Court of Appeal reduces sentence by one year for criminal damage and assault due to mitigating factors.

APPROVED NO REDACTION NEEDED

THE COURT OF APPEAL Neutral Citation: [2025] IECA 173 Record Number: 109/2024;110/2024 McCarthy J.

Kennedy J.

Burns J.

BETWEEN/

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS RESPONDENT -AND-

COLIN MURPHY AND GLEN MURPHY APPELLANTS

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered on the 24th day of July 2025 by Ms. Justice Tara Burns

1. This is an appeal against severity of sentence. On 28 November 2023 the second appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of damaging property contrary to s. 2(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1991 (Counts 1 & 2); two counts of assault causing harm contrary to s. 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997 (‘the 1997 Act’) (Counts 4 & 6); and one count of unlawful use of a mechanically propelled vehicle contrary to s. 112 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (Count 7).

2. On 5 December 2023, the first appellant pleaded guilty to one count of arson contrary to s. 2(1) and (4) of the Criminal Damage Act 1991 (Count 10) and one count of assault causing harm contrary to s. 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997 (Count 13).

3. On 21 March 2024, each appellant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, with the final two years suspended for a period of 5 years, on certain terms and conditions.

Background

4. The spate of offending in the instant matter, which occurred on Christmas day 2022 between 9pm and 11.15pm in a rural community where the appellants occasionally resided with their grandparents, was truly shocking.

At 9pm the appellants, who are brothers, left their grandparents home, having consumed a large quantity of alcohol during the day, to include a bottle of vodka which they brought with them. Their intention was to visit a house where their deceased brother had previously resided. In order to get there, they stole a tractor from a neighbouring farm. Whilst driving the tractor in their very intoxicated state, they crashed into multiple telegraph poles causing significant damage to the telecommunication infrastructure in the locality amounting to approximately €1,700. A female driver, who resided in the area and had been visiting her brother who also lived closed by, came upon the appellants, the crashed tractor and a telegraph pole which had been knocked to the ground and was partially blocking the road.

The appellants got into her car and demanded to be brought to the location they were intending to travel to. The female called her brother and he came to the scene in his car. A confrontation occurred between the appellants and this man (‘the first assault victim’) in the course of which the appellants assaulted him culminating in the second appellant striking this man with the vodka bottle on the head. The appellants proceeded to smash the windows and damage the bodywork of the car in which the first assault

victim had arrived. All of this occurred in the presence of the female driver who had remained at the location.

5. After these incidents, the appellants continued on their journey.

Approximately 500 metres down the road, the appellants had a further altercation with another local resident. Residents described hearing a commotion and gunshots. A man (‘the second assault victim’) was subsequently discovered lying behind his car, which had been set on fire.

This second assault victim was unconscious having suffered serious injuries to include a traumatic brain injury, multiple lacerations to his face and head, and an injury to his left ear. A search of the area resulted in a firearm being uncovered in a broken condition. This firearm belonged to the second assault victim’s brother and was lawfully held. The second assault victim’s car was destroyed by the fire.

6. This second assault victim remained in hospital for an extended period of time and made a very slow recovery from the significant injuries which he sustained. Apart from the serious physical injuries sustained, the second assault victim experienced psychological trauma and significant financial consequences. The second assault victim was unable to recount what occurred due to the injuries he received which resulted in a loss of memory.

7. The appellants were subsequently identified as suspects. When arrested and interviewed, they each made admissions to their involvement in the offences. Admissions made by the first appellant in relation to the assault on the second assault victim were of particular value in light of the inability of that victim to recall these events. The appellants were initially charged with causing serious harm to the second assault victim contrary to s. 4 of the 1997 Act. However, the respondent ultimately accepted pleas of guilty from each appellant of assault causing harm contrary to s. 3 of the 1997 Act.

8. The pleas of guilty entered by the appellants were on a full facts basis except that the second appellant did not accept responsibility for the arson of the second victim’s car with responsibility for that offence being accepted by the first appellant. This was agreed to by the respondent.

Personal Circumstances of the Appellants

9. The second appellant was 30 years of age at the time of the commission of the offences. He is a father of three children. He had a history of drug and alcohol abuse. He had 52 previous convictions to include burglary, theft, criminal damage, assault causing harm and threats to kill. He received custodial sentences in respect of some of this offending. The first appellant was 34 years of age at the time of the commission of the offences and also had a history of drug and alcohol abuse. He is a father of two children. He had 36 previous convictions to include burglary, criminal damage, public order, and unauthorised taking of a mechanically propelled vehicle. He had not previously received a custodial sentence in respect of his record of offending.

