Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against severe consecutive rape sentences, upholding proportionality and mitigation.

APPROVED JUDGMENT

NO REDACTION NEEDED

THE COURT OF APPEAL

[2025] IECA 217

Record No: 264/2024

Charleton J. Edwards J. Burns J.

Between/

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

Respondent

V

A.B.

Appellant

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered (ex tempore) by Mr. Justice Edwards on the 13th day of October, 2025.

Introduction

1. This is an appeal brought by Mr. A.B. (i.e., “the appellant”) against the severity of the sentence imposed on him by the Central Criminal Court in respect of pleas of guilty to one count of oral rape contrary to s. 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 (Count No 3); one count of rape contrary to s. 2 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, as amended (Count No 9); and one count of attempted rape contrary to common law (Count No 14).

2. On the 29th of July 2024, the court below sentenced the appellant to 7 years imprisonment on Count No 3; 9 years imprisonment on Count No 9; and 4 years imprisonment on Count No 14. These sentences were imposed consecutively, with the final two years suspended indefinitely, creating an effective sentence of 18 years imprisonment backdated to the 27th of August 2021.

Factual Background

3. At the sentencing hearings of the 12th of February 2024 and the 17th of June 2024, the Court heard evidence from a D/Inspector Maeve Guckian in respect of the three offences.

4. D/Inspector Guckian confirmed that the offending in question related to three separate complainants at three distinct locations. The three complainants offered their services as escorts through a particular website. In each case, the appellant employed each complainant to provide sexual services to him and organised for them to attend at his home. The appellant gave each complainant a nearby address, where he would meet the women and bring them to his home address.

The First Named Complainant

5. On the 29th of January 2021, the first named complainant was contacted by the appellant via WhatsApp, whereupon a fee of €400 was agreed for a two-hour appointment which was to include vaginal sex, oral sex and various positional sex. The complainant’s profile on the escort service website made it clear that a condom was to be used by any person hiring her for any service provided.

6. The complainant arrived at the appellant’s apartment, and she was directed to his bedroom. The appellant then came into the bedroom with a rope and a hammer tucked up towards the sleeve of his clothing. He then flicked the rope into hand, brandished the hammer and pushed the complainant onto the bed and demanded she perform oral sex upon him without a condom.

7. The complainant described being upset, and she pleaded with the appellant to wear a condom while she was performing sexual services upon him. The appellant refused to wear a condom. While the complainant was performing oral sex upon him, he was tapping the hammer on the soles of her feet. The appellant then pushed her face down on the bed and tied her hands with the rope. He removed her underwear and proceeded to masturbate himself over her but had at this point put a condom on.

8. The complainant managed to free herself when the appellant left the room and she ran into the bathroom off the bedroom, locking the door. Thereafter she ran out the front door and returned to her home. She subsequently reported the incident to An Garda Síochána, and she was later brought to the sexual assault treatment unit in the Rotunda hospital where a full examination took place.

9. The following day, on foot of a search warrant, gardaí attended the appellant’s residence. During the search of his premises, a number of items were seized from around the apartment, and these appeared to corroborate the account that had been provided by the complainant as to what happened the day before. Specifically, a small silver hammer was discovered.

The Second Named Complainant

10. On the 13th of August 2021 the second named complainant received a text message from the appellant during which a fee of €300 was agreed for a two-hour visit for what was referred to as the “girlfriend experience”, which included kissing, massage, oral sex, various positional sex, and vaginal intercourse. It was made clear during this agreement that a condom was required for all services. A taxi fare was also included in the fee.

11. The complainant arrived at the appellant’s apartment and was of the view that “he seemed out of it” and “drugged”. The appellant took the complainants phones and produced a screwdriver from the pocket of his bathrobe which he held to her neck. He repeatedly stated, “Don’t mess with me, motherfucker”, and threatened to kill her. The complainant reported that she felt like her life was in danger at this point. The appellant dragged her backwards into the bedroom and shouted at her to remove her clothes, including the brace which she was wearing. The complainant had undergone abdominal surgery in the August prior to the incident and was wearing a form of brace as a result.

