Court of Appeal dismisses appeals by a self-represented defendant in an interlocutory injunction enforcement case.

APPROVED - NO REDACTION NEEDED

THE COURT OF APPEAL Record Numbers: 2025/160 2025/198 Faherty J. Neutral Citation Number [2025] IECA 289 Collins J. Owens J.

Between/

WENDY DOYLE

Respondent/Plaintiff -AND-

EUGENIE HOUSTON Appellant/Defendant

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Alexander Owens on the 19th day of December 2025.

1. My colleagues are in agreement with this judgment.

2. There is nothing in any of the appeal points raised by the appellant. These appeals are dismissed.

3. Eugenie Houston is a barrister. She represented herself in this action both in the High Court and on appeal.

4. Her first appeal relates to a number of decisions taken by the High Court (Kennedy J.) on 21 May 2025 on applications made by Eugenie Houston on 12 May 2025 prior to the hearing of Wendy Doyle’s application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain her from trespass to land.

5. Firstly, the learned High Court judge declined to recuse himself from hearing Wendy Doyle’s application which was fixed for hearing on that date. Secondly he refused to adjourn that hearing to allow her to submit further affidavit evidence. Thirdly, he refused to direct two deponents of affidavits relied on in the application for interlocutory relief to attend for cross-examination on the content of their affidavits.

Finally, he rejected arguments that he could not proceed with the application on grounds that it was not properly before the court.

6. Eugenie Houston’s second appeal relates to the judgment and order of the High Court following the hearing by Kennedy J. of the application for the interlocutory injunction. The learned High Court judge issued a written judgment on 3 July 2025 in favour of Wendy Doyle. She succeeded in her application for an interlocutory injunction. He also awarded Wendy Doyle the costs of her application, to be adjudicated on a solicitor-and-client basis.

7. Eugenie Houston’s arguments on this appeal covered much of the same ground as those on her first appeal. Many of these arguments were not advanced by her in the course of the relevant High Court hearings. These points cannot be entertained on appeal.

8. Such grounds as are admissible in these appeals show no basis on which it would be appropriate for this Court to set aside the orders under appeal. The decisions of the learned High Court judge not to recuse himself; to refuse an application for an adjournment and not to direct attendance of deponents for cross-examination on their affidavits were proper. The decision of the High Court to grant an interlocutory injunction in favour of Wendy Doyle restraining trespass by Eugenie Houston was fully justified. There was no sound basis for contentions that the application was not properly listed for hearing, or in some way precluded because an earlier application to have Eugenie Houston attached and committed for contempt of court had not been proceeded with.

9. This action is the third in a sequence of three actions involving Wendy Doyle and Eugenie Houston. In this action Wendy Doyle sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain trespass by Eugenie Houston in a dwelling at Morell Drive in Naas (Morell Drive).

10. Wendy Doyle requires possession of Morell Drive to affect a sale with vacant possession of this property to give effect to orders of the High Court in her action to enforce her judgment mortgage over it declaring that mortgage well-charged on it and directing that it be sold under court supervision and that Eugenie Houston deliver up possession of it.

11. Eugenie Houston is the owner of the equity of redemption in Morell Drive and she resides there. Unless Eugenie Houston redeems the judgment mortgage and any other creditors who are owed sums secured on Morell Drive; her proprietary interest is thus limited. Her ownership has been converted into a right to receive any surplus after the costs of sale and these charges, including the costs of the primary orders in the mortgage suit, ranking in the same priority as the judgment mortgage, are paid.

12. Wendy Doyle previously acted as solicitor for Eugenie Houston. Eugenie Houston sued Wendy Doyle. That action was compromised. A consent order for costs in favour of Wendy Doyle was part of that compromise. Wendy Doyle converted that costs liability of Eugenie Houston into a judgment mortgage over Eugenie Houston’s interest in Morell Drive.

13. Wendy Doyle then initiated High Court action Record Number 2017 377 Sp. against Eugenie Houston in that action Wendy Doyle obtained an order declaring that the sum due on foot of her judgment for costs was well-charged against Eugenie Houston’s interest in Morell Drive and an order that it be sold under the supervision of the High Court. This Court affirmed that order on appeal.

