Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against conviction for assault and false imprisonment where evidence sufficed despite missing witness testimony.

APPROVED JUDGMENT

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Record Number: 0307/2024

0202/2024

Neutral Citation Number [2025] IECA 285

Kennedy J. Burns J. Collins J.

BETWEEN/

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

RESPONDENT

- AND -

GERARD STOKES

- AND -

SAMANTHA CAMPBELL

APPELLANTS

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered on the 8th day of December 2025 by Ms. Justice Isobel Kennedy.

1. This is an appeal against conviction. On the 26th of February 2024, the appellants were convicted of assault causing serious harm contrary to s.4 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 (“the 1997 Act”), assault causing harm contrary to s.3 of the 1997 Act, aggravated burglary contrary to s.13 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, and false imprisonment contrary to s.15 of the 1997 Act.

Factual Background

2. Gerard Stokes and Samantha Campbell asked MG, an acquaintance, to hold a package containing cocaine for them and upon its return, the appellants alleged that a portion of it was missing. The appellants summoned MG to Mr. Stokes’ house in the evening of the 5th of December 2018, where they inflicted a series of attacks on MG in order to find out what had happened to the allegedly missing drugs. The first intimation of violence came when Ms. Campbell punched MG in the face and pulled her hair. Mr. Stokes forced MG to turn off her phone and took possession of it. MG was forced to enter the kitchen and stand on black bin bags that had been laid out on the floor. Mr. Stokes then picked up a hammer and told Ms. Campbell that the punching and kicking was not working, and that it was time to finish MG off. He struck her with the hammer 5 times on her left side, before forcing her to turn around and striking her on her back. He then told her he was going to kill her and get rid of her body, before turning her to face him and hitting her with the hammer on her head and right eye. He then told her to pull the black bin bag over herself and tied it, also striking her in her genital area and upper thigh. As she was going unconscious, MG told the appellants that the drugs were in her friend TA’s house in an attempt to save her own life, however TA was not in possession of any drugs. This prolonged attack on MG lasted approximately 3 hours.

3. On the way to the car, Mr. Stokes handed a waiting youth the hammer, phone and plastic bin bags with instructions to burn the items. The appellants drove MG to TA’s house, where upon entering they met TA’s husband who attempted to diffuse the situation. TA was nonetheless assaulted by the appellants; however, members of the Gardaí arrived very quickly on the scene and interrupted the assault. The appellants ran out of the house as the Gardaí arrived, however they seized Mr. Stokes’ car at 9:20pm. Mr. Stokes then made a statement to the Gardaí that his car had been stolen from him at 10:30pm, at which time it was already in Garda custody.

4. MG was brought to hospital that night and remained in hospital for almost a month. She sustained significant injuries, including the rupturing of her right eye leading to its loss, fractures of several facial bones for which she had plates inserted, as well as significant bruising. MG also suffered severe distress and trauma and required psychiatric intervention.

5. A witness statement was taken from MG on the 6th and 7th of December 2018 whilst she was in hospital. The taking of the statement took approximately

4 hours. Members of the Gardaí brought a camcorder to the hospital and recorded the reading back of the statement to MG and the signing thereof. A second statement was taken on the 8th of January 2019, in which the witness clarified the correct name of a tarot card reader she had attended with the appellants. Further to the making of this second statement, the witness assisted the Gardaí on the 15th of January 2019 with their enquiries regarding the location of where the said card reader resided.

6. MG declined to testify during the trial and the respondent applied to admit her statements pursuant to s.16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 (“the 2006 Act”). A voir dire took place, where two members of the Gardaí gave evidence about the circumstances in which the statements were made, as well as MG confirming in evidence that the signatures on the statements were indeed hers. The trial judge ruled the evidence admissible. The other injured party, TA, did not attend court or give evidence during the trial, however her husband, who witnessed the event, did.

