAUL MCGANN AND PLAZAMONT LIMITED

DEFENDANTS

AND

Commercial Court of Appeal Record Number: 2024/151

High Court Record Number: 2019 294COS

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPERTIES ACT 2014 AND IN THE MATTER OF

SECTION 438 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2014 AND IN THE MATTER OF DAN

MORRISSEY (IRL) LIMITED AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY

PHILIP MORRISSEY

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Brian O’Moore delivered on the 30th day of April, 2025.

1. On the 16th May, 2024 the High Court (Quinn J.) delivered a judgment in favour of Allied Irish Banks plc, Dan Morrissey (IRL) Limited (in Receivership) (“the Company”), Everyday Finance DAC, Paul McCann and Stephen Tennant. By way of background, AIB extended a loan to the Company, Everyday is the entity which has acquired AIB’s interest in that loan, and the receivers are the two individuals who have been appointed as receivers over the assets of the Company. The orders made by the High Court were against the appellant, Mr. Morrissey. The orders were initially proposed by the solicitors for AIB, Everyday and the Receivers (“the Everyday interests”) in a letter of the 31st May 2023. The orders relate to three different sets of proceedings. These were “the Quarry proceedings”, “the directions proceedings”, and “the judgment proceedings”. Before explaining the nature of the orders sought in respect of each of these proceedings, it is necessary to describe, in general terms, what each of these actions involved.

2. The earliest of these three claims is the judgment proceedings. These proceedings were summary proceedings issued by AIB in 2015 against Mr. Morrissey, on foot of a guarantee by him of debts of the Company. On the 17th December 2015 Mr. Morrissey consented to judgment in those proceedings in the sum of €24,970,000. The order was perfected on the 18th December 2015. One might wonder why the High Court in 2024 was being asked to make an order in respect of these proceedings. The need for such an order arose because, on the 1st June, 2021, Mr. Morrissey issued a motion seeking the following reliefs: - “(1) An order extending the time for bringing an application under Order 36, Rule

33 of the Rules of the Superior Courts to set aside the order of the High Court of 17th December 2015 perfected on 18th December 2015.

(2) An order setting aside the order of the High Court of 17th December 2015 perfected on 18th December 2015 pursuant to (sic) Order 36, Rule 33 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

(3) An order setting aside the order of the High Court of 17th December 2015 perfected on 18th December 2015 pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

(4) In the alternative an order extending the time for appealing the order of the High Court of 17th December 2015.

(5) An order vacating all subsequent orders made and relied upon the order of the 17th December 2015.

(6) An order vacating the judgment mortgage as executed on foot of the order of the 17th December 2015.” Other adjectival orders are also sought.

3. The application made by the Everyday interests in respect of this action, therefore, was for: - “(i) an order striking out the motion issued by the applicant on the 1st day of June 2021 as against AIB; and

(ii) an order that AIB shall recover its costs of the motion against Philip Morrissey, such costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement.”

Quinn J. made such an order. Mr. Morrissey now appeals against that order.

4. The second set of proceedings are the Quarry proceedings. These were issued in 2017, and the nature of these proceedings was summarised by the trial judge at p. 6 et seq. of the transcript of his judgment as follows: - “Now, in the Statement of Claim in those proceedings, a number of allegations are made against the company, Dan Morrissey (Ireland) Limited (in receivership), against the Receivers, Mr. Tennant and Mr. McCann, and against Plazamont Limited. They include a description of the service of a demand on 17th June 2014 and the appointment of the Receivers on 18th June 2014. They recite the fact that, after their appointment, the Receivers had carried on the business previously carried on by the first defendant. In paragraph 20 of the Statement of Claim, it is said that the bank, through the office of the Receivers, had achieved significant realisations from the receivership in a series of amounts which amount in aggregate to €30.8 million.

Reference is made to the fact that the defendants have continued excavation activities on the quarry after their appointment, and it is said that, wrongfully, the defendants and their servants or agents had commenced blasting with explosives, excavating with heavy plant machinery and grading of limestone rock for sale, without the consent of Mr. Morrissey. It is said also that the defendants have sold the property, the quarried materials for valuable consideration.

