Court of Appeal allows appeal on manslaughter sentence, reducing six years to four and a half years.

THE COURT OF APPEAL

APPROVED

NO REDACTION

Record No: 209/2023

McCarthy J. Neutral Citation Number [2025] IECA 266

O’Moore J. MacGrath J.

Between/

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

Respondent

V

MICHAEL SCOTT

Appellant

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice O’Moore on the 3rd day of December 2025.

Introduction

1. Before this Court is an appeal brought by Mr. Michael Scott (otherwise “the appellant”) against the severity of the sentence imposed on him by the Central Criminal Court in respect of his conviction on one count of manslaughter contrary to common law.

2. On the 27th of January 2023, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the offence of murder. A jury was subsequently sworn. On the 30th of March 2023, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter by gross negligence. The appellant was remanded on bail.

3. On the 12th of June 2023, a sentencing hearing proceeded in the Court below. The matter was adjourned for finalisation to the 26th of June 2023, and the appellant was remanded in custody. On the 26th of June 2023, the Court below sentenced the appellant to six years imprisonment, backdated to the 12th of June 2023. The sentencing judge imposed a headline sentence of eight years, reduced to six to take account of mitigating factors.

4. The appellant appeals this sentence on the following grounds: ‘1) The Learned Trial Judge erred in placing the headline sentence too high given the facts of the case. 2) The Learned Trial Judge placed excessive weight on what she regarded as aggravating factors 3) The Learned Trial Judge gave a sentence that was too high in all of the circumstances.’

Factual Background

5. As the trial judge noted, at the time of her death the late Christina Treacy was in her seventies. The deceased’s eldest sister, Maureen, was the appellant’s mother.

6. The deceased lived at the farmhouse in Derryhiney in Portumna for her entire life. She ran the surrounding 140-acre farm with her late brothers, William and Michael Treacy, until their deaths. Michael Treacy died in 2003 and left his land to the deceased and to William, who continued to run the farm together. The deceased held additional land at Kiltomer in her own name.

7. William Treacy died intestate in 2009. As a result of the intestacy, by operation of law, his land was divided; 50% went to the deceased, and the remaining 50% was to be divided among the living children of his eldest sister, Maureen (the appellant’s mother). Maureen’s six children reached an agreement that the appellant would take all of the inherited land. The appellant and the deceased subsequently became tenants-in-common of the farm at Derryhiney. The land was never formally divided between the two, but the deceased leased her share to the appellant, and also leased the land at Kiltomer to him.

8. Following the death of her two brothers, the deceased’s health and physical ability to take part in farming diminished. The appellant took over running the farm. The deceased received major surgery in 2016 and subsequently began to receive home care visits. The deceased was capable of walking, but her walking was substantially impaired by age and ill health. She used a walking stick, and her walking was very slow.

9. On the 27th of April 2018, the day of the offence, the appellant met with a vet by the name of Gerard Lahart to test cattle. Mr. Lahart arrived at the Derryhiney farm at 11:20am to carry out tests on the cattle there. Afterwards he drove to the appellant’s nearby home in Gortrea to carry out further tests on the cattle there. Mr. Lahert left the appellant’s farm at Gortrea at 12:57am.

10. The appellant remained at home for some time after Mr. Lahert’s departure. He received a letter from an agricultural consultant, Declan McHugh, about an application that the appellant was making regarding single farm payments, and the lands to be included in the application.

11. One of the deceased’s carers, Catriona Starr, visited her at Derryhiney between approximately 1:50pm and 2:17pm.

12. The appellant left his home at Gortrea and travelled into Portumna. He had a very brief meeting with his brother, Tom. CCTV footage showed his car passing by the local school just after 3:00pm. He then drove to Derryhiney. The deceased suffered a fatal injury 15 to 20 minutes later.

13. At 3:22pm the appellant rang his neighbour, Francis Hardiman, and told him that he had struck the deceased with a teleporter (a type of farming equipment similar to a tractor or a forklift). The appellant later informed the gardaí that he was not aware that he could use a 999 call to request an ambulance.

