Court of Appeal dismisses bail appeal for drug conspiracy appellant due to flight risk and lack of sufficient conditions.

THE COURT OF APPEAL Record No: 90/2025 Edwards J. Neutral Citation Number [2025] IECA 134 McCarthy J. Kennedy J.

BETWEEN/ THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

RESPONDENT V ALI MAZIDI APPELLANT

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Edwards on the 5th of June, 2025.

Introduction

1. The appellant is charged with the offence of conspiracy to import controlled drugs, contrary to s.71(a)(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 as amended by s.4(b) of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023 and faces trial before the Special Criminal Court. He has been remanded in custody pending his trial. By a motion issued on

14 March 2025 the appellant applied to the High Court to be admitted to bail pending his trial. His application, which was grounded on an affidavit sworn by him on the same date, was heard by the High Court (Biggs J) on 4 April 2025. Bail was objected to on the first of the O’Callaghan grounds, namely that the appellant represented a flight risk, and that no regime of conditions would serve to allay concerns in that regard. Oral evidence was received at the hearing of the bail application in the High Court from a Detective Sgt Stephen Fuller. There is a full transcript of the High Court hearing, covering the evidence given by Detective Sgt Fuller, the submissions made by counsel, and the judgement of Biggs J. Bail was refused. The appellant subsequently appealed against the High Court’s

decision. The appeal was heard before this Court on Tuesday, the 3rd June 2025.

Following a post-hearing deliberée, the Court set again to announce its decision. The appeal was dismissed, and it was indicated that reasons for doing so will be provided in a written judgment of the Court to be delivered at 10:30 AM on the 5th June 2025. We now give the reasons for our decision.

Background to the matter

2. The background to this matter is fully set out in the evidence recorded on the transcript previously referred to and in the judgment of the High Court judge therein contained.

However, for the purposes of this judgment the court proposes to adopt the brief summary provided in written submissions to this Court on behalf of the DPP, which appear to us to be succinct and accurate, and in respect of which no objection was raised at the appeal hearing. The following is the summary provided:

i) The appellant was stopped as a passenger in a car in Bandon by uniformed gardai on the 27th February 2024. Initially when asked for identification the appellant informed gardai all of his identification documents were in his hotel. Following a search of the car, a number of identity documents including a Dutch passport belonging to the appellant was found. This Dutch passport showed travel to the United Arab Emirates, Peru, Columbia, Trinidad & Tobago, Ecuador on two occasions and Turkey. The appellant travelled to these various destinations all in 2023 and 2024 alone.

ii) Also discovered during this search was a notepad which contained various pier locations, accommodations and travel times and distances between these piers and accommodations. The appellant was then released without charge.

iii) Subsequently on the 12th March 2024, three vehicles converged on Tragumna Pier, namely a black Land Rover Discovery, a white Zafira camper van and an articulated truck, registered in Bulgaria, with a custom-built trailer attached. This gathering was reported to gardai by a concerned citizen. Subsequent investigations showed the Land Rover Discovery had been stolen in Glasgow.

iv) The custom-built trailer contained a 40 foot ‘RIB’ boat with three high powered engines attached to it. A witness observed the launching of the RIB to sea and a garda surveillance operation was put in place. The RIB had been modified for stealth and speed, all lights were blacked out and any surface capable of reflecting light had been spray painted black. The screens on board had also been taped over.

v) At 4:45am on the 14th March 2024, nearly 48 hours after the events on the 12th March, all three vehicles reconverged on the same pier, at which time the RIB was seen approaching the coastline, whereupon it was - with some difficulty - loaded back onto the custom-built trailer.

vi) All 10 co-accused were observed around the pier at this time.

vii) At 7:20 am on the 14th March, the white campervan was observed leaving Tragumna pier and driving into Leap village. At this point gardai moved in to arrest the occupants of this campervan and also, the remaining persons present at the pier.