Reference is made to the sale and supply of raw materials to third parties, the use of the materials in tarmacadam, use in manufacture of ready mixed concrete and other uses that are identified in paragraph 30 of the Statement of Claim. An allegation is made that the defendants are guilty of conversion. An allegation is also made that the defendants have failed to account for any of the limestone removed from the plaintiff’s property and the estimated loss in respect of that claim is €3 million.

A claim then is made in respect of an alleged failure to restore the property, and the cost of restoration which it is said that the defendants have failed to effect is estimated, or is stated, in fact, in the Statement of Claim, to be 61,670,000. The Statement of Claim goes on to make further claims against the defendants that they are guilty of multiple acts of trespass and nuisance and reference is made also to certain addresses onto the plaintiff’s own personal property, and a series of allegations are made in relation to 51 separate occasions after the appointment of the Receivers, when it is said that the defendants, or their servants or agents, entered the plaintiff’s own property without his consent and are, therefore, guilty of trespass.

The claims are then made for a series of amounts stated to be, in the alternative: damages of €61 million, 61,670,000; an account of all the materials extracted from the plaintiff’s quarry since 20th June 2014 ; damages of €3 million, being the value of material removed from the plaintiff’s property since June 2014.”

5. In respect of the Quarry proceedings, the Everyday interests sought: - “(i) an order striking out the proceedings, with no order as to costs, and vacating all cost orders between the parties.”

The trial judge made such an order. Mr. Morrissey now appeals it.

6. The third set of proceedings were commenced in 2019. These are proceedings seeking orders pursuant to s. 438 of the Companies Act 2014, and in them Mr. Morrissey sought (again employing the summary set out in the judgment of the trial judge): - “certain directions regarding the performance of their functions by the Receivers…”

7. By motion issued on the 31st of May 2021, Mr. Morrissey sought a variety of orders including (inter alia) orders declaring the initial letter of demand issued by AIB null and void, restraining AIB and the Receivers from offering any secured property for sale, rescinding all security documents in favour of AIB and any transfer of these securities, restraining the appointment and operation of the Receivers, and seeking damages for the appointment of these receivers. Adjectival orders (including an order seeking DAR transcripts in respect of hearings in 2018 and 2019) were also sought.

8. In respect of these proceedings, the Everyday interests sought the following orders: - “(i) An order striking out the motion issued by the applicant on the 1st June 2021 as against the Receivers;

(ii) an order that the respondents would recover their cost of that motion against Mr. Morrissey, such costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement;

(iii) an order striking out the proceedings, with no order as to costs, and vacating all cost orders between the Parties with the exception of the costs orders made in respect of:

(a) the motion issued by the applicant on the 1st June 2021 as against the Receivers;

(b) the motion issued by the applicant on the 4th April 2022 against the Receivers and AIB;

(c) the appeal filed by the applicant on the 5th June 2022 as against the Receivers and AIB.”

Again, these orders were made by the trial judge and again they are appealed by Mr. Morrissey.

9. These various proceedings arise from a background which is both simple and unfortunately familiar. The Company borrowed significantly from AIB. Mr. Morrissey, as the principal of the company, guaranteed these debts. The Company defaulted on payment of the debts. Receivers were appointed to the Company and its assets. Mr. Morrissey now wishes to dispute both the debt, the appointment of the receivers, and the actions of the receivers.

10. The slightly unusual characteristic of these proceedings is that (as held by the trial judge) all relevant parties have entered into a settlement agreement. At the hearing of the appeal, it was not disputed by Mr. Morrissey (who represented himself) that the validity and scope of the settlement agreement was central to his appeal on all issues. It is therefore necessary to consider, in some detail, the findings of the trial judge with regard to the settlement agreement of the 31st January 2020 and the reasons why Mr. Morrissey says, to this court, the findings of the trial judge with regard to the settlement agreement were in error.

