Court dismisses plaintiff's estoppel claim for farm ownership and rejects defendant's counterclaim for unpaid rent and bills.

THE CIRCUIT COURT

AN CHÚIRT CHUARDA

MIDLAND CIRCUIT COUNTY OF OFFALY

Record No. 2015/00239

Neutral Citation: [2024] IECC 24

BETWEEN:

JAMIE S. FLYNN

PLAINTIFF

AND

MARY DALTON, ANASTASIA KEHOE AND

ALICE NOLAN

RESPONDENTS

Judgment of His Honour Judge Meehan delivered on the 19th day of June, 2024

Introduction

1. The amended Equity Civil Bill claims a number of reliefs. The primary relief sought at the hearing was a declaration that, pursuant to the doctrine of promissory estoppel and/or proprietary estoppel, upon the deaths of the deceased couple (as defined below), the plaintiff thereupon became the beneficial owner of all that and those, the dwelling house and lands situate at Leamore, Blue Ball, Tullamore in the County of Offaly and comprised in Folio 1712 of the Register of County Offaly (hereinafter referred to as “the Property”). The case was heard over four days in Tullamore Circuit Court commencing on the 23rd January 2024.

2. A potentially confusing feature of this case is that a number of the protagonists share the same surname, i.e. Flynn. In order to avoid confusion I will refer to the plaintiff as such, to James Flynn Snr as the plaintiff’s father, to Patricia Flynn (the plaintiff’s wife) as Patricia, to Peter Flynn as the deceased, to the late Margaret Flynn as Peggy, and to the deceased and Peggy together as the deceased couple.

The Evidence

3. The plaintiff’s case is that he had a close relationship with the deceased and his late wife, Peggy. They were an elderly couple and had no children. The plaintiff’s family is unrelated to the deceased couple. The deceased died intestate on 15 March 2014. Peggy died intestate on

16 April 2017. The first named defendant is Peggy’s niece. She was appointed administrator of the deceased’s estate on 20 May 2015. On 19 November 2014, Peggy was made a Ward of Court and the first defendant was appointed committee. The second and third named defendants are the administrators of Peggy’s estate pursuant to the Grant of Letters of Administration of

26 March 2019.

4. The plaintiff said he first met the deceased when he was a child and first met Peggy in or about 1999. On 1st January, 2000 the plaintiff’s father entered a five year lease to rent the deceased’s farm. This was formalised in a written lease dated 26th January, 2001. The plaintiff’s father said he first offered to purchase the deceased couple’s farm in the early 2000s.

5. Until 2004 the plaintiff lived at home while studying for various qualifications and working in different jobs. The plaintiff said he helped his father on the farm and his friendship with the deceased and Peggy intensified during this period. The plaintiff and the plaintiff’s father gave evidence that from 2000 onwards, the plaintiff often stayed overnight with the deceased couple because he liked listening to their stories.

6. Several neighbours described the deceased’s’ house as a “rambling house”. Mr Joe Molloy said there were always cars and bikes outside. Mr PJ Grogan said everyone would be welcome and offered tea and cake. The plaintiff said people were always welcome and in the evenings the deceased told stories and discussed history. He said the deceased couple often invited the plaintiff to stay over and that he often accepted such invitations. He said he loved the stories and that the deceased couple loved having someone to listen to them.

7. The plaintiff said that he always wanted to be a part time farmer.

8. In or around September 2004 the plaintiff was considering going to Australia. He said he consulted the deceased couple and they were very supportive. The plaintiff said that a week or two later they discussed it again. According to the plaintiff, the deceased couple said “We were thinking of leaving this place to your father and now we’re thinking of leaving it to you”. They said, “We’d love you to have this place, we’ve chatted to your father”. He said he was overjoyed, although he did not see the significance of it until later. The plaintiff’s father’s evidence differed in some details but was broadly consistent in relation to these conversations.

9. In September 2004 the plaintiff went to Australia. The plaintiff said that during his time in Australia he rang the deceased couple approximately once a fortnight. He said that following the death of a local teenager in Offaly in 2005 the deceased couple were upset. He said they said; “Come on, you need to come home now,” and, “This place is yours”.