12. The appellant pushed her face down onto the bed and then forced her to perform oral sex upon him. He then grabbed her by the throat, flipped her over and vaginally raped her. The appellant had the screwdriver in his hand throughout the incident. Following this, the appellant proceeded to anally rape the complainant. The complainant pleaded with the appellant not to, stating that she was in pain, and he repeatedly said, “don’t fuck with me”.

13. Following this, the complainant got dressed and tried to leave. The appellant brought her to the living room, where she declined a glass of wine and informed him that she could not leave until he paid her.

14. The complainant subsequently left in a taxi. She informed a friend of the incident but did not immediately report it to An Garda Síochána as she afraid her family, who were unaware of her work, might find out. She later reported the incident on the 27th of August 2021.

The Third Named Complainant

15. On the 27th of August 2021, the third named complainant was contacted on WhatsApp by the appellant. A fee of €250 was agreed for an “out call”, meaning she would travel to the appellant’s residence. Upon her arrival to his apartment, the appellant guided the complainant initially to the living room and then to the bedroom.

16. Upon entering the bedroom, the appellant was brandishing a screwdriver and shouted at the complainant to remove her clothing, and he informed her that they were going to have sex, or he would kill her. The complainant began banging on the window in an attempt to break it and attract help. The appellant then threatened to kill her again if she did not “shut up”. The complainant fought back and described slapping and kicking the appellant, with one of her kicks landing on his nose and causing it to bleed. The appellant called her a “crazy bitch” and shouted at her to leave.

17. The complainant left the premises, and two passerby’s who had enquired with her about her welfare called An Garda Síochána and reported that there was a distraught woman who had apparently been the subject of an attack. Gardaí subsequently arrived at the scene and a report was taken from the complainant.

Appellant’s Interviews in Garda Custody

18. The appellant was arrested on the 27th of August 2021 and brought to a Garda station for questioning. He was interviewed on seven occasions. The first three interviews concerned the incident with the third named complainant. The appellant accepted that he had physically grabbed her and had thrown her onto the bed but related all of this to his belief that she had stolen from him. During the fourth and fifth interviews, the appellant was questioned concerning the second named complainant. The appellant denied raping her and having a screwdriver. He maintained they had consensual sexual intercourse. During the sixth and seventh interviews, the appellant was questioned concerning the incident involving the first named complainant. He denied the allegations put to him.

Victim Impact Statements

19. Three victim impact statements, prepared by the three complainants were read out in court by Mr. Smyth, counsel for the prosecution.

First Named Complainant

20. Firstly, the first named complainant set out under the heading “Physical Injuries”: “Before the incident, my life was already stressful because of the work I do. When I met this person, his appearance scared me. He gave me the impression of an untrustworthy person, and I was right. He turned out to be a dangerous man, and I was abused mentally and physically. And to this day, even though I know he is locked up, I'm still bothered by the experience I'd been through at the time.”

21. The complainant further elaborated under subheadings of “Psychological or Psychiatric Effects”, “Life Changes” and “Additional Information” that she is frightened to go out since the incident. She states that she had difficulty being intimate with her husband, and that it took her a year before she was able to work again. She details that she has panic attacks, especially since she started working again. She outlines that she has seen a doctor, and she was prescribed medications.

Second Named Complainant

22. The second named complainant first outlined that she suffered injuries to her rectum as a result of the appellant’s actions but that she did not seek medical attention for such as she initially was, “afraid of reporting the rape and uncertain about what would happen to [her] afterwards”.

