Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against High Court striking out frivolous and vexatious civil action as abuse of process.

AN CHÚIRT ACHOMHAIRC THE COURT OF APPEAL APPROVED – NO REDACTION NEEDED Court of Appeal Record Number: 2025/83 High Court Record Number: 2020/8318 P Neutral Citation Number: [2025] IECA 224

Faherty J. McDonald J. Collins J.

BETWEEN/ EUGENIE HOUSTON

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

- AND -

LEONIE REYNOLDS

DEFENDANT

- AND -

IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Anthony M. Collins delivered on the 21st day of November 2025

I. Background to the Appeal

1. These proceedings commenced by Plenary Summons issued out of the Central Office of the High Court on 11 December 2020 in which Ms. Eugenie Houston (hereafter ‘the appellant’) sought various reliefs against the Hon. Ms. Justice Leonie Reynolds (hereafter ‘the defendant’), Ireland and the Attorney General (hereafter ‘the respondents’). The appellant’s claim consisted of allegations that the defendant misconducted High Court proceedings Nos. 2017/6661 P and 2017/377 SP, at the hearing of which the appellant appeared in person.

2. On 27 October 2022, the appellant purported to deliver a Statement of Claim to the Office of the Chief State Solicitor. On 17 January 2023, the defendant/respondents caused to have issued a motion that sought, inter alia, relief under R.S.C. Ord. 19, r. 28 and/or pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to strike out the appellant’s action on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was bound to fail, frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse of process.

3. The High Court (Sanfey J.) heard that motion on 3 October and 6 December 2023. He reserved judgment, which he delivered on 7 February 2024 ([2024] IEHC 64). Paragraphs 101 and 102 thereof are in the terms following:

In all the circumstances, it is clear that the proceedings themselves are frivolous and vexatious, and bound to fail. To the extent that the claims are based on factual assertions relating to misconduct or misfeasance, there is no credible basis for suggesting that the facts are as asserted. I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to grant the reliefs sought at para. 1 of the notice of motion pursuant to O.19, r.28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts striking out the plaintiff’s plenary summons and statement of claim as against the defendants and dismissing the plaintiff’s action on the grounds that the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and that the action is frivolous and vexatious.

Alternatively, I am satisfied to make an order pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court dismissing the plaintiff’s action as against the defendants on the grounds that it is bound to fail and/or is frivolous and/or vexatious and/or an abuse of process.

4. Meanwhile, on 9 February 2023, the respondents had caused to have issued out of the Central Office of the High Court a motion in these proceedings whereby they sought an order pursuant to that court’s inherent jurisdiction to restrain the appellant from issuing proceedings against any of the persons and/or classes of persons identified in a schedule attached thereto in the absence of an order of the President of the High Court or of a judge of the High Court nominated by the said President granting leave to issue such proceedings, otherwise described as an Isaac Wunder order. The schedule to that order included any person who holds or has held the office of judge or registrar of the District, Circuit and High Courts, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court; the Minister for Justice, Ireland and/or the Attorney General or any person who has held either of those offices; the Courts Service and any of its employees; any current or former member of the legal profession. At the time the High Court delivered its reserved judgment on the application to strike out these proceedings that motion had not been heard. It is therefore unsurprising that para. 110 of the judgment on the motion to strike out the proceedings concluded with the statement that the learned High Court judge would conduct a brief hearing on 13 February 2024 “…in relation to the issue of the costs of the motion and the proceedings, or any other orders which the parties consider necessary.”

5. On 13 February 2024, the High Court, pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction, struck out the appellant’s action and dismissed it as being bound to fail, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. That order further records that the High Court acceded to the application of Counsel for the respondents for a stay on the execution of the orders that it had made “… pending the determination at High Court level of the said Motion of the Defendants pursuant to Notice of Motion filed herein the 9th day of February 2023”.