7. The jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts on all counts on the indictment.

Grounds of Appeal

8. The appellants appeal their convictions on several grounds; however, the principal common ground relates to the admission of MG’s statements under s.16 of the 2006 Act.

9. It is submitted solely on behalf of Mr. Stokes that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to rely on telephone data involving various phones that were linked to the appellants. This appellant also takes issue with the trial judge’s ruling on the direction application.

10. It is submitted solely on behalf of Ms. Campbell that the trial judge failed to take into account the appellant’s culpability and personal circumstances at the time of the alleged offending, which may have had an impact upon her conviction, however, it was properly conceded at the oral hearing that this relates to the appeal against sentence.

Common Grounds of Appeal

Ground 1 of Gerard Stokes and Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of Samantha

Campbell: The Application Pursuant to Section 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 Submissions of the Appellants

11. The appellants contend that the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence the statements made by MG pursuant to s.16 of the 2006 Act. It is argued that as MG was not “available for cross-examination” within the meaning of the 2006 Act, that her statements were not voluntary or reliable, and that the admission of said statements resulted in unfairness and a breach of the appellants’ rights under art. 38 and art. 40 of the Irish Constitution, and art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

12. It is submitted that the trial judge did not have sufficient regard to the fact that investigating members of the Gardaí took a statement from MG without any medical evidence as to the capacity of the witness, particularly where she had been unfit for interview the previous day, and further that the Gardaí did not obtain a statement from the nurse they claimed had ascertained that MG had the capacity to make the statements.

13. It is noted that MG subsequently instructed her solicitor that she could not stand over the statement which she had made and wished to withdraw it. In addition, the respondent was notified through MG’s solicitor that MG was suffering from memory loss, among other psychiatric problems.

14. The appellants submit that MG’s statements were not voluntary or reliable, and that therefore the admission of said statements resulted in unfairness and a breach of the appellants’ constitutional rights, having particular regard to the case of People (DPP) v CC [2019] IESC 94.

15. The appellants argue that MG was not “available for cross-examination” as is required under this section. The question of giving evidence was specifically put to MG by counsel for the appellant and she made it clear she did not wish to be subjected to cross-examination.

16. It is argued that as 3 bench warrants had to be issued before MG’s attendance was secured, MG clearly did not make herself “available for crossexamination” on a voluntary basis in accordance with the requirements of s.16 of the 2006 Act.

17. The appellants refer to the European Court of Human Rights case of Al- Khawaja and Tahery v The United Kingdom (Application nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06), 15 December 2011, where the court concluded that where a conviction is based “solely or decisively” on the evidence of an absent witness, “strong procedural safeguards” should be in place, in order to ensure a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of the evidence in question.

18. The trial judge noted the remarks made by the Court of Appeal in the case of People (DPP) v DK and MK [2021] IECA 32, that s.16 of the 2006 Act can apply where a witness refuses to answer questions. The appellants submit that in the instant case, there was no meaningful opportunity to cross examine the witness, and the original statement itself is in fact questionable given the circumstances in which it was taken. As such, the “strong procedural safeguards” referred to in Al-Khawaja and Tahery were not met.

19. It is noted that the court remarked that the exclusion of the statements from MG would bring to an end some, if not all of the counts on the indictment. It is therefore submitted that reliance on this statement by the court was decisive.

Submissions of the Respondent

20. The respondent submits that the trial judge correctly considered and applied the statutory framework under s.16 of the 2006 Act and properly found that MG was available for cross-examination and that her statements were both voluntary and reliable. The trial judge also gave the mandatory warning to the jury under s.16(5) of the 2006 Act, directing them to consider the weight of the evidence submitted in light of all relevant factors, and that it was for them alone to determine the weight that should be attached to the statements.

21. It is submitted that the appellants had full opportunity to challenge the statements through cross-examination and that the statements were corroborated by independent evidence.