14. Subsequently, on 7 November 2022, the High Court directed that Eugenie Houston deliver up possession of Morell Drive and put a stay on execution of that order for 6 months. That order was also appealed to this Court. The appeal failed. The stay of execution expired.

15. Affidavits disclose that Eugenie Houston did not deliver up possession of Morell Drive. An execution order was issued on foot of the order for possession. This execution order was sent to the County Sheriff for County Kildare who appointed her court messenger and bailiffs supplied by Sean Cahill to execute it by taking possession.

16. This execution order was enforced on 24 July 2024. Eugenie Houston was not present at Morell Drive when the court messenger and bailiffs attended and the bailiffs were put into possession of Morell Drive on foot of the warrant. The bailiffs changed the locks and left the house in a secured state. They affixed a notice in writing on the inside of the window of the front ground-floor room. This notice advised that the order for possession had been executed. It could be read by any person approaching that window from outside the house.

17. The effect of this execution was to put Wendy Doyle into possession of Morell Drive.

Later that day, Eugenie Houston went back into possession of Morell Drive.

18. The well-charging order was final against Eugenie Houston, as was the order that she deliver up possession. Her replying affidavit in these proceedings did not contest these basic facts. She submitted to this Court that there was an irregularity in the manner in which the Sheriff delegated enforcement of the execution order taken out by Wendy Doyle to enforce the High Court order for possession. As this point was not raised during the High Court hearing and is not a ground of appeal, this Court cannot entertain any submission relating to it. It is apparent from the careful and comprehensive judgment of the learned High Court judge that she did not advance that point to him.

19. It follows that when Eugenie Houston went back into occupation of Morell Drive after the bailiffs had secured it and departed, she did so as a trespasser.

20. Wendy Doyle had a number of options open to her after Eugenie Houston re-entered Morell Drive. She could seek to enforce the existing order that Eugenie Houston give her possession of Morell Drive by applying to have her committed for contempt of court. She could apply in her mortgage suit for ancillary relief in the form of an order restraining Eugenie Houston from further occupation of Morell Drive or directing her to hand over possession of it to her. She could institute a separate action seeking an injunction to restrain trespass by Eugenie Houston.

21. Wendy Doyle initially proceeded on the contempt of court route. She subsequently abandoned that course and opted instead to bring these proceedings seeking an injunction against Eugenie Houston to restrain trespass.

22. The application for an interlocutory injunction in this action came on for hearing on

21 May 2025. On that date the learned High Court judge refused an application to recuse himself and an application for an adjournment to enable Eugenie Houston to put in affidavits. He rejected an application to have Wendy Doyle and the deponent of an affidavit dealing with how the court official and the bailiffs took possession of Morell Drive cross-examined. The High Court judge also rejected an argument that the application for an interlocutory injunction was not properly before that Court. His preliminary rulings on these points were the subject of an order which was perfected on 22 May 2025.

23. Wendy Doyle’s application for an interlocutory injunction then proceeded. Judgment was reserved. This judgment was given on 3 July 2025. The High Court granted an injunction restraining Eugenie Houston from trespassing on Morell Drive. On 9 July 2025, the learned High Court judge awarded the costs of the application for an interlocutory injunction against Eugenie Houston, to be adjudicated on a “solicitorand-client” basis.

24. One of the principal arguments made by Eugenie Houston in this appeal was that the initial consent judgment for costs against her was invalid because the court order which decreed that she pay these costs also provided that the proceedings in which it was made were struck out. Eugenie Houston provided no authority for this extraordinary proposition. Her argument was completely misconceived. The order that she pay those costs survived the strike-out of the proceedings and was an enforceable judgment.

25. Even if there could be anything to this point, no court could entertain an argument that it was an answer to Wendy Doyle’s claim for an interlocutory injunction. This argument was inadmissible because it was a collateral attack on the finality of the well-charging order. That well-charging order was final as between Wendy Doyle and Eugenie Houston on every issue which was or could have been raised in defence to Wendy Doyle’s claim that the amount due by Eugenie Houston to her for costs was well-charged on Eugenie Houston’s interest in Morell Drive.