10. Evidence of significant efforts made by each of the appellants to rehabilitate whilst in custody awaiting sentence was placed before the sentencing judge.

The Sentencing Judge’s Determination

11. In relation to the second appellant, the sentencing judge pronounced his sentence as follows:-

“In this particular case, I'm satisfied that consecutive sentencing is appropriate due to the nature of the offending; to sentence concurrently would not reflect the seriousness of the offending in this particular case. Now, in relation to Glen Murphy, on count No. 1, which is the criminal damage count, in relation to the criminal damage count the headline sentence would be a sentence of four years'

imprisonment. On count No. 1, I'm imposing a sentence of two years'

imprisonment. In relation to count No. 2, which is criminal damage to the Eircom poles, the headline sentence will be a sentence of four years' imprisonment, I'm imposing a sentence of two years'

imprisonment. So, on Count No. 2, a sentence of two years'

imprisonment. I'm making that consecutive to the sentence on count No. 1. So, count No. 2 is two years, that's consecutive to the sentence on count No. 1, in other words, it's to commence on the lawful termination of the sentence on count No. 1. Now, count No. 4 then, is the section 3 assault to [the first assault victim]. And in relation to that count, the headline sentence will be a sentence of four years'

imprisonment. On count No. 4, I'm imposing a sentence of two years'

imprisonment. That is consecutive to the sentence imposed on count 2, in other words, it's to commence on the lawful termination of the sentence on count No. 2. Now, count No. 6 then, is the section 3 assault on [the second assault victim], the sentence I'm imposing on that count is a sentence of five years' imprisonment. That sentence is to be consecutive to the sentence on count 4, in other words, it's to commence on the lawful termination of the sentence on count 4. Now, in relation to count No. 7 then, which is the count in relation to the unlawful use of the tractor, the headline sentence would be a sentence of two years' imprisonment, I'm imposing a sentence of one year imprisonment. So, count 7 is one year imprisonment, and that is to be consecutive to the sentence imposed on count 6, in other words, it's to commence on the lawful termination of the sentence on count 6.”

12. In relation to the first appellant, the sentencing judge pronounced his sentence as follows:-

“Now, in relation to Colin Murphy, similarly, I'm satisfied that consecutive sentences are appropriate. Colin Murphy, on count No.

10, which is the arson of [the second assault victim's] car, I'm satisfied -- Ms Justice Kennedy [in DPP v. Shannon] indicated that in most egregious cases, 15 years is on the range of sentencing. So the headline sentence, I am satisfied, would be a sentence of 14 years'

imprisonment, I'm imposing a sentence of seven years imprisonment.

So, on count No. 10, I'm imposing a sentence of seven years'

imprisonment. On count No. 13 then, which is the section 3 assault on [the second assault victim], I'm imposing a sentence of five years'

imprisonment. So, on count No. 13, the sentence is five years imprisonment and that is to be consecutive to the sentence imposed on count No. 10, in other words, it's to commence on the lawful termination of the sentence imposed on count No. 10.”

13. Having imposed a 12 year term of imprisonment on each of the appellants, the sentencing judge proceeded to suspend the final 2 years of the term of imprisonment imposed for a period of 5 years on certain terms and conditions.

Grounds of Appeal

14. By notice of appeal dated 3 April 2024, the second appellant indicated his desire to appeal his sentence. His grounds of appeal are;

1. “The learned sentencing Judge erred in nominating a headline sentence of four years imprisonment for each of the two counts of criminal damage.

2. The learned sentencing Judge erred in nominating a headline sentence of four years imprisonment in respect of the section 3 assault offence, the subject of count 4 on the indictment.

3. In imposing the maximum sentence for the section 3 assault, the subject of count 6 on the indictment, the learned sentencing Judge erred in failing to give any credit whatsoever for the guilty plea and the other mitigating factors.

4. Given the circumstances in which these offences were committed, the learned sentencing Judge erred in imposing five successive consecutive sentences.

5. The learned sentencing Judge failed to impose sentences individually and/or cumulatively that had adequate regard to the mitigation in the case, in particular the appellant’s personal circumstances, his pleas of guilty and his significant efforts to rehabilitate.

6. Having decided to impose consecutive sentences in the manner described above, the learned sentencing Judge erred in failing to have adequate regard to the totality principle in considering an overall sentence which was proportionate and appropriate in the circumstances.