10. The plaintiff said he came home following this request from the deceased couple because he knew they were upset. They had told him they were not getting any younger and he was needed. He said he came home in August 2005. The plaintiff’s father said that the plaintiff came back from Australia because he missed hurling, and he wanted to come back and do a bit of farming.

11. The plaintiff’s evidence was that, when he returned from Australia, a room was prepared for him in the deceased couple’s house and he moved in. The plaintiff said that a month after he came back he got a full time job with Banagher Concrete. The plaintiff said that from that time he provided assistance to the deceased couple including rooting out chickens, shopping and other matters including attending IFA meetings on behalf of the deceased. The plaintiff’s father said that the plaintiff did slopping for the deceased couple, brought in their turf, tidied the yard, and cut the grass.

12. On 10 January 2007, the plaintiff’s father and the deceased entered into a new five year and six month lease, backdated to 1 July 2006. Under cross–examination, the plaintiff said he believed the deceased wanted to continue the arrangement because he had security and the plaintiff’s father had security. The plaintiff’s father continued to farm the land although the plaintiff said he did most of the work after he finished his work at Banagher Concrete.

13. The plaintiff said that, during this time, there were many different discussions in relation to the proposal to leave the farm to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the deceased said that he had one brother and one sister that would adhere to his wishes. The plaintiff said the deceased referred to Peggy’s family as “a long-tailed family” because there were “a load of them”. He had a view that whatever he put in place could be broken up by Peggy’s family. The plaintiff’s evidence was that the deceased was concerned that his wishes would not be honoured. He said that the deceased liked to tell stories about what happened in circumstances where there was no will.

14. Around the same time, the deceased had a number of consultations with his Solicitor, Mr O’Donovan. Mr O’Donovan kept contemporaneous written attendances and gave oral evidence at the hearing.

15. The deceased attended at Mr. O’Donovan’s office on the 7th of October 2008. Mr.

O’Donovan’s written attendance of that meeting recorded: -

“He wants to appoint his wife Margaret as executor and leave her his entire estate. If she dies before him or within 30 days, he then wants to appoint his nephew James Flynn of Kilcormack to be his executor. James has been leasing his farm off him for several years and it is he that he wants to benefit, maybe under the will, and appoint him as executor”.

16. Although unrelated to the deceased, the James Flynn referred to in that attendance is the plaintiff’s father.

17. Mr. O’Donovan’s evidence is that following that meeting he drafted a will, and posted it to the deceased on 8 October 2008. The covering letter requested the deceased to make an appointment to come in to Mr. O’Donovan’s office and execute the will. The deceased did not attend at Mr. O’Donovan’s office until the 5th of May 2009 by which time he had changed his mind. Mr. O’Donovan’s attendance of that meeting states inter alia: - “The main beneficiary…. was to be James Flynn of Kilcormack who is the man who has been leasing his land from client for several years. However, James Flynn’s oldest son, James Sylvester Flynn, is in fact living with client at the present time for part of the time in any event. Although he is no relation Peter would like to substitute James Sylvester Flynn in the will in the place of his father James Flynn Snr… He made an appointment to come in in a week’s time when we can insert the new address into the will for James Flynn Snr. And he will also sign the will then. He did not want to sign it today and notwithstanding the fact that I suggested he would sign it as it was over six months since he was last in”.

18. The deceased next attended Mr O’Donovan on 12 May 2009. He was accompanied by the plaintiff. The deceased and the plaintiff gave Mr. O’Donovan a copy of a letter from Owens and Company Solicitors dated 19th of December 2008. The letter proposed the sale of the farm to the plaintiff. Mr. O’Donovan’s evidence and his contemporaneous attendance notes state that he asked the plaintiff to wait outside. He then explained to the deceased that if he transferred his farm to the plaintiff at that stage, all he would have would be a right of residence for himself and his wife and, after that, he would only receive an annual payment of €4,000. Mr. O’Donovan explained to the deceased that elderly people have to be very careful in committing themselves to disposing of assets. He said there had to be some clear benefit, particularly if the transfer was to a non-relative as in the present case. Mr. O’Donovan then set out to the deceased and the plaintiff that an alternative would be for the deceased and his wife to make a will leaving the farm to the plaintiff.