11. Mr. Morrissey, AIB, Everyday, the Receivers, the Company, and Plazamont Limited are all signatories to the settlement agreement. At paragraph 2.1 of the settlement agreement, Mr. Morrissey acknowledges that Everyday holds valid security from the Company as successor in title of AIB, and that: - “[Mr. Morrissey] is liable to Everyday for any sums outstanding and due and owing on foot of the Guarantee and Judgment.”

12. “Judgment” is defined in the settlement agreement as: -

“The judgment claimed by AIB against [Mr. Morrissey] on consent in the sum of €24,970,000 plus costs in the context of the Judgment Proceedings.”

The judgment proceedings are the summary proceedings commenced in 2015 by AIB.

13. The trial judge considered as critical the provisions of clause 4 of the settlement agreement, which reads: - “With effect from the effective date, Mr. Morrissey hereby irrevocably acknowledges, agrees and confirms that he does not have any claim or cause of action, either past, present, or future, in relation to the facilities, security documents, Quarry Proceedings, Directions Proceedings, Malcolmson Law Proceedings, Judgment Proceedings, and the use, operation or sale of the Clonmelsh Quarry lands against AIB, Everyday or the Receivers, and confirms that he does not have any claim or cause of action, either past or present, in relation to the Quarry Proceedings, Malcolmson Law Proceedings, Judgment Proceedings, and the use, operation or sale of the Clonmelsh Quarry against Plazamont and, for the avoidance of doubt, hereby agrees to waive any such claim or cause of action against AIB, Everyday, the Receives and/or Plazamont.” It is important to note that Mr. Morrissey acknowledges that he has no claim or cause of action “past, present or future…” in respect of a range of issues, and the clause goes on to repeat that he has no claim or cause of action “past or present…” in relation to a differently defined range of matters. This wording is strikingly comprehensive.

14. The trial judge went on to note that in clause 4.2 of the settlement agreement Mr. Morrissey undertook and agreed to do certain things; I will return to the detail of that in due course.

15. The trial judge described as “all important” clause 5 of the settlement agreement, which reads: - “In consideration of all of the foregoing provisions and subject to the terms of this agreement, AIB and Everyday hereby agree to limit their recourse to Mr. Morrissey, pursuant to the judgment, guarantee or any other liability of Mr. Morrissey, for the obligations of [the Company], Dan Morrissey (Manufacturing) Limited and Dan Morrissey (UK) Limited, to the additional security and to the equitable mortgage, all of which terms are defined in this settlement agreement.”

16. In other words, Mr. Morrissey benefitted from the agreement in that the recourse to him on foot of the guarantee was limited to the assets specified in clause 5.

17. This limitation of recourse was followed through on in clause 6, which reads: - “The Bank and Everyday irrevocably acknowledges, agrees and confirms that Mr. Morrissey should be permitted to retain the family home and the retained lands.”

18. The trial judge then referred to clause 9.1 of the settlement agreement, which reads: - “At the first available opportunity following the effective date, Mr. Morrissey agrees to release [the Company], the Receivers and Plazamont from any claims arising on the Quarry Proceedings and Direction Proceedings and undertakes to attend before the High Court to strike out the said proceedings, vacate on all costs orders and with no further orders as to costs.”

19. At clause 22 the parties confirmed that they had each obtained independent legal and tax advice prior to the entering into of this agreement “and are fully aware of the consequences of so doing.”

20. The trial judge went on to consider two judgments in which Mr. Morrissey had made very similar arguments to the ones that he made before the High Court in the current applications. The first of these judgments is a comprehensive judgment by Barniville P. in Everyday Finance DAC v Bradley [2023] IEHC 179. That judgment, which found against Mr. Morrissey on all relevant issues, was appealed to this court. The appeal failed. The equally comprehensive judgment of Whelan J. at [2024] IECA 54 dismissing Mr. Morrissey’s appeal was also considered by the trial judge in the current applications and found to be of significant assistance in determining the matters before him.

