Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against sentence for attempted arson in a family feud case.

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Approved

No Redaction Needed

[2025] IECA 250

Record No: 230/2024

McCarthy J. Butler J. O’Moore J.

Between/

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

Respondent

V

LAURENCE WARD

Appellant

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice O’Moore on the 5th day of November, 2025.

Introduction

1. Before this Court is an appeal brought by Mr. Laurence Ward against the severity of the sentence imposed on him by the Galway Circuit Criminal Court in respect of his conviction for one count of attempted arson contrary to s. 2(4) of the Criminal Damage Act, 1991 and one count of criminal damage contrary to s. 2(2) of the Criminal Damage Act, 1991.

2. The appellant entered a guilty plea to both counts on a full facts basis on the 4th December 2023. The plea was confirmed before the Circuit Court on the 11th January 2024.

3. On the 17th July 2024 the Court below sentenced the appellant to seven and a half years imprisonment for the offence of attempted arson and five years imprisonment for the offence of criminal damage. The two sentences were to run concurrently. The final eighteen months of the sentence was suspended on terms for a period of three years.

4. The appellant seeks to appeal the severity of this sentence.

Factual Background

5. At the sentencing hearing on the 16th July 2024, the Court heard evidence from Detective Garda Aaron West in respect of the offences.

6. Prior to the events of this appeal, a feud began between the Sweeney-Ward and the Conroy families. The appellant was a member of the former and the injured party’s husband was a member of the latter. Garda West indicated that there had been over fifty incidents involving these feuding families, including shootings, pipe bombs, petrol bombs, and incidents of violent disorder and riot. The feud began in November 2019 and was still active at the time of sentencing.

7. On the 19th June 2022 the appellant and three other individuals caused damage to a Toyota Avensis parked outside a house at 82 Cúirt na Bhán, Claregalway, County Galway. A petrol bomb had also been thrown through the window of the injured party’s home, though it had not caught fire. The injured party was at home with her three children at the time; the children were aged four, six, and eight respectively.

8. At approximately 4.15am, the gardaí received a 999 call in relation to this incident. The gardaí who attended the scene noted the strong smell of accelerant in the house. One bottle was smashed inside the front window; an orange rag was found beside it. Another bottle was located on the windowsill. The windows of the car had been smashed by the assailants. The injured party’s children were asleep upstairs at the time of the incident; they were woken up by the windows being smashed. The children were upset and distressed, as was their mother. The injured party and her three children have since moved to County Mayo.

9. The injured party informed the gardaí that she had observed two young males near her home at the time of the incident: one dressed in all black and one wearing a grey hoodie and black tracksuit bottoms. The gardaí subsequently reviewed CCTV footage from the housing estate and observed a Ford Focus leaving the scene of the attempted arson.

10. At approximately 5.30am, gardaí were on mobile patrol on the Monivae Road in Galway and observed a Ford Focus acting suspiciously. The gardaí stopped the vehicle and immediately identified all the occupants, including the appellant who was driving the car. There was a strong smell of accelerant in the car. The appellant and the other three occupants were initially detained for the purpose of a search in accordance with s. 23(1A) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 as amended. The description of the two males that the injured party had observed at the scene matched the clothing of the two occupants of the vehicle. All four occupants were subsequently arrested under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Law Act 1997 and detained for questioning.

11. The scene of the attempted arson was, in the interim, forensically examined and glass samples were seized from the broken windows of the house and the Toyota Avensis. While searching the Ford Focus, the gardaí found small particles of glass in the rear footwell of the car. Unused petrol bombs were found and sent for analysis. The clothing of all four occupants was seized for examination and the clothing of one of the co-accused was found to contain glass fragments from the Toyota Avensis. Glass particles from that car were also found on the appellant. The appellant’s mobile phone was subsequently seized and examined. The gardaí found a text message sent from the appellant’s phone to a third party which read “House broke up and petrol bombs through it.”

12. On the 1st February 2023 the appellant was re-arrested for interview at Garda Northwestern Regional Headquarters on foot of a warrant obtained under s. 10 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984. On the 4th December 2023, the matter was sent forward to Galway Circuit Criminal Court on a signed plea of guilty.

Victim Impact Statement

13. The injured party was informed about her right to make a victim impact statement and declined to do so.

Personal Circumstances of the Appellant

14. The appellant was born on the 11th November 2002. He was 19 at the time of the offences. He left school at the age of 16 and has no history of employment.

