Court of Appeal dismisses appeals against High Court orders freezing assets found to be proceeds of crime.

APPROVED

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THE COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] IECA 188

Appeal Number: 2025/64

2025/93

Allen J. Butler J. Hyland J.

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 3(1) OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACTS 1996

AND 2016

BETWEEN/

CRIMINAL ASSETS BUREAU

APPLICANT

- AND –

DERMOT CALVERT, MARTINA HARTY AND STACEY CALVERT

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Allen delivered on the 15th day of September, 2025

Introduction

1. This judgment is given in respect of two appeals against interlocutory orders made by the High Court (Owens J.) pursuant to ss. 3(1) and 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Acts 1996 and 2016 in relation to two properties in Limerick, three bundles of cash, and a motor car, all of which the High Court found had been acquired in whole or in part with property that directly or indirectly constituted the proceeds of crime.

The assets

2. The first of the two properties is a house at 26 Singland Crescent, Garryowen, Limerick, which is registered in the name of Ms. Stacey Calvert, who was the third respondent to the application. It was purchased in December, 2014 or January, 2015 and sometime between then and June, 2016 was refurbished. The house was rewired, replumbed and repainted. The bathroom fittings were replaced and a new kitchen added and fitted. The windows and doors were replaced. Sometime between September, 2015 and June, 2018 – probably in the latter half of 2017 a structure – variously described as a granny flat, a shed, and an apartment – was built in the yard at the back of the main house. It is a single bedsiting room with a bathroom. Ms. Calvert lives in the main house with her children and one of her younger sisters. The first respondent to the application, Mr. Dermot Calvert – who is Ms. Calvert’s father – and his wife Ms. Martina Harty live in the granny flat. I will come to the detail, but note for the moment that it was accepted by the Bureau – and the High Court found – that some of the money used to buy the house was provided by Ms. Calvert from the proceeds of a personal injuries compensation claim.

3. The second property is a partly renovated building at Cloughan Court, Garryowen, Limerick, which was purchased in January, 2016 and is registered in the name of Mr. Calvert. This property was previously a shop but at the time it was bought by Mr. Calvert was somewhere between dilapidated and derelict. Mr. Calvert’s – and Ms. Harty’s – plan was to renovate and extend the shop property for use as their family home. By July, 2019 substantial work had been carried out but the property was not habitable. It remains in the condition in which it was in July, 2019; which was the time of commencement of the Bureau investigation.

4. The first two of the bundles of cash, together comprising €17,145 and stg.£30, were seized in the course of a search of the apartment on 22nd July, 2019 and the third, a sum of €5,860, was seized on 4th June, 2021 in the course of a further search of the apartment.

5. The motor car was a 2017 registered Volkswagen Passat which was registered in the name of Ms. Calvert from 30th August, 2021 until 5th May, 2022 when registration of ownership was transferred to Ms. Calvert’s partner, Mr. David Casey.

The High Court orders

6. By the first order, made on 15th January, 2025 – for the reasons given in a written judgment delivered on the same day ([2025] IEHC 73) – the High Court found that all of the assets the subject of the application had been acquired in whole or in part with property that directly or indirectly constituted the proceeds of crime; prohibited each of the respondents to the application from disposing of or otherwise dealing with any of the property or diminishing its value; and appointed the Bureau Legal Officer as receiver over the motor car, with power to sell it and lodge the net proceeds of sale to an interest bearing account under his control. The order noted that in the special circumstances of the case, the Bureau was allowing Ms. Calvert and her children to continue to reside at the Singland Crescent property rent free for seven years; and declared that Ms. Calvert should have an equitable lien over that property for 20% of the proceeds of the eventual sale of that property. The effect of the order is that Mr. Calvert and Ms. Harty will be able to continue to live in the apartment until the entire property is sold.

7. By the second order, made on 19th February, 2025 – for the reasons given in an ex tempore judgment on the same day – the High Court judge appointed the Bureau Legal Officer as receiver over the Cloughan Court property, with power to sell it and lodge the net proceeds of sale to an interest bearing account under his control; and ordered that vacant possession be delivered up to the receiver on 25th February, 2025 at 11.00 a.m. In the High Court, the receiver undertook not to pursue the disposal of the Cloughan Court property until after 19th March, 2025; and on a motion on behalf of the appellants to this Court for a stay on the High Court order, the receiver sensibly undertook not to proceed with the sale pending the determination of the appeals.