26. The second main argument which Eugenie Houston advanced before this Court was that Wendy Doyle did not have what she described as “status” to seek an injunction to restrain her from trespassing on Morell Drive. She argued, without supplying any evidence, that her judgment debt to Wendy Doyle had, in some shape or form, been assigned to a new solicitor’s practice because Wendy Doyle was no longer a sole practitioner Solicitor.

27. This argument was misconceived. Wendy Doyle has the benefit of the judgment for costs and the primary order in the judgment mortgage suit, and, as plaintiff in that suit, she is responsible for arranging a sale of Morell Drive under court supervision and for obtaining and securing execution of any necessary ancillary orders, such as an order for vacant possession to enable the sale to proceed.

28. The effect of the order for possession was that Eugenie Houston was obliged to deliver up possession of Morell Drive to Wendy Doyle after the stay expired.

29. If Eugenie Houston sought to introduce evidence for the purpose of identifying the supposed right of a third party to the benefit of the judgment mortgage or to possess Morell Drive, that evidence would not have been admissible. She could not raise any ius tertii as a defence. She was obliged to defend her right to possession of Morell Drive by reference to the strength of her own right to possession as against that of Wendy Doyle. She was not entitled to suggest that some third party had a superior right to that possession.

30. Wendy Doyle’s right to possession of Morell Drive stemmed from an order of the High Court which was affirmed by this Court on appeal. That order was obtained to enable a court-supervised sale of Morell Drive to proceed. Without vacant possession, any sale would be frustrated. No potential purchaser would bid without viewing the property and without the assurance that vacant possession would be forthcoming on completion of the purchase.

31. Wendy Doyle has carriage of the proceedings which will lead to sale of Morell Drive through the court process in her action to enforce her judgment mortgage. She has the authority of the High Court to take possession of Morell Drive in order to proceed with its sale. It follows the Eugenie Houston’s claims that Wendy Doyle lacked locus standi to seek possession is not correct.

32. The tort of trespass is concerned to uphold the rights of those entitled to possession of land. It is self-evident that, in the context of the present proceedings, Wendy Doyle had the right to take possession of Morell Drive and that she had been put into possession by the Sheriff.

33. There is no substance to Eugenie Houston’s claim that Wendy Doyle’s application to the High Court for the interlocutory injunction to restrain her from trespassing on Morell Drive “had been heard” and “was withdrawn.” No High Court order was produced to this Court evidencing any decision on, strike out or withdrawal of the application for this injunction. The listing records produced by Eugenie Houston to this Court did not demonstrate that this application was struck out or otherwise disposed of prior to the hearing on 21 May 2025. It was listed for hearing on that date. Even if had been struck out as a result of some inadvertence, it could have been re-entered and heard. Once the hearing of this application was embarked on, any point relating to how it came to be listed for hearing was spent.

34. There is nothing in the allegation that Eugenie Houston was frightened of the learned High Court judge. Wendy Doyle was not precluded from seeking an interlocutory injunction to restrain trespass by reason of her abandoned attempt to have Eugenie Houston attached for alleged contempt of court arising from retaking possession of Morell Drive after the bailiffs had left. Wendy Doyle, by taking this course, did not make any legally binding election to pursue it as her sole legal remedy. There are some circumstances where a party to litigation must elect to pursue one of two alternative legal remedies and will be held to that election. This was not such a case.

35. The learned High Court judge explained why he was not adjourning the hearing of the application. The hearing date for this application had been fixed on 7 March 2025. Eugenie Houston had ample opportunity prior to the hearing date to bring any application for recusal; to file affidavits and to deliver legal submissions. The learned High Court judge had already delivered a written judgment on recusal on 30 January 2025 which explained in detail why he was not recusing himself. If Eugenie Houston intended to rely on further reasons for recusal existed arising from events since the hearing which led to delivery of that judgment, she was obliged to identify each point relied on and produce any available materials to the learned High Court judge.