19. The plaintiff said that in 2008 he was advised by his father’s accountant to put in place a lease to buy the premises from the deceased over his lifetime. The purpose was to avoid inheritance tax. He said that he brought the deceased to Mr. O’Donovan, the deceased’s solicitor. Mr O’Donovan asked the plaintiff to leave that meeting to speak to the deceased privately. The proposal “never got off the ground”.

20. The plaintiff said that the deceased told him he went to see Mr O’Donovan another day and had everything arranged. The plaintiff understood he was to look after Peggy if anything happened to the deceased and vice versa. After their lifetime he was to take over full ownership. The plaintiff said that the deceased made these representations many times in front of the plaintiff’s father and later in front of the plaintiff’s wife, Patricia.

21. In 2008, the plaintiff started a relationship with his current wife Patricia. He said that the deceased couple “hit it off” with Patricia. Patricia said that she asked the plaintiff why he wasn’t working with his father. He told her the deceased couple were his priority at that time because he was to get the Property. She would be his priority “down the road”.

22. The plaintiff said he was offered a job in Cork with Bord Gáis in or around 2009. He said that the deceased couple asked him not to take the job. Patricia said she wanted him to take the job with Bord Gáis.

23. Patricia said she knew a woman, Patricia Dempsey, whose husband Billy Dempsey had a business building sheds in Portarlington. She thought that would be suitable because it was relatively local. She said Patricia Dempsey spoke to Billy Dempsey who offered the plaintiff a job. She said that the deceased told the plaintiff that he needed him around the yard.

24. The Plaintiff said he was offered a job by Billy Dempsey. He said that he discussed this offer with the deceased couple and he turned it down because the long hours would have required him to spend too much time away from the farm.

25. Mr Dempsey gave very vague evidence that was of limited assistance.

26. Patricia described visiting the deceased couple’s house every second evening in 2009 and/or 2010. She said the plaintiff had no 20s or 30s because “he never left”. She said that she met the plaintiff there, the deceased couple, the plaintiff’s father and “on loads of occasions” Jim Grogan. Under cross examination she added that she met Jane Leavy and Janet Rosney at the house during this period too. She said that she never met the Molloys.

27. Patricia said that in 2011 “a conversation started” around whether she was going to help more. She said she worked in a hotel and rostered her days off to assist the deceased couple. She said that the deceased was very thankful and told her that “this house won’t be modern enough for you”. Patricia said she stopped this conversation because she had her own home and mortgage.

28. The plaintiff said that, in 2012, Peggy was diagnosed with cancer and had a hysterectomy. He said that during this period Patricia brought Peggy to her appointments in Mullingar and Dublin. Patricia said that she drove Peggy to Dublin for her hysterectomy and that Peggy stayed in hospital for two to three weeks.

29. Patricia said that after Peggy came home, her stitches burst. The deceased called an ambulance and phoned Patricia at work. Patricia said she went to Tullamore hospital and on to St James’s hospital in Dublin. (Clare Farrell, a niece of Peggy’s, said that she also attended at St James’s hospital.)

30. Patricia said that while Peggy was in hospital they got a bed and had it ready for Peggy to come home to. She said that Peggy became slower after this and she sat in the house all day long.

31. Patricia gave evidence that, in 2013, the deceased was in hospital and she stayed with Peggy for a week until he came home. She said she went to work during the day.

32. In August 2013, Patricia said she spoke to Peggy’s doctor and nurse and asked whether it was necessary for Peggy to go to Dublin so often. She said it was agreed that Peggy was to be kept comfortable.

33. The plaintiff’s son, Adam, was born in May 2013. Patricia and Adam lived in Patricia’s house. The plaintiff said that the deceased was very supportive. The plaintiff said that he continued to live in the deceased couple’s house after Adam was born but he would stay over regularly in Patricia’s house.

