Court of Appeal dismisses murder appeal where DNA evidence and travel patterns were deemed admissible and compelling.

APPROVED JUDGMENT

NO REDACTION NEEDED

THE COURT OF APPEAL Record No: 170/2022 Edwards J. Neutral Citation Number [2025] IECA 267 McCarthy J. Kennedy J.

BETWEEN/ THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

RESPONDENT V CHRISTOPHER SLATOR APPELLANT

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Edwards on the 13th day of November, 2025.

Introduction

1. On the 15th of July 2022, Mr. Christopher Slator (i.e., “the appellant”) was convicted by the Special Criminal Court (“the SCC”) of the sole count of murder contrary to common law and as provided for in s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964. He was sentenced on the same day to the mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life to date from the 23rd of December 2020. He now appeals against his said conviction.

2. We will describe the basis of the appeal presently. However, in order to do so most efficiently, and in order to place each ground of appeal in its appropriate context, the most convenient way of proceeding is to first of all outline the background to the case, including the substantial body of evidence which is uncontroversial and the findings based on that evidence made by the court below; the evidence as to controversial matters; the case made at trial by the prosecution; how controversial issues were resolved by the court below; and how the court below arrived at its verdict. In doing so, we will quote liberally, and verbatim, to a large extent from the judgment of the court below, delivered on the 15th of July 2022.

Background Evidence and findings of the SCC

3. On the 25th of April 2016, a Mr. Michael Barr was shot dead whilst he was in the Sunset House, a licensed premises on Summerhill Parade in Dublin 1. The circumstances, as summarised in the judgment of the SCC, were that at approximately 9.30 pm, “two men entered the Sunset House and walked up to Mr. Barr, who was standing outside the bar area. Both of these men were described as wearing rubber masks pulled down over their heads and covering their faces. They were dressed in dark clothing. One of the patrons of the licensed premises referred to one of the men as wearing a boiler suit. Other patrons referred to the man who did the shooting as wearing something on his head in the nature of a hat, in addition to the mask. Some of the patrons noted that one of the men was significantly taller than the other. One of the men fired and shot at Michael Barr at close range, the other man's gun shot at the bar. Witnesses have described the guns as having silencers on the guns. Michael Barr fell to the ground whereupon the two men ran from the premises and got into an awaiting car which was facing in the Ballybough direction. The injuries sustained by Michael Barr were such that he lost his life immediately. The post-mortem examination revealed that he had sustained five gunshots to his head, one to his shoulder and one to his leg. The bullets which were shot at Michael Barr were recovered from his body.

At 9.38 pm, a silver Audi pulled up on the footpath at Walsh Road, Drumcondra. Three men alighted in that car. CCTV footage of that scene shows two of the men wearing an all-in-one suit which they remove and put into the car. All three men are seen standing outside the car, bending down into it, in what appears to be the action of putting items into the car. When the men are finished bending into the car, all three men's faces and shapes of their head look different from when they initially got out of the car. Two of the men can be seen removing whatever is covering their faces.

The third man can also be seen removing an item from around his head and throwing it into the car. The car goes on fire after one of the men threw a lighted object into the car whereupon the men flee the scene. A green petrol can was found located at the passenger side of the vehicle after the incident. James Fogarty, who lived on Walsh Road, saw this car arriving at the scene. The car was travelling very fast and screeched to a halt. He saw three men alight from the vehicle and saw one of the men drop something shiny and bright on the ground. A phone was later discovered on the ground beside the car.

Mr Fogarty witnessed these men at the passenger side of the door of the car, pouring liquid into the car. They then dispersed to the Millmount direction, he surmised Milburn, on foot. Mr Fogarty went over to the burning car and opened the front passenger door. He was hoping to somehow put out the fire, as his car was in very close proximity. This had the effect of causing the flames of the car to increase in volume, so he quickly closed the door. Michael Sheedy, who also lived on Walsh Road, also witnessed three men running from the burning car towards Milburn Avenue and getting into a car which was stationary there.

Two men got into the back of the car, whereas the third man got into the front passenger seat. The car sped away immediately, thereby implying that a driver was awaiting their arrival. The guards had been contacted and arrived at the scene within three to four minutes of 9.38 pm. Detective Garda Horkin utilized a fire extinguisher located in his car to attempt to extinguish the fire. He obtained a second fire extinguisher from another garda car which came on the scene, and he also used that. The CCTV footage which depicted the Audi pulling into the footpath at Walsh Road, reveals that there was no interference with the car for the duration that the CCTV was operational for namely, an hour and three quarters after the arrival of the Audi.

A Garda cordon was set up incorporating a large area around the Audi during that time. The court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the scene was properly preserved and that there was no interference with the Audi by any unauthorised person before it was removed to the secure garda compound at Santry later that morning.”

4. The judgment then moves to the evidence concerning events in the early aftermath of the shooting. The SCC’s judgment states:

“At 9.38 pm, a silver Audi pulled up on the footpath at Walsh Road, Drumcondra.

Three men alighted in that car. CCTV footage of that scene shows two of the men wearing an all-in-one suit which they remove and put into the car. All three men are seen standing outside the car, bending down into it, in what appears to be the action of putting items into the car. When the men are finished bending into the car, all three men's faces and shapes of their head look different from when they initially got out of the car. Two of the men can be seen removing whatever is covering their faces. The third man can also be seen removing an item from around his head and throwing it into the car. The car goes on fire after one of the men threw a lighted object into the car whereupon the men flee the scene. A green petrol can was found located at the passenger side of the vehicle after the incident.

James Fogarty, who lived on Walsh Road, saw this car arriving at the scene. The car was travelling very fast and screeched to a halt. He saw three men alight from the vehicle and saw one of the men drop something shiny and bright on the ground. A phone was later discovered on the ground beside the car. Mr Fogarty witnessed these men at the passenger side of the door of the car, pouring liquid into the car. They then dispersed to the Millmount direction, he surmised Milburn, on foot. Mr Fogarty went over to the burning car and opened the front passenger door. He was hoping to somehow put out the fire, as his car was in very close proximity. This had the effect of causing the flames of the car to increase in volume, so he quickly closed the door. Michael Sheedy, who also lived on Walsh Road, also witnessed three men running from the burning car towards Milburn Avenue and getting into a car which was stationary there. Two men got into the back of the car, whereas the third man got into the front passenger seat. The car sped away immediately, thereby implying that a driver was awaiting their arrival.