7. The learned sentencing Judge erred in principle and fact by suspending the final two years of twelve year sentence of imprisonment for a period of five years thereby placing a further punitive sanction on the Appellant.

15. By notice of appeal dated 3 April 2024, the first appellant indicated his desire to appeal his sentence. His grounds of appeal are;

1. “That the learned trial Judge erred in principle, and in law, by applying a headline sentence of five years imprisonment in respect of a Section

3 assault causing harm offence.

2. That the learned trial Judge erred in principle, and in law, by imposing a term of imprisonment of five years in respect of a Section 3 assault

causing harm offence, in particular where there had been an indication of a guilty plea from the earliest opportunity.

3. That the learned trial Judge erred in principle, and in law, by imposing a headline sentence of 14 years in respect of a criminal damage (arson) offence involving the setting of a motor vehicle alight.

4. That the learned trial Judge erred in principle, and in law, by imposing a sentence of seven years imprisonment for an offence of arson of a motor vehicle.

5. That the learned trial Judge erred in principle, and in law, by imposing consecutive sentences in respect of the sentence of five years (Section 3 assault causing harm) and seven years (arson of a motor vehicle), in particular given that both this alleged offending constituted the same transaction.

6. The learned trial Judge erred in failing to have adequate regard to the principle of totality in considering an overall sentence which was proportionate and appropriate in the circumstances, in particular, the imposition of a combined 12 year term of imprisonment, with the final two years suspended.

7. That the learned trial Judge failed to have any, or any adequate regard, for the mitigating factors and/or personal circumstances of the Appellant and in particular:

(i) The early plea entered by the Appellant.

(ii) The imposition of a two year suspended sentence, inter alia, in sole recognition of a valuable guilty plea.

(iii) The circumstances of the incident including the Appellant’s involved.

(iv) The Appellant’s personal history and family background.

The Parties Submissions The Second Appellant

16. While the second appellant’s written submissions asserted that the headline sentences nominated for all but the s. 112 offence (unlawful taking of a vehicle) were too high, a concession was made in the course of the hearing before us that the headline sentences identified by the sentencing judge fell within his margin of discretion. The focus of the submissions made by the second appellant narrowed to the imposition of the maximum sentence for the s. 3 assault on the second assault victim, despite the significant mitigation existent in the case which was reflected in the other sentences imposed; and the imposition of consecutive sentences in relation to each offence. That the offending was extremely serious and that the sentencing judge could, within his margin of discretion, impose consecutive sentences in respect of distinct periods of offending was accepted.

17. The first appellant made similar submissions with respect to the imposition of the maximum sentence in relation to the s. 3 assault on the second assault victim, and the imposition of consecutive sentences in relation to the arson and s. 3 assault which it was submitted fell within the one transaction rule. It was also submitted that the headline sentence identified in respect of the arson offence was much too high.

18. The respondent submitted that the offending was extremely serious and merited the term of imprisonment imposed. It was argued that the imposition of the maximum sentence in respect of the s. 3 assault on the second assault victim was not an error in principle as the offending fell within the exceptional category of offending which permitted the imposition of the maximum sentence, despite the mitigation present, and that this could be inferred from the sentencing judge’s reasoning. It was further submitted that the imposition of consecutive sentences in respect of each offence was permitted having regard to the particular circumstances of each

offence which reflected offending of a very serious nature involving different victims.

Discussion and Determination Maximum sentence imposed for the s. 3 assault on the second assault victim

19. The sentencing judge imposed a 5 year term of imprisonment on each of the appellants in respect of the s. 3 assault on the second assault victim.

Whilst the maximum sentence for this type of offence has now been increased, at the time the offence was committed, this was the maximum sentence which could be imposed for such an offence. Significant mitigation in respect of each of the appellants existed in this matter, to include an early guilty plea; helpful admissions from the appellants; remorse; and significant efforts made by each appellant to rehabilitate whilst in prison.

These mitigatory factors were accounted for by the sentencing judge in the sentences imposed for each of the other offences before the court where a 50% reduction from the headline sentence was reflected.