34. On 18 December 2013, a public health nurse filled out a common summary assessment report on behalf of the deceased. This was part of an application for home care and it was stamped received by Home Care Packages Primary Care Centre in Mountmellick, Co. Laois on 19 December 2013. That application form indicates that the deceased lived with his spouse. There is no reference to any other person living in the house on that date. The report states that a family friend who works on the land provides “light assistance”. The common summary assessment report stated that “until recently” the deceased was able to drive, do his own shopping, assist with dinner cooking and meal provision, and self care to a basic level. Mary Mahon is identified as the family member contact name on that form.

35. On 26 December 2013, Peggy had a stroke. The plaintiff said that home help was coming in five days a week at that stage, but after she had the stroke she couldn’t return to the house.

36. Mrs Josie Molloy was a neighbour of the deceased couple between 2006 and the deceased’s death. She said her house overlooks the deceased couple’s house and she knew the couple well. She said she was in the deceased couple’s house on Christmas Eve 2013 and they were both “walking around.” She said that when Peggy had her stroke, her husband, Mr Molloy, called the ambulance. Mrs Molloy said she went with Peggy to the hospital and waited until she got a bed. She said she called back to the hospital the following day; Peggy was settled and her niece Debbie Munsey was with her. Mrs Molloy said that she brought the deceased to the hospital to visit his wife, Peggy.

37. Mr Joseph Molloy said that early in the morning of St Stephen’s Day, the deceased called to the door saying there was something wrong with Peggy. She was sitting in a chair unresponsive. He said he called an ambulance and went in the ambulance with Peggy. His wife Josie followed in the car.

38. Peggy required residential care after her stroke. Mrs Molloy said the hospital staff spoke to the deceased about the Fair Deal Scheme. Mrs Molloy helped the deceased with the Fair Deal Scheme application. She said they required a document evidencing the leasing of the lands for the application. The plaintiff said that the deceased asked him for a letter stating that he was renting the farm for the Fair Deal Scheme application.

39. By handwritten faxed letter dated 7 February 2014, the plaintiff wrote to Caroline Kelly of the Tullamore Health Centre. The letter states that the plaintiff was leasing the farm off the deceased couple, that he paid an annual amount of €1,000 a year along with doing odd jobs like, for example, getting in turf and cleaning up around the yard, collecting prescriptions at the chemist, doing shopping, driving the deceased to the hospital etc. The letter also states that along with this he spends approximately €2,500 each year on reclamation and development work on the farm.

40. The plaintiff said that he only signed this letter in order to get Peggy into the Fair Deal Scheme. He said that he didn’t feel right about writing the letter but that they had to look after Peggy. He said that the application was successful and that Peggy went to a local nursing home.

41. Mrs Molloy said that she worked in a nursing home in Ferbane and that she helped to get Peggy into that nursing home after she was discharged from hospital.

42. The plaintiff said he provided increased assistance after Peggy left in December 2013. The plaintiff said that it was part of the understanding that the plaintiff was to look after Peggy if anything happened to the deceased. He said that Peggy’s care was his responsibility. The plaintiff gave evidence that his wife Patricia brought Peggy to appointments in Mullingar, Tullamore and Dublin after her hysterectomy.

43. Various people provided assistance to the deceased in the brief period between Peggy’s stroke on 26 December 2013 and the deceased’s death on 14 March 2014. Ms Molloy said that after Peggy’s stroke, she visited the deceased in the evenings. She said that she saw the plaintiff on the land but very rarely saw him in the house. Mr Molloy said that he and his wife brought the deceased to and from the nursing home to visit Peggy. Mr Molloy said that carers visited the house in that period.

44. Ms Debbie Munsey, a niece of Peggy’s, said she visited Peggy in Tullamore every day after Peggy had her stroke in 2013. She said that Peggy was in Tullamore Hospital for 6 or 7 weeks before she went to Ferbane. Ms Munsey said that on the day she left Tullamore she met her in Ferbane so that she wouldn’t be on her own. She said that in the hospital, Dr Donnelly asked her to be next of kin for Peggy because the deceased was not coping.