The guards had been contacted and arrived at the scene within three to four minutes of 9.38 pm. Detective Garda Horkin utilized a fire extinguisher located in his car to attempt to extinguish the fire. He obtained a second fire extinguisher from another garda car which came on the scene, and he also used that. The CCTV footage which depicted the Audi pulling into the footpath at Walsh Road, reveals that there was no interference with the car for the duration that the CCTV was operational for namely, an hour and three quarters after the arrival of the Audi. A Garda cordon was set up incorporating a large area around the Audi during that time. The court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the scene was properly preserved and that there was no interference with the Audi by any unauthorised person before it was removed to the secure garda compound at Santry later that morning.”

5. The court below also received evidence concerning the ownership and provenance of the Audi motor car. The court was satisfied that it had been owned by a Desmond Willis, who had purchased it in June 2014 and had sold it on the 19th of April 2016 by trading it in at Naas Road Autos. Naas Road Autos had sold it on immediately to another car dealer, who in turn sold it, on the 23rd of April 2016, to a man who gave his name as David McCarthy.

The new owner was registered as such in the vehicle registration office on the 26th of April 2016.

6. The court below received evidence that members of An Garda Síochána were on the scene of the burning vehicle within three to four minutes and, as stated, managed to extinguish the fire before it took hold and before the car was completely destroyed. A Detective Garda O’Donnell subsequently conducted a forensic examination of the vehicle and recovered a number of items from it. These included a pair of black Airtech runners;

a Dublin (GAA) scarf; a Dublin (GAA) baseball cap; a five-litre red petrol can; one navycoloured boiler suit; two rubber masks; a black baseball cap; and a black ski mask amongst other items. A number of firearms were also recovered from the vehicle. The firearms recovered included two Makarov pistols with silencers attached, one of which had an empty magazine, the other of which was loaded with six rounds of nine-millimetre ammunition and a seventh round in the breach; and two Glock pistols which were loaded.

A subsequent ballistics examination of the firearms found in the vehicle revealed that the empty Makarov pistol had discharged the shots which had killed Mr. Barr. Later during the investigation, the appellant was forensically linked to a rubber mask (designated SOD71)

which was found on the front passenger seat of the vehicle and a pair of runners (designated SOD64) which were found in the middle of the backseat of the vehicle on top of the four guns and beside a baseball cap. On the basis of the evidence it had received the SCC concluded:

“the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Makarov pistols in the back of the car were the pistols which were fired in the Sunset House. The Court is further satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the other items in the car, in terms of the face masks, boiler suits and hats which had been referred to by eyewitnesses in Sunset House were also utilised in the shooting. Detective Garda O'Donnell wore a full bodysuit with a hood, shoe covers, rubber gloves and a face mask as he removed items from the Audi. He stated in evidence, which the Court accepts that he engaged in the minimum of handling of all items removed from the car as he was aware that there was a potential for forensic evidence.”

7. The court below heard evidence that, as part of the forensic analysis of the items recovered from the Audi, certain trace evidence, including DNA material, was recovered and analysed. The judgment records: “DNA analysis was conducted on the items taken from the Audi by Mr Rodney Lakes. He made the following findings. On the black baseball cap found in the rear of the Audi vehicle, a mixed DNA profile was found, which had a major profile and a minor contributor. The major profile matched the DNA profile of a man called Eamon Cumberton. Mr Lakes' estimated that the chance of finding the DNA profile had come from someone unrelated to Eamon Cumberton was considerably less than 1:100 million.

On a rubber mask SOD68, which was located in the rear of the vehicle, a mixed DNA profile was generated, which had two contributors. Analysis revealed that all of the DNA alleles present in Eamon Cumberton's profile were also present in this DNA mixture. Mr Lakes concluded that the observed mixed profile on the mask was in excess of one-thousand-million times more likely that it came from Eamon Cumberton and an unknown person, rather than it coming from two unknown persons. On a ski mask located in the back of the Audi, a mixed DNA profile was generated which had a major profile with a minor contribution.

The major profile was that of a male, who was designated as "Unknown Male 2". On the second rubber mask, SOD69, located in the back of the Audi, a DNA profile consisting of four contributors was found. All of the DNA alleles present in unknown male 2 DNA profile were present in this mixed DNA profile. On a rubber mask, SOD71, a mixed DNA profile was found on the inside of that rubber mask, around the area of the mouth and nose. The DNA profile consisted of a major profile with a minor contribution. The major profile was that of a male who was designed as "Unknown Male 3".

On the pair of runners found in the back of the car, a male DNA profile was generated from inside the tongue of the runners, which matched the profile designated as Unknown Male 3. Trace elements of DNA from a second source were also noted. The accused was arrested in December 2020, and a buccal swab was taken from him in the course of his detention. Examination by Dr Connor Young of the DNA generated from that buccal swab revealed that the accused DNA matched the DNA profile of Unknown Male 3. He estimated that it was at least a thousand-million times more likely that the DNA originated from the accused, rather than from an unknown, unrelated person.”

8. The SCC made the following uncontroversial findings with respect to the DNA evidence:

“The Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that all relevant items were properly preserved, with continuity of possession established. We are also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the DNA profiles generated were properly generated and were accurate.”

9. It is uncontroversial that the SCC further held that:

“We are further satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that cross-contamination of DNA did not occur between the various items.”

While it is uncontroversial that such a finding was made, it is convenient to note at this point that the correctness of that finding is a controversial issue on the appeal, and it is contended that the DNA evidence was wrongly admitted. Be that as it may, the SCC went on to comment that evidence was not called by the defence in relation to any aspect of their challenge to the DNA evidence, which had “put the prosecution on full proof of the preservation and continuity of possession of all relevant items, the generating of DNA profiles and the comparison of the accused's DNA profile, with the profiles generated on relevant items.”.

10. The SCC then moved to a consideration of the significance of the DNA evidence in relation to the accused. The judgment notes:

“The defence suggest that the significance of the DNA evidence in relation to the accused cannot result in the Court being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was in the car which carried the murderers from Sunset House to Walsh Road. They point to the evidence of Mr Lakes to the effect that DNA evidence simply establishes that DNA is on an item. It does not establish how or when it came to be on an item, and also Dr Lakes's confirmation that DNA can transfer by direct contact, aerosol movement or secondary transfer. The Court, of course, accepts all of these propositions. However, the Court is not assessing the fact that the accused’s DNA was found on a mask and runners in the shooter's car alone. It must consider these facts in the context of the evidence as a whole.”