21. The trial judge concluded that: -

“So the settlement is a conclusive settlement of all of the matters arising, firstly in relation to the judgment proceedings, and it is not appropriate for the court now to reopen those proceedings, so I will be making an order to strike out the motion issued on 1st June 2021 in relation to the summary proceedings.”

22. The trial judge, having recited the nature of the directions proceedings, the timing of the settlement agreement and the scope of the settlement agreement, concluded that: - “… the settlement agreement extends to all of the matters arising in the Directions Proceedings. So I propose to strike out the motion issued on 31st May 2021 and the Directions Proceedings themselves …”

23. With regard to the Quarry Proceedings, the trial judge found: - “clause 4.1 of the settlement agreement could not be clearer in its waiver of all claims made in those proceedings and, again, the commitment is contained in clause 9 to strike out those proceedings. The settlement agreement has been found to be binding and I have already described the reasons why it is not appropriate to go behind the settlement agreement already analysed in such detail that President Barniville and by the Court of Appeal. So there will be an order also in the Quarry Proceedings striking out those proceedings.”

24. In his notice of appeal, Mr. Morrissey lists 26 grounds of appeal. His written and oral submissions are, however, somewhat more focused and I therefore intend to consider the appeal by reference to these.

25. Both in his written and oral submissions, Mr. Morrissey emphasised the absence of legal aid, which, he says, should have been provided to him. At the end of the hearing of the appeal, it was pointed out to Mr. Morrissey that his grounds of appeal appeared not to refer to the fact that legal aid was not available to him. Mr. Morrissey was invited to notify the court, after the hearing, of the grounds of appeal which referred to the lack of legal aid. In his response, Mr. Morrissey was unable to identify any ground of appeal which suggested that the judgment of the trial judge should be upset on the grounds that Mr. Morrissey did not have access to legal aid or assistance. Instead, in an email sent by him on the 29th of October 2024 Mr. Morrissey set out his “understanding on Legal Aid” in these terms; “I applied to Barniville (sic) for legal aid which was refused point blank.”

“I repeated the application prior to judgment. Barniville (sic) simply ignored the application.”

“I applied to the Court of Appeal but was simply ignored.”

“Supreme Court Got facts wrong and stated that no application was made in High Court or Court of Appeal.”

“I thought it was included in my submissions or Affidavit to Quinn and Grounds of Appeal.”

“Noonan J is saying I must apply to Legal Aid Board. I did not know about the legal Aid Board so could not apply to Board.”

26. Mr. Morrissey concluded, in this note, that this court “is obliged to deal with the substance of the application and not to be side-tracked by procedural considerations” However, as the jurisdiction of this court is circumscribed by the issues brought before it by the parties on appeal, it would not be appropriate to consider Mr. Morrissey’s complaints on this matter, on that ground alone. However, the problem is more fundamental from Mr. Morrissey’s perspective in that it does not appear to be the case that he asked the trial judge in these proceedings to adjourn the hearing of the motions until legal aid could be obtained by Mr. Morrissey; while Mr. Morrissey complains that the trial judge did not arrange for him to be given legal aid, this complaint runs up against the fundamental objection that no application for legal aid was made to the trial judge and, even if it was, the trial judge had no function to decide on whether or not legal aid was to be granted. What Mr. Morrissey describes as the “sacrosanct” right to legal aid is addressed in this jurisdiction by the provision, through the Legal Aid Board, of legal aid. By his own account, Mr. Morrissey has not even applied for legal aid from the Board. The complaints made by Mr. Morrisey on this question in his original written submissions, in his written submissions replying to the written submissions of the Everyday interests, in his oral submissions before the court, and in the written note that he was invited to provide after the appeal hearing are therefore completely misplaced.

27. The second matter agitated in Mr. Morrissey’s written submissions is that the trial judge never actually heard his motions, notwithstanding the fact that these were issued prior to the applications by the Everyday interests and notwithstanding that the judge in charge of the Commercial List at the time (McDonald J.) and President Barniville had both indicated that his motions should be heard. This is a somewhat unreal complaint. The trial judge had before him all of the materials constituting Mr. Morrissey’s motions, he had an application that those motions be struck out, essentially on the grounds that they were in breach of Mr. Morrissey’s obligations under the settlement agreement, and he dealt with Mr. Morrissey’s motions by acceding to the claim made by the Everyday interests that these motions were unsustainable given the terms of the settlement agreement. This second issue raised on the appeal is therefore one without any merit.