36. During the course of this appeal Eugenie Houston made vague allegations of impropriety against the learned High Court judge which were not supported by evidence or any transcripts. When asked by this Court if she had transcripts which backed up her assertions, it emerged that she had not taken any step to obtain them. She suggested that he deliberately adjourned a hearing scheduled for 21 January 2025 to facilitate Wendy Doyle and that he had corrected Wendy Doyle’s proofs by suggesting that she put in an affidavit evidencing the circumstances of how the Sheriff put Wendy Doyle into possession on foot of the execution order. She also claimed that he made remarks on other occasions which showed that he was biased against her.

37. The judgment of the learned High Court judge dated 3 July 2025 set out the history of his involvement. He recounted that this adjournment arose because he had understood that the application for the interlocutory injunction, while listed on that date, was not listed for hearing.

38. These allegations of bias on the part of the learned High Court judge in the period leading up to the hearing on 21 May 2025 did not feature as complaints in the transcript of the interchanges which led to a refusal of Eugenie Houston’s preliminary applications for the learned High Court judge to recuse himself at the hearing on 21 May 2025. We cannot entertain these complaints. They were neither advanced before the High Court nor supported by evidence.

39. Even if the learned High Court judge did draw the attention of the parties to the absence of an affidavit detailing the circumstances of enforcement of the execution order for possession of Morell Drive, this action would not amount to favouring one of them over the other.

40. Had I been in the position of the learned High Court judge and noticed the absence of an affidavit dealing with this issue, I would have pointed this out to the parties. It would be somewhat pointless to allot a hearing date for the application if some obvious evidential aspect had not yet been attended to. If this deficiency was not addressed in good time there was a risk that the hearing date might have to be vacated.

41. In my view, if the learned High Court judge did draw attention to the absence evidence covering this point, this step was both appropriate and necessary to ensure efficient use of court time. The matter could be addressed and Eugenie Houston would have ample time to respond by putting in her own affidavit prior to the hearing date.

42. Eugenie Houston complained that the learned High Court judge referred to her as having “broken into her home” during the hearing on 21 May 2025 and that in response to this counsel for Wendy Doyle stated that her case was that she had “gained access.”

43. The transcript of the hearing on 21 May 2025 dealing with the application for the High Court judge to recuse himself and to adjourn the motion for an interlocutory injunction did not reflect this claim. Even if this comment was made by the learned High Court judge during the course of the application for the interlocutory injunction, this complaint has no merit.

44. The affidavit of Sean Cahill discloses that when he got possession of Morell Drive on foot of the execution order he changed the locks and fully secured this property, retaining the new keys. In light of that, and absent any evidence from Eugenie Houston explaining how she got back into her house, it would not have been improper for the learned High Court judge to infer that she broke back into this property, and to express this conclusion.

45. Eugenie Houston had Sean Cahill’s affidavit. She did not contradict on affidavit the fact that he had secured the property against her re-entry or explain how she succeeded in getting back into it. It may thus be inferred that she then proceeded to remove and replace the new locks which Sean Cahill had installed. Those locks were installed so that the keys could be given into the control of Wendy Doyle.

46. There is nothing to show that the judge advised Wendy Doyle to bring an action for trespass as, alleged by Eugenie Houston. In any event, this point, if it had any substance, was not made at the appropriate time. The application for an injunction had already been adjourned. Eugenie Houston had an opportunity to make a case to the Court of Appeal arising from the learned High Court judge’s previous decision on the recusal issue. As he stated to her in the course of his remarks on 21 May 2025, if she wanted to make that case she should have done so in the period before that date.

47. The application for recusal on 21 May 2025, was based on nothing more than vague assertions of judicial impropriety and favouritism and the fact that she had sued him.

It is inappropriate for any litigant to institute plenary proceedings against a judge based on an allegation of judicial misconduct. Any action of this sort is an abuse of process because it advances a claim which is not maintainable. Eugenie Houston could not use the existence of any such action to support her application to the High Court judge to recuse himself from hearing and determining Wendy Doyle’s application for the interlocutory injunction.