viii) The appellant was found in the rear of the stolen black Land Rover Discovery along with three other males. A search of the vehicles resulted in receipts that showed more than £8,500 had been spent on maritime clothing alone, prior to the 12th March. There was also a large volume of communication devices seized at this stage, including iridium satellite phones and Motorola walkie-talkies. The State will allege the appellant was part of the land crew, which had all of the necessary technical equipment to monitor the sea crew during the operation, including tracking devices, handheld GPS trackers and a bug detection device.

ix) The onboard Garmin GPS device and the two handheld Garmin GPS devices revealed the RIB had travelled from Tragumna slipway, past Lands’ End and into the English Channel and was at sea for just under 48 hours. Logged in the handheld Garmin GPS devices were waypoints. The State will contend these were rendezvous locations for the RIB to meet with a cargo ship to take on a consignment of narcotics. A screenshot of this ‘mothership’ was located on the phone attributed to one of the accused.

x) There were a number of waypoints input on the 3 GPS devices, some of the waypoints were along the track line of the “ mothership “ .

xi) The RIB vessel had been brought into Ireland via Rosslare. It was then transported to a commercial building in Northern Ireland where Mr. Sean Curran is employed.

xii) The appellant accepted one of the many mobile phones seized was his but declined to provide a pin number.

xiii) The appellant was interviewed and claimed to be the owner of a company called FSS Trading which sells coffee to restaurants. He accepted he was the person stopped at Bandon on the 27th February 2025 and claimed his presence in Cork related to the organization of a military style fitness boot camp. The appellant denied any involvement with drug importation and contended Gardai had handed him a phone and planted a document in his holdall bag during the arrest operation.

The appellant accepted he was in the black Land Rover and denied he had ever seen the boat or truck prior to his arrest.

xiv) The appellant went on to accept ownership of five of the mobile phones seized, including the two iridium satellite phones and gave an account of selling mobile phones.

The Judgment of the High Court

3. The High Court judge considered in detail the evidence that had been adduced before her and summarised it. She then observed:

“So, the position is that the State's case, in my view, considering all of that evidence, the multiple pieces of it and their interconnections, is that there is, in fact, a strong case for conspiracy. There are extremely unusual activities going on.

There is -- has been sourced and searched exhibits provided, that suggest that a large amount of funding went into this enterprise. It was sophisticated, it was complex and, clearly, the position is that there has been no evidence that's suggestive of innocent explanations for this activity. The position in relation to the applicant -- just bear with me one moment, I want to make sure I haven't left anything out there of importance. Yes, sorry, there was one matter which is that the electronic equipment and some of the communication systems were sent -- were received in this jurisdiction through post.

The State view is that was to ensure that they were not detected by authorities. So, as indicated, bearing in mind that this is an offence of conspiracy and considering the first three principles in O'Callaghan, it seems to me that there is a strong case for conspiracy. The fact of sophisticated technology being utilised, the, I suppose, covert actions of the men found at the pier, as indicated the financial investment that would have been necessary for the purposes of the rib itself, the modification of the vehicle that Mr Curran was found in, the other matters, as I said, in relation to accommodation and presence at the scene and presence in Ireland which, effectively, all of those matters lead me to take the view that there is a strong case against the applicant.

And as I've indicated, that's in circumstances where I have considered the comprehensive evidence provided by the State in this case by Detective Sergeant Fuller. Now, bearing in mind the complexity and the nature of the allegation, it does appear to me that bearing in mind the maximum penalty that can be imposed, that a significant custodial sentence will be warranted in the event of conviction, and I don't think that can be disputed, really. So, Mr Perry is absolutely right in the sense that he says that there is no prior history that suggests that the applicant, Mr Mazidi has failed to answer bail in the past.

The matter that I can take into consideration are the previous convictions, but only in the context of any sentence that might be imposed, and they are fairly limited, although there are two in recent times for money laundering. So they would be of interest, but not great interest, I would imagine, to the sentencing court, should that arise. So, the position I'm advised is that the applicant is a Dutch resident in Holland. I am advised that notwithstanding that he has travelled, as I have already indicated, twelve months prior to arrest to numerous countries, Peru, Columbia, Trinidad, Tobago, Ecuador.