The appeals

8. By notice of appeal filed on 24th March, 2025 (2025/64) Mr. Calvert and Ms. Harty appealed against the judgment and order of 15th January, 2025. The single ground of appeal is that the judge erred in determining that the Bureau had satisfied the standard of proof required by s. 8(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996 that the property the subject of the application had been acquired, in whole or in part, with or in connection with property that, directly or indirectly, constituted the proceeds of crime. There was no appeal by Ms. Calvert.

9. The notice of appeal did not – nor did the written or oral submissions which followed

– attempt to engage with the evidence adduced by the Bureau, or the judge’s analysis of the evidence, or his findings and conclusions.

10. The notice of appeal appeared to challenge the judge’s findings in respect of each of the assets but it was clear from the appellants’ written submissions – and confirmed by counsel at the hearing of the appeals – that there was no challenge to the judge’s findings and conclusions in relation to the Singland Crescent property. Those findings and conclusions were that, save as to the money contributed by Ms. Stacey Calvert, the purchase and renovation of the Singland Crescent house and the construction of the apartment to the rear was funded by Mr. Calvert from the proceeds of crime. As I will come to, the difference between the cost of purchase and refurbishment of the Singland Crescent house and the money provided by Ms. Calvert was found to be something more than €100,000.

11. Similarly, it was confirmed that there was no appeal against the findings and conclusions of the judge in relation to the VW Passat motor car. The evidence was that this was the seventh in a succession of cars registered in the name of Ms. Stacey Calvert. It was registered in her name from 30th August, 2021 to 5th May, 2022 when it was transferred into the name of David Casey but all the appearances are that Ms. Calvert continued to use it until it was seized. The details of the previous purported registered owner were bogus. In the course of the investigation, Mr. Casey claimed to be the owner of the car but although served with the proceedings, he did not participate.

12. The upshot of all this is that there is no appeal against the finding by the High Court that the VW Passat car was purchased with Mr. Calvert’s proceeds of crime.

13. By the second notice of appeal filed on 11th April, 2025 (2025/93) Mr. Calvert and Ms. Harty appealed against the judgment and order of 19th February, 2025. Again there is a single ground of appeal, which is that in acceding to the Bureau’s application for the appointment of a receiver over the Cloughan Court property, the High Court judge erred in failing to consider the equitable principles set out in Criminal Assets Bureau v. Russell [2020] IECA 61.

14. Since the order of 19th February, 2025 was founded on the order of 15th January, 2025, it would fall away if the first appeal were to succeed, but it was pursued as a separate appeal in the event that the first appeal were to fail. The order of 19th February, 2025 would see the property sold. The appellants ask for an order setting aside the order of the High Court but there is no suggestion as to what, otherwise, should be done with the property.

The High Court application and judgment

15. The High Court application was made by originating notice of motion issued on 4th November, 2022 following an extensive investigation which included searches of the properties at Singland Crescent and Cloughan Court; the inspection and analysis of Mr. Calvert’s, Ms. Harty’s and Ms. Calvert’s bank and credit union accounts; the obtaining and analysis of data from a number of insurance companies; the interrogation of motor vehicle registration records; and interviews by Gardaí and a Social Welfare Bureau Officer.

16. The case advanced by the Bureau was summarised in an affidavit of the Chief Bureau Officer based on the information provided by the Bureau Officers who had carried out the investigation under his direction and control; on other information provided by members of An Garda Síochána; and from his personal knowledge and experience as a member of An Garda Síochána for upwards of thirty years. Referencing s. 8(1) of the Act of 1996, the Chief Bureau Officer deposed that it was his belief that “the Respondent” was in possession or control of the property set out in the schedule to the notice of motion; that the property constituted directly or indirectly the proceeds of crime and/or was acquired in whole or in part with or in connection with property that, directly or indirectly, constituted the proceeds of crime; and that the value of the property was not less than €5,000. There was some ambiguity in the reference to “the Respondent” but it was clear from the affidavit of the Chief Bureau Officer and the evidence as a whole that the primary target of the investigation was Mr. Calvert.

17. The detail of the Bureau’s case was set out in an affidavit of Detective Garda Mark Davis, who is a Bureau officer; Detective Garda Rory O’Grady, of Henry Street Garda station; Detective Garda Sean Twomey, of the Divisional Drugs Unit; Mr. Keith Kelleher, a quantity surveyor; a Bureau Revenue Officer identified as Revenue Bureau Officer No. 89; and a Bureau Social Welfare Officer identified as Social Welfare Bureau Officer No. 57. As I will come to, part of the Bureau’s case was that the recorded prices paid for the Singland Crescent house and the Cloughan Court property were not the true prices and an affidavit was filed on behalf of the Bureau identifying the prices paid by Limerick City and County Council for what were said to be comparable properties.