15. The appellant lived with his parents. Since the offending, the appellant married and had two children: an 18-month-old and a four-month-old at the time of the sentencing hearing. The appellant’s wife and children also lived with his parents at the time of sentencing. His older sister, her husband, and her three children also lived in the family home. The appellant also has a younger brother who resided outside of the family home and was in full time employment at the time of sentencing.

16. The appellant has 12 previous convictions, all of which were recorded on the 11th January 2023 and which concerned road traffic offences.

17. A Probation Report was prepared in advance of the appellant’s sentencing hearing. The Report placed the appellant at medium risk of re-offending. The primary risk factors highlighted were the appellant’s substance abuse, previous peer group, unemployed status, and a history of anger management issues. The protective factors identified were that the appellant has a supportive family and accommodation. The Report indicated that the appellant expressed willingness to engage with the relevant training and employment services directed by the Probation Service, and made certain recommendations in respect of those services. The Report also expressed concern over the appellant’s dishonesty over the course of preparing the Report.

Sentencing Judge’s Remarks

18. On the 17th July 2024, the judge in the Court below passed sentence on the appellant. The judge noted the factual background as described by Detective Garda Aaron West.

Attempted Arson

19. The sentencing judge made the following comments about the gravity of the attempted arson: “In assessing the gravity of the crime, the Court must not only consider harm done to the victims and to society generally by this type of offending, but also assess the level of his moral culpability. It is this Court’s view that this man’s moral culpability was at the high end. It is this Court’s view that the harm done, the fear and terror inflicted by this type of activity is at a significantly high level. There seems to be some thing about this case that people seem to have the view that because this young man did this to the opposing crowd in a so-called feud, that it somehow lessens the criminality. It does not. It does the very opposite because this was pre-meditated and intended. This was no spur of the moment, ‘I’m going to get my own back on you.’”

20. The sentencing judge identified the relevant aggravating factors in this case as follows: “The aggravating factors in this case are quite clearly that this man in… the attempted arson, put people’s lives at risk, including those of a lady and children. I’m saying including because he put other people’s lives at risk in the neighbourhood, driving in and driving out. This lady and her children were not the only victims; the people who live in the area, who want to live peacefully without stress in their homes, they are victims. It amazes this Court how four people, four young men, seemingly healthy men, cannot smell petrol inside in a car, when a guard who stops the car can smell it immediately standing outside it. This man has perpetrated a lie whenever he can, to whoever he can speak to… He was a driver and a ringleader of this gang of four sent to do serious damage to people and property, and to inflict terror and fear into those people and those connected. This was not a case of smashing up of the car because you just didn’t like them to have a fancy car, this criminal damage was done also to give a message. The phone text speaks for itself. I have already mentioned it. This was pre-meditated, intended and was not carried out under the influence of any substance.”

21. The sentencing judge also addressed the principles of deterrence and rehabilitation, noting ultimately that “this Court will proceed on the basis that a custodial sentence, an immediate custodial sentence is not only warranted, not only proportionate, but essential in this case.”

22. Having regard for the aggravating factors and the principles of deterrence and rehabilitation, the sentencing judge identified a headline sentence of ten years imprisonment.

23. In relation to mitigation, the sentencing judge made the following remarks: “In mitigation, the Court notes this man’s young age and that yes, he was doing dirty work for those cowards who asked him to do it…But that doesn’t absolve this man for blame for what he did and what he knew he was doing. However, his young age will be acknowledged in any penalty that’s imposed. The fact that he signed a plea of guilty. He may take it that on taking his advice, legal advice, to sign a plea, he will have a much less custodial sentence than he would otherwise have been getting here today. The Court will also be treating him as a first-time offender who has not come to notice since and has complied with strict bail conditions since. The Court notes that he says that he had an addiction. However, on the other side, the Court is absolutely satisfied that this man was not acting under the influence of any substance when driving his father’s car that night. He has a young family, yes, and the Court will note that any sentence imposed will have a detrimental impact on his family and that’s to be regretted but so be it.”

24. Having accounted for the mitigating factors, the sentencing judge reduced the sentence to seven years and six months imprisonment. The sentencing judge suspended the final eighteen months of this sentence for a period of three years, subject to various conditions.

Criminal Damage

25. With regard to the criminal damage offence, the sentencing judge identified the relevant aggravating factors as follows: “Once again, the Court is satisfied that this man was the leader of the pack. The leader of the gang, as evidenced by the telephone text in relation to the attempted arson. He left in this car with his three passengers, two of them or three of them minors, as he understood, with the job done. Accordingly, the criminal damage of this motor vehicle goes beyond the simple physical damage done to the car. It’s the message that was intended to be passed on. That is a further aggravating factor.”