6. The respondents’ motion of 9 February 2023 came on for hearing before the High Court on 26 June 2024, which hearing resumed on 19 December 2024. The High Court (Sanfey J.) reserved judgment, which it delivered on 5 February 2025 ([2025] IEHC 58, hereafter ‘the judgment under appeal’). By order of 18 February 2025, the High Court granted the relief sought in the respondents’ notice of motion and directed that the appellant pay to the respondents the costs of the motion and order, such costs to be adjudicated upon in default of agreement.

7. On 2 April 2025, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in the Office against the High Court Order of 18 February 2025. On 24 April 2025, the respondents filed a Respondent’s Notice which, by way of general preliminary response, observed that the appellant had failed to plead or to identify any finding of fact or law in the judgment under appeal that she contended had been made in error before it traversed seriatim such grounds as appeared in the said Notice of Appeal.

8. On 20 June 2025, this Court (McDonald J.) extended the time for the delivery of the appellant’s submissions to 30 June 2025 in which she was directed to address separately the amended grounds that she proposed to include in her Notice of Appeal. The Court further directed that the appellant issue a motion seeking leave to amend the Notice of Appeal returnable for 4 July 2025 and that the respondents deliver their submissions by 14 July 2025. The appellant complied with neither of these directions: the respondents filed their submissions in accordance therewith. The motion seeking leave to amend the Notice of Appeal ultimately issued on 30 June 2025 and was served on the respondents’ solicitors on 15 July 2025. The additional grounds in respect of which leave to amend was sought were not identified in the motion papers that were ultimately served on the respondents’ solicitors on 18 July 2025.

9. On that last date, this Court (McDonald J.) granted the appellant leave to amend the Notice of Appeal by adding eight grounds of appeal on terms, notably that she filed and served her amended Notice of Appeal together with submissions that addressed each of the amended grounds. The submissions the appellant delivered on 23 July 2025 did not comply with that direction, by reason of which, in both the supplemental written submissions that the Office received on 28 July 2025, and at the hearing of the appeal on 31 July 2025, the respondents objected to the admission of those additional grounds of appeal. Without prejudice to that objection, the respondents’ submissions responded to all of the grounds the appellant advanced.

II. The Appeal

10. The amended Notice of Appeal recites a number of matters that, on their face, are incapable of constituting grounds of appeal. The operation of a legal system that purports to be guided by the maxim audi alteram partem requires parties that bring proceedings to articulate their case in a manner that, viewed objectively, is capable of being understood both by their opponents and the Court with seisin of the matter. It is impossible to do justice between parties in circumstances where one party does not know the case that it has to meet: see Mahon v. Celbridge Spinning Co. Ltd. [1967] I.R. 1, 3 per Fitzgerald J.; Cooney v. Browne [1985] I.R. 185, 191 per Henchy J. Nor should a party, still less a Court, be placed in a situation where it must speculate as to the claims being advanced in proceedings.

11. A careful reading of the Notice of Appeal and the appellant’s oral and written submissions appears to disclose the following grounds of appeal. First, the respondents lacked standing to bring the motion. Second, the High Court had no jurisdiction to make the order of 18 February 2025 since it had dismissed the proceedings by order of 13 February 2024. Third, the Isaac Wunder order made on 18 February 2025 violated EU law. Fourth, that Isaac Wunder order denies the appellant her right to fair procedures and constitutional justice. Fifth, the judgment under appeal is insufficiently reasoned. Sixth, the High Court failed to apply or to assess correctly the case law on Isaac Wunder orders. Seventh, the High Court judge made an order for his personal benefit. Eighth, the High Court has no jurisdiction to make an Isaac Wunder order. Ninth, the respondents could not seek an Isaac Wunder order without having first obtained the consent of those protected by it. Tenth, there was insufficient evidence before the High Court to justify it making an Isaac Wunder order.

12. At Part III, below, I analyse each of these grounds of appeal in the light of the parties’ submissions. At this juncture, I would point out that none of these ascertained grounds impugn any of the findings of fact that the learned High Court judge made on the basis of the evidence presented to him, on which basis he concluded at para. 74 of the judgment under appeal that the circumstances amply justified the imposition of an Isaac Wunder order in the terms sought. It is well-established that whilst this Court may rely on its own judgment as to whether an assessment of facts based upon affidavit or documentary evidence is correct, a party who claims that a trial judge erred in making that assessment bears the burden of proving that it was wrong: see Northern Bank Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Charlton [1979] I.R. 149, 180 per O’Higgins C.J.: 192-3 per Henchy J.; McDonagh v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd. [2018] 2 I.R. 1, para.

