Legislator Case Law & Legislation
IECA 304 ECLI:IE:CA:2025:304 AI generated

Court of Appeal quashes 9-year burglary sentence for 53-conviction recidivist, reducing to 4.5 years with 2-year probation.

Case Number IECA 304
Court / Authority
Jurisdiction Ireland (IE)
Decision Date
Outcome Partially Allowed

Legislator summary

AI generated

The Court of Appeal quashed a 9-year prison sentence imposed on George Hackett for burglary and attempted theft. The appellant argued for a 9-year headline sentence citing aggravating factors like a knife threat and 53 prior convictions, while the prosecution opposed rehabilitation incentives. The court found the original sentence exceeded the mid-range for his criminal history and granted a new sentence of 4 years and 6 months, suspended for 2 years, based on the prospect of rehabilitation.

Legislator headnote

AI generated

Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, s. 12(1)(b) and (3); Criminal Justice Act 2006, s. 10: A sentencing judge must apply correct parameters for headline sentences based on the number of prior convictions and cannot nominate a term that exceeds the appropriate range for the offender's history.

Keywords

AI generated
burglary sentencing parameters recidivist prior convictions headline sentence error probation suspension terms rehabilitation prospect assessment

Cited Legislation

AI generated

Cited Case Law

AI generated
Casey
Casey and Casey [2018] IECA 121, the judge concluded that the headline sentence should fall in the mid-range of gravity; he nominated a headline sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment.
[2018] IECA 121
Court of Appeal increases sentences for burglary spree from seven to six years and four months total.
AI generated

Need to analyze how this precedent applies to your matter?

Cross-reference this judgment against statutes, commentaries, and subsequent citing case law inside Legislator AI.

Open in Legislator →

Full text

THE COURT OF APPEAL Neutral Citation Number: [2025] IECA 304 Court of Appeal Record No. 7/25 Charleton J McCarthy J O’Moore J

BETWEEN/

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

RESPONDENT -AND-

GEORGE HACKETT APPELLANT

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered on the 25th day of November 2025 by Mr Justice Patrick McCarthy

1. This is an appeal against sentence. The appellant came forward to Limerick Circuit Court on signed pleas of guilty in respect of one count of burglary contrary to section 12(1)(b)

and (3) of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, and two counts of attempted theft contrary to common law. He was sentenced to a post-mitigation sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment in respect of the count of burglary on the 19th of December 2024;

the two counts of attempted theft were taken into consideration.

Factual Background

2. The offending behaviour in this case occurred on the 3rd of March 2024. One Garda Jack O’Sullivan gave evidence to the sentencing hearing that at approximately 16:50 p.m. on the afternoon in question the victim returned to her house after dropping her son to work.

She found herself unable to open her front door fully due to an obstruction inside the house.

When she opened the door, she heard someone coughing inside (the house ought to have been unoccupied). She then contacted her neighbours for assistance. One of her neighbours, Mr Ian Farrell, attended at her house and told her to alert the gardaí (which she did). Mr Farrell heard a noise upstairs; he went upstairs and returned with the male intruder in his grip. The male threatened to stab Mr Farrell and said that he had a knife in his possession. Having heard that threat, Ms Cross told Mr Farrell to let the intruder go and the latter left fled the scene.

3. The victim’s son rang her a short time after this incident had occurred to inform her that a person unknown had twice attempted to use his Revolut card to complete a purchase at a nearby store [it had in fact been stolen from the house]. Garda O’Sullivan then attended at that store with a colleague. They harvested CCTV footage from the store and identified a male wearing a black puffy jacket, a navy hoodie, and navy pants as the culprit. Garda O’Sullivan later observed a male matching that description, being the appellant, at approximately 21:50 p.m. that evening.

4. The appellant was arrested shortly after 10 p.m. and brought to a garda station. He was examined by a medical practitioner who concluded that the appellant was unfit for questioning at that time by reason of intoxication. Gardaí took possession of the appellant’s clothing—Mr O’Sullivan confirmed during cross-examination at the sentencing hearing that no knife was recovered by gardaí. The appellant was interviewed on three occasions the following day. During these interviews, he maintained that he had not been involved in any burglary; however, he ultimately admitted that he had attempted to use the Revolut card to complete a purchase—though he claimed that an unidentified person had given him the relevant card.

Victim Impact

5. The judge (as do we) had the benefit of a victim impact statement which fairly set out the impact of the appellant’s offending on the victims in the instant case. Given its concision, we think it appropriate to set the victim’s statement out in extenso:

“My home was a safe haven to both me and my son. A place where we valued & built memories.

Unfortunately this is no longer the case.

My home now represents a place of discomfort and fear. I no longer feel protected within my own walls.

The violation of my personal space has left me feeling anxious, vulnerable and distressed.