And the concern expressed by the prosecution is that he has the means therefore and the ability to travel, and travel extensively. While a point has been made that some of the countries in question may not have extradition treaties, I don't know if that is the case off-hand in relation to the countries listed, and even if they did there may be some difficulty in securing the efficient cooperation of police forces in those countries. And that is a point, but the more important point, I think, is that in circumstances where Mr Mazidi has no connections to this jurisdiction, it is a concern, and a meaningful concern, that he has had the ability, the means and the wherewithal to travel so extensively in the year prior to this arrest.

And as indicated by Detective Sergeant Fuller, Detective Sergeant Fuller is not saying that he is of the view that Mr Mazidi will travel to Peru, Columbia, United Arab Emirates, he doesn't know where he will travel to, but the history shows he has the capacity, the means and the ability to travel. So that is, as I said, a very significant concern. The other matter that has been raised by the prosecution is that, as I've already indicated, the applicant has no ties whatsoever to this jurisdiction, and that has not been disputed. And the further concern is that the applicant may have access to, and I say "may have" to false documentation.

It is not denied by the applicant's legal team, rightly, that in light of the sophisticated nature of this operation, of this enterprise, what would have been needed for it, the large sums of money available, et cetera, that a Court could infer that such an organisation with such, as I said, complexity and sophistication could have access to false documentation. And that is simply supported by the fact that some of his co-accused had data on their phones that suggested access to false identification documents. I take Mr Perry's point that the argument is weakened somewhat, because such data was not found on the phone of Mr Mazidi, but the point does have a foundation, nonetheless.

Much has been said in relation to this matter about the position in relation to Mr Curran. The position in relation to Mr Curran, I am advised, is that he has a slightly different role and different factual circumstances, but I am not really concerned, and nor can I be concerned with Mr Curran's situation. While the issue of parity would always arise in relation to sentencing, I'm completely aware of that, and to some degree in relation to bail applications as well, I was not the judge in Curran either in the bail application or indeed the Court of Appeal, I have not considered the Court of Appeal judgment, I haven't been asked to.

Every case has different factual circumstances, both personal and in relation to the crimes or allegations themselves. And for me to indicate that, well, on the basis that Mr Curran's circumstances are the same as Mr Mazidi, I'm going to grant bail by means of some class of domino effect, the same principle could easily apply to the other eight accused who have been refused bail, who I know very little about. And I'm not going to engage in that. I decide these facts on the basis of the information that I have set out by the prosecution, both in relation to the involvement in the alleged criminal activities and, indeed, the personal circumstances of the applicant.

While it's of interest to know what has happened in the other cases, it is not something that should inform my view one way or the other. To do so would be to act, in my view, unfairly in relation to Mr Mazidi, because that would engage a process of trawling through the evidence that's relevant to the other applicants, both personal and in terms of criminal activity, and seeing whether there is a correlation. So, my view is that I decide this case on the evidence that I have in relation to Mr Mazidi and not look beyond that really. And in that regard, it is the State's case, and there is evidence to support it, that Mr Mazidi was here from February of '24 on, effectively, a recognisance mission.

He was present at the time that the rib re-entered Ireland at the time of arrest. He was present on the land. He had and accepted a number of phones, including satellite phones on his possession. He has not given an account that is consistent with innocence, I suppose, in relation to those phones and has no account in relation to the significant amount of cash that was found on his possession. So, in those circumstances, in light of the nature of the accusations, the evidence, the likely sentence to be imposed and the evidence that I've heard in relation to the personal circumstances of the applicant, in my view, in all probability, he will attempt to evade justice if released on bail.

Now, I have carefully considered the conditions put forward by Mr Perry and, indeed by -- as per the affidavit which I've considered of Mr Mazidi, and I note that he has provided a Dutch address where he had previously lived. He has indicated through Mr Perry that he would agree to reside in Ireland, at an address to be approved by the garda!. I'm advised by Mr Perry that he's in a position to offer surety to his brother, and he would have to be approved by the gardai, together with a suite of other conditions that he has agreed to in tenns of what he would do if released.