18. As I have said, Mr. Calvert was the primary target of the Bureau’s investigation. He was born in 1970. He previously lived in another house in Garryowen with his former wife with whom he had fifteen children. At the commencement of the investigation he was living with Martina Harty, whom he married in 2023. Ms Harty was born in 1987; and Ms Calvert in 1993.

19. The premise of the Bureau’s application to the High Court was that the cost of purchase and refurbishment of the two properties, the three bundles of cash seized, and the purchase of the VW Passat car were all financed by the proceeds of drug dealing by Mr. Calvert.

20. The uncontested evidence was that Mr. Calvert had recorded earned income for his entire life of €161 (one hundred and sixty one euro). Neither Ms. Harty nor Ms. Calvert had any Revenue record of employment or income.

21. Mr. Calvert was in receipt of domiciliary care allowance from 2002 to 31st October 2017: since when he had no visible source of legitimate income. Over the years, significant enough social welfare payments were made in respect of Mr. Calvert’s children. These payments were made to the children’s mother, Mrs. Jacqueline Calvert.

22. Over the years Mr. Calvert was the registered owner of a series of motor vehicles.

23. Ms. Harty was in receipt of various social welfare allowances from February, 2006 until November, 2017: since when she had no visible source of legitimate income. The uncontested evidence of Social Welfare Bureau Officer No. 57 was that Ms. Harty was in receipt of one parent family payment from 23rd February 2006 to 23rd July, 2014 during which time she was also paid various back to school allowances and rent supplement; and that from 17th July, 2014 to 28th March, 2017 she was in receipt of jobseekers allowance.

24. The Revenue records showed that Ms. Harty was registered as the owner of a Renault motor car on 12th February, 2007 and of a Toyota motor car from 24th December, 2019 to 28th October, 2021.

25. Ms. Calvert was in receipt of jobseeker’s allowance between September, 2011 and January, 2019. From April, 2018 she was in receipt of weekly payments in respect of carer’s allowance and child benefit, a monthly domiciliary case allowance, and an annual respite care grant, as well as children’s allowances. According to Mr. Calvert, Ms. Calvert was supporting him and Ms. Harty, as well as herself and her three children.

26. Over the years Ms. Calvert was the registered owner of a series of motor vehicles, including the VW Passat the subject of the proceedings.

27. According to the paperwork, the price paid for the Singland Crescent property was €17,250, which was paid directly to the vendor. The Bureau accepted that €14,000 part of the purchase price came from a personal injuries award received by Ms. Calvert. The balance of the recorded purchase price and the legal costs associated with the purchase came from unknown sources.

28. Part of the Bureau’s case was that the recorded purchase price of the house at Singland Crescent was significantly below the market value. The recorded price of €17,250, was – it was said – significantly lower than the price recorded in or around the same time for similar properties in the area. Garda Davis pointed to the purchase by Limerick County Council of four terraced housed for prices of between €68,000 and €84,000. The judge was not persuaded that the prices actually paid were greater than the recorded prices and there is no cross-appeal against that finding.

29. It was common case that the house at Singland Crescent was refurbished after Ms. Calvert bought it and that sometime later the apartment was constructed in the garden. The Bureau’s case that the work had been paid for by Mr. Calvert was not contested. Mr. Calvert’s replying affidavit did not engage with the case which had been made by the Bureau that it was he who funded the purchase and improvement of the house.

30. Part of the case made by the Bureau – by reference to a bill of quantities prepared by Mr. Kelleher – was that the cost of the works at Singland Crescent would have been €205,371, inclusive of VAT but exclusive of professional fees. In the course of the investigation Mr. Calvert suggested that the cost of all of the work at Singland Crescent was €11,500 to €12,000. Having carefully and comprehensively examined the evidence, the judge concluded that the likely overall cost of the refurbishment of the house and the construction of the apartment was €100,000. There is no appeal (or cross-appeal) against that finding.

31. According to Revenue records, the price paid for the property at Cloughan Court was €13,000. In July, 2015 Mr. Calvert paid a deposit of €3,000 to the auctioneers by way of bank draft. The evidence was that he had bought the draft for cash on 9th July, 2015. The balance of €10,000 was funded by a credit union loan drawn down on 15th September, 2015. That loan was fully secured by the credit balance on a shares account held by Mr. Calvert with the credit union which had been built up between 2014 and 2019 and was repaid on 3rd December, 2019 by a transfer of the balance of the shares account to the loan account.

32. Again it was part of the Bureau’s case that the recorded price paid for the Cloughan Court property was not the true price. Again the judge was not persuaded of this and there is no cross-appeal by the Bureau against that finding.