22. It is said that the trial judge was correct in ruling MG as “available for cross-examination” within the meaning of s.16(1) of the 2006 Act, as she was physically present in the court and sworn in, and the appellants had the opportunity to put questions to her if they so wished. The fact that MG indicated she did not wish to answer questions does not alter that, as availability does not require that the witness be cooperative or that the cross-examination be productive.

23. It is noted that during the voir dire, MG stated that she would refuse to answer questions posed by the respondent or the appellants, due to issues with her own mental health. The respondent submits that this refusal did not amount to unavailability for cross-examination and that it is in fact an issue of weight and credibility for the jury to consider, ref: People (DPP) v Campion [2015] IECA

274. The respondent also refers to the case of DK and MK, where a similar argument as is made by the appellants was rejected before the Court of Appeal.

24. The respondent submits that the trial judge correctly ruled that “reliability” under s.16 of the 2006 Act refers to the circumstances in which the statements were made and whether this makes it untrustworthy or suspect, not to the truth or accuracy of the statement, which is a matter for the jury to decide. Ref; People (DPP) v O’Brien [2010] IECCA 103, and Campion.

25. The trial judge found no evidence of oppression, inducement or impairment of MG’s understanding when she made the statements. It was noted that she spoke freely to the members of the Gardaí, the statements were read back to her, and she made the necessary adjustments before signing them to confirm their accuracy. It is also noted that the trial judge accepted the evidence of the Gardaí that MG was lucid and responsive when making the statements, and that there was nothing to suggest incapacity.

26. The respondent submits that the trial judge carefully considered s.16(4) of the 2006 Act, he ruled that the appellants were aware that a s.16 application would be made and were aware of the contents of the statements. The appellants were also afforded the opportunity to cross examine both Garda witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements. The trial judge expressly concluded that there was no unfairness in admitting the statements of MG.

27. Finally, the respondent submits that the fair trial rights of both appellants under art. 6 ECHR and the Irish Constitution were vindicated in the consideration and determination of the application under s.16 of the 2006 Act.

Discussion

28. For a statement to be admitted pursuant to s. 16 of the 2006 Act, the witness, although available for cross-examination, has refused to give evidence; denied making the statement or has given evidence materially inconsistent with the statement. The statement may be admitted if the judge is satisfied that oral evidence of the facts concerned in the statement would be admissible; that the witness understood the requirement to tell the truth; and that the statement was voluntary and reliable. Even if all those factors are satisfied, if the judge is of the view that, in the interests of justice, the statement ought not to be admitted, or its admission is unnecessary, the statement may be excluded.

29. MG indicated in her direct evidence that she did not want to say what happened in Mr. Stokes’ house. A voir dire then commenced. The two members of An Garda Síochána who were involved in taking her statements gave evidence, as did MG.

30. The sequence of events regarding the taking of the statements is as follows; on the night of the 6th of December 2018, members of the Gardaí began taking a lengthy and detailed statement from the witness. She was in hospital as a result of injuries sustained. The statement commenced circa 9pm on the night of the 6th of December 2018 and concluded in the early hours of the 7th of December 2018. A further statement was taken from her whilst she remained hospitalised, on the 8th of January 2019. The reason why this second statement was taken is instructive. In her first statement she had, in error, provided an incorrect second name for a tarot card reader. The appellants had attended the reader in the company of the witness. The statement was taken for clarification purposes and she also elaborated on aspects of her first statement.

31. On the 15th January 2019, the witness assisted the Gardaí by taking them to the house of the tarot card reader and made a further statement of clarification on this date. She made another statement on the 26th January 2019.

32. On the 5th of August 2020, the witness attended a solicitor and furnished the Gardaí with a letter indicating that she wished to withdraw her statement.

33. MG gave direct evidence during the voir dire, the relevant portions of which are below:

“Q. All right. And I'm just going to ask you whether or not you made a statement to the guards on the 7th of December, that's in the early hours of the 7th of December 2018, starting on the 6th and ending on the 7th of 2018?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You did, yes. And this is going to be handed in now. I know

obviously your eyesight's affected but I'm just wondering, you don't need to read the full statement but if you can go to the back of that statement. If the guard can attend, Judge, just for the purpose of it.