But I'm afraid I've considered those conditions and none of them really allay my fears in relation to what I believe to be a significant flight risk. And in those circumstances, I will refuse bail. I do acknowledge your point, Mr Perry, in relation to the fact that the trial date may not be imminent. It may well be that -- although I think the receipt of the book of evidence does suggest or should suggest some degree of readiness on the part of the State. There may be disclosure requests that may delay matters getting on, and it may be that the intervention, that it may be difficult to go through vast amounts of evidence with the applicant whilst he's in custody.

That, in my view, warrants pre-trial management, pre-trial management as between both the lawyers for the prosecution and the lawyers for the defence, but also pre-trial management to ask the court to engage and assist. And I don't really have any doubt, but that Mr Justice Hunt will readily try and assist matters in expediting both the service of disclosure documentation and finding a way of ensuring that Mr Mazidi can be properly advised in good time. And of course, once he comes before the Special Criminal Court, in the event that a trial date is not fixed expeditiously, and I do understand that the list in the special is greatly reduced, and you don't find the same type of delays that you might find in other courts or other jurisdictions, but if there is a very significant delay in going to trial, of course, you can renew the bail application on the basis that the length of time might amount to a change of circumstances that will all have to be decided upon by another bail judge.

But oftentimes, sitting in the Special I have taken a bail application sitting as a High Court judge singularly, and that is something that can be considered by you and your legal team in due course. But for present purposes, despite the very comprehensive and capable application you have brought, I can't grant bail.”

The Grounds of Appeal

4. The notice of appeal filed by the appellant sets out eight grounds of appeal, as follows:

1. The learned High Court judge erred in law and in fact in refusing to admit the appellant to bail pending the determination of the criminal proceedings pending against him.

2. The learned High Court judge erred in her determination that the appellant posed a flight risk such that bail should be refused.

3. The learned High Court judge erred in holding that the flight risk concern advanced by the respondent could not be addressed by fixing appropriate conditions and/or in failing to adequately consider the extent to which appropriate conditions could address that concern.

4. The learned High Court judge erred when considering the strength of the evidence against the appellant by having undue regard to evidence which did not appear in the book of evidence and had been neither disclosed nor served in a Notice of Additional Evidence by the respondent.

5. The learned High Court judge erred when considering the strength of the evidence against the appellant by treating as a relevant consideration that he had not provided explanations to gardai which were “consistent with innocence”, and thus treating the appellant’s exercise of the right to silence as part of the body of evidence against him.

6. The learned High Court judge erred in giving undue weight to claims by the respondent that the appellant had access to extensive financial means and/or falsified documents which would enable him to evade justice.

7. The learned High Court judge erred in failing to give adequate weight to (i) the lack of any forensic history suggesting that the appellant posed a flight risk; (ii) the likely length of time that the appellant would spend in pre-trial detention if bail were refused; and (iii) the difficulties that would exist in the defence preparing adequately for trial in the event that bail was not granted.

8. The learned High Court judge erred in failing to have adequate regard to the fact that the Court of Appeal had granted bail to Sean Curran, a court accused of the appellant.

5. At the oral hearing before the Court, only grounds 4, 5, 7(iii) and 8 were pressed.

Submissions

6. The court received helpful written submissions from both sides, and these were amplified in oral argument. Where necessary the court will reference submissions made in dealing with the substantive arguments.

Discussion and analysis Ground of Appeal No 4

7. The complaint here is that the High Court judge erred when assessing the strength of the evidence against the appellant by taking account of matters that did not appear at that stage in the Book of Evidence and which had been neither disclosed in disclosure made up to that point, nor served in a Notice of Additional Evidence by the respondent.