11. The judgment then records the following findings:

“Under a heading then with respect to the history of the Audi. On the basis of the statistical analysis relating to the DNA match between the rubber mask, SOD71 and runners found in the Audi and the accused’s DNA, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the DNA found on those items which matches the accused DNA profile does not come from another source, apart from the accused. On the basis of the evidence regarding the previous ownership and change of ownership of the Audi vehicle, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused’s DNA was not within that vehicle before it was taken possession of by the man calling himself David McCarthy on 23 April 2016, two days before the shooting of Michael Barr.”

12. The SCC continued:

“Under a heading then that relates to "Per chance deposit of DNA on the mask and the runners". The defence suggest that there are a number of explanations as to how the accused DNA came to be on the rubber mask, SOD71, and the runners located in the car. They refer to the opening of the door by James Fogarty, which had the effect of stoking the fire. They suggest that this action could have caused DNA present in the car to be blown around the car. They also referred to the fire extinguishers utilised by Detective Garda Horkan in the car, making a similar suggestion that DNA could have been blown around by attaching to the fire extinguisher dust, which covered the internals of the car. They further point to the removal of the car from Walsh Road to the secure compound in Santry, suggesting that the movement of getting the car on and off the tow truck could have resulted in items, particularly the fire extinguisher dust, moving around with the consequent effect that DNA was moved around. Another suggestion is that even within the exhibit bags, the loose fire extinguisher powder could have moved around within the bag, thereby causing DNA to be moved to the location at which it was found on these items. There is, of course, no burden on the accused to establish any of these matters. They are suggestions, which the Court should consider in determining whether it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused guilt of the offence charged. The burden of proof at all times remains with the prosecution, at no time does the burden of proof move to the accused.

The Court has considered these suggestions with care. The prime difficulty with any of the suggestions is that they don't provide an answer as to how the accused’s DNA got in the car in the limited interval between the 23rd of April, and the occasion of the car journey on the 25th of April, for it then to be blown about the place internally. It is highly unlikely that a car which was purchased on the 23rd of April and then used in a murder plot, was driven around with abandon over those two days, such that the accused’s DNA could have gone into the car. Furthermore, there is no evidence before the Court of the accused being in that car prior to the murderers' car journey. However, leaving aside the issue of how the accused DNA could have got into the Audi prior to the murder, it is implausible that the possible, but random blowing of DNA around the car could result in DNA landing on areas of the mask and the runners where one would expect to find DNA deposited, if those items had been worn. The Court is of the opinion that it beggars belief that DNA randomly blown around the car would found itself inside the runners, at the back of the tongue, along the lace line and on the inside of the mask, at the area of the nose and mouth. Furthermore, other DNA, which has been established to be on items in the Audi, does not find itself blown onto these items at these areas of contact, nor does Mr Michael McDonagh's DNA, who had driven the car on various journeys in the short time he had possession of the car. His DNA doesn't find itself blown onto these items either. It is completely implausible that any of the actions referred to above, either alone or in conjunction with each other, could have resulted in the unhappy consequence of the accused’s DNA lodging on the very area on the mask and the runners where one would expect to find the wearer's DNA.”

13. The judgment of the SCC further records:

“So, then under a heading of "Innocent explanation for the presence of the DNA".

The defence further assert that even if the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused’s DNA was present on the mask and runners without the movement of his DNA around the place in the manner suggested, that this does not mean that he was present in the car on the night of the murder. There is a suggestion that as a friend of Eamon Cumberton's, it having been established on the evidence that these men regularly associate with each other, that he may have tried on the mask at an earlier stage, arising out of innocent curiosity and that the mask was then brought along by the perpetrators of this incident. The fact that there is no evidence that the driver of the vehicle was wearing a mask is also relied on. So, with respect to the mask, the prosecution have not suggested a role which the accused allegedly played in the events of the night. There is evidence from eyewitnesses in the Sunset House that one of the shooters was substantially taller than the other. There was other evidence that the accused and Eamon Cumberton, who has been convicted of the murder of Michael Barr, are of a similar height and that another man, David Hunter, who was also convicted of Michael Barr's murder, was taller than Eamon Cumberton and the accused. While there is no evidence before the Court that the driver of the vehicle was wearing a mask, the Court finds it implausible that he was not. The driver of the vehicle was clearly involved in a joint enterprise to carry out the assassination of Michael Barr. He drove through the busy city streets of the inner city in a dangerous manner after the stop at Sunset House, as the CCTV reveals, cutting through a petrol garage forecourt to skip traffic lights, and almost colliding with a taxi, as he manoeuvred in a dangerous manner through busy traffic. It is implausible that with a third mask in the car, he did not wear it. Furthermore, the CCTV footage from Walsh Road, when carefully and repeatedly watched, clearly shows each of the three men who emerge from the car taking something off their heads and putting these items into the car.

Furthermore, the three men's heads and faces look different from when they get out of the car to before they leave the scene at Walsh Road. One of the men can be discerned to be wearing a mask. In light of the manner in which the DNA was taken from the mask, namely taking dry and wet swabs from the mouth and nose area of the mask, in an attempt to capture all DNA in that area, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the DNA of a recent wearer of the mask would have been taken from the mask. The DNA found at that area reveals a major profile with a minor contribution. The major profile being that of Christopher Slator. The logical inference from that finding, the Court having excluded the possibility of Christopher Slator's DNA getting into that area of the mask by being blown around the car, is that Christopher Slator wore the mask at some stage. Of course, the Court cannot determine that because his DNA is the major contributor to the mixed profile that he was the last person to wear the mask. However, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he wore that mask at some stage.”

14. The judgment then moved to consider the runners found on top of the guns in the vehicle, which footwear had been forensically examined and had been found to have DNA trace evidence on the back of the tongue of each shoe. The SCC concluded:

“the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Christopher Slator wore those runners in light of his DNA having been found in an established, likely area of contact with the wearer, namely at the back of the tongue, at the lace line. The Court having discounted the possibility that his DNA was blown around the car and landed at that area. Trace elements of DNA from a second source were also noted.