20. The appellants acknowledged that DPP v. McGrath, Dolan and Brazil [2020] IECA 50 permits the imposition of the maximum sentence of 5 years for a s. 3 assault where the assault perpetrated was of such a serious nature that it could be categorised as a s. 4 assault. As already noted, a s. 4 charge in relation to this assault was originally proferred against the appellants. In this regard, Birmingham J stated at para. 24 of his judgment:-

“It is in the nature of things that there may be cases where the

decision to charge with s.3 or with s.4, or to accept a plea to s.3 if s.4 has been charged, will be finely balanced. There will be other cases which will be identified as borderline s.3 or s.4. In such cases, a starting point or pre-mitigation sentence of five years may be appropriate. Certainly judges should not operate on the basis that a starting point of five years is not generally available and that it should only be considered, if it be ever considered, in exceptional circumstances.”

21. The appellants commented that the dicta of Birmingham J in McGrath related to the identification of the headline sentence rather than being authority for the proposition that the maximum sentence can be imposed regardless of the mitigatory factors present. The respondent accepted that submission.

22. Section 29 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999 permits the imposition of a maximum sentence for an offence even in circumstances of a guilty plea.

It provides:-

“(1) In determining what sentence to pass on a person who has pleaded guilty to an offence, other than an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law, a court, if it considers it appropriate to do so, shall take into account-

(a) The stage in the proceedings for the offence at which the person indicated an intention to plead guilty, and

(b) The circumstances in which this indication was given.

(2) To avoid doubt, it is hereby declared that subsection (1) shall not preclude a court from passing the maximum sentence prescribed by law for an offence, if, notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence which warrant the maximum sentence.”

23. In DPP v. Begley [2013] 2 IR 188, McKechnie J considered the issue of a sentencing court imposing a maximum sentence where a guilty plea had been entered stating at p.208 of the report:-

“However, this is not to say that a court, even with a guilty plea, cannot impose a maximum sentence in “rare and exceptional” cases.

It can and always could, with s.29(2) of the Act of 1999 being purely declaratory in this regard. Before doing so however, it must consider all of the mitigating factors and give each one its due and proper weight. Having so stated (in the R. McC case), Kearns J. continued at para. 35, p.105:

“It would, however, be an essential requirement when imposing a maximum sentence against a backdrop of a guilty plea that the court would identify those exceptional circumstances in such a way that would make it absolutely clear why the maximum sentence is warranted when there had been mitigating factors in the case. Such instances will of necessity be rare and confined to those cases where the offences represent the worst imaginable variation of the offence in question.””

24. In the instant case, the s. 3 assault perpetrated on the second assault victim was of an extremely serious nature and readily falls within the category of “the worst imaginable variation of the offence in question”

having regard, in particular, to the viciousness of the assault which left the second assault victim unconscious and unrecognisable due to the injuries sustained to his face; the seriousness of the injuries sustained by this victim to include a significant traumatic brain injury which has resulted in lasting neurological damage together with continuing post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms and a serious financial impact. This assault is also aggravated by the earlier s. 3 assault committed on the first assault victim only a short period in time previously. It is clear that the sentencing judge had full regard to the significant mitigating factors in the case as he reduced the headline sentence for each other offence by 50%. Having regard to the fact that he did not apply a similar reduction in respect of this offence, it can be easily inferred that he had regard to the mitigating factors present but was of the opinion that the nature of the offending was so exceptional that it merited the imposition of the maximum sentence despite the presence of these factors. While the sentencing judge did not specifically state this, the manner in which he approached sentencing leads to no other

conclusion.

25. We are of the opinion, that the trial judge did not err in finding that this s.

3 assault offence was of such an exceptional character that it required the imposition of the maximum sentence available for the offence so as to impose a proportionate sentence for the offence committed.

Headline Sentence for Arson Offence

26. The first appellant submitted that the headline sentence of 14 years imprisonment in respect of the arson offence was too high having regard to the guideline judgment of DPP v. Shannon [2023] IECA 325. It was submitted that the offence fell into the lowest category of seriousness for offences of this nature and therefore should have attracted a headline sentence of between 0-5 years imprisonment. It was further submitted that the arson offence was of secondary importance to the s. 3 assault offence which was committed at the same time and that therefore it should not have attracted a higher sentence than the 5 year sentence imposed in respect of the s. 3 assault offence.

27. The arson offence related to the second assault victim’s car. Having seriously assaulted this victim and leaving him unconscious on the ground behind his car, his car was set alight and ultimately was burnt out. The arson of this car could have had very serious consequences for the second assault victim had he not been rescued from this scene. This in itself proved difficult due to the appellants’ earlier offending which destroyed the telecommunication system and blocked traffic routes in the area as a result of telephone poles being knocked down.