8. We can deal with this aspect of the case relatively briefly. The court hearing an application for bail is not trying the substantive case. It is concerned with assessing the strength of the evidence that may be adduced against the applicant at trial, for the purpose of risk assessing the likelihood of flight. In People (Attorney General) v O’Callaghan [1966] IR 501, the strength of the evidence against a person charged with a crime was identified as being a relevant consideration in considering whether or not it is likely that the prisoner may’s attempt to evade justice. In particular, Murnaghan J, in referencing the nature of the evidence in support of the charge, observed that the more cogent the evidence the greater the likelihood of conviction and consequently the greater the likelihood of the prisoner attempting to evade justice.

9. It is in the nature of things that bail applications are frequently made at a relatively early stage of criminal proceedings and before full preparations for trial have been made. Often, while the prosecution may have acquired sufficient evidence to enable it to charge an individual, and serve him/her with a Book of Evidence, supplementary investigations, for example certain forensic enquiries, may be ongoing and which depending on their outcome might either strengthen or weaken the case against the prisoner. Frequently, full disclosure may not yet have been made. Frequently, there may be an expectation, and indeed likelihood, that Notices of Additional Evidence will be served before the trial commences.

10. In assessing the likely strength of a case, a court considering a bail application is entitled to consider not just the contents of any Book of Evidence/Notices of Additional Evidence that have been served, and disclosure made, up to that point but to also consider any representations made by or on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, concerning likely further evidence to be adduced at trial, or further disclosure to be made. Of course, counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions must be a Minister for Justice in outlining such information to a court seized of a bail application. The likely strength of the case should not be misrepresented or overstated. In that regard, only such further information/evidence that it can be confidently predicted the DPP may seek to introduce (subject to her being successful in any challenges that might arise to the admissibility of contentious evidence) should be outlined. Subject to that caveat, however, a court seized of a bail application may be apprised of anticipated further evidence to be adduced at trial, or further disclosure to be made, and take it into account.

11. There is nothing to suggest that there has been any want of probity on the part of the DPP in this case in outlining anticipated further evidence to be adduced at trial, or further disclosure to be made. There is nothing to suggest that the strength of the case against the appellant was overstated or misrepresented at the hearing before the High Court in this case.

12. We are satisfied that the High Court judge was entitled to receive such additional information as she was provided with in the circumstances of the case and to take it into account in assessing the strength of the case against this appellant. Accordingly, we reject Ground of Appeal No 4.

Ground of Appeal No 5

13. This ground of appeal is based upon a contention that the High Court judge erred when considering the strength of the evidence against the appellant by treating as a relevant consideration that he had not provided explanations to gardai which were “consistent with innocence”, and thus treating the appellant’s exercise of the right to silence as part of the body of evidence against him.

14. We are completely satisfied that the High Court judge did not err as suggested. The relevant portion of her judgment remarks bear reiteration. She stated:

“He had and accepted a number of phones, including satellite phones on his possession. He has not given an account that is consistent with innocence, I suppose, in relation to those phones and has no account in relation to the significant amount of cash that was found on his possession.”

15. We are completely satisfied that the High Court judge, in making these remarks, was doing nothing more than commenting that the evidence in regard to the appellant’s possession of the phones in question, and the significant amount of cash that was found in his possession (and which the prosecution intends to rely upon as being evidence of the appellant’s participation in the conspiracy alleged) appeared, at least at that stage, to be all one way in the sense of being suspicious, and potentially circumstantially supportive of guilt. She had not been made aware of any counter narrative or explanation “consistent with innocence”. This was manifestly relevant to her assessment of the strength of the case against the prisoner. The appellant’s right to silence or privilege against selfincrimination was simply not engaged in that context. The High Court judge was not trying the case, and the appellant will, in due course, at his trial, be entitled to a certain rely upon the full range of substantive and procedural rights that inure to a defendant at a criminal trial, including (but not confined to) relying upon the presumption of innocence, the entitlement to insist that the State proves its case against him to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, to object to any evidence obtained in breach of his right to silence and right not to have to incriminate himself, and to assert his entitlement not to give evidence if he does not wish to do so and to have no adverse inference drawn against him should he opt not to do so.