23. She then outlined the psychological effects which were caused to her by the appellant’s offending, where she stated: “After this event, I fell into a deep depression. I suffered panic attacks and anxiety. I believed I was being followed, that someone was going to break into my house. I experienced delusions of persecution, couldn't sleep for almost three days, and cried constantly. I began drinking heavily to try to get some sleep. Every second, I was haunted by what happened in that house, and I didn't know how to escape that man's grasp. I searched for some explanation for what I was experiencing. I am still grappling with these thoughts. The depression never abated, and despite my efforts to move forward, this individual shattered my entire life. I was never able to recover from the fear and mistrust. I can't be alone. All this pain affected not only my professional life; I couldn't work for a while due to fear, but also my personal life. I couldn't finish my master's degree and my social life. I completely isolated myself, unable to confide in anyone about what happened, or what I was going through. This isolation led to the unravelling of many aspects of my life; personal relationships, work opportunities and more.”

24. The second named complainant then went on to outline how this offending has impacted her life since. She stated: “The fear and the mistrust became my daily living. I didn't want to see anyone. I felt a lot of shame. After this event, I struggled to form relationships with other men because I feared getting hurt. A fear that deep down, they might be secret deviants. I isolated myself for a while. I have to finish paying my master's degree in digital marketing in Barcelona because I couldn't bring myself to work with men. Working as an escort, I was able to cover the University bills, but after this event, I abandoned everything and retreated in fear and pain. The only thing that slowly comforted my heart was getting close to my family. I started spending more time at home. It was the only place that I felt safe. However, soon I started having problems with my family because they didn't understand what was happening to me; why I was crying, why I was depressed. I remember clearly, that in those times, I thought several times in taking my own life. I couldn't cope any longer with the depression and with this secret. I was afraid to live on my own, afraid to go back to work, afraid to return to my previous lifestyle. I watched time pass, hoping to eventually overcome this event, and return to my old self, but now I realise that even a thousand years were to pass, this is an event that I will never forget. I must learn to live with it without letting it affect those around me, learn how to live with the pain. Despite never receiving any help or treatment, I have learned to manage the anxiety, the depression, hoping that one day my heart will shine again like it once did, and I will fight until the end that this individual that took away half of myself, won't do that to anyone every again. Thank you everyone. I want to take this opportunity to express special gratitude to [K] for unwavering support, her understanding and her commitment to me and to justice. To [L], as well. Thank you with all my heart. And to all the people who have listened to us and who fight every day to ensure that men who hurt women are held accountable. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.”

Third Named Complainant

25. The third named complainant detailed that she was stabbed in the left side of her body with a screwdriver and scratched from her shoulder to her feet.

26. In terms of psychological effects, in summary she describes that she has been having panic attacks, and that she feels insecurity and fear when working. She details experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder, and that she experiences nightmares since the offending.

27. The complainant details how the incident has affected her life since. She states that her work has decreased, as she is frightened when working. She outlines that she struggles leaving her home and that she does not want to socialise. She states that she is depressed.

28. Finally, under a section titled “Additional Information”, the complainant stated: “I never expected to be this close to this; of this level of madness. I won't never forget those demonic eyes or that screwdriver pointing me to, stabbing me. It was the most dramatic memory I have in my head, and I don't wish this to anyone. I do believe he is a very dangerous person, and I don't even look -- regretting this. I just can say be a woman or a sex worker shouldn't be at risk, and I do believe in justice." And then overleaf, she continues, "I have constant panic attacks.

I have nightmares. I don't sleep well. I don't socialise. I don't feel able to talk. First time I was in court I had a panic attack and I had to lock myself in a bathroom because I couldn't even talk about it. Being constantly under the stress of taking caring myself at work, having to deal with the memory of this bad situation, often makes me have suicidal thoughts. I am in a state of depression that I have to treat myself for, but I don't have time because I have to work. This has been ruining my life, but I will not allow it for much longer, as I will heal, and trusting in justice, he will also have to heal or at least think about it.

I have been abused and raped before, and I have not been listened to. Nowadays, I'm very grateful for this opportunity that shows me that I can believe in justice. Also, I so sorry for the women in his family, whom I saw crying with big pain last time I was in this court, and I still can't understand who a person so consciously wants to do so much harm to women, and I say, consciously because he had a modus operandi. Before I went to his house, he had already tried to contact me other times, but I had ignored him. So, I think he sat down and thought about everything he was going to do.