163 per Charleton J., cited in A.K. v. U.S. [2022] IECA 65, para. 51 per Murray J. The appellant has made no attempt to discharge that burden in this appeal, by reason of which the findings of fact made in the High Court are taken as final and binding upon this Court.

III. Analysis of the Grounds of Appeal

(a) First ground: respondents’ lack of standing

13. Paragraph 84 of the judgment under appeal states that:

In my view, the applicants are uniquely placed to prosecute the present application, and are entitled to do so. They are parties to the present action, but are in any event directly and closely concerned with the operation of the administration of justice, and the protection of the courts system from abuse. They are entitled to bring to the attention of the court the institution of proceedings by the plaintiff in the past which constituted an abuse of process, and the circumstances that suggest a probability of the plaintiff perpetrating an abuse of the court’s processes in the future. They are also entitled to seek appropriate orders to address the anticipated abuse.

14. The appellant has made no argument to dispute that finding, let alone identify any error in the judgment under appeal in its ruling on that issue. That is sufficient justification to dismiss the first ground of appeal.

15. Without prejudice to the foregoing, paras. 27 to 31 of the judgment under appeal describe the rationale for Isaac Wunder orders and the principles upon which they may issue. As Noonan J. observed at paras.

24 and 25 of his judgment in Fitzsimons v. Bank of Scotland Plc [2019] IECA 336, cited at para. 28 of the judgment under appeal, the right of access to the Courts is not absolute, parties are entitled to protection from meeting oppressive and abusive claims and the Courts are, in the public interest, entitled to protect their own processes from abuse. Since one of the fundamental motivations for making Isaac Wunder orders is to protect the public interest, it is difficult to envisage how that interest could be asserted if Ireland and, in particular, the Attorney General did not have standing to make an application for that purpose: see, for example, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Industry and Energy (No. 2) [1983] I.R. 88, 101 per Keane J.

16. For these reasons, I dismiss the first ground of appeal.

(b) Second ground: no jurisdiction by reason of the dismissal of the proceedings

17. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant asserted that once the High Court had dismissed the proceedings by order of 13 February 2024, the parties were thereafter precluded from bringing any new motion that ought to have been dealt with before then, by reason of which the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ motion of 9 February 2023. The appellant cited no authority for that proposition.

18. My first observation is that the respondents’ motion of 9 February 2023 issued well in advance of 13 February 2024. The motion was thus pending before the High Court on the latter of those two dates and no

‘new’ motion issued thereafter. Second, on 13 February 2024, the respondents successfully applied to the High Court for a stay on the order to dismiss the proceedings until their motion of 9 February 2023 had been adjudicated upon. The success of that application had the consequence that the proceedings remained in being until that event occurred. The appellant has not shown how that state of affairs is unlawful. Third, the appellant has not, to date, appealed the order to dismiss these proceedings, which in the light of the grounds for that dismissal and their impact upon this appeal, seems to be inconsistent with an argument that the High Court’s power to entertain the respondents’ motion expired on 13 February 2024. Fourth, since it is clear from para.

24 of the judgment under appeal that the respondents always intended their application to have prospective effect, the logic of the appellant’s submissions would create circumstances where a party that had succeeded in obtaining an order to strike out proceedings by reason of their being condemned as bound to fail, frivolous and vexatious, would be required to commence a fresh set of proceedings to obtain an Isaac Wunder order that had, at least in part, been obtained as a consequence of that strike out order.