45. Mr Molloy said that on the 14th of March 2014, he called to the house and the deceased wasn’t well. Mr Molloy phoned an ambulance. Later that day he got word that the deceased had passed away.

46. The plaintiff said that he played a hurling match that morning and planned to stay away that night. He said that in the middle of the night he got a call to say that the deceased had passed away. Under cross-examination, the plaintiff didn’t know who found the deceased on the day he died. He said he was told it was a neighbour. He said he only had sketchy details. He said he was told it was one of the Molloys, and that was enough for him.

47. The plaintiff said that he organised the deceased’s funeral including having him buried in Ballycumber according to his wishes. The plaintiff said he picked his friends to do the readings and he organised soup and sandwiches. He didn’t know who paid for the funeral. He said nobody ever gave him a bill. The plaintiff said that he was shocked that the deceased hadn’t made a will and that no arrangements had been made.

48. The first defendant said that after the funeral she attended a meeting with Peggy’s family members and the nursing home manager. At the meeting, the manager told them that Peggy had been approved for the Fair Deal Scheme three or four days previously. The manager told them there would need to be a reassessment of the Fair Deal Scheme.

49. The first defendant said that she submitted a second application to the Fair Deal Scheme after the deceased died. She said she used the same documents that formed part of the original application submitted by Ms Molloy.

50. The plaintiff said in July 2014 an application was made for Peggy to be put into Wardship. The first named defendant was nominated as committee. Subsequently Peggy moved to a nursing home in Baltinglass in County Wicklow.

51. Peggy Flynn died intestate in 2017. The plaintiff said she couldn’t communicate by then. She could mumble but she just couldn’t get words out. He said that on certain days you could see the light in her eyes.

52. Mr PJ Grogan said that between 2005 and 2014 he visited the deceased couple twice or three times per week; generally in the evening. He said there were two or three regular visitors including Johnny Coffey and Jim Grogan. He said that over a 12 month period the plaintiff was there perhaps two or three times. He said there was never any indication that anyone other than the deceased couple lived in the house. He said that several times he kept Peggy company when the deceased was off visiting. The deceased would return at about 11:30pm and the deceased or Peggy would make tea. He said that after Peggy went to the nursing home, the deceased would ask him to put the key on the table and pull the door behind him.

53. Mr Grogan described the deceased as very independent and private. He said the deceased drove his car right up to three or four months before he died. He said the deceased did the couple’s shopping and collected his pension. He said the plaintiff and his father were never mentioned.

54. Mr Peter Grogan operates the adjoining farm and is Mr PJ Grogan’s son. He agreed to purchase the deceased’s farm in 2017 or 2018. He described the opportunity to purchase the farm as an opportunity that comes up every two or three generations. He described the farm as run down. He said there hasn’t been much maintenance carried out. It is not productively run and the fencing that has been erected is temporary.

55. The plaintiff said that the representations from the deceased couple were made on numerous occasions; “If I heard it ten times I heard it a hundred times”. He said it was a complete shock that there was no will.

Improvements to the Property

56. The plaintiff said that in 2007 he organised the Disabled Persons Grant in order to improve the house after Peggy “had a bang”. By letter dated 22 June 2007, Offaly County Council wrote to the deceased advising that a Disabled Persons Grant had been approved in principle subject to a number of conditions. The plaintiff said that these works were carried out by a Mr. Nigel Mahon and that he helped Mr. Mahon. He said that while the works were carried out the deceased couple stayed in the plaintiff’s father’s house for four or five days.

57. The plaintiff said that he assisted with the application for the Disabled Person’s Grant and he sent it to Offaly County Council. He said he procured three quotes for the work that had to be done. Neither the application nor the quotes were produced in evidence.

58. Under cross-examination the plaintiff said he did some extra work at the time that the grant works were carried out. The plaintiff said he purchased radiators and paid Mr. Maher for them. He said he wasn’t given an invoice at the time this was done. The plaintiff’s father said the plaintiff paid for radiators, and sealing of windows and doors at the time these works were carried out.