JUDGE: Yes, thank you.

Q. (Counsel for the Prosecution): Yes. If you go to the back of the statement, is that your handwriting there where it's your signature? JUDGE: If you could turn the page over, Mrs G.

(Counsel for the Prosecution): I do apologise, Judge.

JUDGE: Yes, at the bottom of that page.

A. I can see it a bit, yes, that's mine.

Q. (Counsel for the Prosecution): It is, it's yours, okay. Thanks, thanks very much. And I'm going to ask you the same question then again in relation to the 8th of January 2019. And, again, that's a short statement and I just wanted to see whether or not you recognise your signature at the bottom of that statement?

A. Yes, yes, sir.

Q. Yes, all right. Thank you very much, Ms G. And just in relation to a particular matter that we have to go through, I know on earlier on this week you said to the Court you didn't wish to give evidence, isn't that right?

A. Yes, yes, sir.

Q. Does that remain your position?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I have to ask you, is there any explanation for that or any reason for that?

A. Yes, sir. For my -- my own mental health and for me to start a new life somewhere else.”

The letter

34. The fact of attending a solicitor, as well as the contents of the letter were put to the witness in cross-examination during the voir dire, and again before the jury following the ruling of the admission of the evidence;- “Q. In that regard I'm going to move on to a matter. You may recall attending a solicitor about this, where you put that -- asked a solicitor to help you put that in writing. Do you remember that in 2020?

A. Yes.

Q. And can you confirm to the jury that you instructed a solicitor in relation to a statement setting out why you want to withdraw your statement?

A. Yes.

Q. That it was signed and presented by him on your behalf?

A. Yes.

Q. I just want to read that and to confirm that that is the statement.”

35. The pertinent contents of the letter are as follows;-

“[T]he prosecution has arisen against Gerard Stokes and Samantha Campbell because of that complaint. I wish to withdraw my complaint. I cannot stand over my complaint. The reasons I want to withdraw my complaint are that I am not sure who assaulted me and I am suffering memory loss and psychiatric problems. I suffer from severe distress and visual hallucinations and have been referred for psychiatric treatment. My memory is unreliable and I have been referred to the liaison psychiatric team on multiple occasions who prescribed me with several medications, and I am due back again on the 18th. I have gone to a solicitor's office and asked them to deal with this matter for me because I don't have the professional training to deal with it, professional training or ability to deal with it. I ask that all questions and correspondence be directed to that solicitor. It is my instruction to withdraw my statement and complaint. I made it in good faith but I don't believe it is accurate and reliable now. I do not want to progress it any further and I do not want to be persuaded or approached by the guards or anyone else to change my mind. This is my final word on the matter. I am not a reliable witness and it would be unfair to present me as a witness if I am not sure myself."

36. The trial judge heard the evidence during the voir dire over two days and on the third day, ruled the statements admissible. There can be no doubt that the judge considered the evidence before him on the issue with conspicuous care, and that he properly applied the legal principles.

37. It is evident from the commencement of the trial when the witness was called to give evidence, that she was refusing to give her evidence. It is apparent that she confirmed in evidence that she made the statement, and indeed that fact was also accepted as proven by virtue of the Garda evidence to that effect. The statement was read over to her, which was recorded, and she signed the statement. Moreover, prior to making the statement, she gave the statutory declaration.

38. The witness gave evidence that she made the statement, that she was asked questions by the Gardaí and that she had answered them. Nothing in the evidence was suggestive of the absence of free will. We do not find any error in the judge’s determination in this regard.