28. In light of the serious consequences which could have arisen from this offence, we do not agree with the submission that the arson offence was secondary to the assault offence or that it fell within the lowest range of seriousness for offences of this nature.

29. We are of the opinion that the sentencing judge did not err in nominating a headline sentence of 14 years imprisonment having regard to the extreme seriousness of this offending behaviour.

Consecutive Sentences

30. The appellants submitted that the sentencing judge erred by imposing consecutive sentences in respect of each of the sentences. The appellants submitted that the sentencing judge, at most, should have imposed consecutive sentences in respect of distinct periods of offending and suggested that three periods presented: a) the unauthorised taking of the tractor and criminal damage to the telephone poles; b) the criminal damage to the first assault victim’s car and the assault on the first assault victim;

and c) the arson of the second assault victim’s car and assault of the second assault victim.

31. Counsel for the appellants relied on the Supreme Court judgment in DPP v.

FE [2021] 1 IR 217 where Charleton J stated at para 31 of his judgment:-

“In many instances, but even still sensibly looked at, a criminal event may consist of several different offences. The accused could be a male burglar who breaks into a house in order to steal. In doing so he will be carrying housebreaking implements, he will criminally damage doors and windows to enter and make good his escape, he will steal, he may threaten to kill the householder if confronted, he may tie her up, thus assaulting and falsely imprisoning her. That may take half an hour. It is still one event. While separate charges may be sensible in case the jury are inclined to reject part of the narrative, such as the threat to kill, each crime informs the seriousness of the others in the set. It would be wrong in principle for a sentencing court faced with four convictions out of the same events to split these up for tariff purposes and make each term consecutive to the other. That would be to act artificially. The event of the crime was clearly very bad and deserves an appropriate sentence. It is not appropriate to treat the events as separate and requiring consecutive sentences. The overall sentence, usually on the most serious of the offences, which would be the imprisonment aggravated by the threat to kill, must fit the event with other smaller sentences running concurrently.”

32. We are of the view that there is merit to the argument made by the appellants in this regard. The onus on a sentencing judge is to impose a proportionate sentence for the crime committed by the particular offender.

In circumstances where multiple offences have been committed, the option of imposing consecutive sentences in respect of the individual offences committed or imposing a sentence in respect of the principal offence which reflects the aggravating feature of the other offences committed arises.

Generally, this is a matter which falls within the sentencing judge’s discretion. However, where the multiple offending occurs within the same criminal transaction, the appropriateness of imposing consecutive sentences in respect of each offence committed within that criminal transaction narrows such that a proportionate sentence cannot be reached by the imposition of consecutive sentences and the imposition of a sentence for the principle offence committed aggravated by the less serious offences becomes the more appropriate avenue to reach a proportionate sentence.

33. We are of the view that the imposition of consecutive sentences in respect of each of the offences committed in the instant matter was not an appropriate approach by the sentencing judge in light of how closely

connected some of the offending was and that this reflects an error in principle.

34. We are not of the view that the imposition of consecutive sentences did not arise for consideration by the sentencing judge as distinct periods of offending occurred in this matter, reflected by different offences being committed; different victims involved; different locations; and different time periods when offending was committed. However, the imposition of consecutive sentences in respect of each offence was not an appropriate manner to arrive at a proportionate sentence. Instead, the three distinct periods of offending which have been identified by the appellants appropriately reflects the periods in respect of which the imposition of a consecutive sentence could arise for consideration by the sentencing judge.

35. As we have found that an error in principle arises with respect to this aspect of the sentence imposed, we will quash the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge on each appellant and proceed to re-sentence as of today’s date.

Re-sentence Colin Murphy

36. The first appellant pleaded guilty to arson and s. 3 assault on the second assault victim on a full facts basis.

37. In respect of the arson offence (Count 10), as already indicated, we are of the view that the arson offence in this matter was an extremely serious offence in circumstances where the second assault victim lay unconscious behind his vehicle which had been set on fire and which had the potential to explode. His unconscious state was caused by the serious assault which had been perpetrated on him by the appellants. The risk to the second appellant’s life was very high, particularly in circumstances where contacting the emergency services was made problematic by the destruction of the telecommunication system caused by the appellants, and access to the second assault victim to rescue him from this perilous situation was made more difficult because of road blockages arising from the appellants’ earlier behaviour.

38. We are of the opinion that a headline sentence of 14 years correctly reflects the very serious nature of the offending which was aggravated by the assault on the second assault victim together with the earlier offending by the first appellant which was to be taken into account on a full facts basis.