This is not madness. This is evil. So sorry for that child who was not given the love and education he should have, and turned into this horrible man, but especially when I look at him. When I remember this whole experience, I don't see a man, I see a demon. At some point, I thought that suddenly, he could be drugged or drunk and that when I saw him again, he would be sorry. At some point I tried to understand his behaviour, until later, after therapy with [R], to whom I'm very grateful because they have helped me a lot in this process. I understood that I should not understand evil, that I should only be grateful to God because I have the strength to fight and survive and I would do it a thousand times more because if one more man wants to rape me, he will have to rape my dead body.

As long as I'm alive, I'm going to fight. Being an escort and being a woman should not be a danger in society, but men like him are a danger in society. Here in front of this Court, I want to claim my energy from you for all the pain and all the damage that you have caused me during these years, and all the tears that you have made me suffer. I wish you nothing more than just what you deserve for your bad behaviour. I don't have to explain what I do with my body, or how I decide to live my life, but surely, I don't hurt anyone. The look, I will never forget, that screwdriver, and he had been living in mind all this time.

That experience has certainly made me much stronger, and I will always fight because be a women once again shouldn't be a risk. Thank you to everyone who has accompanied, especially [K], [L], [D], accompanied me in this process, and who has made me understand that I'm a victim, that I am not the one who was wrong, and that I've the right to report to defend myself, and I know that I'm not alone because you have shown me that I can have a voice, even if I'm not in a complicated industry like the sex industry. Thank you for listening to me. Thank you for defending me.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak. Thank you always. Thank you for save me and God bless you all.”

Personal Circumstances of the Appellant

29. D/Inspector Guckian confirmed that the appellant was 28 years of age and that he had been in custody since August 2021.

30. The appellant is the youngest of five children, he has four sisters one of whom passed away when she was four years of age. Further, the appellant is a father to one child (who was

6 years of age at the time of sentencing).

31. D/Inspector Guckian confirmed that the appellant has no previous convictions or history of violence.

32. A probation report of the 13th of June 2024 places the appellant in the medium risk category for sexual re-conviction in the long term. The Stable 2007 risk assessment placed the appellant in the high-risk category. This assessment is used to identify areas to target interventions to address offence related needs and assess whether there has been an increase or decrease in the risk of sexual offending over time.

Psychologist Report

33. A psychologist report prepared by a Dr. Catherine Norton on the 5th of February 2024 was before the sentencing court. The report outlined that the appellant displayed concerning scores on suicide ideation and also high scores on the depression scale.

34. The report details that the appellant outlined that he had joined a recruitment agency when he left Youth Reach and he gained a variety of employment such as Greyhound Bin collections, various manual labour, and factory work positions.

35. The report outlines that the appellant reported being addicted to cocaine, pornography and alcohol. Dr Norton opines that these addictions contributed to the appellant’s offending behaviour.

36. Dr Norton recommends that the appellant receive appropriate professional counselling in order to reduce the significant risk of any future offending behaviours.

Sentencing Judge’s Remarks

37. On the 29th of July 2024, the judge in the Court below passed sentence on the appellant. The sentencing judge noted that that appellant entered pleas of guilty to three counts (Count No’s 3, 9 and 14) on the indictment on a full facts’ basis.

38. The sentencing judge noted that this was a case which involved considered and planned and serious offending of a sequential variety. He stated: “The second offence was committed in the light of and with knowledge of the first and the third offence was likewise committed with knowledge of and in the light of the first two. So, it cries out for a consecutive sentencing regime, and that is what is going to follow in this case.”

39. The sentencing judge identified headline sentences of 12 years imprisonment on Count No 3; 16 years imprisonment on Count No 9; and 8 years imprisonment on Count No 14, which in effect created a total pre-mitigation headline sentence of 36 years imprisonment. This was then reduced to 27 years in the interest of proportionality and totality.