28. Mr. Morrissey next argues that there was a failure on the part of the Everyday interests to disclose settlements with co-guarantors. However, Mr. Morrissey has advanced no coherent basis for this suggestion. More importantly, as the Everyday interests submit in their written submissions, this is one of several bases upon which Mr. Morrissey seeks (inappropriately) to re-open the settlement agreement. Other bases to achieve the same result advanced by Mr. Morrissey include an assertion that the relevant debt was repaid, that the solicitor for the Everyday Interests swore an affidavit “containing the empty but damaging shibboleth that [Mr. Morrissey] had no defence…” to the summary proceedings, and that monies had been “recovered by the company and not paid to the Bank…” As is found by this court (at para. 86 of its judgment in Everyday Finance DAC v. Bradley & Ors): - “In substance one is driven to conclude that in large measure this application is being availed of by Mr. Morrissey as a vehicle to reopen the proceedings and adduce new evidence. In addition, he seeks to impugn the unappealed summary judgment… obtained by AIB against him and to which, with the benefit of legal advice, he consented on the 17 December 2015 … In effect he wishes to revisit the merits of the decisions and orders of 2015 and 2023. Parties to litigation are entitled to finality.”

This observation, while made in the context of a slightly different aspect of the Morrissey litigation, is one with which I would entirely agree. Having carefully considered all of the reasons advanced by Mr. Morrissey for the setting aside of the settlement agreement (and the original consent order) none of them justify such a course of action.

29. On a related point, Mr. Morrissey also complains in his written submissions that he has not been provided with a redemption figure for the sums due by the company on foot of the facilities advanced to it. Whether or not such redemption figure has been provided is irrelevant to the validity of the settlement agreement, and it was the terms of the settlement agreement upon which the trial judge relied in making the orders which are currently under appeal.

30. The next argument made by Mr. Morrissey is that the trial judge incorrectly decided that the waivers contained in “the so-called settlement agreement…” disposed of all outstanding issues between the parties. No basis is advanced for this contention. The reasoning of the trial judge is not in any way impeached by Mr. Morrissey. As it happens, the reasoning of the trial judge follows the reasoning of Barniville P. and this court (Whelan J.) in the associated proceedings. Mr. Morrissey does not advance any meaningful argument as to why the reasoning of these three judges (notably the trial judge) is in any way flawed.

31. The settlement agreement provided for the provision by Mr. Morrissey of a letter of consent to certain court orders. Mr. Morrissey argues that there was in fact no letter of consent, and that he had instructed his legal advisers “not to release the so-called ‘consent letter’”. An identical argument, in similar proceedings, was roundly rejected by this court in the judgment of Whelan J. at para. 59: - “Mr. Morrissey’s manoeuvre of purporting to withdraw his consent many months after the duly executed Consent Letter was provided and the Settlement Agreement executed by him amounts in substance to an assertion that he is entitled unilaterally to rely on his own gratuitous breaches of the Agreement for the purposes of impeding the outstanding condition precedent at clause 3.1(d) being performed and satisfied. There is palpably no such entitlement. Neither is he entitled to rely on his own wilful failure and neglect to perform his obligations pursuant to Clause 3 (1) (b) as a basis to impugn the Settlement. Where parties have agreed a settlement of proceedings, and where, as here, a clear an (sic) unequivocal consent to the compromise has been given involving, inter alia, the compromise of the Quarry Litigation and the Directions Litigation, it is not open when the other party to the compromise/settlement proceeds to seek the relevant agreed orders to give effect to the settlement for a party who previously consented to go back on his consent.”

Again, I respectfully agree with this analysis by Whelan J. It is also entirely consistent with the approach taken by the trial judge on these applications.