16. All of that having been said, however, a judge seized of a bail application must consider the entirety of the evidence as outlined to him or her in assessing the strength. It is perfectly proper and reasonable for such a judge to have regard to the fact that the evidence, as outlined to him or her, appears to be all one way at least at that stage, and that no narrative or explanation consistent with innocence had been put forward up to that point. Moreover, it obviously must cut both ways. If a narrative or explanation consistent with innocence had indeed been put forward, an applicant for bail could reasonably, and indeed would be entitled, to expect that it would be taken into account in the assessment of the strength of the case.

17. For these reasons we do not believe that the observations of the High Court judge relied upon were inappropriate or that they impacted in any way on the appellant’s right to silence. Accordingly, we reject Ground of Appeal No 5.

Ground of Appeal No 7(iii)

18. This Ground of Appeal articulates a concern that, because the documentation in this case is already very voluminous, and it is anticipated that more will be served during the process of ongoing disclosure; and because of asserted anticipated difficulties in securing the necessary consultation time with the appellant while he is in custody to go through that documentation with him for the purpose of obtaining instructions; the appellant will not be able to receive a fair trial unless he gets bail. It was alleged that the difficulty is exacerbated by an unusual situation obtaining in this case whereby an undertaking was required of, and given by, the appellant’s legal team that documentary copies of records of interviews with him, and with his co-accused, should not to be left with the appellant (but rather be retained by his solicitor) necessitating his lawyers laboriously reading such material aloud to him during consultations for the purpose of taking his instructions. It is relevant in that context that the appellant has been in custody since March 2024, that a firm date for his trial has not yet been set, and that it is anticipated that the earliest trial date that he is likely to receive before the Special Criminal Court would be in January 2026.

19. In regard to this complaint, the respondent contends that accommodations can be made for the difficulties asserted by the appellant, assuming they can be substantiated, through active case management by the Special Criminal Court of his case. Counsel for the appellant, in response to this suggestion, has submitted that it is not clear that any case management could resolve those difficulties.

20. The High Court judge agreed with the respondent on this issue. She stated:

“That, in my view, warrants pre-trial management, pre-trial management as between both the lawyers for the prosecution and the lawyers for the defence, but also pre-trial management to ask the court to engage and assist. And I don't really have any doubt, but that Mr Justice Hunt will readily try and assist matters in expediting both the service of disclosure documentation and finding a way of ensuring that Mr Mazidi can be properly advised in good time. And of course, once he comes before the Special Criminal Court, in the event that a trial date is not fixed expeditiously, and I do understand that the list in the special is greatly reduced, and you don't find the same type of delays that you might find in other courts or other jurisdictions, but if there is a very significant delay in going to trial, of course, you can renew the bail application on the basis that the length of time might amount to a change of circumstances that will all have to be decided upon by another bail judge.”

21. We agree with the position taken by the High Court judge. We consider that the complaint currently being relied upon is being prematurely made, in circumstances where to date there has been no engagement with any process of case management. To state this is not to criticise the appellant in any way, in circumstances where a firm date for his trial has not yet been set. However, the fact remains that no application has yet been made to the Special Criminal Court for any order(s), including that his lawyers might be released or partially released from the undertaking given, or perhaps for some modification of the terms of the undertaking, to mention but some possibilities, that might serve to ameliorate the asserted difficulties. The High Court judge flagged that an application for bail could be renewed in certain circumstances. If a process of case management has been properly engaged in by all concerned, and appropriate applications made in that regard have not resulted in the anticipated difficulties being overcome, or sufficiently overcome, to allow for proper instructions to be taken from the appellant, he can always make a further application for bail at that stage, relying on those new circumstances. If he does so it will be a matter for whatever court is concerned with adjudicating on that application to determine whether the granting of bail is necessary in the interests of ensuring a fair trial and, if so, the conditions of any such bail. We are satisfied, however, that at this stage the complaint that he raises is premature, that per se (other than in the general sense that it is always easier for a defendant who is at liberty to engage with their lawyers) it is not a circumstance that at this point on the road to this appellant’s trial would strongly favor, or weigh heavily in the balance towards, the granting of bail, and that the High Court judge properly addressed it in suggesting that there should be engagement with a process of case management before the Special Criminal Court in the first instance. Accordingly, we also reject Ground of Appeal No 7(iii).