40. In relation to mitigation the sentencing judge stated that it may be broken down into two matters. First, taking account of the pleas of guilty he reduced the 27-year sentence by 7 years. Secondly, he noted the appellant’s youth, his absence of previous convictions and the necessity to incentivise and encourage rehabilitation. The sentencing judge suspended the final 2 years of the appellant’s sentence to reflect the mitigating circumstances outlined.

41. Thereby, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 7 years imprisonment on Count No 3; 9 years imprisonment on Count No 9; and 4 years imprisonment on Count No 14. The sentence of Count No 9 to be served consecutively on the sentence of Count No 3, and the sentence on Count No 14 to be served consecutively on the sentence of Count No 9. Ultimately, the sentencing judge imposed a cumulative sentence of 20 years imprisonment with the final 2 years suspended. This was backdated to the 27th of August 2021 to account for time served.

Notice of Appeal

42. By a Notice of Appeal lodged the 23rd of August 2024, the appellant now appeals to this Court against the severity of the sentence imposed by the Central Criminal Court. In support of this application, he has advanced six grounds which are as follows:

1. “The trial judge erred in law and in principle by setting a pre-mitigation headline sentence of 36 years for all counts. (12 years on count one, 16 years on count two, 8 years on count three).

2. The trial judge erred in law and principle by failing to consider the guidelines contained in the Supreme Court decision of DPP v. F.E. when sentencing the appellant.

3. The trial judge erred in law by failing to consider appropriately the issue of totality and proportionality when imposing consecutive sentences.

4. The trial judge erred in law by failing to have due regard to the mitigating circumstances and/or failing to correctly balance the mitigating factors against the severity of the offences.

5. The trial judge erred in law and principle in failing to expressly state how he calculated the value of the guilty plea, and the value of the mitigating factor of remorse.

6. The trial judge erred in law and in principle by imposing a sentence that was excessive in all the circumstances of the case.”

Submissions on Appeal

Appellant’s Submissions

Grounds 1 & 2

43. Counsel for the appellant submits that the pre-mitigation headline sentences for all three offences were significantly out of line with sentences imposed in similar cases having regard to the sentencing principles set down in People (DPP) v. F.E. [2021] 1 IR 217.

The First Offence

44. It is submitted that the offending in this instance was in the upper end of what is referred to in People (DPP) v. F.E. as the ordinary headline sentence category (7-10 years).

45. Counsel for the appellant submits that this offence, similar to that in People (DPP) v. Stafford [2008] IECCA 15, would be at the margin with the more serious cases category in People (DPP) v. F.E. (10-15 years) and that the offending, being on the margin and coupled with the plea of guilt and mitigating circumstances involved, should have been significantly lower than the 12 year headline sentence identified.

The Second Offence

46. It is submitted that the sentencing judge incorrectly placed this offence in the cases requiring up to life imprisonment category (15 years – life imprisonment) as referred to in People (DPP) v. F.E.

47. It is accepted that there was a higher degree of force used, and a prolonged threat of violence involved in this offence, however, it is submitted that this offence should have been placed at the mid-range of the more serious cases category (10-15 years) as was recommended to the sentencing judge by the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The Third Offence

48. Counsel for the appellant submits that the lasting effect of an attempted rape upon the victim is usually less, and for this reason usually carries a lesser sentence than a completed offence. The appellant refers to People (DPP) v. H.V. [2021] IECA 57 in support of this.

49. It is submitted that that this offence should have been placed at the lower range of the ordinary headline sentence category.

Ground 3

50. The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred in failing to consider appropriately the issue of totality and proportionality when imposing consecutive sentences. It is argued that the incorrect manner in which the sentencing judge assessed the premitigation headline sentences, had the effect of increasing the final sentence imposed following totality and mitigation.

51. It is submitted that the totality of the appellant’s offending does not fit into the cases requiring up to life imprisonment category (15 years – life imprisonment), or in the alternative, that the overall offending should be placed at the lower end of the most serious category.