32. An associated argument by Mr. Morrissey is to the effect that there was a failure to comply with “the rules of evidence including the Civil and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 with regard to admission documentary evidence presented by [Everyday Interests]”. This argument has not been developed, and is on the face of it without any substance.

33. On a number of occasions, Mr. Morrissey advances the argument that the trial judge had “the erroneous view” that he was bound by the decisions of the High Court and of this court in their respective judgments in the Malcolmson Law proceedings. The approach taken by the trial judge is neatly summarised at para. 22 of the transcript of his judgment, where he said: - “It is necessary to have a look in more detail at a number of the features of the judgment of the President which, in my view, inform the Court’s approach to the application that I am now considering.”

34. This is an entirely proper approach for the trial judge to take. He carried out his own analysis of the settlement agreement and considered the arguments made by Mr. Morrissey. It would have been unreasonable for him to fail to consider the analysis of very similar arguments carried out by the High Court and by this court. He said that these analyses merely informed his view about the approach he would take towards his eventual decision; that

decision was the trial judge’s own.

35. Mr. Morrissey spends a considerable portion of his written submissions attacking the quality of the representation he had at the time of the settlement, and relying upon instructions given to his lawyers to proceed with the case as opposed to settle the litigation. However, Mr. Morrissey has not pointed to any authority which indicate that an inadequacy of legal advice or representation is sufficient to set aside a settlement. If his lawyers failed Mr. Morrissey in these services which they provided, that is a matter between him and them. Equally, a failure to comply with his instructions is a matter which should be taken up by Mr. Morrissey with his then solicitors and counsel. While Mr. Morrissey refers at length to “uncontested evidence” as to the instructions given to his solicitor not to proceed with the settlement agreement, the fact remains that Mr. Morrissey signed the settlement agreement and is bound by its contents. Although the latter portion of Mr. Morrissey’s written submissions complain about “critical information” which was “deceitfully concealed” from him which prevented him from having “the capacity to make an informed decision” this very argument was dealt with by the trial judge in the following way (at p. 40 of the Transcript) of his judgment): - “Importantly, a decision to settle a case made, for example, at an early stage of proceedings, whether before or after a discovery of documents is made, at a time when it is always possible that further information could become available if the action were pursued to trial or pursued to further discovery or interrogatories or other information, so every settlement is made before a case goes to trial and, therefore, engages a decision to settle that having certainty on every fact, which could become available if the case progressed further, facts which might even have emerged if the case went to trial.”

36. That observation must be taken in conjunction with the next page of the Transcript, where the judge observes: - “Were it not possible for parties to rely on the finality of such a clause, it would be impossible ever to resolve litigation by settlement and the entire benefit to all concerned of mediations and obtaining legal advice and entering into settlements would be undermined and defeated.”

The clause to which the judge refers is clause 4.4 of the settlement agreement, taken in conjunction with clause 22.

37. Again, this argument smacks of an impermissible effort by Mr. Morrissey to reopen the settlement agreement, despite the fact that he agreed by entry into the settlement agreement that this would bring a finality to his disputes with the Everyday interests. He has simply advanced no factual or legal basis, let alone referred to any relevant authority, which entitles him to do so.

38. The final substantive argument advanced by Mr. Morrissey in his written submission is that the underlying debt to the relevant bank has been repaid. It is put, most vividly, at para. 9 of the written submission as follows: - “Quinn J. also avoided dealing with the concealment of payments made to the Bank by the debtor company prior to the alleged settlement and judgment and later held back on making payments to the bank to keep the receivership on artificial life support to facilitate the ultimate purpose of a land grab.”

39. However, the terms of the settlement agreement very plainly preclude Mr. Morrissey from raising this issue, for the reasons which I have just advanced in respect of the other alleged failures to provide information to Mr. Morrissey. As it happens, and in respect of a very similar argument, the judgment of Whelan J. also dismissed this argument (at para. 50):

-

“The contention agitated by [Mr. Morrissey] before the High Court that his debt had been ‘massively overpaid’ was not supported by probative evidence and amounted to a variation on the previous theme. There was simply no evidence before the trial judge that could have satisfied him that there was a statable basis for a contention that Mr. Morrissey’s liabilities to AIB/Everyday under the guarantee had either been discharged or overpaid.”