The intrusion into my safe space has disrupted me sense of safety and I now live in constant fear that it could happen again.

The emotional and psychological impact of this incident has been profound, affecting my daily life, and has shattered my peace of mind.

I live in constant fear. Turning the key in my front door leaves me in a perpetual state of unease.

Your actions have deeply affected my life and I hope you understand the profound emotional and psychological impact your actions have had on me and my son. I also hope that you never ever put another family through this and you make peace with your internal demons and get the help you need so no other family will leave [sic] in constant fear like I do.”

Personal Circumstances

6. The appellant was 38 years of age at the time of sentencing. His counsel informed the judge that he was on an enhanced prisoner regime in custody and had completed a restorative justice and victim awareness programme. The court was informed that the appellant suffered from chronic addiction issues pertaining to the use of alcohol and drugs throughout his adult life. He has an extensive history within the criminal justice system which we set out in more detail below.

7. The appellant has 204 previous convictions. 53 of his previous convictions are for burglary—

44 of these were dealt with in the District Court and 9 were dealt with by the Circuit Court.

26 of his previous convictions relate to offences contrary to the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 which include: 18 offences of theft, 5 offences of possession of stolen property, 2 offences of robbery, and 1 offence of making gain or causing loss by deception. The appellant also has previous convictions for possession of knives and other articles among other offences.

8. On the 1st of October 2024 the appellant was sentenced to cumulative term of 18 months’ imprisonment on 4 counts of burglary, in the District Court. It is of note that on the 7th of April 2016 a sentence of imprisonment of 12 years for an offence of burglary the last 7 years of which were suspended for a period of 7 years was imposed. He did not observe the terms of suspension after his release from prison and ultimately a sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment with an additional 4 years suspended was imposed on the 5th day of February 2020. At the time of commission of the present offences he was on bail for the matters dealt with in the District Court, but he breached those terms not only by commission of the present offence but by failure to remain and undergo treatment for addiction at Hyde Park residential treatment facility (indeed we were told that it was for this purpose that he was granted bail). It does not appear that the suspensory portion of the earlier sentence was relevant by reference to the date of the present offences and the length of that suspensory period, but we think it indicative of the failure to-date of the appellant to break the cycle of criminality. Even though he was on bail at the time of commission of these offences, the sentence imposed here was not made consecutive to that imposed in the District Court some months earlier as aforesaid. He had been unlawfully at large for a period of time before arrest for the present offences as aforesaid. There is no doubt but that the single most significant aggravating factor here is the history of offences involving theft (including robbery) but especially burglary. By definition the 9 burglary offences dealt with on indictment can only have been significant.

9. The sentencing court was told that the appellant was taking steps to address his addiction issues. To that end, evidence was called from one Deborah Ryan who is the services manager of Novas (an organisation which provides support and advocacy for those experiencing homelessness) in the Tipperary area. Ms Ryan provided what might shortly be described as evidence pertaining to the services and support offered by Novas and other services (which included assistance accessing housing, residential treatment programmes, drug counselling, psychological assessments and support, and the support of the HSE). Ms Ryan confirmed that Novas were willing to re-engage with the appellant upon his release from prison, and she expressed hope for his future.

10. The sentencing judge (as do we) had the benefit of a letter written by a senior clinical psychologist, Dr Harry Horgan, of the HSE. In that letter, Dr Horgan confirmed that the appellant is eligible for the ‘Housing First’ programme which is a model of support available to those who have experienced difficulty exiting homelessness through mainstream services. He noted that the appellant’s engagement with clinical supports had been interrupted due to his incarceration; however, he stated that his initial work with the appellant suggested a long history of trauma, beginning in childhood, which has contributed to mental health difficulties and maladaptive coping in adulthood. Counsel for the appellant informed the sentencing court (and this is confirmed by Dr Horgan’s letter) that Dr Horgan had taken the somewhat exceptional step of continuing to work on the appellant’s behalf whilst he is in custody in an attempt to ensure that the appellant receive appropriate trauma-focussed psychological therapy in custody.

11. We also have the benefit of a number of certificates which have been handed into this Court evidencing the appellant’s completion of various programmes during his time in custody.

We also have a letter written by Ms Ryan in which she states, inter alia, that Novas’ hope is that planned psychological interventions will assist the appellant to address the root causes of his addiction and make progress in tackling his addiction issues.

Sentencing Remarks

12. When identifying the aggravating factors of the offending in this case, the judge said that the extraordinary number of relevant previous convictions was a significant aggravating factor. Another serious aggravating factor identified was the fact that the appellant was on bail granted by the High Court in respect of another matter when the present offences were committed. The judge also said that while very little of value had been taken from the house during the burglary the impact on the victims remained significant. Having regard to the facts of the case, the judge identified several features which weighed on the gravity of the offending behaviour, including:

“that the accused targeted a residential premises at a time when the residents were likely to be at home. The accused confronted the victim and her neighbours, and made a threat of violence to them during this confrontation. They could not know that this threat would not be carried out, nor could they have known that the accused was not carrying a weapon at the time.”