14. Mr. Hardiman was working in Eyrecourt and it took him 15 or 20 minutes to reach the farmyard in Derryhiney. He did not immediately see the appellant when he arrived. However, he did see the deceased, noticed the extent of her injuries, and rang Loughrea Garda Station at 3:45pm to request the gardaí, a doctor, and a priest. Sergeant Garda Cleary and Garda Bill O’Gorman arrived at 4:07pm.

15. Mr. Hardiman located the appellant shortly after placing the call. The appellant was hysterical. When Mr. Hardiman arrived, the appellant went to his car, removed a shotgun, and then took actions which caused Mr. Hardiman to be concerned that the appellant would harm himself. Mr. Hardiman removed the shotgun from the appellant and made it available to the gardaí when they arrived.

16. The gardaí met Mr. Hardiman and were shown the deceased, who was lying face down on the concrete yard at the rear of the house. The gardaí observed tyre tracks running along the entirety of the back of the deceased’s body. The gardaí checked for signs of life but found none.

17. Dr. Raymond Brogan had arrived at around the same time as Sergeant Cleary and Garda O’Gorman. Dr. Brogan examined the remains and pronounced the deceased dead at 4:10pm.

18. Sergeant Cleary and Garda O’Gorman spoke with the appellant at the scene. The appellant told the gardaí that he had been reversing a JCB teleporter in the yard when he heard a noise that he thought was the JCB teleporter hitting a trailer. The appellant stated that he drove the JCB teleporter forward, got down from it, and at this stage noticed the deceased lying on the ground. The appellant told the gardaí that he had not seen the deceased at all that day, including when he was operating the JCB teleporter.

19. The deceased’s remains were preserved at the scene and later brought to University College Hospital Galway. A post-mortem was carried out the following day by the thenassistant state pathologist, Dr. Linda Mulligan. Dr. Mulligan identified both external and internal injuries to the body of the deceased, including injuries to her legs, pelvis, trunk, chest, arms, and a number of internal injuries. These were all consistent with the deceased being run over by the JCB teleporter, and with the tyre imprints which could be seen on the deceased’s clothing.

20. Dr. Mulligan expressed the opinion that death had occurred because of multiple traumatic run-over, crush-type injuries. There were no contributing factors in respect of the deceased’s death. Dr. Mulligan gave evidence that death would have been almost instantaneous and would have occurred within one to two seconds.

21. On the 4th of May 2018, the appellant was arrested by appointment for the purpose of interview. The appellant attended Loughrea Garda Station and was accompanied by his thensolicitor, Mr. Nash. A voluntary cautioned memorandum of interview was taken from him.

22. In his interview, the appellant said: ‘When I landed down there, I parked the jeep. I got up on the teleporter then and there was a bit of silage in it…Then I reversed off back along and I hit something then. I thought it was a trailer I hit, so I pulled up then and I got out and then I seen [the deceased] on the ground’. The appellant identified on relevant plans and photographs the various buildings and locations to which he was referring. These were available to the jury at the trial.

23. When asked to describe what he felt when he hit the deceased with the JCB teleporter, the appellant said: “I thought I hit the trailer. Sometimes you’d think you’d go over the drawbar.” The trailer in question was a silver metal trailer which was moveable. The deceased’s remains were approximately a meter away from the drawbar of that trailer after the collision.

24. Garda O’Connor later gave evidence on the operation of the JCB teleporter. He found it to drive appropriately; the lights were working, the brakes were functioning, and the vehicle emitted an audible warning alarm when the vehicle was reversing. However, the handbrake did not work. He also noted that the boom on the right-hand side caused a significant impairment when looking to the right side of the vehicle. He also did a line-of-sight analysis for the Court to determine whether the deceased could have been seen by the appellant when he was operating the JCB teleporter. Garda O’Connor’s evidence was that a person of 1.62 metres (the deceased’s height) would be visible at all times when looking through the rear window of the teleporter.