40. However, even more relevant to the trial judge’s analysis that the settlement agreement prevented this argument now being advanced was the finding (at para. 53 of the judgment)

by Whelan J. that: -

“There is force in the argument advanced by Everyday that by virtue of the Settlement Agreement executed by Mr. Morrissey on 31 January 2020 he expressly acknowledged at Clause 2.1(b) that as of the 31 January 2020 he was ‘…liable to Everyday for any sums outstanding and due and owing on foot of the Guarantee and Judgment’. The summary judgment is defined as ‘The judgment obtained by AIB against PM on consent in the sum of €24,970,000 plus costs in the context of the judgment proceedings’. The various technical and procedural points belatedly launched by Mr. Morrissey attempting to impugn the validity of the 17 December 2015 judgment are unsustainable, amounting to nothing more than impermissible attempts to collaterally attack the consent order itself. He is estopped by his own previous conduct from pursuing such a course of action in the context of this appeal. Grounds of appeal which seek either in whole or in part to impugn the validity of the summary judgment obtained with the consent of Mr. Morrissey are lacking in merit and are unsustainable.”

41. There is no argument advanced in the written submissions filed by Mr. Morrissey advanced at the hearing of the appeal which justify the overturning of the orders made by the trial judge. Mr. Morrissey also filed a “preliminary response to respondent’s notice 20th September 2024” which set out, at some length, why Mr. Morrissey says that he is entitled to legal aid by reference to statute, the Constitution, and the European Convention on Human Rights. However, this once again ignores the fact that the issue was not agitated before Quinn J. in the High Court, and does not form any part of the Notice of Appeal against the decisions made by the trial judge on the applications before him.

42. The document goes on to repeat arguments made in the written submissions to the effect that, for example, the underlying debt was repaid in full, the failure on the part of Mr. Morrissey to provide the consent letters in accordance with the settlement agreement, and the failure to inform him of any arrangements made between the bank and Mr. Morrissey’s co-guarantors. I have already considered each of those, and nothing new is said in respect of them in this further document. Mr. Morrissey also claims that in the original summary proceedings AIB had failed to particularise its claim as it should have in accordance with the judgment in Bank of Ireland v O’Malley [2019] IESC 84. Again, this is an argument that avails Mr. Morrissey not at all, as a failure to particularise the original claim does not provide any basis upon which the order in the summary proceedings can now be set aside, or by which the settlement agreement can be overthrown.

43. Finally, in this document Mr. Morrissey makes a number of allegations which are quite inappropriate. In the first place, it is suggested that the manner in which the various motions were addressed meant that his own motions “especially to set aside the consent judgment” had been set at naught. Elsewhere in the document, he goes further; it is suggested that he was “entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether he was bound by the settlement…” and that “his motions were dismissed peremptorily without giving the Applicant any hearing.” This simply does not reflect the reality of the hearing before the trial judge, as Mr. Morrissey was given the full opportunity to make any submissions he wished to about the settlement agreement and its scope. There is no doubt that Mr. Morrissey understood that what the trial judge was considering, at least to start with, was whether or not the settlement agreement meant that all relevant disputes between the parties were at an end. Mr. Morrissey also understood that, were the court to come to the view that this submission was correct, there would be no need to proceed to a full hearing of any application that he had brought. The judge put it pithily at p. 98 of the transcript of the hearing: - “I mean what [counsel for the Everyday interests] is saying that (sic) he doesn’t need to reply to your affidavits, that he’s relying still on the settlement agreement. He’s asking me to decide whether I should dispose of all of the proceedings in the manner he’s recommended or if I refuse that whether we then go into your motions further, in which case [counsel for the Everyday interests] and his clients would have to have some opportunity. Up to now they’ve elected not to do so but if I decide that we were (sic) going further with this, I think you’d have to have an opportunity to deliver replying affidavits.”