However, this is different to a minor DNA contribution being present. In light of the position of the runners on the back seat of the Audi on top of the two pistols which had been used in the shooting at Sunset House, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the runners were worn by one of the occupants of the Audi on this murderous car journey, and deposited on top of the guns which had been used to shoot Michael Barr, the runners having been deposited after the shooting occurred. The Court is supported in that conclusion by reference to the CCTV footage at Walsh Road.

The prosecution asserted in their closing speech that a person who emerged from the vehicle could be seen in stockinged feet at the scene. The defence took grave exception to this and submitted that this could not be seen. It is a matter for the Court to determine what can be seen from the footage at Walsh Road. Having watched the video with care on very many occasions, the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a person standing at the passenger side of the car has white-coloured ankles and feet, and appears not to be wearing shoes, which is consistent with that person having white socks on.

The implication of the finding that the runners were worn by an occupant of the Audi in the course of the murder is that either someone else wore the runners for the purpose of the murdering plan or the accused wore them for that purpose. The proposition that the runners had either been left in the car at an earlier stage or were brought along, but not used by one of the perpetrators, simply does not arise for consideration in light of the position of the runners on top of the pistols. The Court is of the opinion that it is unlikely that if the runners were worn by a person who was not the accused, that that other person's DNA was not deposited on them at this area of likely contact, in light of the fact that the wearer's intention was to destroy the runners by fire.

This was a well-planned operation, which happened to go wrong because of the quick actions of Detective Garda Horkan in extinguishing the fire. Efforts not to deposit the DNA would not have been taken by the wearer in light of this intention to destroy the runners. Furthermore, it is unlikely that another person would have worn someone else's shoes, to then leave them in the car. Surely, the more obvious method of dealing with the shoes was to leave them on when departing the scene, as the other two occupants had. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that it is unlikely that someone else had worn these runners on the night.

The Court is of the opinion that the alternative possibility that the accused was in the shooter's car wearing the runners, and that he discarded the runners at Walsh Road when other items of clothing, such as the boiler suits were being discarded, is more likely in light of the presence of a profile matching his DNA profile being present on the runners.”

15. The SCC then moved to consider whether the Court could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was, indeed, in the shooter's car and involved in the murderous plan, in light of all the other evidence in the case. They reasoned:

“Whatever about the possibility of an unfortunate situation arising, whereby a mask previously innocently tried on by the accused ended up being utilised by someone else in this murderous plot, it would be an unbelievable coincidence that in addition to that, runners which the Court has found the accused wore at some stage, and which the Court is satisfied were unlikely to have been worn by someone else that night, but were likely to have been worn by the accused, also found themselves in the shooter's vehicle, which was intended to be burnt out. On the basis of the co joinder of the established facts, namely that the accused's DNA profile is found on a mask which the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt was worn during this operation, that his DNA profile is found on a pair of runners, which the Court is satisfied were worn by him at some stage, that there are no other DNA contributions, bar trace elements at that area of the runners where it is likely that a wearer would deposit DNA. That the runners were left on top of the pistols used to shoot Michael Barr. That there was an intention to destroy the runners by fire, and that it is unlikely that anyone else wore the runners that night and, instead, likely that the accused wore them, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was in the car and took part in the murderous plot to kill Michael Barr.

The Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that no other explanation, except for guilt, is reasonably compatible with these established facts. No rational explanation exists, which points to innocence. On the basis of the DNA evidence alone, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt with respect to the murder of Michael Barr.”

16. There was, however, other circumstantial evidence in the case relating to the appellant’s movements on the following day, and the SCC having considered the totality of the evidence in the case went on to say that their conclusion was supported by that further evidence. The prosecution’s case was that the appellant, and his alleged accomplice Eamon Cumberton, arranged to leave the jurisdiction on the day after the shooting. They booked at very short notice to depart at approximately 10 pm on the 26th of April 2016 to travel from Dublin to Thailand, via Dubai, on Emirates Airline. The prosecution's case was that the appellant boarded the intended outbound flight, whereas Eamon Cumberton was refused permission to board as his passport was out of date. He was issued with a change of flight document which cost him €75. His flight was changed to the next day and having renewed his passport, he flew on the 27th of April 2016. It was asserted that both men returned to the jurisdiction together on the 25th of May 2016. Mr. Cumberton was arrested at Dublin Airport after his return journey in circumstances where there was an outstanding arrest warrant for him. Documentation regarding the flights believed to have been flown by the appellant, established that the booking made in respect of the outbound flight from Dublin was made three hours before the departure time, at approximately 7 pm. The ticket assigned to the appellant was a sequential ticket number to that assigned to Eamon Cumberton, thereby establishing, according to a Mr. Enda Corneil of Emirates Airline, that the tickets were booked at the same time. The flown data documentation in relation to the person who travelled on the flights in the name of Christopher Slator reveals that the person travelled on passport number PT7744871 and that his date of birth is the 4th of October 1984. Other evidence in the case confirmed that the appellant’s date of birth is the 4th of October 1984, and that he was issued with a passport with this number. Information is provided on the flown data documentation that checked-in baggage was not recorded in respect of the flights flown in the name of Christopher Slator. Records reveal that Eamon Cumberton did not check in baggage either. CCTV footage at Dublin Airport had captured the two men arriving at the check-in desk of Emirates Airline. Not only did they not have any luggage to check in, but they had no bags whatsoever.

17. There was evidence of a recognition process carried out by An Garda Síochána in respect of the two men of interest from the CCTV footage at Dublin Airport, relating to the outward and inward flights. The SCC expressed itself satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the fairness and propriety of this recognition process. Two gardaí, a Garda Burns and a Garda Clarke, identified the appellant from this footage as being Christopher Slator. The SCC expressed itself to be satisfied that the person of interest shown on CCTV footage both outbound and inbound to Dublin airport on the relevant dates, and believed to be the appellant, was in fact the appellant.