25. Mr. John Hayes, an engineer, also gave evidence on the functionality of the JCB teleporter. Mr. Hayes indicated that while the opacity of the rear window had been significantly increased by a film of dirt and grime, a pedestrian in a light blue cardigan would still be clearly visible through the window.

26. The appellant was arrested on the 11th of December 2018 on suspicion of the murder of the deceased. He was conveyed to Loughrea Garda Station and detained under s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984. The appellant was interviewed on four occasions. In interview, the appellant set out the history of his involvement with the farm at Derryhiney and offered an explanation, describing the incident on the 27th of April 2018 as a tragic farm accident. Some of the appellant’s testimony in interviews was at odds with other evidence in the case, including the claims that he could observe that the deceased was breathing after the collision, that he could see her moving, and that he did not see any injuries to her body. The appellant stated that he blacked out for several minutes before calling Mr. Hardiman and told the gardaí that he was not aware that he could use a 999 call to request an ambulance.

27. The issue of the appellant’s eyesight was raised in the interviews. He indicated to the gardaí that it was getting bad, that he got his eyes tested, and that he was getting blurry spots.

His optician was later called in to give evidence. She stated that while the sight in his right eye was substantially impaired, his brain had learned to ignore this eye and divert all its attention to the other eye (colloquially referred to as lazy eye). The sight in the appellant’s left eye was close to optimal, which was considered by the optician to be fine for driving purposes.

Victim Impact Statement

28. The Court below received a victim impact statement from Ms. Regina Donohue, who described the deceased as her: “best friend and neighbour”. Ms. Donohue described a “worsening relationship” between the appellant and the deceased since at least 2016.

29. When describing the impact that the deceased’s death had on her, Ms. Donohue stated that: ‘I am broken hearted for [the deceased], fearful for the safety of my family, myself and my neighbours and friends. After years of trying to come to terms with the tragic loss of [the deceased] and all that went on before her death, and all the events since I have finally accepted the fact that I urgently needed help in order to reclaim my life. On June the 1st, 2023, I had an hour long consultation with Dr Bernie Finneran at the Whitford Medical Centre. She listened to my story, gave me time to cry when I needed and time to reveal things about myself that I had left behind and forgotten, especially my happy outlook on life. She has referred me for counselling and gave me the option of availing of medication if needed. Her final words were, “my door is always open for you’.’ Personal Circumstances of the Appellant

30. The appellant was born on the 10th of June 1964. He was 59 years old at the time of sentencing. He has worked as a dairy farmer since 2010.

31. The appellant has no previous convictions. He also has no history of addiction.

32. The appellant lives with his wife and four children, who are currently between the ages of 16 and 20. His son and his two younger daughters are in secondary school in Portumna. His oldest daughter is training to be a home economics teacher. The appellant has been married for approximately 22 years.

33. The appellant is the eldest of six children. His mother died when he was 22 years old. His father is 88 years old.

34. After the incident on the 27th of April 2018, the appellant attended the Portumna Mental Health Centre weekly for a number of months. After some time, this attendance reduced to every second week. At the time of sentencing, the appellant was on anti-depression medication. The Psychological Report described the appellant as: ‘a psychologically vulnerable individual who experiences significant anxiety and suicidal ideation.’ Sentencing Judge’s Remarks

35. On the 26th of June 2023, the judge in the Court below passed sentence on the appellant. The judge noted the factual background of the case as set out by Detective Sergeant Duane.

36. When deciding on a headline sentence, the sentencing judge made extensive reference to previous case law in both Ireland and the U.K. The sentencing judge noted that: ‘The starting point for me is Mahon, and I refer in that regard to a number of extracts from Charleton J, in dealing with the issue of medium culpability, he says that headline sentences in this category tend to be between four and ten years, imposed where there is a high level of culpability, but where aggravating factors are absent or are considerably less than in the higher range. He said that cases that fall into this middle category, include those where offences involve an unlawful act, which would not normally be expected to result in death and where the act was not premeditated but where there was still a degree of culpability.’