19. I dismiss the second ground of appeal for these reasons.

(c) Third ground: violation of EU law

20. Paragraphs 93 to 96 of the judgment under appeal disclose that, whilst the appellant sought to assert before the High Court what she described as her “guaranteed EU law rights including Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 19(1)” the grounds upon which she based that argument were far from clear, the learned High Court judge having observed at para. 96 of that judgment that “[t]he reference to “Article 19.1” is not understood, and does not appear to have been developed in argument by Ms. Houston.” It seems the appellant delivered written submissions to the respondents in this appeal on 23 July 2025, in which she purported to amplify whatever argument she had made before the High Court, relying upon, inter alia, what she described as “autonomous and self-standing” rights under Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (hereafter ‘TEU’). Notwithstanding some serious doubts whether the appellant had addressed that issue before the High Court and, if so, the arguments she advanced to support it, my consideration of the third ground of appeal attempts to address the various points that she appears to make under this rubric.

21. In appearing on her own behalf as a barrister before the Courts of Ireland, the appellant asserts that she is engaged in the provision of services as defined in Art. 57 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter ‘TFEU’), by reason of which her EU law rights are engaged. A national provision that obstructs her right to provide those services “…without begging for permission from Barniville P. or any other Judge must be disapplied…”

22. The appellant is faced with an immediate, if not insuperable, difficulty in making out that case. The Isaac Wunder order the High Court made restrains her from issuing proceedings against identified persons and entities without prior leave. It does not in any way purport to prevent her from taking instructions from solicitors on behalf of their clients and exercising her right of audience before the Courts in her capacity as counsel. Since the Isaac Wunder order does not apply to the exercise of her profession as a barrister, the arguments that she seeks to make by reference to and in reliance upon that status are a ius tertii and can be dismissed on that ground alone. It is therefore unnecessary to examine a number of other issues that might otherwise arise for consideration, including whether (a) the services that barristers provide include applications to issue out proceedings, (b) a barrister may act on his/her own behalf before a Court without being required to engage a solicitor, (c) self-instruction is normally provided for remuneration so as to satisfy the definition of a service under Art. 57 TFEU, and (d) services that one provides to oneself are confined in all respects within a single Member State such that the freedom to provide services cannot apply: see para. 47 of the judgment in Case C-268/15 Ullens de Schooten EU:C:2016:874 and the case-law cited.

23. Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereafter ‘the Charter’) states that its provisions are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. Other than the manifestly unfounded assertion that the respondents sought an Isaac Wunder order to prevent her from exercising her profession as a barrister, the circumstances in which this application has been brought do not show that, in so doing, they are implementing EU law. The appellant is thus not entitled to rely upon Art. 47 of the Charter to resist the respondents’ application.

24. Article 2 TEU provides that the European Union is founded upon the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights. The appellant purports to rely upon the Opinion of Čapeta AG in Case C-769/22 Commission v. Hungary (Union Values) EU:C:2025:408 on the ground that the Isaac Wunder order sought infringes her “autonomous and self-standing rights” under that provision. She cites no other authority in support of that proposition.

25. In response, I gratefully adopt what the respondents set out at para.

25 of the “Outline Supplemental Submissions” they caused to have filed in the Office on 28 July 2025, in particular sub-para. 1 thereof, which refers to paras. 152 and 153 of the Opinion of Čapeta AG. Under the heading “Justiciability of Article 2 TEU” those paragraphs observe that the infringement procedure before the Court of Justice in Case C-769/22 “only raises the question as to whether Article 2 TEU can be used by the Court of Justice… for the judicial review of a Member State’s legislation in the context of an infringement procedure” and does not “raise the question of either the direct or interpretive effect of Article 2 TEU”. It suffices to hold that before this Court the appellant seeks to rely upon an Opinion of an Advocate General that was delivered in proceedings before the Court of Justice in which the argument that she seeks to advance in this appeal was never made.

26. The second paragraph of Art. 19.1 TEU requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law. I surmise from the appellant’s diffuse submissions on this point that her case is that the restrictions contained in the proposed Isaac Wunder order will block her access to the effective judicial protection that the first named respondent must ensure by virtue of that provision. The appellant also appears to assert that, in order to comply with Art. 19.1 TEU, the power to make, and the procedure to grant, an Isaac Wunder order must be provided for by statute.