39. To reflect the mitigatory factors present in this case which include the early guilty plea, the remorse shown, the helpful admissions made, and the rehabilitative efforts of the first appellant whilst in custody, we will reduce the headline sentence by 4 and a half years to one of 9 and a half years imprisonment. To encourage further rehabilitative efforts on the part of the first appellant, we will suspend the final 18 months of the sentence imposed on Count 10 for a period of 18 months on condition that he keep the peace and be of good behaviour; that following his release from prison that the appellant come under the supervision of the Probation and Welfare Services and comply with all their directions and requirements; and that he stay away from the townland where the offences were committed for the period of the suspension.

40. In relation to the s. 3 assault on the second assault victim (Count 13), we are of the opinion that this assault falls into the most serious type of assault possible for a s. 3 assault having regard to the seriousness of the injuries sustained by the second assault victim and the ongoing significant sequalae he continues to suffer physically, mentally and financially. This assault has had a devastating ongoing effect on this victim. We are of the opinion that the maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment should be imposed as the offending falls within the exceptional category of offending where a proportionate sentence would not otherwise be reflected, although mitigating factors are most certainly present in the case which we already have noted and given credit for in the sentence imposed with respect to the arson offence.

41. The sentence in respect of Count 13 is to run concurrently to the sentence imposed on Count 10.

Glen Murphy

42. We are of the opinion that each of the criminal damage offences attract a headline sentence of 4 years imprisonment. The criminal damage to the telecommunication poles (Count 2) was of significance both in monetary terms and the effect of the damage, resulting in the telecommunication system being non-operational. The criminal damage to the motor vehicle driven by the first assault victim (Count 1) was also significant and displayed violent and frenzied behaviour which was carried out in front of the first assault victim and his sister. To reflect mitigatory factors present which include the early guilty plea, expression of remorse, the helpful admissions and the rehabilitative efforts made by the second appellant whilst in custody, we are of the view that a reduction of one and a half years should be made from the headline sentence.

43. With respect to the s. 3 assault on the first assault victim (Count 4), we are of the opinion that this was a serious assault on that victim and that the appropriate headline sentence is one of 4 years imprisonment. To reflect the mitigatory factors present in the case which we have already recited, we are of the view that the headline sentence should be reduced by one year.

44. With respect to the s. 3 assault on the second assault victim (Count 6), for the reasons we have already outlined, we are of the opinion that the offending which occurred is the most serious offending for an offence of this nature and exceptional circumstances arise which lead us to the

conclusion that despite the fact that mitigatory factors exist, a proportional sentence would not be imposed for the offence committed if a the maximum sentence for this offence was not imposed.

45. With respect to the offence of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle (Count 7), we agree with the sentencing judge that the offence attracts a headline sentence of 2 years imprisonment. Again, to reflect the mitigatory factors, we are of the view that the headline sentence should be reduced by 9 months.

46. We are of the opinion the imposition of consecutive sentences arises in this case and are of the view that the three distinct periods of offending identified by the second appellant attracts consecutive sentences in light of the different victims involved, different locations and different time periods.

47. Accordingly, the sentences imposed on Count 2 (criminal damage to telephone poles) and Count 7 (unlawful taking of a mechanically propelled vehicle) are to run concurrently with each other; the sentences imposed on Count 1 (criminal damage to the motor vehicle driven by the first assault victim) and Count 4 (s. 3 assault of the first assault victim) are to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences imposed on Counts 2 and 7; and the sentence imposed on Count 6 (s. 3 assault of the second assault victim) is to run consecutively to the sentences imposed on Counts 1 and 4.

48. In light of the fact that consecutive sentences are being imposed and to reflect the principles of totality and proportionality, we are imposing terms of imprisonment as follows: Count 1 - 2 years; Count 2 - 2 years; Count 4

– 2 and a half years; Count 6 – 5 years; Count 7 - 1 year.

49. In light of the consecutive nature of the sentencing which we have ordered, the term of imprisonment imposed amounts to 9 and a half years imprisonment. We will suspend the final 18 months of the sentence imposed on Count 6 for a period of 18 months to encourage further rehabilitation on the part of the second appellant on condition that he keep the peace and be of good behaviour; that following his release from prison that the appellant come under the supervision of the Probation and Welfare Services and comply with all their directions and requirements; and that he stay away from the townland where the offences were committed for the period of the suspension.

Approved No Redaction Needed