37. The sentencing judge identified a number of aggravating factors: a. Firstly, that the vehicle involved was what the judge described as: ‘effectively a lethal weapon, a JCB teleporter…more dangerous than any car and a vehicle that should be driven with a care.’ b. Secondly, that the appellant was driving in a negligent way: ‘which involved him looking to his right-hand side…the reality behind that if he’d looked to his left, he would have seen [the deceased]’. The evidence indicated that there had been a blind spot when looking to the right due to the boom. The appellant’s optician also told the Court below that the appellant was: ‘almost entirely blind in the right eye, save for peripheral vision’. Although his lazy eye allowed him to drive safely in general, the optician had opined that: ‘if you’re looking over your right shoulder, you would get to a certain extent of peripheral vision but you would have reduced field for the right. There would still be some peripheral vision there.’ c. Thirdly, even if the appellant had been looking to the left, the JCB had been negligently kept in such a way as increased the risk of danger. The sentencing judge noted that in this case: ‘you could not even glance to the left because he had no left-hand mirror and perhaps, of less importance is the fact that the back window was very dirty.’ Both matters could have been easily remedied in the Court’s view, and the sentencing judge drew a comparison between the missing left-hand wing mirror and the fact that the appellant had arranged for his tractor seat to be fixed within 24 hours: ‘The back window could’ve been cleaned with a J Cloth and a bit of fairy liquid.’ d. Finally, the sentencing judge noted that: ‘this offence occurred in [the deceased’s] own home, in her yard, albeit jointly owned. And while on the evidence of [the deceased]’s friends and carers, she may not have left the house or been in the yard habitually… [the appellant] indicates that [the deceased] would occasionally be in the yard and she had, in this court’s view, an expectation to be safe in her own house and in her own yard.’

38. Having regard for the aggravating factors, the sentencing judge fixed a headline sentence of eight years.

39. In relation to mitigation, the sentencing judge noted several factors which limited the mitigation available to the appellant: a. Firstly, ‘there is one mitigating factor that is conspicuous by its absence and that is the plea of guilty.’ b. Secondly, ‘It seems to me, certainly in the immediate aftermath of these events, [the appellant] had no remorse. While this is not an aggravating factor, it does meant that the remorse he exhibits today…it seems to me to be, to have come at a late stage.’ c. Thirdly, the appellant stated that he believed the deceased to be alive when he came upon her and he did not call for medical assistance. The sentencing judge noted that it would ordinarily be an aggravating factor to not seek medical assistance in the aftermath of events which led to a person’s death, particularly where immediate medical assistance could have prevented that death. However, in this case, the sentencing judge considered that: ‘it is not an aggravating factor because I don’t believe him. I don’t believe that he took the view that [the deceased] was alive when he came upon her. Thus, I am not treating it as an aggravating factor but something again which results in perhaps a loss of mitigation. It seems to me patently obvious that [the deceased] had died when he came upon her according to the medical evidence of Dr. Mulligan.’ d. Fourthly, the appellant: ‘did tell lies during the course of those interviews” with the gardaí. The sentencing judge set out these lies in some detail and stated that “while there is cooperation, it is limited. And this Court must, for the record indicate, why it says it’s limited’.

40. The sentencing judge then identified a number of mitigating factors which the Court below did take into account: a. Firstly, the appellant: ‘is a man with no previous convictions, further he is a man who has worked his whole life and in the course of his 20-year marriage, he has raised four children…he’s a responsible man in terms of his farm, his business and the rearing of his family.’ b. Secondly, the appellant ‘does accept the jury’s verdict and that is a matter of mitigation, albeit limited.’ c. Thirdly, ‘the probation report references [the appellant]’s mental health issues…specifically where the probation report states that in the last six months, [the appellant] has shown symptoms of major mental disorder and effective instability, particularly in the form of hopelessness and anxiety.’ The psychological report also noted that the appellant: ‘has limited intellectual ability. And he may have found it difficult to see a way out of his perceived difficulties’. Additionally, the appellant’s ‘mother died young…and it seems that he, in accordance with his interview, took on a lot of responsibility’. The psychological report indicated that the appellant: ‘has shown an active engagement with treatment in both compliance and responsiveness’ and has:

‘taken active steps to engage with a counsellor, is on depression medication, which may also help him with his anxiety.’ d. Fourthly, ‘he is deemed by both the probation services and a psychologist to be at low risk of reoffending.’