27. In order to determine the first issue, it is necessary to ascertain the features of the proposed Isaac Wunder order. It purports to restrain forthwith the appellant from issuing proceedings against the persons or classes of persons identified in the schedule to the High Court order without prior leave of the President of that Court or a judge that he nominates for the purpose of hearing an application for leave to issue such proceedings. It thus introduces a screening mechanism for any proceedings that the appellant may wish to take against the persons and bodies that appear in the schedule to that order. The order does not have retroactive effect and has no consequences for any proceedings already in being. It places no restraint upon the appellant issuing proceedings against persons or bodies that do not appear in the schedule. Paragraphs

87 and 88 of the judgment under appeal represent that since the purpose of the order is to prevent the appellant commencing vexatious proceedings against identified persons or bodies, the screening mechanism is no obstacle to her commencing bona fide proceedings against those same persons or bodies. The appellant may bring proceedings to assert any rights that she may enjoy in the fields covered by EU law against any party other than those listed in the schedule to the Isaac Wunder order. She may also commence proceedings for that purpose against persons and bodies that appear in that schedule with leave of a Judge of the High Court, which leave must be afforded where the proceedings she seeks to commence are not frivolous or vexatious in nature. Viewed in that light, I do not consider that the appellant has established that the Isaac Wunder order in fact operates to prevent her from access to effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law, by reason of which that order is not caught by Art. 19.1 TEU. On that approach, the second issue the appellant raises simply falls away.

28. If one considers the matter from the perspective that the Isaac Wunder order the respondents seek in fact comes within the scope of the measures caught by Art. 19.1 TEU, it is well established that it is for the national legal systems of each Member State to determine the procedural conditions governing actions that are intended to ensure the protection of rights which individuals derive from EU law. Those procedural conditions should not be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature (principle of equivalence) and should not contain conditions that would make it impossible in practice to exercise the EU law rights that national courts are obliged to protect (principle of effectiveness): see Case 45/76 Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen EU:C:1976:191, paras. 13 - 16. The first requirement is met by the fact that Isaac Wunder orders issue to restrain the repeated commencement of proceedings exclusively by reference to their frivolous and vexatious character, not their subject matter. The discussion in para. 27, above, demonstrates that the second requirement is also met: the appellant has not shown that the screening requirement the proposed Isaac Wunder order will impose makes it impossible in practice for her to exercise any right that she enjoys at EU law. That finding is sufficient to determine the first issue. As for the second, whilst the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of proceedings are amongst the considerations to be taken into account in an assessment of the compliance of a national rule of procedure with the principle of effectiveness: Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck EU:C:1995:437, para. 14, no authority was cited to the effect that compliance with those principles or, by extension Art. 19.1 TEU, requires that Member States enact legislation to confer jurisdiction upon national courts or tribunals. In any event, Art. 34.3.1° of the Constitution of Ireland expressly invests the High Court with full original jurisdiction to determine all matters and questions, whether of fact or law, civil or criminal.

29. In my opinion, these reasons both justify the dismissal of the third ground of appeal and explain why this Court need not make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Art. 267 TFEU.

(d) Fourth ground: denial of fair procedures and constitutional justice

30. The appellant has advanced no evidence whatsoever to support the proposition that she was denied fair procedures and/or constitutional justice in the conduct of the proceedings before the High Court: to the contrary, as para. 97 of the judgment under appeal indicates, the High Court afforded the appellant every indulgence to make out her case, as indeed did this Court throughout the course of this appeal.

31. Insofar as this ground of appeal may be interpreted as an assertion that the making of an Isaac Wunder order against the appellant denies her access to fair procedures and the benefit of constitutional justice, she has made no argument before this Court to explain how the principles described at paras. 27 to 31 of the judgment under appeal are incorrect as a matter of law. She has, moreover, failed to explain how the following passage from para. 27 of the judgment of Meenan J. in Ulster Bank Ireland DAC & Ors. v. McDonagh & Ors. [2024] IECA 276, cited at para. 77 of the judgment under appeal, which succinctly describes the effect of an Isaac Wunder order, denies her access to fair procedures and/or constitutional justice:

An Isaac Wunder order requires the person subject to it to seek the leave of the court before instituting any proceedings or applications against any of the persons listed in the order or in relation to the subject matter with which it is concerned. It does not prevent the institution of proceedings per se, rather it imposes a screening mechanism to ensure that the party for whose benefit it is made is not subjected to further vexatious proceedings. Clearly if a person subject to an Isaac Wunder order can satisfy a court that they have a bona fide cause of action, the court will grant leave for the institution of proceedings reflecting that cause of action. Further, the existence of an Isaac Wunder order does not impose any restriction on the defence of proceedings by the person subject to it, whether those proceedings are in being at the time of the making of the order or are issued subsequently.