33. As to the work carried on to Cloughan Court, Mr. Calvert in interview in 2019 suggested that the work had cost €12,000. Mr. Kelleher – who examined the property in 2021 – estimated the cost of the work at €48,305. The judge found that the probable cost of that work was in the region of €25,000 and there is no appeal (or cross-appeal) against that finding.

34. As a first step in considering the application, Owens J. examined the belief evidence tendered by the Chief Bureau Officer under s. 8 that the assets came within section 3(1). He found that while some of the evidence which underpinned elements of the belief were not persuasive, nevertheless there were reasonable grounds for the belief evidence that each of the assets were derived from the proceeds of crime. There is no appeal against that finding.

35. The judge then carefully examined the evidence which had been tendered by the Bureau, including what had been said by the respondents and others in the course of the investigation. At para. 47 the judge concluded that the evidence tendered by the Bureau established that it was more probable than not that the source of the money used to acquire the assets was Mr. Calvert’s activities as a drug dealer.

36. Starting at para. 48, the judge summarised the evidence of Mr. Calvert’s drug dealing and association with prominent criminals in Limerick, including drug dealers.

37. At para. 100 of the judgment, the judge noted that Mr. Calvert, in his replying affidavit, had disputed some of the evidence but (at para. 101) found that the offending which he did not deny was by itself sufficient to prove that he was an established drug dealer and that he had been in receipt of substantial cash associated with drug dealing for a number of years. That – he said – also explained the cash which was found when the Gardaí searched his apartment on 22nd June, 2019 and 4th June, 2021.

38. The judge addressed in detail Mr. Calvert’s evidence that the money used to buy Cloughan Court came from social welfare allowances and unquantified cash income from nixers and rejected it. He found that the suggestion that Mr. Calvert was able to divert social welfare payments – made to enable his large family to subsist – into savings used to purchase Cloughan Court and to repay his credit union loan did not accord with the manner in which he had accumulated money in his credit union account. He found that the pattern of transactions on the credit union account was consistent with Mr. Calvert having ready access to cash from drug dealing.

39. The judge also rejected Mr. Calvert’s assertion that the money used to renovate Cloughan Court had come from the proceeds of various insurance claims.

40. The judge also considered in detail and rejected the evidence of Ms. Harty as to the provenance of the cash found in the apartment. He found that her assertions that it had come from the proceeds of insurance claims was unsupported by any evidence and was inconsistent with the evidence of the times and circumstances in which the bundles of cash were found. Part of Ms. Harty’s explanation was that part of the money seized in 2019 had come from the sale of a camper van. The judge carefully examined what she said and rejected it. There was no evidence that she had ever owned a camper van, or ever had the means to purchase a camper van. She had been unable to give the Gardaí a make or model, never mind a registration number. She had been unable to identify the person from whom she allegedly bought it or the person to whom she allegedly sold it. Her assertion that the camper van had been registered in her name was shown to have been wrong. He found that Ms. Harty’s assertion that the purchase of a camper van in 2019 had been funded from the proceeds of an insurance payout in 2015 was inconsistent with what her Bank of Ireland account showed:

which was that she had made a substantial lodgement on 20th November, 2015 and spent most of it in dribs and drabs between then and 1st January, 2016.

41. At para. 122, the judge concluded that there was no acceptable evidence which rebutted the evidence tendered on behalf of the Bureau which had established as a matter of prima facie probability that the cash found in the apartment at Singland Crescent was drugdealing money.

Appeal No. 2025/ 64 – The substantive appeal

42. The starting point is to recall that the judgment of this Court in Criminal Assets Bureau v. Russell [2020] IECA 61 (Baker J., Costello and Donnelly JJ. concurring) established that the standard of review applicable to an order made under the Proceeds of Crime Acts on an application such as this is that articulated by the Supreme Court in Ryanair Ltd. v. Billigfluege.de [2015] IESC 11 – when the findings of fact were based on wholly affidavit evidence, an appellate court may be in as good a position as a trial court to make findings of fact and to draw inferences; but the burden of establishing an error in the findings of the High Court lies on the appellants.

43. The written submissions filed on behalf of the appellants no more than summarised their affidavits and the judge’s findings. The oral argument did not really add anything to what had already been written.

44. Mirroring the single ground of appeal, it was asserted that the judge erred in determining that the Bureau had satisfied the standard of proof requited by s. 8(2) of the Act of 1996 – that applicable to civil proceedings – but not how.