18. The admissibility of this recognition evidence was initially controversial and was challenged unsuccessfully at trial in the course of a voir dire. The decision to admit the evidence was then the subject of two grounds of appeal to this court, i.e., grounds iii and iv, respectively. However, it was indicated by counsel for the appellant at the oral hearing of the appeal that these grounds were no longer being pressed, in light of the decision of this Court in People (DPP) v. Sweeney, Beirne & O’Toole [2024] IECA 205 which had held that identification of a person of interest by a member of An Garda Síochána from viewing CCTV footage capturing a person engaged in the act of committing a crime, or being near to a crime scene, or being in transit to or from a crime scene, was prima facie relevant and admissible. Indeed, it was accepted by counsel that in light of that decision, which post-dates the appellant’s trial before the SCC, it is now clear that the admissibility of the controversial evidence did not require to be tested on voir dire.

19. Returning to the judgment of the SCC, they then considered the significance of the evidence concerning the travel to Thailand, via Dubai, of the appellant and Mr.

Cumberton. They did so under a heading of ‘The consequences of the flight to Dubai in these circumstances’. The judgment records:

“The Court is of the opinion that leaving this jurisdiction on a long haul flight, booked only three hours before travel, using a suspicious mobile phone number is unusual. Travelling without any baggage whatsoever is even more strange.

Counsel for the accused asserted that statistics should have been proven by the prosecution to evidence the percentage of people travelling without any baggage, rather than assumptions being made that this is a very strange way to travel. The Court is entitled and required to use its common sense and knowledge of life to assess this evidence. The Court views travelling in this manner as extremely unusual, as a perusal of passengers at Dublin Airport any day of the week would establish. Travelling light may have become fashionable in recent times, but travelling without anything is highly unusual.

Suggestions have been made that this flight from Ireland should not be conceived as an indication of guilt. Again, the accused friendship with Mr Cumberton is brought into play. It is suggested that the possibility exists that the accused determined to accompany his friend, who had his own reasons for escaping the country, with which the accused was not associated. This suggestion does not hold any water. Had that been the case, then surely the accused would have waited for his friend to solve his passport difficulty, and then flown the following day. After all, the change of flight fee was only €75. The accused did not take this option and proceeded alone. That puts paid to the suggestion that he was innocently accompanying his friend in trouble. Suggestion is made that this trip was a journey previously embarked upon by these two men. Records are not maintained by Emirates as far back as the previous suggested travel date. This argument is somewhat difficult to make, in light of the fact that the accused has put in issue that he made this journey on this occasion, but in any event, the Court is of the opinion that the accused's travel pattern over six years ago is irrelevant to its consideration in relation to this matter. The Court is of the view that this travel arrangement was extremely unusual, and begs the question what was the cause of the accused's anxiousness to exit the State in the company of his friend, whose DNA also happens to be found in the shooter's car. The answer can, of course, be found in his involvement in the events of the 25th of April. The Court is of the view that the accused fled from this jurisdiction on the 26th of April 2016 because he was involved in the murder of Michael Barr the night before. The Court has reached that conclusion that the accused was involved in the murder of Michael Barr on the basis of the DNA evidence alone. However, the highly suspicious flight from this jurisdiction is supportive of his involvement in the murder of Michael Barr.

Accordingly, the Court returns a verdict of guilty on count number 1 on the indictment.”

The Grounds of Appeal

20. By a Notice of Appeal dated the 10th of August 2022 the appellant indicated his desire to appeal against his conviction. The said Notice of Appeal indicated “Grounds to Follow”.

Five detailed grounds of appeal, numbering i to v, respectively, were subsequently filed on the 6th of February 2025. As previously indicated, grounds of appeal no’s iii and iv, respectively, were not ultimately proceeded with.

21. The remaining grounds of appeal were in the following terms:

“i The learned trial Court erred in law and/or principle in failing to properly consider the direction application at the close of the prosecution’s case; in all the circumstances, the resulting conviction is unsafe;

ii The learned trial Court erred in law or in fact (or in a mixed question of law and fact) in admitting DNA evidence related to SOD 71 and SOD 64; adequate consideration was not given to the possibility that the DNA profile found on both exhibits was transferred from other areas of the vehicle and not by direct contact;

iii [Not pressed]

iv [Not pressed] v The learned trial Court erred in law or in fact (or in a mixed question of law and fact) in placing reliance on a trip taken by the appellant to Thailand in the days after the alleged offence as being supportive of the charge against him.”

Submissions Ground i

22. The substance of the appellant’s complaint in ground of appeal no i is that the appellant contends that the SCC failed to properly consider the direction application, which was made by counsel for the appellant alongside the closing speech, requiring an analysis of both the legal and evidential burden of proof. In this regard, the following was stated to the trial court during counsel for the appellant’s closing speech:

“Judges, as I think has happened as happens regularly in the special criminal court, I am asking the court to consider the closing submission effectively as a direction application or in the alternative the ultimate finding of fact, because in fairness, if I succeed on the first, I succeed on the second; if I don't succeed at all, well then the direction application was of no merit. So if I may run the two of those in tandem, so to speak.

…

And in my respectful submission I'd firstly suggest to the court that it's not a case which should go to the jury, but in the event that it does, for the exact same reasons, if we fall short of the direction standard, I'd respectfully submit a jury could not but have a doubt as to exactly what the prosecution can prove in terms of accepting the proposition that the DNA is Mr Slator's and it's on the inside of the mask.”

23. In a replying submission, the respondent noted that it is not unusual given the dual function of the SCC for counsel for the defence to make a “rolled-up closing speech and application for direction”. The respondent stated that this is an efficient way to approach the issues given that the same tribunal will be adjudicating on both the law and the facts and, as such, it is frequently the case that the same points fall to be made in respect of both an application for a direction and in advocating that the standard of proof in a criminal case has not been met. The respondent refers to People (DPP) v. M. (J.R)[2015] IECA 65 when contending that it is the case that the issues raised by the appellant were primarily directed towards the weight of the evidence, which is quintessentially a matter for a jury.

24. The appellant submitted that the evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial fell short of meeting the evidential burden to allow a case to proceed to be considered by a tribunal of fact, whether that be a jury or, in this case the three judges of the SCC acting in that capacity.

25. The cases of People (DPP) v. O’Callaghan [2013] IECCA 46 and People (DPP) v. Wilson [2019] 1 IR 96 were referred to as examples of cases in which certain DNA evidence was heavily relied upon, and as emphasising the care that requires to be taken in regard to it and the rigorous nature of the analysis that must be undertaken.