26. The sentencing judge passed sentence for the criminal damage offence as follows: “The Court will impose a headline sentence of seven years imprisonment. The Court will discount that headline sentence to reflect the signed plea and the other mitigating factors already referred to under the other count, and will reduce the sentence to one of five years…the Court will suspend the last 18 months of those five years, whereby he will serve three and a half years in custody, in respect of the criminal damage.”

27. The sentencing judge finally noted that the two sentences would be concurrent to one another because “they are the same set of facts…one attack, with two points of attack laid out and planned in advance.” This left the appellant with an effective sentence of six years imprisonment with a further 18 months suspended subject to various conditions.

Notice of Appeal

28. The appellant seeks to appeal the severity of his sentence on the following grounds of appeal: “1. The learned trial judge erred in fact in referring to the Appellant as ‘the ring leader’ of the incident whilst acknowledging at the outset of the sentencing hearing that the offence was carried out by four young men on the instructions of ‘cowardly other persons’ who were not before the court. This was re-iterated by the learned Judge during the sentencing hearing wherein he spoke to the Appellant and told him that he should think of the person who caused him to be there when he was serving his lengthy sentence. Notwithstanding these remarks, and the acceptance by the court of the fact that other parties were ‘pulling the strings’ in this case, the learned trial judge erred in fact in treating the Appellant as the ring leader of the event in question and applied a sentence that did not reflect the reality of the offending.

2. The learned trial judge erred in principle in setting the period of the suspended sentence for both sentences at 18 months which he suspended for a period of 3 years. The circumstances of the offender and the offence, respectfully, warrant a lengthier period of suspension in circumstances where the Appellant was a first time offender and had not re-offended in any manner, after the offences the subject matter of the within proceeding and had co-operated fully with the Probation Services to compile a report to assist the court. The Appellant had further undertaken several of the steps recommended by the Probation Services in order to reduce his likelihood of re-offending and the learned trial Judge gave insufficient weight to same.

3. The learned trial Judge erred in principle in failing to have due regard to the Appellant’s youth at the time of the offending.

4. The learned trial Judge erred in principle in failing to have due regard to the Appellant’s lack of prior or subsequent criminal convictions.

5. The learned trial Judge erred in principle in failing to have due regard to the Appellant’s early plea of guilty having been sent forward to the Circuit Court on a signed plea of guilty.

6. The learned trial judge erred in principle in setting the headline sentence for attempted arson at 10 years in the circumstances.

7. The learned trial judge erred in principle in applying a discount of only 2.5 years to the headline sentence of 10 years for attempted arson, given the Appellant’s circumstances and the circumstances of the offending.

8. The learned trial judge erred in principle in setting the headline sentence for criminal damage at 7 years in the circumstances.

9. The learned trial judge erred in principle in applying a discount of only 2 years to the headline sentence of 7 years for criminal damage, given the Appellant’s circumstances and the circumstances of the offending.

10. The learned trial judge attached insufficient weight to the Appellant’s youth at the time of the offending (aged 19 years) and treated him disproportionately to the other offenders, who were minors at the time of the offending.

11. The sentence imposed by the learned trial judge was excessive and disproportionate in all the circumstance of the case.

12. Failure on the part of the learned sentencing judge to take account all of the mitigating and personal circumstances of the appellant advanced on his behalf by Counsel and in particular, failing to have sufficient regard to this early guilty plea, his being a first time offender, his not being engaging in any subsequent offending, his full co-operation with the Probation Services and/or not allowing sufficient credit for the foregoing.”

Submissions on Appeal

Headline Sentence for Arson

29. The appellant submits that when compared to comparators, in particular the decision of this Court in DPP v. Graham Shannon [2024] IECA 325, the headline sentence for the arson charge in the present case was unduly severe.

30. The respondent submits that the circumstances of this particular offence indicated a high level of culpability on the part of the appellant and did significant harm to the injured party and her three children, thus rendering the headline sentence proportionate in the circumstances. Additionally, the respondent makes reference to the Supreme Court decision in DPP v. F.E. [2019] IESC 85, where Charleton J remarked that “[w]hen crimes are proximate to each other, then just like events, it is appropriate to have regard to the overall event in sentencing.” The respondent submits that, even if the headline sentence for arson would ordinarily be considered two high, the commission of the criminal judge justifies the imposition of a higher sentence for the attempted arson offence.