52. It is submitted that the offending here falls within the more serious cases category (10-15 years) of offending when considering the totality of the offending and that the overall discount should have brought the sentence in line with the higher end of this category.

Grounds 4 & 5

53. The appellant argues that the sentencing judge failed to give any regard to the appellant’s remorse. Counsel for the appellant outlines that the appellant displayed genuine remorse for these offences by giving sworn testimony in the form of an apology to the victims.

54. At the sentencing hearing on the 17th of June 2024, the appellant stated: “I'd like to apologise to them and to their families for everything I put them through. I don't know how it got to that -- I lost control of my life on drugs, and I dragged three innocent women down with me. I can't take it back. I wish I could, but I can't. But I will work towards being better. I have been raised by women. Some of them are sitting there, who I love very much, and would kill a man if they done this to them… you know, figuratively speaking, but it… it's me, you know, who's done these things. Eh -- I don't -- -- any excuses. I've been over it loads of times. The reality is, I just lost the plot on drugs during the pandemic, and I attacked them girls. I attacked some drug dealers, and I don't really know why -- I don't know why. If they want the letters, they're there for them. If they want an in-person apology, that, that it would be there for them too -- you know. I'm committed to -- to change. I have a son who I love very much, and I would like to see him again. And I will do whatever I have to do to get back to him and provide for him. So, you know, rehabilitation, prison, whatever it is, that's what I'm going to do. And again, I'm truly sorry for everything that I done wrong.”

55. It is submitted that the sentencing judge failed to have regard to the genuine remorse exhibited by the appellant and evidenced to the Court through the psychological report, the apology in court, the written apology letters, and the corresponding pleas of guilty.

56. Further, it is argued that the sentencing judge failed to have adequate regard to the psychological report prepared by Dr. Norton. It is stated that this report is not mentioned at any stage during the pronouncement of the sentence, nor are any of the mitigating factors contained within the report.

Respondent’s Submissions

Grounds 1 & 2

The First Offence

57. At the sentencing hearing of the 17th of June 2024, the respondent submitted to the sentencing judge that these offences fell within the 10-15 year bracket as contemplated by People (DPP) v. F.E. The sentencing judge agreed with the respondent and identified a headline sentence of 12 years imprisonment. It is argued that the appellant’s use of a rope and hammer here, and also his refusal to wear a condom elevated the level of offending conducted during this offence above and beyond the ambit of the “ordinary” headline sentence category in People (DPP) v. F.E. of 7-10 years.

58. Further, it is submitted that the case of People (DPP) v. Stanford, referred to by the appellant, is of limited assistance as a comparator, as the sentence imposed in that case was greater than the sentence imposed here, and further the judgment is silent on whether a premitigation headline sentence was identified in that case.

59. It is submitted that this offence contained clear pre-meditation, and it was clear the appellant pre-planned to go beyond the scope of the agreement and beyond the ambit of consent. It is stated that the appellant provided the complainant with an incorrect address, and he emerged with a rope and hammer upon her arrival, before any sexual activity had been embarked upon.

The Second Offence

60. Counsel for the respondent refers to People (DPP) v. Hearne [2019] IECA 137, referred to by the appellant, and submits that the headline sentence of 15 years identified in Hearne falls between two stools in respect of the People (DPP) v. F.E. guidance, straddling the second and third categories. Thus, it is submitted that whether the instant offending fell within the upper range of the 10-15 year category, or the lower range of the 15 years – life imprisonment category, is immaterial where the gravity of the offending was appropriately marked by the headline sentence.

61. Further, it is submitted that the appellant taking issue with the pre-mitigation starting point arrived at by the sentencing judge here is somewhat moot, given the substantial discount afforded to same for mitigatory factors. It is highlighted that the reduction to a sentence of 9 years imprisonment here, is that of almost 50%.