26. In O’Callaghan, following rigorous analysis of the significance of the DNA evidence, comprised of a major and minor contributor, found on a discarded balaclava, and with the major contributor’s profile matching that of the appellant in that case, and with a lot more of the major contributor’s DNA being found in the nose and mouth area of the balaclava, the Court of Appeal concluded that this DNA evidence could not per se establish beyond reasonable doubt that the balaclava had most recently been worn by the appellant. In consequence, absent other significant probative evidence in that regard, it was found that the prosecution had fallen short of discharging its evidential burden. Consequently, the appeal in that case was allowed.

27. Conversely, in Wilson, although the Supreme Court emphasised that it was important that the trial judge ensured that the jury fully understood all of the issues that arose in a case where the only evidence of identity derived from DNA profiling, and further that the jury fully understood the role of the expert evidence relating to DNA and, depending on the issues concerning the DNA evidence that might have actually arisen during the trial, also understood any questions that might have arisen as to the probative value of the DNA evidence concerned, the appeal was none the less dismissed.

28. Counsel for the appellant in the present case has argued that the finding of DNA matching that of the appellant’s DNA profile on both the rubber mask and under the tongue of the runners is not necessarily probative of guilt. While it was established in evidence that the appellant’s DNA profile was a match to the major contributor DNA profile found on the rubber mask (SOD71), counsel placed reliance on the fact that the forensic investigator was unable to determine whether the minor or major profile was indicative of the person who last handled or wore the mask. Further, the DNA sample taken from runners (SOD64) was taken from the tongue of the runners. Dr. Lakes confirmed in evidence that the tongue is amongst the most obvious places an individual would handle a pair of shoes. Counsel submitted that such evidence could only take the prosecution so far, and that it did not establish that the runners had been worn by the appellant.

29. The respondent acknowledged that it is understandable and practical that defence counsel chose to combine his closing speech with the direction application, asking the trial court to consider the evidence at both standards of proof. However, it is not accepted by the respondent that the fact that the direction application was not specifically addressed by the trial court in its judgment had the effect of disadvantaging or of subjecting him to some unfairness. The respondent has submitted that it is self-evident from the judgment of the trial court that they rejected the suggestion that a direction application should be granted and the fact that the court proceeded to record a conviction reveals unambiguously that the court was satisfied that there was evidence on which a jury properly charged could convict. The respondent also asks this Court to note that having heard the court’s ruling, the appellant did not raise a request for a specific ruling on the direction application.

Ground ii

30. Apropos ground of appeal no ii, the substance of the complaint covered by this ground is that the evidence of the appellant’s DNA profile on the rubber mask (SOD71) and on the pair of runners (SOD64) should not have been admitted into evidence because the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the possibility that the DNA profile found on both exhibits was transferred from other areas of the vehicle, i.e., by contamination or cross contamination and not by direct contact. It was contended that whilst efforts had been made to reduce the risk of contamination, or cross-contamination, it was not a possibility that could be excluded.

31. We have already set out the SCC’s summary of the evidence given by Dr. Rodney Lakes on the 25th of May 2022 in relation to the DNA profiles generated from relevant items. To briefly recap, he gave evidence to the effect that two swabs were taken from the inside area of the rubber mask (SOD71) around where the holes were for the nose and the mouth. He stated that this area was targeted, “to try to elucidate was there any DNA from a possible wearer of the mask because if someone wears a mask the place they will most likely deposit DNA is on the inside around the nose and mouth” as distinct from someone who may have handled it leaving their DNA on the outside. A mixed DNA profile was found from this swab, with the appellant’s DNA profile matching that of the major contributor.

32. A pair of runners (SOD64) were also examined by Dr. Lakes who applied mini tape “underneath the tongue of the runner, again with a similar idea that the aim would be that if a person wears runners that's where they will most likely deposit DNA”. Dr. Lakes also noted here that “skin cells, epithelial cells that tend to be emitted from the body, shed from the body, whether it be from in around your mouth or whether it's from your feet, and are deposited onto whatever surface they're in contact with”. A male DNA profile was generated from this swab inside the runners which matched that of the appellant.

33. The appellant contends that the expert witness (Dr. Lakes) was unable to rule out the possibility of cross-contamination of these items. It may be helpful to quote the relevant extract from the transcript here:

“Q. And in circumstances where the air movement is attributable to an external factor, that would include, for example, in this particular instance -- and I think you're familiar with this -- the force created by a fire extinguisher?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And, indeed, it could also be generated in circumstances where if a door is opened into a car, creating an influx of air, or a current, it would facilitate movement within the vehicle.

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And, indeed, into that mix, we actually have, in this case, I think you are aware of the fact that there was a powdery substance or a coating on the exhibits taken out of the vehicle. I'm not sure if it was tested, but I don't think anybody seriously disputes, but that it came from the fire extinguisher that was used to extinguish the flames?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And that it appeared to distribute a fine powdery substance, kind of greyish in colouring, across all of the exhibits that you received?

A. Yes, that's correct. Yes.

Q. And that material itself is very fine, but it's also loose. So while it settles on a subject or an item, it can actually fall off or move around?

A. It can do, yes.

Q. And that is capable, or DNA is capable of adhering to that substance, which is a powder and moving with it?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And in the circumstances where you have an environment such as this, with the application certainly of an air current, either by opening a door or during the currency of the use of the fire extinguisher, that may actually pick up or maintain a DNA trace on it and it may be deposited on an item which otherwise did not have the DNA on it?

A. That couldn't be excluded.

Q. So the movement within the vehicle could result in an item that wasn't contaminated or bearing DNA containing it when you went to examine it?

A. It's possible, yes.

Q. You couldn't exclude that?

A. That's correct, yes.”

34. When considering the DNA matches, the SCC in its judgment stated:

“The defence suggest that there are a number of explanations as to how the accused’s DNA came to be on the rubber mask, SOD71, and the runners located in the car. They refer to the opening of the door by James Fogarty, which had the effect of stoking the fire. They suggest that this action could have caused DNA present in the car to be blown around the car. They also referred to the fire extinguishers utilised by Detective Garda Horkan in the car, making a similar suggestion that DNA could have been blown around by attaching to the fire extinguisher dust, which covered the internals of the car. They further point to the removal of the car from Walsh Road to the secure compound in Santry, suggesting that the movement of getting the car on and off the tow truck could have resulted in items, particularly the fire extinguisher dust, moving around with the consequent effect that DNA was moved around. Another suggestion is that even within the exhibit bags, the loose fire extinguisher powder could have moved around within the bag, thereby causing DNA to be moved to the location at which it was found on these items.”