59. Mr Mahon gave evidence of having carried out the works. He said the plaintiff helped him with the kitchen floor. He said the deceased gave him a cheque from the local authority for approximately €10,500. He accepted in cross examination that the cheque was for €11,993. Later, he said he vaguely remembered being paid in stages, probably in cash. No invoices or receipts for these works were produced in evidence. The only document I was shown in relation to any of this work was the letter from Offaly County Council dated 22 June 2007.

60. In 2012, the plaintiff’s father transferred his herd number to the plaintiff. The plaintiff said that in order to transfer the herd number he had to demonstrate that he had land; that he intended to farm it; and that there was handling equipment on it. The plaintiff said that he carried out certain works to the land in 2011 or 2012 in order to get the herd number. He said the deceased was fully aware and supportive of the works. A ditch was removed and some land drainage was carried out. He said he retained a contractor to carry out some of that work. The plaintiff said that the deceased couple came down to see the works; it was about 100 metres from the house; they were delighted to see the work going on.

61. Under cross-examination the plaintiff said he met an official from the Department of Agriculture in order to demonstrate that he was leasing the deceased’s land. The plaintiff’s application for a herd number included a document dated 4 April 2012 stating that the deceased had rented 60 acres to the plaintiff for a period of 5 years commencing on 1 January 2012. It is signed by the deceased and by the plaintiff.

62. The plaintiff gave evidence that he incurred expense in relation to the lands. He cited examples including the provision of a cattle crush and works to a shed. He accepted in crossexamination that he required a cattle crush in order to get a herd number. The plaintiff’s father said that in 2012, the plaintiff wanted his own herd number. He said that the deceased told the plaintiff to work away, and that the farm would be there for him. He said the plaintiff built stone walls, re-roofed the sheds, installed tiles and painted the house.

63. There was no evidence that the plaintiff spent any money on the land or the farm. The plaintiff did not specify or even approximate an amount of money he spent in work or improvements to the farm. Very limited receipts or invoices were provided in evidence and no credible evidence was provided that such receipts related to works connected to the subject property.

64. Expert evidence was given by Mr Andy Dunne PhD, Agronomist of EAEC Ltd. Mr Dunne’s evidence is based on instructions from the plaintiff as to the works the plaintiff says he carried out on the farm since 2012. Mr Dunne estimates the cost of works carried out on the farm at €38,223 in 2023 values. Mr Dunne states that these improvements have added to the overall value of the holding particularly the reclamation, infrastructure provision, reseeding and control of invasive species. He says the increase in land value amounts to €12,970. Under cross examination, Mr Dunne accepted that much of this work would be carried out by a farmer in occupation of the land anyway.

Proprietary Estoppel

65. I accept the plaintiff’s submission that the law in relation to proprietary estoppel is set out in the decision of the High Court (McDonald J.) in K v K [2018] IEHC 615. The three main elements of proprietary estoppel are identified at paragraph 91 of that decision:

91. The plaintiff submitted, on the basis of the decision of the House of Lords in Thorner v. Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 (adopted in Ireland by White J. in Finnegan v. Hand [2016] IEHC 255), that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel involves three main elements namely:

-

(a) A representation or assurance made to the claimant;

(b) Reliance on it by the claimant;

and

I A detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance on that assurance.

92. The test laid down in Thorner v. Major is essentially the same test as that suggested by Griffin J. in the Supreme Court in Doran v. Thompson [1978] I.R. 223 at p.230.

66. At paragraph 93, McDonald J. went on to consider a submission that the representation or assurance is hugely dependent on context and the comment of Geoghegan J in Smith v Halpin [1997] 2 ILRM 38 where he said: “Even if nobody knew of any conversations between father and son, I think that any reasonable person with knowledge of the family such as a friend or relation would have assumed that the intention at all material times was that the entire house would become the property of the Plaintiff upon the deaths of his parent”'.

67. McDonald J commented at paragraph 94: “I do not disagree that a representation can arise by conduct and can be inferred from circumstances. I also do not doubt that, in some cases, relatively general evidence may be sufficient to establish an enforceable representation.”