39. There are certain factors to which a judge may have regard in determining whether a statement is reliable, as stated in People (DPP) v Gruchacz [2020] 2 IR 213 at para.22;- “(a) whether or not it was given under oath or affirmation and was videotaped, or (b) whether if none of the circumstances mentioned in (a) apply, there is "other sufficient evidence" in support of this reliability. The Court must also have regard to any explanation given by the witness for refusing to give evidence or for giving evidence which is inconsistent with the statement.”

40. The issue for consideration, which bears on the reliability of the statement, is the absence of a witness regarding her capacity to make a statement at that point in time.

41. There are several factors which may be assessed in this context. The submission made by the Director that the judge had viewed the video recording of the statement being read over to the witness, and could therefore assess her capacity, is one with which we do not place great emphasis. The evidence of the Gardaí is more pertinent in that they both told the court that the witness was able to make a statement, and indeed wished to do so. It is however, more telling that the statement made is long, detailed and cogent. She further assisted in the investigation by making subsequent statements clarifying her original statement. She also attended with the Gardaí upon her discharge from hospital to assist in locating the house of the tarot card reader.

42. At no stage from the date of the making of the statement in December 2018, and throughout the taking of the further statements in early 2019, did the witness seek to resile from her statement. As previously mentioned, it was not until the witness attended a solicitor in August 2020 that she expressed a wish to withdraw her statement.

43. While the optimum position would have been to have a witness from the hospital testify as to her medical condition, the above facts clearly point to the making of a voluntary and reliable statement.

44. Moreover, the judge carefully analysed her evidence and the reasons she advanced for not wanting to testify, which was on the basis of her mental health and her wish to start a new life elsewhere. She did not give evidence that she had not wanted to make the statement, or that she could not recall the nature of her allegations.

45. It is also argued that the appellants could not engage in meaningful crossexamination, as the witness had clearly indicated that she did not want to give evidence. This is advanced on the basis that while the witness was present and therefore available for cross-examination, she could not be meaningfully crossexamined, moreover, that s.16(4) of the 2006 Act applies, which confers a discretionary power on the trial judge to refuse to admit a statement as evidence, where its admission would be unfair.

46. It is quite clear that this evidence was central to the prosecution’s case. It was not supportive evidence, but evidence which was essential “in a material and substantive respect”, as said in Gruchacz, at para.25.

47. We do not believe that the decision of this Court in People (DPP) v MT [2023] IECA 65 is apposite, as s.16 of the 2006 Act was expressly said to be in an entirely different category than the situation of a child witness being crossexamined at a remove from the videorecording of a complainant’s direct testimony.

48. Of direct application is the decision in DK and MK, where it was explained that the reason underpinning s.16 of the 2006 Act was to address situations where a witness refused to give evidence, which of course, includes a refusal to give evidence on cross-examination. If a judge were to find the evidence inadmissible on the basis of the latter, this would in essence set at nought the entire purpose of the legislation. All other things being equal, it is the purpose of the legislation to permit the admission of the evidence in those very circumstances. It is of course necessary to consider whether the admission of the evidence would be in the interests of justice. The trial judge considered all factors and found;- “I am not satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances, including any risk that its admission would be unfair to either accused, that in the interest of justice the statements ought not to be admitted. This is not a case where the admission of the statements is unnecessary in regard to other evidence given in the proceedings. Firstly, no other evidence has been given in the proceedings, but more importantly, it seems to be common case that the exclusion of these statements would have the effect of bringing an end to at least some, if not all, of the counts in the indictment.”

49. He went on to say;-

“An actual refusal to engage in cross-examination before the jury may subsequently give rise to a subsequent POC application, which would have to be considered at least in part in the context of that judgment in DK and MK. That, should it arise, is a matter for later in the trial.”

50. We cannot find an error in the trial judge’s careful assessment of all matters and ultimate determination to admit the statement as evidence.

51. Finally, it is the position as stated in Campion, that the truth or otherwise of the statement is a question for the jury. In that assessment, the jury were informed of the letter written on the witness’s behalf by her solicitor and so could consider the veracity of the statement in this context, in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances and evidence of the case.