35. In support of this ground of appeal, the appellant again relies on the case of O’Callaghan and submits that the finding of the trial court was not substantiated by the evidence presented at trial. The written submissions reiterate that the evidence did not go far enough to enable a tribunal of fact to conclude that the appellant wore the mask, or indeed the runners, and neither could cross-contamination be ruled out.

36. Further, in oral submissions at the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant laid emphasis on the fact that other areas of the rubber mask and runners respectively had not been swabbed in the course of the forensic analysis. As counsel put it:

“the downstream consequence is that that Court proceeded on the basis that the only area that DNA is retrieved from on the shoes is the tongue, and the only area that the DNA is retrieved from from the mask is on the inside. And then postulates, not unreasonably, a question that answers itself: How unlucky can a man be to suggest that the DNA gets blown into areas you'd expect to find it where it's worn.

But the answer is we can't say that because we don't know what else is on the items.”

37. The further point was made that due to further forensic investigatory steps taken by the Forensic Science laboratory in relation to the items in question, it is no longer possible at this remove to re-examine and re-test those exhibits for the presence of other DNA trace evidence. Counsel submitted, relying on the Dunne, Braddish, Bowes and Ludlow line of authorities1, that it was unfair to have admitted before the tribunal of fact the evidence concerning the matching DNA trace evidence recovered from the areas on the items in question that were swabbed, because his client is now deprived, through no fault of his, of the opportunity to have the items re-examined and re-tested for other DNA trace evidence.

38. In response to all of this, the respondent submitted that the complaints made seem to be directed towards the findings of fact made by the trial court, and contended that such factual findings, in line with People (DPP) v. McKevitt [2009] 1 IR 525, may only be interfered with by this Court if it was not open to the court of trial “rationally to have had that belief or at least not to have had a reasonable doubt”. It was contended that in so far

Dunne v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 2 I.R. 305; Braddish v. Director of Public Prosecutions & Anor [2001]

IESC 45; Bowes v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] 2 I.R. 25; Ludlow v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] IESC

54. as there are complaints about the fact that parts of the exhibits in question were not swabbed, proper forensic investigative procedures had been followed. There was therefore no unfairness and no basis for excluding the evidence. The criticism now being levelled was a matter going potentially to weight rather than admissibility. However, Dr.

Lakes’ testimony concerning the finding of matching DNA trace evidence on swabs taken from the areas on the items in question that were in fact swabbed, and the extent of it, was in the respondent’s submission clearly relevant and admissible.

39. In written submissions, the respondent argued:

“There is clearly a strength in the evidence that not one but two items in the car bore a DNA profile matching that of the Appellant, and that such items were located temporally proximate to the murder in circumstances where there was a plan to destroy such evidence by fire. The positioning of the DNA would strongly suggest that it came from the wearer of the item, being on the inside and not on the exterior of the material in question. Further such cells as had been deposited (in respect of the runners) was to the virtual exclusion of the presence of any other person’s DNA and it is difficult to understand why this would be so if the Appellant’s DNA had merely blown onto them. It would be a serious kind of misfortune for a person’s DNA to make its way onto the inside of an item, as a major contributor, in circumstances where the items were in fact worn by another unidentified person, who it is assumed must have failed inexplicably to shed his own DNA on the items in question.”

40. The Court was referred by counsel for the respondent to a number of authorities including People (DPP) v. O’Callaghan [2013] IECCA 46, People (DPP) v. Cumberton [2020] IECA 136, and People (DPP) v. Marlowe [2019] IECA 263.

Ground v

41. The substance of this complaint is that the SCC erred in placing reliance on a trip taken by the appellant to Thailand the day following the murder of Mr. Barr as being supportive of the charge against the appellant. In reply, it was submitted by the respondent that the highly unusual travel arrangements made by the appellant so proximate to the murder was a relevant factor to be considered by the fact finders and it was submitted that the SCC made no error in admitting same.

42. In its judgment the SCC held that the appellant’s journey from Dublin to Thailand the day following the murder was circumstantial evidence which could establish, alongside the DNA evidence, the appellant’s guilt. We have set out in detail what the trial court had to say in that regard at paragraph 19 above.

43. It was argued by counsel for the appellant that these findings were speculative and troublesome. Additionally, it was submitted that it was an unfounded leap by the trial court to regard the appellant’s travel arrangements as being effectively corroborative of the disputed DNA evidence in the case.

44. In response, the respondent submitted that the evidence concerning the travel and travel arrangements of the appellant and of Mr. Cumberton in the days following the shooting was relevant and probative circumstantial evidence. Further, there was no error in law or unfairness in the admission of evidence concerning the travel and travel arrangements of the appellant and his companion in the early aftermath of the shooting, as a component piece of circumstantial evidence in what was a circumstantial evidence case. It was submitted that the SCC was entitled to consider that the cumulative evidence in this case, including the evidence as to travel and travel arrangements of the appellant and his companion in the early aftermath of the shooting, led inexorably to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the offence charged in the indictment.

Analysis & Decision Ground of Appeal No i

45. We have no hesitation in dismissing Ground of Appeal No i. In that regard we agree with the submission made by counsel for the respondent that it is self-evident from the judgment of the SCC that they rejected the suggestion that a direction application should be granted and that the fact that the court proceeded to record a conviction reveals unambiguously that the court was satisfied that there was evidence on which a jury properly charged could convict.

46. Having considered all of the evidence in this case, and (for reasons to be elaborated further in our ruling below with regard to Ground of Appeal No ii) being satisfied that the DNA evidence was properly admitted by the SCC, we consider it to be manifestly the case that there was sufficient evidence on which a tribunal of fact, properly charged, could have convicted the appellant.

47. On the specific issue of the suggested insufficient probative value of the DNA evidence, we are satisfied that this complaint is misconceived in the circumstances of this case.