32. Absent any identifiable argument advanced in support thereof, the fourth ground of appeal must stand dismissed.

(e) Fifth ground: the judgment under appeal is insufficiently reasoned

33. Having considered a number of authorities on the point, at para. 156 of his judgment in NECI v. Labour Court & Ors. [2021] IESC 36, MacMenamin J. framed three questions that a court may ask when it is called upon to assess the adequacy of reasons in a judgment. Could the parties know, in general terms, why the judgment reached its conclusion? Did the parties have enough information to consider whether they could, or should, appeal the judgment? Were the reasons contained in the judgment sufficient to allow this Court to engage properly in such an appeal? He further observed at para. 157 of his judgment that the application of that test was to be assessed from an objective standpoint.

34. The appellant’s written and oral submissions neither engage in this or any similar analysis of the judgment, nor do they identify, even in broad terms, how the High Court failed to provide sufficient reasons for its decision. For that reason alone this ground of appeal must fail. An objective reader of the judgment under appeal will, in any event, readily appreciate that it sets out the facts from which the respondents’ motion arose, identified the law on Isaac Wunder orders, considered the facts relevant to the categories of the intended defendants listed in the schedule to the proposed Isaac Wunder order and proceeded to apply the law as identified to those facts. There is thus no basis upon which this Court could hold, by reference to the test described at para. 33, above, that the judgment under appeal is insufficiently reasoned.

(f) Sixth ground: failure to apply or to assess correctly the law on Isaac Wunder orders

35. The considerations adumbrated at para. 27, above, are equally relevant to the consideration of this ground of appeal. The appellant has not identified how the High Court erred in its assessment and application of the law governing Isaac Wunder orders, absent which it must be dismissed. Paragraphs 27 to 31 of the judgment under appeal contain a correct description of the principles that rule the availability of Isaac Wunder orders. Paragraphs 32 to 73 thereof contain a concise but nonexhaustive summary of the matters upon which the respondents relied to demonstrate the necessity to make an Isaac Wunder order with regard to the individuals and entities listed in the schedule to the Notice of Motion. In that context it should be observed that nowhere in her oral and written submissions does the appellant contest the High Court’s account of her behaviour in the various actions to which it referred in its judgment, neither does she seek to challenge the conclusions that that court reached on the basis of that account.

(g) Seventh ground: the High Court judge made an order for his personal benefit

36. In their submissions the respondents describe this ground as consisting of an allegation of objective bias. Since the appellant does not appear to allege actual bias against Sanfey J., her claim under this heading may be so described.

37. The Notice of Appeal recites that each Judge of the Superior Courts is a Bencher of the Honorable Society of King’s Inns and as such “…supports the removal of the Appellant’s rights procured by the requirement to sign an undertaking for their benefit as benchers…” Insofar as the appellant advances any argument on this basis, I adopt the statements at paras. 34 and 39 of the judgment of Collins J. in Houston v. Doyle [2020] IECA 289 to the effect that the fact that a Judge of the Superior Courts may be a Bencher of the Honorable Society of King’s Inns does not give rise to any bias, or reasonable perception of bias, against the appellant.