Conclusion

52. We are not persuaded that the trial judge erred in determining to admit the evidence. He analysed the evidence before him, viewed the recording of the statement being read over to the witness, and considered the surrounding circumstances of the making of the statement. He properly applied the legal principles and ultimately determined that the statement was made voluntarily, and was reliable in the correct sense. The statement was made proximate in time to the offending conduct, contained the statutory declaration, was read over, and such reading was recorded. The statement contained a most detailed account of alleged events, and the supplemental statements made over a period of time, together with the assistance rendered by the witness in showing the Gardaí a particular house, were all relevant factors pointing in the firm direction of reliability.

53. Moreover, the judge properly and conscientiously considered the issue of the refusal to give any evidence, including that on cross-examination. Whilst there is a high threshold for the admissibility of statements under s.16(4) of the 2006 Act, we are satisfied that the judge properly exercised his discretion and considered the impact the admission of the evidence might have on the fairness of the trial.

54. It was for the jury to determine what they thought of the evidence in the context of all the surrounding circumstances and factors in making the statement, as well as the inclusion of the letter written on the witness’ behalf.

55. Accordingly, we reject these grounds of appeal.

Gerard Stokes

Ground 2: Undue Reliance on Unattributed Telephone Data

Submissions of the Appellant

56. It is argued by the appellant, Mr. Stokes that the admission of the call and text data obtained from various phones linked to the appellant resulted in a breach of his rights, as no context was provided for the telephone communications, and the jury was merely told that there had been “contact” between MG’s phone and phones attributed to the appellants.

57. Counsel for Mr. Stokes raised this issue as part of the direction application. The trial judge ruled as follows in relation to this; “The prosecution does not seek to attribute either phone to any particular accused but there does seem to me to be appropriate value in the evidence that the phones -- that phones recovered during the searches to relevant premises contain evidence of contact with the complainant in the case. It may not be directly probative vis à vis either accused in particular, but it does, if it is accepted by the jury, seem to me to provide strong circumstantial evidence.”

58. The trial judge remarked that the evidence that Gardaí intended to give in relation to the telephone data was admissible, and that “its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect that there might be”. The appellant submits that there was nothing in the telephone data which could be described as “probative”, and that the manner in which it was presented created an impression of significance to the jury when there was nothing of significance in the data itself.

Submissions of the Respondent

59. It is noted that there was no objection made on the basis of unlawfulness, chain of custody or a statutory breach, but only on the weight to be attached to the data. The respondent submits that as a matter of law, once evidence is legally obtained and is relevant, it is admissible, and any question of its persuasive value is a matter for the jury.

60. The respondent submits that the phone evidence was plainly relevant to the circumstances of the case. Data extracted from phones and SIM cards that were linked to Mr. Stokes showed a significant amount of contact between the appellant and MG around the time of the alleged offending. Garda witnesses at trial also made it clear that the intention behind the introduction of this evidence was to demonstrate patterns of communications consistent with MG’s account of events and the movements between the houses, not to seek to attribute each phone to either of the accused individually. It is submitted that the trial judge acknowledged this during his ruling and found that the evidence had “appropriate value” as circumstantial evidence of MG’s version of events.

61. The respondent submits that the appellant’s contention about the lack of context given in respect of the telephone evidence was fully explored during cross-examination. It is further submitted that the trial judge properly left the issue of assessing the weight of the evidence to the jury.

Discussion and Decision

62. It is important to note that no objection was taken to the admissibility of the telephone evidence, the application formed part of the direction/PO’C application on the grounds of unfairness.

63. It appears that circa 11 mobile phones were located in Mr Stokes’ residence, to which Ms. Campbell had access. Those phones showed evidence of contact with MG, and constituted circumstantial evidence.

64. We are not at all persuaded that any unfairness arose as a result of the admission of this evidence, and reject this ground of appeal.