Mr. Morrissey was given a full hearing on this point. The fact that the trial judge decided that the settlement agreement continued to bind Mr. Morrissey (and therefore made the full hearing of the motions he had brought quite unnecessary) does not mean that Mr. Morrissey was in any way deprived of due process. It is therefore quite inaccurate to claim, as Mr. Morrissey does, that he was “taken by surprise by the sudden decision to dismiss the motions.” That possibility had been very clearly flagged by the trial judge, and it must have been obvious to Mr. Morrissey from the submissions of counsel for the Everyday interests.

44. Mr. Morrissey goes on to make a number of unfortunate allegations in this document. He states that a firm of solicitors “stole” monies belonging to him. He goes on to accuse the Everyday interests of “theft” and does so by reference to a submission made by their counsel during the High Court hearing. The submission was to this effect: - “All I’m saying, Judge, is that because that issue is determined on and are foreclosed, there is no way out of the trap for Mr. Morrissey because irrespective of what he raises, everything is within the parameters of the claim that he has released, waived and let go. And that is an end to the matter, I’m afraid.”

45. This perfectly everyday form of words has been misinterpreted by Mr. Morrissey to mean that the Everyday interests “have colluded in the theft of my Cash, Personal Properties, My Business and My Livelihood…”. This is an assertion without any basis or merit whatsoever.

46. The oral submissions of Mr. Morrissey at the appeal hearing raise no fresh points, and instead emphasise many of the issues contained in the “preliminary response” document which was used as something of a script for his oral argument. Just as there was nothing in the written submissions that would support a reversal of the trial judge, there is nothing in this further document or on the oral submissions of Mr. Morrissey which suggest that the appeal should be allowed. Equally, in the document which he provided to the court after the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Morrissey developed allegations of illegality and fraud on the part of the receivers. He refers to an alleged falsification by the receivers of the ownership of land in a document received by An Bord Pleanála on the 24th of October 2017 (predating the settlement agreement). He also refers to an “unlawful application to assign my NON- assignable lease”. Taking Mr. Morrissey’s complaints on these points at their very height, this would not justify the making of any of the orders sought by him in his motions struck our by the High Court. Inasmuch as these complaints fall within the scope of the summary proceedings, the Quarry proceedings or the directions proceedings (and the relevant motions issued by Mr. Morrissey were brought in one or other of these actions) or relate to the use operation or sale of the Clonmelsh Quarry they cannot now be advanced given the very full release provided by Mr. Morrissey to the Receivers (and the other parties) under the terms of the settlement agreement.

47. The fundamental problem for Mr. Morrissey is that he entered into a comprehensive and wide ranging settlement agreement which he may now regret and feel was commercially unsound or unfair, but from which he has no escape. No asserted inadequacy on the part of his legal advisors would allow him to walk away from the settlement. The fact that he may have acquired further information after the settlement was executed does not allow him to renounce the agreement. Even more clearly, the fact that he may himself have been in breach of the agreement does not mean that the settlement is one from which he can be released.

48. Equally unconvincing is the argument that the trial judge’s decision is in some way infirm as Mr. Morrissey’s motions were not heard first (or, he would argue, at all). The reality is that the trial judge, in assessing whether or not the settlement was binding on Mr. Morrissey, considered whether the type of claims advanced by Mr. Morrissey in his motions could possibly mean that the settlement agreement was not binding on him. Having come to the conclusion that he did, it would have been otiose for the trial judge then to embark upon the hearing of applications which had to fail not least because Mr. Morrissey had agreed (by entering into the settlement agreement) not to bring.

49. Finally, for the reasons which I have already set out the complaint by Mr. Morrissey about the absence of legal aid is misconceived.

50. I would dismiss the appeal.

51. Noonan and Pilkington JJ agree with the judgment and the orders which I propose. There will be a hearing on the costs of the appeal at 9.30am on Thursday the 8th May 2025.