45. At para. 9 it was recalled that Ms. Harty’s evidence was that she resides with Mr. Calbert in a 15 feet by 10 feet converted shed at Singland Crescent and that the Cloughan Court property – once converted – was to have been their marital home. That was common case.

46. At para. 10 it was recalled that Ms. Harty swore that the €17,145 and stg.£30 seized on 22nd June, 2019 had been saved by her for her then intended wedding to Mr. Calvert and that the 2,000 small plastic bags which were found at the same time were for everyday home use.

47. The appellants simply did not engage with the judge’s finding (para. 43) that they had no track record of legitimate earnings which could have accounted for the accumulation of cash and (para. 56) that the circumstances in which the bundles of cash had been found – wrapped in plastic and concealed behind the kickboard in the kitchen of the apartment – strongly indicated that the cash came from the proceeds of illicit drug sales. The judge had addressed (paras. 57 to 59) the explanations which Ms. Harty had offered at the time of the seizure and rejected them as vague, unsupported by any credible evidence, and inconsistent with the pattern of lodgements and withdrawals on Ms. Harty’s bank account. Part of that explanation was that in 2015 Ms. Harty had received a sum of €20,000 inclusive of legal costs in settlement of a compensation case. That was rejected by the judge for the reason that her bank account showed that by the time the cash was found in 2019, any compensation which she received in 2015 was long spent. There was no suggestion that the judge erred in that conclusion.

48. As to the €5,860 seized on 4th June, 2021, the appellants’ written submissions recalled that Ms. Harty had sworn that in November, 2019 she and Mr. Calvery had each received €5,500 from AXA insurance company following a road traffic accident. So she had, and the judge had addressed this explanation at paras. 66 to 69. The evidence was that the three compensation cheques – one each for Mr. Calvert, Ms. Harty and Ms. Calvert – had been lodged to Ms. Calvert’s bank account on 8th November, 2019 and that on 13th November, 2019 she had withdrawn sums of €5,000 and €10,000. The apartment at Singland Crescent was searched five times between November, 2019 and June, 2020 and no cash was found. It was searched again on 2nd July, 2020 when a sum of €5,370 was found, but returned to Ms. Harty when she produced a letter from AXA in respect of her claim. When the apartment was searched again on 21st April, 2021, no cash was found. The judge found that it was inherently improbable that Ms. Harty had kept €5,500 in cash in her apartment from 13th November, 2019 until 4th June, 2021. At para. 13, the appellants’ written submissions noted that the judge, at para. 57, found that the explanations offered by Ms. Harty for the provenance of the cash lacked reality. It was not suggested that he was wrong.

49. At para. 16 the appellants’ submissions moved on to the affidavits of Mr. Calvert which were filed in response to the application. The focus of the submissions – such as it was – was on what Mr. Calvert had said, rather than on the evidence tendered on behalf of the Bureau and the judge’s analysis of all of the evidence, including his analysis and rejection of Mr. Calvert’s assertions as to the provenance of the money.

50. Mr. Calvert, in his affidavit filed on 26th February, 2024, deposed that he had received personal injury awards of €12,545 in November, 2014; €8,202 in February, 2017; and €5,500 in November, 2019. The Bureau had already established this. He said that he paid a booking deposit of €3,000 to purchase the Cloughan Court property and the balance of €10,000 with a credit union loan. The Bureau had already established this: and that the credit union loan was back-to-back with his share account, from which it was evident that he did not need the loan to complete the purchase.

51. The submissions recalled that Detective Garda Davis had deposed that much of the repayment of the loan was by cash from an unknown source and that Mr. Calvert had sworn that the repayments were funded by savings from his social welfare payments and the children’s allowances in respect of his fifteen children. At para. 21 it was recalled that the judge found that his various awards had been dissipated through point-of-sale transactions and various withdrawals that were gradual in nature, and it was said that this finding was the subject of the appeal.

52. As the High Court judgment shows, Detective Garda Davis, besides establishing the fact of the compensation payments, had traced them into an AIB account in the name of Mr. Calvert; a credit union account in the name of Mr. Calvert; and an AIB account in the name of Ms. Calvert. He had exhibited a print out of Mr. Calvert’s credit union loan account and shares account from 1st June, 1998 to 19th March, 2021 and a print out of his AIB account from 8th April, 2013 to 21st June, 2021; as well as a print out of Ms. Calvert’s account, which showed the lodgement of the AXA compensation cheques and the immediate withdrawal of the proceeds. The appellants’ submissions did not address the statements of account nor – save to baldly contest it – the judge’s finding.