Description of the Appellant as the ‘ring leader’

31. The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred in categorising the appellant as the “ring leader” of the offending despite the earlier acknowledgement that the appellant and his co-accused were acting on the instructions of a third party, and that the result of this error was a disproportionately high sentence for the appellant. The appellant submits that:- “the mere fact that the Appellant was driving the borrowed care does not make him a ring leader, nor does the fact that he was an adult when the others were minors, nor does the fact that text messages were sent from a mobile phone discovered in the car to an unknown third party.”

32. The respondent submits that the context in which this comment was made was one where the appellant was the driver of the car, the only adult in the car, and that it was his phone from which the “House broke up and petrol bombs through it.” text message had been sent. The respondent submits that the sentencing judge’s assessment of the appellant’s role in the offending was based on the evidence put before the Court, and that it was not an error in fact to make such an observation.

Insufficient Suspension

33. The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred in principle in suspending only

18 months of the appellant’s sentence. The appellant submits that the present case warranted a longer period of suspension in circumstances where the appellant was a first-time offender, had not re-offended in any manner, had co-operated fully with the Probation Service to compile a Probation Report, and had undertaken several of the recommended steps to reduce his likelihood of re-offending. In light of these factors, the appellant submits that a larger portion of the sentence ought to have been suspended.

34. The respondent refers to the decision of this Court in DPP v. Stanescu [2020] IECA 55 for the proposition that a sentencing judge has a wide margin of discretion over how to structure a sentence and which objectives of sentencing to prioritise. The respondent submits that sufficient weight was afford to (in particular) the appellant’s good engagement with the Probation Service, as seen by the decision to suspend a further 20% of the post mitigation sentence, but that the sentencing judge was also entitled to advance the principles of deterrence and rehabilitation in the manner in which he did.

Lack of Regard for the Appellant’s Youth

35. The appellant submits that the sentencing judge failed to have due regard for the appellant’s youth at the time of the offending, which constituted an error in principle. The appellant submits that the appellant, who was 19 at the time, was assumed to have greater culpability than his co-accused, who were minors. The appellant submits that this led to a disproportionately high sentence.

36. The respondent submits that the fact that the appellant was an adult at the time of commission means that he should have been treated differently to his co-accused. The respondent submits that the culpability of the appellant increased once he attained the age of majority, referencing the decision of this Court in DPP v. Dullaghan [2024] IECA 115 in support of this proposition.

Lack of Regard for Other Mitigating Factors

37. The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred in principle in failing to have due regard for the mitigating factors in the present case. The appellant summarises those factors as including the appellant’s guilty plea, his lack of previous and subsequent convictions, his young age, the fact that he was doing the dirty work of others, and the fact that he has a young family at home. The appellant submits that the combined effect of these factors should have led to a greater discount from the headline sentence.

38. The respondent submits that the fact that the appellant was caught red handed reduces the amount of mitigation that can be afforded because of the plea. The respondent then references O’Malley in Sentencing Law and Practice, and the citation therein of the Court of Criminal Appeal decision in DPP v. Kenny [2011] IECCA 16, to support the proposition that where an offender is caught red handed and there is a strong case against them, “a plea of guilty merits less in terms of consideration than it might otherwise.” On these grounds, the respondent submits that the sentencing judge did attach appropriate weight to the mitigating factors in the appellant’s case.

Sentence for Criminal Damage

39. The appellant submits that the sentence of five years for the criminal damage charge with the final 18 months suspended, to run concurrent to the sentence for attempted arson, was excessive in all the circumstances.

40. The respondent submits that the aggravating factors in relation to the attempted arson charge were relevant in determining the headline sentence for the criminal damage charge, and therefore that the headline sentence of seven years was appropriate. The respondent also submits that the reduction of “just shy of 30% for mitigation” of this sentence was within the range of appreciation of the sentencing judge in light of the mitigating factors, and further notes the suspension of the final 18 months of the sentence. The respondent thus submits that the sentence imposed for the criminal damage charge was an appropriate one.

Principle of Deterrence

41. The respondent submits that “the particular circumstances of this case warranted the imposition of a sentence that promoted the sentencing object[ive] of deterrence as well as rehabilitation” and that, in the present case, the sentencing judge achieved the correct balance between the two.

42. The appellant submits that “the appellant wrongly bore the brunt of a sentence intended to create general deterrence in respect of such offences and undue weight was given to this as a factor in the sentencing.”