48. It is clear that Wendy Doyle requires vacant possession to enable sale of Morell Drive through the High Court procedure. It will not be possible for her to enforce her security by a sale of this property under court supervision unless she is in position to give vacant possession to a purchaser. Eugenie Houston is not entitled to interfere with this process by retaking possession of Morell Drive or by taking any other steps which would frustrate this sale, such as by discouraging bidders or purchasers. The well-charging order and the High Court order for possession gave Wendy Doyle a better right to possession of Morell Drive than Eugenie Houston. Once she was put into possession by the Sheriff, Eugenie Houston was not entitled to oust her.

49. The preliminary ruling of the learned High Court judge and his subsequent written judgment dealt with the issues. He acted properly in refusing the late applications by Eugenie Houston to adduce further affidavit evidence, to adjourn the proceedings and to direct that Wendy Doyle and Sean Cahill attend for the purpose of being cross-examined on their affidavits.

50. A grant of leave to cross-examine a deponent on an affidavit is only appropriate where other affidavits contradict that affidavit evidence on a significant issue of fact, so that it becomes necessary for the court to resolve that issue by receiving oral evidence. The content of the affidavit sworn by Eugenie Houston did not identify anything which would justify cross-examination of Wendy Doyle or Sean Cahill on the contents of their affidavits.

51. The learned High Court judge accepted the explanation by Wendy Doyle that was proceeding in this action in order to avoid getting into an issue as to whether the order for possession was “spent.”

52. It is difficult to see how an order directing that possession of a property be given up to a plaintiff to enforce sale with vacant possession in a mortgage suit could ever become “spent” as a result of an ineffective execution by the Sheriff or as a result of the former occupier retaking possession after enforcement of the execution order.

Such events would not prevent issue of a further execution order directing the Sheriff to go out again and take possession for the purposes of enforcing the order for possession.

53. This point does not assist Eugenie Houston. It is not necessary “to go back to square one” and get a further court order for possession in such circumstances. The “spent” order argument could never be an answer to trespass proceedings to enforce the right of Wendy Doyle to possession once she had taken possession on foot of the High Court order.

54. The courts are obliged to ensure to litigants who turn to them to declare and enforce their rights, that their remedies are effective. In this case it would have been appropriate for the High Court to grant a mandatory injunction directing Eugenie Houston to vacate possession of Morell Drive or deliver up physical possession of that house to Wendy Doyle on a specified date. An injunction restraining Eugenie Houston from remaining in occupation of this house comes to the same thing.

55. An injunction to restrain trespass has generally been readily granted at the behest of any party who has been ousted from possession of land by an intruder. This right derives from possession. An intruder who cannot show a better right to possession than the party ousted will be prohibited from remaining in possession. Damages are usually not an adequate remedy for this type of trespass. They were certainly not an adequate remedy for Wendy Doyle in this case.

56. As Keane J. pointed out in the first edition of “Equity and the law of Trusts in Ireland,” trespass to land is a tort which readily attracts the remedy of an injunction.

As he stated in Keating & Company Ltd v. Jervis Street Shopping Centre Ltd [1997]

1 I.R. 512 at 518: “It is clear that a landowner whose title is not in issue is prima facie entitled to an injunction to restrain a trespass and that this is also the case where the claim is for an interlocutory injunction only.” Other later Irish authorities cited by the learned High Court judge in the judgment which is the subject of this appeal are to the same effect.

57. This principle must apply with greater force where the trespass complained of is an ouster of possession given on foot of a court order. In such cases there is usually no arguable defence to the claim that the person ousted should, as of right, be put back into possession forthwith.

58. No arguable defence was mounted by Eugenie Houston before the High Court. The High Court could not go back over issues which were the subject of concluded final judgments. This Court had affirmed both the primary order in this judgment mortgage suit and the order directing that Eugenie Houston deliver up possession of this house.