53. The judge found (at para. 106) – and the AIB statement clearly showed – that the €12,545 was lodged to Mr. Calvert’s AIB account on 31st March, 2014 and that €12,400 was withdrawn two days later. As the judge found, there was no evidence of what Mr. Calvert did with this money but whatever he did with it, he did not lodge into his credit union account. Garda Davis’s evidence was – and Mr. Calvert did not contest it – that the deposit on Cloughan Court had been paid by a bank draft bought for cash in July, 2015 and it was common case that the balance of €10,000 was paid using a credit union loan. The judge found (para. 108) that there was no evidence that the compensation payments of €8,202 which Mr. Calvert received in 2017 or the €5,500 he received in 2019 were used to pay for the work at Cloughan Court. It was not said that the judge was wrong in so finding. Even if

– for the sake of argument – those payments had been so used, the total of €15,702 was well short of what the judge found was the likely cost of the work at Cloughan Court alone: never mind the work at Singland Crescent.

54. The appellants’ submissions (para. 19) recalled that the Bureau had estimated the cost of the refurbishment works at Cloughan Court at €48,305; that Mr. Calvert had deposed that the cost was in the region of €12,000; and that the judge had found that the likely cost was somewhere in the middle: something, he said, in the order of €25,000. There was no suggestion of error in this finding. It was recalled that the judge found that there were no legitimate sources of income to fund the renovation of the house at Singland Crescent or the construction of the apartment, or the conversion of the Cloughan Court property into a residence. Again, there was no suggestion of error in this finding.

55. At para. 20 it was recalled that the Bureau had submitted to the High Court – and at para. 21 that the High Court had found – that the personal injury awards received by Mr. Calvert and Ms. Harty had been dissipated through point-of-sale transactions and various withdrawals which were gradual in nature. It was not suggested that either the Bureau’s submission or the judge’s findings were wrong. All that was said was that “At no time did either respondent aver that the monies seized were the exact monies received in the said awards but that these sums had allowed them, along with social welfare and odd jobs to save the said sums and to purchase Cloughan Court. These sums came from legitimate sources.”

56. This does not accurately reflect the evidence.

57. The evidence was that in interview on 22nd June, 2019 Mr. Calvert and Ms. Harty both told Garda O’Grady that the €17,145 and stg.£30 was Ms. Harty’s money. Specifically, Mr. Calvert told Garda O’Grady that none of the money was his. That was the case made by Ms. Harty in her replying affidavit in which she attempted to account for it in part as the proceeds of an insurance payout in 2015.

58. In interview on 4th June, 2021 Ms. Harty told the Gardaí that the €5,860 then seized had come from money which she had received from AXA insurance in November, 2019. That was what she swore to in her replying affidavit filed on 3rd April, 2024 in which she deposed – as the Bureau had already established – that the AXA monies had been lodged to the AIB account and almost immediately withdrawn in cash. Ms. Harty’s evidence was that “… the said cash was held by us at our residence.” About five weeks previously, in his affidavit filed on 26th February, 2024 Mr. Calvert had sworn that the €5,860 which was seized on 4th June, 2021 “… was surplus funds from my insurance claims received previously.” (Emphasis added.) Ms. Harty’s evidence that the €5,860 could be accounted for as the proceeds of her AXA payment was obviously inconsistent with Mr. Calvert’s evidence that it was the proceeds of his AXA payout but the point, for present purposes, is that they both sought to make the case that the money had been derived directly from AXA. Separately, in affidavits filed in this Court in connection with their legal aid application, Mr. Calvert and Ms. Harty both referred to the money which was seized on 4th June, 2021 as money which they had saved and from personal injury payouts which they had received.

59. The appellants did not attempt to engage with any of this. There is no challenge to the judge’s finding that Mr. Calvert was an established drug dealer who was in receipt of substantial cash from that activity for a number of years. The appellants’ submissions merely recall their explanations and evidence without attempting to engage with the reasons for which the judge rejected them. Contrary to their submissions on the appeal, the appellants did make the case that the money seized was the proceeds of their insurance claims.

60. Counsel for the appellants sought to make much of the absence of any evidence of a lavish lifestyle. It is true that in this case there was no evidence of very expensive cars or watches or the like; and, by the way, that the judge was sceptical of the figures used in Bureau’s forensic accountant’s lifestyle analysis. However, the evidence clearly demonstrated the acquisition of assets which could not be accounted for by legitimate sources.