Court’s Analysis & Decision

43. At the hearing of the appeal, the submissions of both parties focused on the sentence for attempted arson and in particular (though not exclusively) on the headline sentence. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appropriate headline sentence would have been in the middle of a range of five to ten years, rather than the ten-year headline sentence imposed in this case. Counsel stressed, in this regard, that the appellant had merely attempted arson rather than achieved his objective, that he had subsequently achieved insight into the seriousness of the offence (and in particular had later realised that the house he had targeted was occupied and that the people inside must have been terrified) and that he was very young at the time. On this last point, counsel argued that the appellant was only “chronologically an adult”.

44. These arguments do not withstand any serious scrutiny. The fact that the attempted arson was not successful was not down to any lack of effort, or intent, on the part of Mr. Ward. As counsel for the DPP submitted to us, the sentencing judge’s comments (in passing sentence on a co-defendant) are of some relevance on this point. At page 14 of the transcript of the hearing on the 16th of July 2024, the judge noted that “the window was broken and there was a flame for three or four seconds and it was quenched by a woman or a man in the house”. The difference between attempted arson and a successful firebombing of the house in question was wafer thin. In any event, what the appellant succeeded in doing was to launch a night-time attack on a family home, thereby terrifying the mother and three young children inside.

45. The submission as to Mr. Ward’s subsequent insight into the seriousness of what he had done is even less plausible. As counsel accepted during the course of the argument, Mr. Ward’s account that he did not know that the house was occupied is hard to believe; or, as counsel put it, there are “elements” of this account that “are difficult to reconcile”. Put simply, one struggles to believe that Mr. Ward did not know that the house he sought to burn down was occupied for a number of reasons. The house was not derelict; instead, it was an ordinary family home in a housing estate. There was a car parked outside the house. It was also the middle of the night when the attack occurred. It is simply unreal to suggest, as counsel did, that an “element of naivety” on Mr. Ward’s part meant that he was unaware that there were people in the house he chose to firebomb.

46. As to Mr. Ward’s age at the time of the offence, it is simply incorrect to suggest that he was effectively a minor. Mr. Ward was closer to twenty years of age than he was to turning eighteen. He was a father at the time he committed these offences. In those circumstances, the argument that he should have been treated as in effect a minor is ill founded. Mr. Ward was, correctly, sentenced as having been a responsible adult at the time of the commission of these crimes.

47. As noted at paragraphs 31 and 32 of this judgment, the written submissions of counsel for Mr. Ward argued that the sentencing judge had erred in describing the appellant as the “ring leader”. While this was not advanced at the hearing of the appeal, it should be noted that (of the group in the car) Mr. Ward was the only adult, was the driver of the vehicle and was the one who then reported back in vivid terms that the attack had been carried out; see paragraph

11 of this judgment. In addition, the group was travelling in Mr. Ward’s family car. Each of these factors point strongly to Mr. Ward being the ringleader of the gang carrying out the attack. The sentencing judge was quite correct in that regard. The sentencing judge’s remarks show clearly that he was aware of the fact that there were others (or another) to whom the appellant was reporting. This does not diminish Mr. Ward’s role as leader of the group which actually attempted arson.

48. We agree with the sentencing judge’s view that the principle of deterrence is strongly engaged by the facts of this case. This was a premeditated attack carried out in the context of a violent, intense and longstanding feud. While, as already noted, it was submitted on behalf of Mr. Ward that deterrence had featured excessively in the sentencing judge’s analysis this argument was not elaborated upon in the course of the hearing before us. It would also appear to be one without any merit in the circumstances of this case.

49. Apart from the issue of the headline sentence, it was argued at the hearing of this appeal that the sentencing judge had not sufficiently taken into account the mitigating factors in this case. These factors were said to include the signed plea of guiltyF, the fact that Mr. Ward had both kept all appointments with the probation service and undertaken a number of courses, and had not otherwise come to the attention of the Gardai. In this context, Mr. Ward’s late “insight” into the seriousness of his crimes and his youth were also argued to be relevant; we have already noted the somewhat exaggerated nature of these submissions by reference to the headline sentence, and there is no need to repeat those observations here.

50. We are of the view that the sentencing judge committed no error of principle in considering each of these features. As Mr. Ward’s counsel accepted during the appeal hearing, these are ultimately “marginal” matters. The sentencing judge identified Mr. Ward’s youth, the signed guilty plea, the fact that he was doing the “dirty work” of others and the fact that he was “ a first-time offender who has not come to notice since and has complied with strict bail conditions since.” However, the sentencing judge did not just pay lip service to these factors. Instead, he reduced the headline sentence by a quarter and went on to suspend the balance by a further eighteen months. In so doing, we do not believe that he went outside what was permitted by his discretion.

51. We will therefore dismiss the appeal.