Considering the aforementioned as well as the decision of this Court in The People (DPP) v.

Casey and Casey [2018] IECA 121, the judge concluded that the headline sentence should fall in the mid-range of gravity; he nominated a headline sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment.

13. The judge had regard to several mitigating factors. He noted that the appellant came forward on a signed plea and he acknowledged the value of such a plea. The judge also had regard to the appellant’s difficult personal circumstances when the offence was committed, including the fact that he was of no fixed abode at that time and was suffering from a longstanding and chronic addiction. He noted that the appellant had engaged with community supports which had been made available and acknowledged those supports remained available to him. He referred to the fact that the appellant had expressed remorse in a letter written to the court, which he accepted to be genuine. The judge also observed that the appellant appeared to be doing well in custody and had participated in a restorative justice programme; however, he said that there must be: “a significant loss of mitigation by virtue of the other convictions that Mr Hackett has … .”

Grounds of Appeal

14. The appellant appeals against the severity of the sentence imposed on him on the following grounds:

(i) The learned Circuit Court Judge erred in law in fixing a headline sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment.

(ii) The learned Circuit Court Judge misdirected himself in law in forming the view that the guidelines indicated by this Honourable Court in the case of [Casey] when applied to the facts of this case would result in a headline sentence of 9 years.

(iii) The learned Circuit Court Judge erred in law, when considering mitigation, in failing to have any regard to the evidence adduced in respect of efforts at rehabilitation.

(iv) The learned Circuit Court Judge erred in law in failing to suspend any portion of the sentence imposed, especially having regard to the evidence of ongoing rehabilitation in the prison system.

(v) In all the circumstances, the learned Circuit Court Judge erred in law in imposing an unduly severe sentence on the Appellant.

There is a degree of overlap between the grounds of appeal being advanced; we therefore consider them together below.

Submissions

15. The core of the appellant’s submission regarding the headline sentence was that many of the aggravating factors identified in Casey were absent from the present case and the judge was accordingly not justified in placing this offence as high on the scale of gravity as he did by nominating a headline sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment. Counsel also submitted that the judge erred in failing to suspend a portion of the sentence imposed to incentivise rehabilitation. He said that notwithstanding the appellant’s previously poor record in this regard, there was positive evidence which supported the view that the appellant could be assisted to address what he termed the appellant’s “chronic recidivism”.

16. The respondent submitted that the sentencing judge was correct to nominate a headline sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment having regard to the aggravating features of the offending which included a confrontation within the premises, the threat to use a knife, and the fact that a residential premises was targeted at a time when it was likely to be occupied. It was further submitted that the judge applied an appropriate discount in light of the available mitigating factors, and that no further discount to incentivise rehabilitation was appropriate because of the appellant’s previous history and that there was insufficient evidence before the judge to establish that the appellant was willing to take steps to rehabilitate himself.

Discussion

17. We think that the judge erred in principle by nominating a headline sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment having regard to the sentencing parameters elaborated in Casey. We think that, primarily because of the aggravating factor of 53 previous burglary convictions, this case falls into the middle range but not at the highest end thereof. There is no clear blue water between the ranges, or terms of years used to identify them, but nonetheless on any view the headline sentence must be viewed as being toward the top of the mid-range. We accordingly quash the sentence imposed and proceed to re-sentence de novo.

18. Having regard to gravity of the offending behaviour, we nominate a headline sentence of 6 years. We have already referred to the principal aggravating factor (the previous relevant convictions); to this may be added the fact that the burglary was of a dwellinghouse, that the dwellinghouse was targeted as such, that there was a confrontation in the house, that there was a threat of violence with a knife, and that the offence has had a grave adverse effect upon the householder. The mitigating factors are the signed pleas of guilty, the personal circumstances of the appellant (including his history) as referred to by Ms Ryan and Dr Horgan, his remorse (although modest significance must be attached to this having regard to his recidivism), and above all the prospect of rehabilitation. There is no question of evidence of previous good character.

19. We have not only had regard to the evidence in the Circuit Court bearing upon rehabilitation, but also the additional material furnished since indicative of the fact that the HSE and ‘Novas’ have a continuing willingness to assist the appellant, even though he breached his obligations when granted bail. This assistance will extend to the provision of housing and institutional care. We think that there must be some reasonable prospect at this stage of breaking the cycle of criminality to the ultimate benefit not only of the accused but of society.

20. Having regard to the available mitigating factors, we think a sentence of 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment is appropriate. We will suspend the final 6 months thereof for a period of 2 years on terms conducive to rehabilitation and in respect of which we will hear counsel.