There is nothing to suggest that the SCC, in its role as a tribunal of fact, was not fully alive to the need to take a cautionary approach as commended by the Supreme Court in the Wilson case. Indeed, there is every indication from the rigour of their analysis that they did so. However, the circumstances of this case were clearly distinguishable from those in the O’Callaghan case. For a start, in this case, there was a DNA component matching the appellant’s profile found on not just one, but on two separate exhibits i.e., on the rubber mask and on the tongue of the runners, which exhibits were recovered from different places in the vehicle of interest. Moreover, in both instances the DNA was found in most abundance on a part of the item where the most recent wearer might be expected to deposit trace DNA evidence. While that alone would not have proven that the appellant was the last person to wear those items, respectively, the SCC expressly acknowledged that; but then went on to say on the basis of further analysis:

“Whatever about the possibility of an unfortunate situation arising, whereby a mask previously innocently tried on by the accused ended up being utilised by someone else in this murderous plot, it would be an unbelievable coincidence that in addition to that, runners which the Court has found the accused wore at some stage, and which the Court is satisfied were unlikely to have been worn by someone else that night, but were likely to have been worn by the accused, also found themselves in the shooter's vehicle, which was intended to be burnt out. On the basis of the co joinder of the established facts, namely that the accused's DNA profile is found on a mask which the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt was worn during this operation, that his DNA profile is found on a pair of runners, which the Court is satisfied were worn by him at some stage, that there are no other DNA contributions, bar trace elements at that area of the runners where it is likely that a wearer would deposit DNA. That the runners were left on top of the pistols used to shoot Michael Barr. That there was an intention to destroy the runners by fire, and that it is unlikely that anyone else wore the runners that night and, instead, likely that the accused wore them, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was in the car and took part in the murderous plot to kill Michael Barr.

The Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that no other explanation, except for guilt, is reasonably compatible with these established facts. No rational explanation exists, which points to innocence. On the basis of the DNA evidence alone, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt with respect to the murder of Michael Barr.”

48. We consider that these were entirely legitimate conclusions that were properly anchored in the evidence.

49. In circumstances where the SCC having considered the evidence in its totality, and being satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was appropriate to convict the appellant (as occurred here), it was unnecessary for it to specifically address the direction application in its ruling. It was sufficient to give a detailed ruling explaining the reasons as to why the court was satisfied to convict.

50. We have considered the full ruling of the SCC in this case. It was detailed, comprehensive, and rigorous in its analysis. The appellant could have been in no doubt but that his application for a direction had also been rejected. It is, in our view, significant that no complaint was made immediately after the ruling, and that no request was made for a specific ruling.

51. In conclusion, we are satisfied that there has been no unfairness and that the requirement to rule expressly on the direction application was overtaken by the SCC, having concluded in the course of its deliberations at the end of the case that the prosecution had met the evidential burden necessary for the case to be considered by the court in its role as a tribunal of fact, adopting the course of proceeding immediately to then consider the entire case against the appellant and whether the prosecution had proven him guilty of the offence charged to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt. The SCC concluded that he was indeed guilty and fully and comprehensively explained how they had reached that conclusion. We are therefore satisfied that the appellant has no legitimate basis for complaint in respect of the failure to rule specifically on the direction application. Ground of Appeal No ii

52. We agree with counsel for the respondent that the complaints made by the appellant seem to be directed towards the findings of fact made by the trial court, and that this Court cannot and should not intervene unless issues of the type identified in the McKevitt jurisprudence are identified or there was simply no evidence that could have supported the trial court’s conclusions.

53. We have already commented on the rigour and thoroughness with which the SCC conducted its analysis of the evidence. On the specific issue of possible contamination / cross contamination the SCC considered carefully suggestions advanced by the defence as to how the appellant’s DNA came to be on exhibits SOD71 (i.e., the rubber mask) and SOD64 (i.e., the runners). We have set out that consideration earlier in this judgment, at paragraph 12. The Court’s conclusions on the issue of possible contamination / cross contamination have further been set out at paragraph 13 above. They are cogent, rational and grounded in the evidence. We see no basis on which we would be legally justified in second guessing them or seeking to interfere with them. The SCC’s analysis exhibits no error in approach and is supported by the evidence. We are satisfied in the circumstances that it is legally unassailable.

54. We further reject the complaint that it was unfair to have admitted for consideration by the SCC in its role as the tribunal of fact the evidence concerning the matching DNA trace evidence recovered from the areas on the exhibits in question that were swabbed, in circumstances where other parts of the same items were not similarly swabbed, because the appellant is now deprived, through no fault of his, of the opportunity to have the items re-examined and re-tested for other DNA trace evidence. The evidence of what was in fact found was clearly relevant, probative and admissible. There was no breach of forensic procedures. There was no indication of a forensic need to swab every square millimetre of the items in question. It was entirely reasonable and appropriate to have confined swabbing to those areas with the highest likelihood of deposition of trace evidence by a recent wearer of the item. While it is true that the SCC placed some weight on the inherent unlikelihood of the appellant’s DNA ending up where it did, i.e., “on the very area on the mask and on the runners where one would expect to find the wearers DNA”, solely through aerosol action, or through physical movement of air within the vehicle, or through movement of the vehicle itself during transport, we do not consider that their conclusions would have been undermined to any significant degree even if the appellant could have successfully demonstrated that either the appellant’s DNA, or the DNA of a third party or parties, was also to be found elsewhere on the items. The SCC’s conclusions were based not just on that “unhappy coincidence” as they put it, but on that coupled with the whole series of co-existing circumstances outlined in the section of their judgment commencing, “So, then, under a heading ‘Innocent explanation for the presence of the DNA’ …”, and rehearsed ad longum in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 above.

We reiterate that the analysis was thorough and rigorous. We consider that the conclusions reached were justified having regard to the evidence, and that they are indeed compelling.

55. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in dismissing Ground of Appeal No ii.

Ground of Appeal No v

56. We can deal with this complaint very shortly. The evidence received concerning the travel and travel arrangements of the appellant and his associate Mr. Cumberton, in the early aftermath (i.e., in the days immediately succeeding) the shooting at the Sunset House, was clearly admissible as circumstantial evidence and was by any yardstick relevant and potentially probative. We find the SCC’s analysis concerning the potential significance of that evidence to be compelling. We reject the suggestion on behalf of the appellant that those findings must be regarded as speculative. We consider that they are well supported by the evidence.

57. We therefore have no hesitation in also dismissing Ground of Appeal No v.

Conclusions

58. The appellant’s trial was satisfactory, and his conviction is safe. His appeal against his conviction must therefore be dismissed.