38. The Isaac Wunder order the High Court made with respect to the appellant does not confer a benefit upon Sanfey J. or upon any other Judge of the Superior Courts. The case law referenced at paras. 27 to 31 of the judgment under appeal, the pertinence of which the appellant does not challenge, makes it clear that the principal purpose of the jurisdiction to make orders of that nature is to prevent public resources being absorbed in the management, assessment and determination of repeated proceedings that have a frivolous and/or vexatious character. Since Isaac Wunder orders are made to protect the public interest in facilitating access to the courts by parties with genuine disputes that require resolution, the exercise of the jurisdiction to make those orders does not engage any private interest. Whilst that is sufficient to dispose of this ground of appeal, I would add that, were members of the judiciary to be prevented from exercising the jurisdiction to make such orders by reason of a perception that they might have a personal interest in the outcome, it would seem to follow that courts could not determine any issues that might touch upon the operation of the judicial branch of government, notably its independence. On that approach, courts would be incompetent to decide cases such as, in the Irish context, Buckley & Ors. v. Attorney General & Ors. [1950] I.R. 67 or, in the context of EU law, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A.K. (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) EU:C:2019:982, upon which latter authority the appellant purports to rely in this appeal.

(h) Eighth ground: the High Court has no power to make an Isaac Wunder order

39. This ground of appeal encounters two insurmountable hurdles. First, para. 94 of the judgment under appeal recites that “…no basis whatsoever was set out for the contention that …. the Irish Courts are not entitled to make balanced and proportionate orders to protect their own processes.” The eighth ground of appeal not having been advanced in the High Court, this Court is not in a position to receive it save where that reception is clearly mandated in the interests of justice: see Cave Projects Ltd. v. Gilhooley & Ors. [2025] IESC 3, para. 27 per Hogan J., citing KD (orse. C) v. MC [1985] I.R. 697, 701 per Finlay C.J. The appellant has not even attempted to show how this Court’s reception of that ground is in the interests of justice, by reason of which it does not arise for consideration. Second, the appellant has advanced no argument in support of this ground. For these reasons, I would dismiss the eighth ground of appeal.

(i) Ninth ground: the respondents could not seek an Isaac Wunder order without the consent of those protected by it

40. As the purpose of an Isaac Wunder order is to facilitate access to the Courts by persons who seek to invoke their jurisdiction to resolve genuine legal disputes and to protect the Courts from the abuse of their procedures, it follows that such orders are dispensed only where it is clearly demonstrated that it is in the public interest. The respondents assert the public interest in the existence and the availability of a functioning court system. That invocation falls to be assessed on its own merits, without regard being had to whether it coincides with the interest of an individual or of a group of persons.

41. As I observe at para. 15, above, the respondents are uniquely placed to assert the public interest. They may therefore do so without seeking the consent of, or by reference to, any person whom the appellant identifies as a ‘beneficiary’ of such orders as a court may make on foot of such an application. The logic behind the ninth ground would lead to a situation where Ireland and/or the Attorney General, which are entrusted with responsibility to assert the public interest, could not do so without obtaining advance authorisation from that same public on behalf of whom the law presumes they are authorised to act. The appellant has identified neither authority nor principle to support such an extraordinary proposition, by reason of which I reject it and, as a consequence, the ninth ground of appeal.

(j) Tenth ground: insufficient evidence before the High Court to justify an Isaac Wunder order

42. As a consequence of the findings of fact contained in the judgment under appeal, which bind this Court, this ground fails for the reasons given at para. 12, above.

IV. Conclusion

43. For all of the reasons set out at Part III, above, I would dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment and order of the High Court.

44. The default position under s. 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 is that a party that has been entirely successful in proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against the unsuccessful party unless the court hearing the matter orders otherwise. I am of the provisional view that the respondents are entitled to an order against the appellant for the costs of the proceedings before this Court, to include any reserved costs. Should the appellant disagree with that proposed order, she should cause to have filed and served a written submission of not more than 1,000 words within fourteen days of the delivery of this judgment, after which the respondents will have a further fourteen days in which to respond by the lodgment and service of a reply of no greater length.

45. Since this judgment is delivered electronically, I am authorised by Faherty and McDonald JJ. to state that they agree with it and with the orders proposed therein.

Appearances:

The Appellant appeared in person

For the Respondents: Douglas Clarke SC (with him Paul Gardiner SC) and Paul Brady, instructed by the Chief State Solicitor