The Third Offence

62. In response to the appellant’s contention that the consequences for an attempted rape, for a victim, are usually less lasting and traumatic than those of a completed rape, the respondent notes that this was wholly and appropriately acknowledged by the sentencing judge when he remarked that Count No 14 “was of necessity the least serious of the three incidents”.

63. In response to the appellant’s argument that the sentencing judge erred in imposing sentences that were aggravated by the preceding offence or offences as applicable, it is noted by the respondent that sentencing is not an exercise conducted in a vacuum.

Ground 3

64. Counsel for the respondent refutes the appellant’s contention that it was inappropriate for the sentencing judge to impose consecutive sentences in this case. The respondent refers to People (DPP) v. S.C. [2019] IECA 348, where it was stated that, “consecutive sentences are appropriate in any given case where to impose concurrent sentences would not meet the extent of the offending conduct”. The respondent also outlines that the Court of Appeal in S.C. noted that if offences arise from separate and unrelated incidents, consecutive sentences can properly reflect that “each victim requires separate and distinct consideration”.

65. The respondent refers to the case of People (DPP) v. McK [2021] IECA 212, and it is submitted that albeit the instant case concerns three distinct incidents rather than two as in McK, it is comparable, and the sentencing judge here was equally attuned to totality and proportionality. The sentencing judge identified significant headline sentences which were mitigated down on the basis of the individual mitigatory aspects of the instant case, but also to reflect totality and proportionality.

66. It is submitted that the cumulative starting headline sentence was far from disproportionate or crushing, and constituted an appropriate starting point given the particular circumstances of the case, as was identified by the sentencing judge.

Grounds 4 & 5

67. In response to the appellant’s contention that the sentencing judge failed to expressly state how he calculated the value of the guilty plea, counsel for the respondent contends that the value of same was recognised by the sentencing judge and quotes the following passage from the transcript: “JUDGE: Somebody who has pleaded guilty, maybe not at the earliest time -- but sometimes the nature of the case overshadows everything. This is one of these cases. You're going to get significant value for it. I haven’t worked out ultimately what that will be. MS FOYNES: Yes Judge.

JUDGE: But where you save the three women having to recount matters of this kind to total strangers, plus ultimately, the -- you know, the relief that that brings. But also, I suppose the understanding that they don't have to convince 12 strangers that their word is acceptable. Their word has been accepted and they have that vindication. I think that’s important too.”

68. In response to the appellant’s contention that the sentencing judge failed to expressly state the value of the appellant’s remorse, counsel for the respondent argues that the sentencing judge acknowledged the matter of remorse in tandem with other mitigating factors ancillary to those which he considered paramount. It is contended that these aspects of mitigation, distinct from the appellant’s guilty plea, youth, and no previous convictions, resulted in the suspension of two years of the cumulative sentence.

69. It is submitted that the mitigatory factors of clear relevance were carefully delineated by the sentencing judge, and no error in principle arises under these grounds of appeal.

Court’s Analysis & Decision

70. We have carefully considered the circumstances of each incident and have no hesitation in rejecting the submissions of counsel for the appellant to the effect that the sentencing judge erred in his selection of the appropriate sentencing ranges in nominating his headline sentences.

71. We consider that in respect of the first offence in time, on no view of it could this offending qualify as falling within the “ordinary sentences” category in the Supreme Court’s guideline judgment on rape in People (DPP) v F.E. [2021] 1 IR 217. There was coercion and force was used. The victim was falsely imprisoned in aid of her rape. A weapon, i.e., a hammer, was produced and used to terrorise her. There was significant degradation by forcing her to have sex without using a condom which she expressly made clear she did not want. The victim was severely traumatised. This was clearly a case falling within the range of potential penalties appropriate to “more serious cases” and we find no error of principle on the part of the sentencing judge in nominating a headline sentence of 12 years imprisonment.