61. As to the acquisition and refurbishment of the properties, there was never any suggestion that Ms. Harty had made any contribution to the cost. The issue as to the true cost of the acquisition of those properties was resolved in favour of the appellants. There was no challenge to the judge’s assessment of the likely cost of the refurbishment. Leaving aside Ms. Calvert’s money, the total expenditure in connection with Singland Crescent was significantly in excess of €100,000 and the total expenditure in connection with Cloughan Court was something in the order of €38,000 plus costs of acquisition. This expenditure was all in cash – airgead tirim – and was all borne by Mr. Calvert. The judge carefully examined Mr. Calvert’s assertions that the wherewithal came from insurance payouts, odd jobs, Tommo jobs, scams and from skimming the children’s allowances and – for the reasons given – rejected them. The appellants’ bald assertion that “these sums came from legitimate sources” does not even put a dent in the judgment.

Appeal No. 2025/93 – The appointment of the receiver over Cloughan Court

62. The appellants’ written submissions on the second appeal repeated the ground of appeal: that in granting the Bureau’s application for the appointment of a receiver over the Cloughan Court property, the judge failed to adequately consider the equitable principles set out in Criminal Assets Bureau v. Russell.

63. It should first be said that the arguments which the appellants sought to advance on the second appeal were not made in the High Court. Accordingly, it is difficult to contemplate how the judge might have erred in not taking into account factors which he was not asked to take into account.

64. There is a transcript of the hearing before Owens J. on 19th February, 2025. The hearing was brief. Theretofore, Mr. Calvert and Ms. Harty had been represented by separate counsel. Mr. Calvert’s counsel had ceased practice and Ms. Harty’s counsel had been briefed in his stead: to represent both. The transcript shows that the court was provided with a further affidavit of the Chief Bureau Officer which confirmed that the property at Cloughan Court was partly finished, unoccupied, and uninsured. Counsel for the then respondents suggested that the Bureau’s application might be put back to allow him to take instructions on the recent affidavit but the judge saw no need for an adjournment. The judge said that he would appoint a receiver with a power of sale, on the receiver’s undertaking that he would not pursue any sale before 19th March, 2025. It was no part of the appeal that the judge was wrong in his view that there was no need for an adjournment.

65. While the basis of the appeal against the order of 19th February, 2025 is that the judge failed to adequately consider the equitable principles set out in Russell, neither the notice of appeal nor the appellants’ submissions identified which of those principles which ought to have been considered was not considered, or what, otherwise, they contend that the judge ought to have done with the property at Cloughan Court.

66. In Russell this Court approved of the statement by Feeney J. in Murphy v. J.G. [2008] IEHC 33 of the seven factors to be considered before making an order under section 7. The scheme of the Act is that a s. 7 order must follow an earlier determination that the property constitutes directly or indirectly the proceeds of crime. There are then a number of factors which must be considered, which are:- “Firstly, it is the case that a receiver under section 7 can only be appointed in circumstances where an interim or interlocutory order under the Proceeds of Crime Act has been made. Therefore, at the time that the Court comes to consider the appointment of a receiver, there will be in existence an interim or interlocutory order whereby the High Court will have come to an earlier conclusion that the specified property constitutes directly or indirectly the proceeds of crime. That earlier conclusion is a necessary prerequisite to the application of section 7 and is the context within which the appointment of a receiver must be considered. Secondly, it is clear that an application to appoint a receiver under section 7 requires to be considered on equitable principles. Thirdly, the purpose of a receivership is to preserve the property over which the receiver is appointed for the benefit of the party ultimately found to be entitled to it. The appointment of a receiver is not a penalty but rather a mechanism to endeavour to ensure that property is preserved. Fourthly, the use of the word ‘preservation’ is not the use of a precise term but covers a number of different and varying circumstances but unquestionably covers the necessity to ensure that property is properly and validly insured. Fifthly, in considering the application of equitable principles, the issue of delay, if any, inconvenience and occupation by a family or a family member are factors to take into account. Sixthly, a further factor a take into account in applying the equitable principles is the existence of pending proceedings seeking to discharge or vary a section 3 order and the timing and circumstances of such application. Seventhly, the handing up of possession or use of lands and/or houses after the making of a section 3 Order or when a section 4 order is pending is relevant. Finally, a factor to take into account is consideration as to whether the appointment of a receiver is appropriate or inappropriate.”

67. Baker J. in Russell adopted the factors listed by Feeney J. in J.G., emphasising that the different and varying circumstances “unquestionably” included whether the property was insured, and that the fact that the property might be occupied by a family or family members was a factor to be taken into account.

68. The appellants, in their written submissions, set out the list of factors and note Baker J.’s particular reference to the fact that the property might be occupied by a family or family members as a factor to be taken into account.