Ground 3: The Direction Application

Submissions of the Appellant

65. The appellant Mr. Stokes submits that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a direction to acquit in respect of count 2 (assault causing harm), in circumstances where the alleged injured party, TA, did not attend or give evidence at the trial.

66. It is argued that the onus is on the prosecution to prove that the accused person has committed every element of an offence in order to be convicted, particularly the elements of mens rea and actus reus. As there was no evidence from TA of any of the requisite elements of the offence, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in refusing to give a direction to acquit in respect of this count. It is further submitted that it was wholly unsafe to allow the charge to go to the jury, as they were essentially invited to speculate as to the ingredients of the offence.

67. Finally, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in refusing to give a direction to acquit the jury in relation to the charge of false imprisonment, on the basis that the details of the charge on the indictment lacked specificity. The appellant refers to the case of People (DPP) v ED [2006] IECCA 3, where the Court of Criminal Appeal made the following comments;- “This Court is satisfied that additional particulars of time, date, and location could have been provided in the indictment while steering "a safe course between prejudicial uncertainty and overloading". This would have been of material assistance to the applicant in identifying precisely what misbehaving was alleged against him on each count in the indictment and therefore in organising his defence. […] This Court is satisfied that the learned trial judge in the instant case ought to have acceded to the request by counsel for the applicant and ordered that the indictment be amended so that each count indicated with as much particularity and specificity as the circumstances of the case would allow the nature of the misbehaving charged in each count on the indictment.”

68. The appellant submits that the charge of false imprisonment in the instant case offended this principle of “prejudicial uncertainty” referred to in the ED case, and accordingly a direction ought to have been given in respect of this count.

Submissions of the Respondent

69. The respondent submits that there is no legal requirement that a complainant personally testify in order for an assault charge to be proved, what is actually relevant is whether there is admissible evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to be satisfied of each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. It is submitted that the trial judge was correct in ruling that there was “clear evidence” of an assault on TA and that the absence of her direct testimony did not preclude conviction, particularly as TA’s husband, who witnessed the assault, gave evidence in court, which constituted ample evidence upon which a jury could convict.

70. It is submitted that the appellant’s contention that the count of false imprisonment was defective because it did not state a single precise location or moment of detention is legally unfounded. The respondent refers to the Supreme Court decision of People (Attorney General) v Melody 1965 WJSC-CCA 447, which established that an indictment is sufficient once it sets out the essential nature of the allegation, and particulars such as a precise time, place or method are not required, provided that the accused’s ability to prepare a defence is not impaired. It is noted that in his ruling on the application for a direction, the trial judge rejected the appellant’s argument concerning the false imprisonment count and observed that the question of when the detention actually began and ended was a matter for the jury to determine.

Discussion and Decision

71. It is axiomatic that the burden of proof must be discharged by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; this means that there must be proof of the external elements of an offence and the relevant mental element. The Director adduced evidence of the external elements of assault by a witness to the attack; namely TA’s husband. This constituted admissible evidence of the external elements of assault, which the jury were entitled to reject or accept.

72. It is contended that the count of false imprisonment was defective because it did not set out a single precise location or moment in time of imprisonment.

73. The particulars of the offence state: Gerard Stokes, on the 5th day of December 2018, at Dundalk, in the County of Louth, falsely imprisoned one MG by detaining her without her consent.

74. S. 4(1) of the Criminal Justice (Administration) Act 1924 provides: “Every indictment shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a statement of the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge.”

75. The particulars herein clearly provided sufficient information so that the appellant had reasonable knowledge of the nature of the charge he faced. It is entirely permissible for a charge to be preferred as being ‘within the State’; it is not always possible to provide the precise location of alleged offending, or indeed the precise date. The indictment in the present case was drafted with sufficient particularity to enable the appellant to know the wrong which was alleged.

76. Accordingly, this ground fails.

Decision

77. As we have rejected each ground of appeal, the appeal of each appellant against conviction is dismissed.