72. Apropos the second offence in time, once again we find no error in the sentencing judge’s assessment of gravity. This was an extremely serious incident of rape. The victim was raped every conceivable way, including orally, anally and vaginally, and again there was significant degradation involved. Violence and coercion were again used, including producing a screwdriver. The victim was only recently post-surgery and was wearing a surgical brace which she was forced to remove. She was caused to fear for her life, and was hugely traumatised by the whole experience. While counsel for the DPP had submitted that the case could be located towards the upper end of the “more serious cases” range, the sentencing judge disagreed and felt that it properly belonged in the range appropriate to cases deserving of imprisonment from 15 years to life, and set a headline sentence of 16 years. Mindful of the dictum of Birmingham P in People (DPP) v. Casey [2018] 2 IR 337 that very often there may be no clear blue water between ranges and that many cases may be located at the high end of one range and the low end of the range above it, we are satisfied that this was within the range of discretion of the sentencing judge and that he did not commit any error of principle.

73. Apropos the third offence in time, we are again of the view that gravity was properly assessed by the sentencing judge. While this was an attempted rape rather than a fully completed rape the attendant circumstances were nonetheless significantly aggravated. Once again, a weapon was produced, namely a screwdriver, and it was used to stab the victim in her side. Considerable violence was used. The door to the room was locked and the victim was falsely imprisoned. Only the manifest bravery of the victim and the resistance that she put up saved her from being fully raped. We find no error in the nomination of a headline sentence of eight years for this offence.

74. The sentencing judge’s general approach was one which had previously been tested at appellate level and had passed muster. The sentencing judge expressly referred to the McK case (cited in the respondent’s submissions) in which he had applied the same approach, and in which he had been upheld. He was right to do so.

75. While he is criticised in respect of the adjustment he subsequently made for totality, we are satisfied to reject those criticisms. It seems to us that the sentencing judge considered the case with great care and that he was assiduous in endeavouring to ensure that the ultimate sentence would not be crushing and would be proportionate. Undoubtedly the cumulative sentence is a long one, but it is deservedly a long one. We also do not consider it to be crushing having regard to the age of the appellant and the circumstances of the case. There was a very substantial, and in our view appropriate, reduction on account of totality. The cumulative headline sentence of 36 years was initially reduced to 27 years. We are satisfied that this was proper and sufficient.

76. It is also complained that the sentencing judge failed to have due regard to the mitigating circumstances in the case. It is complained that he failed to specifically reference the appellant’s expressions of remorse and his apologies to the victims. Further, it is suggested that insufficient weight was attached to the psychological report that was tendered in evidence.

77. We agree with counsel for the respondent that the sentencing judge gave a very substantial discount on the adjusted cumulative headline sentence figure to reflect all of the mitigation in the case. We are satisfied that sufficient generosity was shown in that regard. It has been stated in previous cases that it is not necessary for a sentencing judge to slavishly itemise each, and every point urged upon the court in mitigation. There is no doubt in our minds but that the sentencing judge had appropriate regard to the fact that the appellant had pleaded guilty, but that he took into account the stage at which the plea was offered. Further, that he took into account the appellant’s youth, background and personal circumstances, including his addictions, as set out in the probation report and in the psychologist’s report. At the end of the day, it was a matter for the sentencing judge to attach such weight to these as he considered appropriate. We have also read these documents, and we do not consider that they required to be referenced with any more specificity than they were. We are satisfied that the appellant’s personal circumstances were properly taken into account and fully reflected in the substantial reduction of seven years from the adjusted cumulative headline sentence to a baseline post mitigation sentence of 20 years.

78. The sentencing judge then went further and suspended the final two years of that 20- year sentence for the purposes of incentivising and encouraging rehabilitation. We consider that was generous in the circumstances, having regard to the limited available evidence on which to infer a true intention to reform. The partial suspension was provided for on the basis that it was to “incentivise good behaviour,” and this was something the sentencing judge was entitled to do. However, there could be no legitimate complaint that the sentencing judge did not go far enough in that respect.

Conclusion

79. In circumstances where we have not seen fit to uphold any of the appellant’s complaints the appeal against the severity of his sentence is dismissed.