69. The property – it is said – was once a corner shop and was vacant for seven years before it was purchased by Mr. Calvert in 2015. So it was. The property – it is said – was in a derelict state and the appellants embarked on an extensive refurbishment with the intention that it would be their marital home once finished. So it was and so they did. The appellants – it is said – moved into the apartment at Singland Crescent in November, 2019 after they were evicted from their previous home. I accept that. And I accept that the appellants’ intention was that their occupation of the apartment would be temporary.

70. Ms. Harty – it is said – is the mother of five children. That is the evidence. The appellants’ written submissions suggest that Ms. Harty averred in her replying affidavit that due to what is described as the converted shed being only fifteen feet by ten feet, Ms. Harty’s sister had to take her children, and that the children’s allowances were transferred to the sister. That is not borne out by the evidence. What Ms. Harty swore was that before moving into the apartment she and Mr. Calvert lived in rented accommodation. She did not say that her children were living there with them. She did say that her children were living with her sister – to whom the children’s allowances had been transferred – but did not say when this took place.

71. Ms. Harty did not say how old her children are but the affidavit of Social Welfare Bureau Officer No. 57 shows that they were born between 2004 and 2014. It also shows that Ms. Harty was in receipt of one parent family payment from 23rd February 2006 to 23rd July, 2014 and that from 17th July, 2014 to 28th March, 2017 she was in receipt of jobseekers allowance. At the time of the High Court hearing the children were aged between just over twenty and nearly eleven; and had been living with their aunt for at the very least upwards of five years.

72. The appellants’ case is succinct.

73. The property at Cloughan Court is described in the appellants’ written submissions as the intended family home of the appellants and Ms. Harty’s five children, who are said, in the written submissions, to be dependent on her. The evidential basis for that is wafer thin. In his affidavit filed on 26th February, 2024 in connection with his legal aid application – under the heading “Application pursuant to section 7 of the Act in respect of the property – Mr. Calvert identified “the primary asset comprising the focus of these proceeds of crime proceedings” as his residence. His residence was the apartment to the rear of 26 Singland Crescent. If, in referring to his residence, Mr. Calvert meant the partly renovated building at Cloughan Court that he hoped would become his residence, that is not what he said. Mr. Calvert’s only apprehension was that the taking of possession of his residence would leave him without a place of abode. He mentioned that by then he had married Ms. Harty but there was no reference to her children or, indeed, to the Cloughan Court property. In his replying affidavit filed on 21st March, 2024 Mr. Calvert dealt in some detail with the acquisition of the Cloughan Court property but said nothing about his plans for it. I have already addressed Ms. Harty’s evidence. There is no clear evidence as to the dimensions of the Cloughan Court property or how many bedrooms it was intended to have.

74. It seems to me that the evidence does not support the submission that the Cloughan Court property was the intended family home of the appellants and Ms. Harty’s children. Even if it did, I do not believe that a hope or aspiration that it might one day be such a home would have carried any great weight in the balance. I do not understand the identification by Baker J. of the fact that a property “might be” occupied by a family or family members as a factor to be taken into account as extending to a mere hope, or to a property which would or might be a more desirable property than that in which the family or family members were in fact living: but on the facts of this case the point does not arise.

75. The objective fact of the matter is that the property at Cloughan Court is incomplete and unfit for occupation as a residence. There is no evidence as to how much it would likely cost to finish it but the objective fact of the matter is that neither Mr. Calvert nor Ms. Harty has any money. The appellants do not address the elephant in the room that the property is uninsured, and they do not have the means to insure it. Whether the house at Cloughan Court was or was not intended to be the family home of Ms. Harty’s children as well as her own, I recognise her dashed hope of a much better place to live than she has. However, the evidence was that neither Ms. Harty not Mr. Calvert had the means to make it habitable. Absent any prospect that it could be made habitable, it seems to me that her disappointment is not something that could have carried any weight in the judge’s assessment of what was to be done with it.

Summary

76. On the authority of Criminal Assets Bureau v. Russell, the burden of establishing an error in the findings of the High Court lies on the appellants.

77. The appellants have failed to clearly identify, still less establish, any error in the analysis, reasoning, findings or conclusions of the High Court judge. It follows that the appeals must be dismissed.

78. The Bureau having been entirely successful in opposing the appeals, is presumptively entitled to an order for its costs. Formally, if the appellants wish to contend for any other costs order they may, within fourteen days of the electronic delivery of this judgment, file and serve a short written submission – not exceeding 1,000 words – in which event the respondent will have fourteen days to file and serve a reply – similarly so limited.

79. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, Butler and Hyland JJ. have authorised me to say that they agree with it.