41. Having regard for the mitigation factors, the sentencing judge reduced the headline sentence by two years. This resulted in an effective sentence of six years, backdated from when the appellant entered custody on the 12th of June 2023.

Submissions on Appeal

Appellant’s Submissions

42. The appellant seeks to appeal the sentence imposed on the following grounds:

1. ‘The Learned Trial Judge erred in placing the headline sentence too high given the facts of the case.’ The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred in principle in indicating a headline sentence of eight years because she erred in her assessment of the appellant’s culpability. Subsequently, ‘indicating a headline sentence of eight years for this offence resulted in an excessive sentence being imposed upon the Appellant even with a necessary reduction for mitigating factors.’

2. ‘The Learned Trial Judge placed excessive weight on what she regarded as aggravating factors.’ In particular, the appellant submits that: ‘the Learned Sentencing Judge in indicating a headline sentence of eight years which is the upper end of mid-range manslaughter regarded the Appellant as having greater culpability than a person convicted of dangerous driving causing death.’

3. ‘The Learned Trial Judge gave a sentence that was too high in all of the circumstances.’ The appellant outlines a series of charges: ‘of dangerous driving causing death or serious bodily harm arising out of exceptionally poor driving. The accused in the above cases all received a lesser sentence than the Appellant.’ The appellant does note however that: “every case stands on its own facts.”

43. The appellant submits that the sentence imposed was therefore unduly severe.

Respondent’s Submissions

44. The respondent submits that the sentence imposed in the Court below is not unduly severe on the following grounds: a. ‘The Learned Trial Judge addressed the issue of sentence and legal principles over 8 pages of the transcript (sic)’. The respondent therefore submits that there was no error in principle in the sentencing judge’s identification of the headline sentence. b. ‘It is respectfully submitted that appropriate weight was placed on the aggravating factors in the case. The Learned Trial Judge heard evidence in the case over a ten week period and was best placed to assess the evidence objectively. The aggravating factors are set out on the transcript at page 22 to 24…The Court also took great care to identify matters in mitigation, both present and absent, both in terms of how the Applicant engaged with the investigation and after.’ c. ‘Having regard to the Learned Trial Judge’s detailed analysis of the facts in her sentencing remarks and having regard to the fact that the Learned Trial Judge was in a position to listen and observe the evidence over a ten-week period the sentence imposed was proportionate and appropriate…[allowing] for mitigation, which the court noted was limited, the Appellant was afforded a discount of two years leaving a net set of six years…It is submitted that the sentence imposed in this case was proportionate in all the circumstances, particularly in light of the fact that the Appellant’s conduct resulted in a fatality.’ Court’s Analysis & Decision

45. This appeal raises one central issue: the extent of the appellant’s moral culpability for the death of the late Ms. Tracey. The leading judgment of Charleton J. in Mahon sets out with great clarity the impact which the culpability of an accused will have on the headline sentence imposed. There is no dispute, on this appeal, of the trial judge’s decision to place the current case in the medium range (i.e., between four and ten years). However, where the headline sentence falls within that range is important; we do not accept the argument, made by counsel for the DPP at the start of his oral submissions, that the issues raised on this appeal only involve a very small change in the sentence and that (inferentially) they are not of real consequence. It will be remembered that, in DPP v. Millea [2016] IECA 137, this Court set aside a sentence for manslaughter as it was fixed at the upper end of the relevant range when it was more properly at the middle of the range. As Finlay Geoghegan J. found (at paragraph 29): ‘In so far as the sentencing judge placed this offence at the upper end of the mid-range of manslaughter offences, on the above facts this Court considered that he erred in principle. This Court considered that it is correctly at the mid-range of such offences, bearing in mind the circumstances in which the knife came to be used and the element of self-defence which attended the circumstances of the offence and that excessive force is intrinsic to the offence of manslaughter’.