59. It is clear that Wendy Doyle is attempting to enforce a court sale and that Eugenie Houston has not demonstrated any stateable defence to Wendy Doyle’s right to have Eugenie Houston’s property sold on foot of the judgment mortgage. The courts have already determined that this property should be sold. This is a statutory remedy given to creditors which applies to dwellings as much as to any other property and courts enforcing it do not have the sort of discretions which might arise in some other circumstances.

60. We refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in McDonagh v. Clare County Council ([2022] IESC 2) [2022] 2 I.R. 122. At most, McDonagh mandates a proportionality assessment where a court is asked to restrain trespass by the former occupier of a family home. The learned High Court judge carried out that assessment. In reality, the only case based on proportionality which Eugenie Houston might make was for a short further stay to give her an opportunity to get out of this property. Her defence to the interlocutory injunction application was not advanced on that basis.

61. The prior history of this litigation was relevant. The learned High Court judge identified that property rights of private landowners must be adequately vindicated and he referred to para.102 of the judgment of Hogan J. in McDonagh at pp. 163 and 164 of the report.

62. McDonagh does not give a defence to private law actions by mortgagees to enforce contractual or statutory remedies of mortgagees which involve possession or sale of dwellings. It is noteworthy that borrowers for business purposes are still allowed to mortgage their dwellings to secure their liabilities. These are laws are legitimate legislative choices which are not prohibited by Article 40.5 of the Constitution.

63. The rights and remedies of holders of security over property, including judgment mortgage holders are regulated by law. Powers of the courts to grant a stay in actions for enforcement of mortgages are quite limited and are based on recent statutory interventions.

64. The authorities in this area show that the courts in mortgage enforcement litigation and landlord and tenant proceedings seeking to take possession of dwellings are concerned with ensuring due process. Contractual rights of these mortgagees and landlords which interfere with occupation by occupiers of dwellings must be enforced on foot of court orders, rather than by entry into possession of land without consent.

Defences to such actions by those in occupation of dwellings can thus be raised in court proceedings while they are still in occupation.

65. Even if proportionality were a legitimate consideration at this stage of the process of realisation of Eugenie Houston’s dwelling to pay off this judgment mortgagee, she has put nothing of substance forward which could be regarded as outweighing Wendy Doyle’s right to seek enforcement of her judicially declared remedy.

66. The question of whether this house should be sold to discharge this judgment mortgage and whether possession of it should be delivered up for this purpose are water under the bridge now because these have already been ordered. Eugenie Houston’s appeals have failed. She has not identified any legal basis which would justify this Court in refraining from acting to enforce those court orders.

67. The stay on the order for possession has long passed. The only point which any Court might be permitted by McDonagh to entertain, at this point, is whether some further stay on the injunction taking effect immediately is warranted in light of the need for Eugenie Houston to relocate and what the realities are of arranging the court-approved sale of Morell Drive at this time of year.

68. It might also be appropriate in that context to require, as conditions of any further forbearance, that Eugenie Houston give personal undertakings to vacate possession, to look after the property while she remains in occupation and to fix a date for delivery up of possession to Wendy Doyle or her agent. If these matters arise, they should be canvassed before the High Court in the mortgage proceedings. Those issues relate to the sale of Morell Drive. That sale is under the superintendence of the High Court. They are not matters for this Court.

69. This judgment is being delivered electronically. Our provisional view is that the costs of these appeals should follow the event and be awarded to Wendy Doyle on a party and party basis. It should be sufficient that there be one order as to costs by reference to the main appeal against the order granting the interlocutory injunction and of preparing and lodging the respondent’s notice in the other appeal. Should either party disagree with the proposed order relating to costs, that party should within fourteen days of delivery of this judgment serve and file a written submission of not more than 1,000 words, after which the other party will have a further period of fourteen days to respond by delivering and filing a reply of no greater length.

Either party may then contact the office of this Court to arrange an oral hearing on the costs issue.

70. The final matter which we must address is Eugenie Houston’s request for a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union. She has not identified any question on which it might be necessary for this Court to obtain guidance from that Court. We therefore refuse to accede to that request.