Ground of Appeal No 8

22. The complaint here is that because a person co-accused with the appellant, a Mr Sean Curran, was granted bail, the appellant should also have been granted bail.

23. Mr Curran was originally denied bail in the High Court but successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was ex tempore and no note or transcript of it was produced either to us or to the court below.

24. It is asserted on behalf of the appellant that the circumstances of the co-accused were very similar to his own, although little or no evidence of that has been provided. It is contended by counsel on his behalf that reasons should have been given by the High Court judge for not showing curial deference to the ruling of the Court of Appeal in deciding to grant bail to Mr Curran. It was submitted that the High Court judge had failed to accord to that decision the weight that should have been accorded to it.

25. The High Court judge dealt with the contention that she should have regard to the

decision to grant bail to Mr Curran, as follows:

“Much has been said in relation to this matter about the position in relation to Mr Curran. The position in relation to Mr Curran, I am advised, is that he has a slightly different role and different factual circumstances, but I am not really concerned, and nor can I be concerned with Mr Curran's situation. While the issue of parity would always arise in relation to sentencing, I'm completely aware of that, and to some degree in relation to bail applications as well, I was not the judge in Curran either in the bail application or indeed the Court of Appeal, I have not considered the Court of Appeal judgment, I haven't been asked to. Every case has different factual circumstances, both personal and in relation to the crimes or allegations themselves. And for me to indicate that, well, on the basis that Mr Curran's circumstances are the same as Mr Mazidi, I'm going to grant bail by means of some class of domino effect, the same principle could easily apply to the other eight accused who have been refused bail, who I know very little about. And I'm not going to engage in that. I decide these facts on the basis of the information that I have set out by the prosecution, both in relation to the involvement in the alleged criminal activities and, indeed, the personal circumstances of the applicant. While it's of interest to know what has happened in the other cases, it is not something that should inform my view one way or the other. To do so would be to act, in my view, unfairly in relation to Mr Mazidi, because that would engage a process of trawling through the evidence that's relevant to the other applicants, both personal and in terms of criminal activity, and seeing whether there is a correlation. So, my view is that I decide this case on the evidence that I have in relation to Mr Mazidi and not look beyond that really.”

26. We consider that the High Court judge’s approach to this issue was entirely correct and unimpeachable in its terms. In our view this ground of appeal, in the absence of any or any sufficient evidential foundation capable of supporting it, was unstateable. Accordingly, we dismiss it in limine.

Other Grounds

27. Although the other grounds of appeal pleaded were not pressed at the hearing of this appeal, we should briefly comment that we are satisfied that the ruling of the High Court judge exhibits no grounds for concern in terms of the additional grounds pleaded. In our view the evidence that was presented was sufficient to establish a significant flight risk. It was cogent and compelling. Indeed, counsel for the appellant conceded that he could not contest that issues had been raised that could generate concerns as to flight risk. He contended, nonetheless, there had been insufficient engagement by the High Court judge with whether the concerns in question could be allayed and addressed by a regime of conditions. We are satisfied that the High Court judge was justified in concluding that bail should be refused. The fact that the alleged offences were believed to be in furtherance of the objectives of an organised criminal group engaged in suspected transnational criminal activity, and in particular drug trafficking, was a very relevant consideration. The inference may readily be drawn that such a group would have the resources to enable individuals to flee the jurisdiction. There was clear evidence suggesting that the appellant had carried out activities in support of that group and, as was the position taken by this court in People (DPP) v Curtis and Curtis [2020] IECA 85, we do not have any difficulty in drawing the inference that if somebody carries out tasks of significance on behalf of such a group, that that person would be in a position to draw on the resources available to that group, if required.

Conclusion

28. The High Court judge approached her task with care, and was conscientious in her consideration of the evidence and of the legal issues arising. We find no errors in her approach. In our assessment, the application for bail was properly refused in the circumstances of this case.

29. Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, the appeal was dismissed.