46. As it happens, this appeal raises exactly the same type of dispute as to where in the middle range the current case falls.

47. The moral culpability of the appellant was described by the sentencing judge by reference to the factors set out at paragraph 38 of this judgment. Without repeating these verbatim, they broadly involve driving a large and dangerous vehicle without maintaining a proper lookout. Proper lookout was not kept for a number of reasons. The appellant’s reduced vision in his right eye was one of them. Had the appellant sought to address this by looking to his left, his view would not have been improved as there was no left-hand mirror. The back window was “very dirty”. Both the missing mirror and the dirty window could have been easily rectified. In addition, the offence occurred in the late Ms. Treacy’s yard.

48. The culpability on the part of the appellant, as seen by reference to these factors, is far removed from that to be seen in many of the other authorities referred to by Charleton J. in the relevant section of Mahon. Millea was a case where the accused had killed the victim by using a knife. In Shanley, the accused had brought a knife to the victim’s home and killed him when a varicose vein was severed in the course of a struggle. In Rice, the victim was: ‘…punched and kicked in the head, suffering a fractured skull and severe brain injuries’; Charleton J. in Mahon, at paragraph 68. As Charleton J. noted, this Court upheld the sentence of seven years (with two suspended) in Rice notwithstanding the observation by Mahon J. that the episode had also involved the wielding of a knife by the killer.

49. A number of the other cases mentioned by the sentencing judge are also instructive. The sentencing judge stated that she had derived “the greatest assistance” from the judgment of this Court in People (DPP) v. Lennon [2022] IECA 97 and the judgment of Donnelly J. (sitting as a judge of the Central Criminal Court) in People (DPP) v. Kierans [2015] JIC 2005. Indeed, the sentencing judge directed the attention of both sets of counsel to these decisions, presumably on the basis that they were of particular relevance to the current case.

50. Referring to the judgment of Bermingham P. in Lennon, the sentencing judge stated that she agreed with paragraph 10 of that decision where the former President observed that the

decision in Mahon was: ‘of somewhat limited assistance, and is not directly on point when dealing with gross negligence manslaughter, or, in particular, motor manslaughter.’ This is not, on the face of it, consistent with her earlier finding that: ‘The starting point for me is Mahon, and I refer in that regard to a number of extracts from Charleton J in dealing with the issue of medium culpability…’ The sentencing judge then goes on to consider Mahon (and some of the authorities referred to by Charleton J.) for the next couple of pages of the ruling

51. The second aspect of Lennon to which the sentencing judge refers is paragraph 11 of that judgment, reads: ‘We begin our consideration of this case by observing that the occasions when courts are called to sentence for manslaughter where there have been multiple fatalities are rare. By any standard, the offending at issue here has to be regarded as extremely serious. A powerful car was driven for a prolonged period at a very high speed, reaching no less than 140 miles per hour immediately prior to the collision. What sets the case apart was the actions of the driver in producing two video recordings, while driving at speed, and sharing these recordings with friends. It is difficult to find the language to describe just how reckless that conduct was. If one considers situations where high-speed driving is permitted, for example in motorsport, intense and total concentration is called for’.

52. It is not clear why this was of particular assistance to the sentencing judge in fashioning the sentence. If anything, there is a sharp disparity between a headline sentence of eight years in the current case and a headline sentence of fourteen years in Lennon when one considers the shocking behaviour described by Bermingham P. which led to the deaths of three people.

53. The second judgment of particular assistance to the sentencing judge was Kierans. She noted that Donnelly J. had rejected the view that gross negligence manslaughter: ‘must automatically.. fall on the lower end of the scale with an assault manslaughter’; page 21 of the sentencing statement of the trial judge. Whatever the argument before the trial judge, no such submission was made on this appeal. Equally, the importance placed by the trial judge in the extent of “criminal blameworthiness” is not disputed by the appellant. However, in matching such blameworthiness (or moral culpability) with the appropriate sentence, it is helpful to look at the facts of Kierans. In that case, which was one of gross negligence manslaughter, the accused had picked up his illegally shortened shotgun while intoxicated with a view (he said) to killing himself but instead killed his wife. He did so by firing the gun, not at himself but in his wife’s direction; she was a very short distance away, as both were in the back bedroom of their house. In order to discharge the firearm, the shotgun had to be loaded, the safety catch “positively switched to the off position”, and the trigger pressed; paragraph 13 of the judgment of Donnelly J.

54. Again, the fixing of the sentence in that case at the lower end of the upper range (i.e. a headline sentence of twelve years) suggests that the headline sentence imposed on Mr. Scott was simply too high. The aggravating factors in Kierans (not all of which are set out here) are far more serious than those in the current case. Comparing one with the other and taking into account these factors, if the sentence in Kierans is correct, then the sentence in Scott is excessive.

55. While the aggravating factors described by the sentencing judge apply, she does not mention (in summarising the relevant facts) that the warning sound when the vehicle was reversing was operational. This in no way excuses the actions of the appellant. However, given that the essence of the offence by Mr. Scott was that he failed to keep a proper lookout, and that the teleporter was (in important ways) in poor repair, it would have been relevant to note that one potentially relevant feature of the vehicle was functional. However, as Ms. Tracey’s mobility was very limited, this aspect of the case is of minor significance.

56. Having considered the aggravating factors identified by the trial judge, and the guidance given by the authorities, we believe that the gross negligence manslaughter in this case lies in the lower half of the mid-range of such offences. The trial judge erred in finding that the appropriate sentence was in the upper half of the mid-range.

57. In light of our finding that the trial judge erred in the sentence she imposed, we will now proceed to resentence Mr. Scott. In our view, the appropriate headline sentence is six years. This lies in the lower half of the range of four to ten years imprisonment, but not at the bottom of that range. It reflects the moral culpability of Mr. Scott for the tragic death of Ms. Treacy. In particular, it correctly has regard to all of the factors identified by the sentencing judge as constituting aggravation on the part of the appellant, notably the fact that Ms. Treacy was run over on her own property as a result of a failure on the part of Mr. Scott to take elementary steps to avoid such a catastrophe.

58. In this appeal, no real issue was taken with the approach adopted by the trial judge with regard to mitigation. While counsel for the DPP was sceptical about Mr. Scott’s remorse, this submission is unconvincing. Not only did Mr. Scott express remorse in the context of the probation report, but he also communicated similar sentiments in his letter to the trial judge. Having said that, such expressions of regret ordinarily carry little weight in providing mitigation for this type of offence. It is to be expected that someone who caused the death of a close relative as a result of their gross negligence would feel deep regret.

59. In resentencing, it is for this Court to assess what discount (if any) is to be applied in mitigation. There are a number of mitigating factors. Mr. Scott cooperated with the investigation, though this is subject to the very heavy reservations (as set out by the trial judge) concerning the untruthfulness of a number of the statements he made at the time. Much more importantly, Mr. Scott had no previous convictions. In respect of this factor, counsel for the DPP submitted at the hearing of the appeal that, while this was correct, the evidence at the trial had been of unacceptably aggressive behaviour on the part of Mr. Scott towards Ms. Tracey. We accept that this is so. Mr. Scott acted towards Ms. Tracey (an elderly and vulnerable woman) in a way that ranged from the unacceptable to the thuggish. While we have taken this into account, it does not significantly reduce the mitigation due to Mr. Scott arising from his lack of any previous convictions over his lifetime. He has worked all of his life (having taken no holidays other than his honeymoon), he has been married for over 20 years, and he has raised four children. The appellant was assessed by both the probation services and by a psychological assessment as being at a low risk of reoffending. In light of all of these considerations, we will reduce the headline sentence by eighteen months.

60. We would therefore allow the appeal. We will impose a headline sentence of six years, reduced by one quarter to four and a half years to take into account the mitigating factors which we have identified. The sentence will run from the 12th of June 2023.