68. I was also referred to the Supreme Court judgment of Murphy J in McCarron v McCarron [1997] WJSC-SC 1414. In that case the plaintiff assisted the deceased with the management and operation of his farm “over a period of sixteen years – and that for long hourswithout reward”. For six years “he worked virtually full-time for the Deceased”. The plaintiff in McCarron sought specific performance of an agreement where the deceased had promised to remunerate him for the work by devising to him all of his lands. Murphy J was satisfied that:

“there was evidence of a sufficient degree of certainty of a contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant by which the latter agreed to devise his farms to the Plaintiff and it was appropriate for the Court to grant specific performance of that contract.

69. Counsel for the defendants referred me to the decision of the High Court (Hogan J.) in Coleman v. Mullen [2011] IEHC 179. That case involved a consideration of whether the plaintiff was entitled to maintain a quantum meruit claim in respect of services which she voluntarily supplied to the deceased during her lifetime. Hogan J answered the question in the negative and concluded as follows: “If therefore, there was no intention to create legal relations, should, then, the law impose such an obligation? I do not think that the courts can – or should – take this step. If the law is to be changed such as to enable voluntary carers of family and neighbours to make quantum meruit claims of this kind quite independently of any intention to create legal relationships, this would represent a potentially far-reaching legal change which could not be described as being some incremental and perfectly logical deduction from the existing corpus of case-law in this area. A change of this kind would be a matter for the Oireachtas.”

Decision

70. The task of the Court is to apply the test identified by McDonald J in K v K. In seeking to establish whether there was an enforceable representation, I may take into account the circumstances and context. As stated by, McDonald J in K v K, the context is important. As Murphy J put it in McCarron, every case must be examined on its own specific facts.

71. In the present case, there were representations. The question is whether they were enforceable representations. The only surviving witnesses to these representations are the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s father and the plaintiff’s wife Patricia. I approach that evidence with “a critical eye” to borrow a term from the judgment of Murphy J in McCarron.

72. The plaintiff went to Australia in 2004. He came home in 2005. The plaintiff and his father suggested different reasons for the plaintiff’s decision to come home. The plaintiff only intended to go for a year. He probably came home for a combination of reasons.

73. The plaintiff said repeatedly that he always wanted to be a farmer. He pursued that career by working on the farm his family leased from the deceased couple. Against that background, it is not surprising that he came home from Australia in 2005, or that he did not take up employment, either with Bord Gáis in Cork in 2009 or subsequently with Billy Dempsey. Both jobs demanded significant time commitments.

74. The deceased knew he had not made a will. He attended at his Solicitor’s office on 7 October 2008 with the intention of making the plaintiff’s father the main beneficiary of his will. However, he did not execute the draft will drafted by his Solicitor after that meeting. He attended again on 5 May 2009 by which time he had changed his mind, then intending to make the plaintiff the main beneficiary of his will. According to Mr O’Donovan’s attendance he did not want to sign the will on that date. A week later on 12 May 2009 the deceased attended with the plaintiff, having changed his mind a second time, then proposing the inter vivos transfer in consideration for an annual payment. The deceased, after being privately advised by his Solicitor, changed his mind a third time and refrained from entering that arrangement. The plaintiff was certainly aware after this meeting that the deceased had changed his mind three times and that there was no will. Following a phone call from the plaintiff in June 2013, Mr O’Donovan wrote to the deceased stating that there was no will in force or effect. The deceased was advised repeatedly by his Solicitor between 2008 and 2013 that he had not executed a will.

Despite this, he did not execute a will

75. The facts in this case are easily distinguishable from those in McCarron. In the present case, the plaintiff was not assisting the deceased couple to run their farm. The plaintiff’s father was in occupation of the lands pursuant to written leases. The second of these leases was for a five year and six month term commencing on 1 July 2006. The plaintiff assisted with the management and operation of the farm leased by his father since 2000. He was working on his own family’s farm, albeit leased from the deceased.

76. The plaintiff and/or the plaintiff’s father continued in occupation of the farm as leaseholder after the expiration of the term of the 2007 lease. Clause 6 of that lease deemed that a monthly tenancy would exist if the demise should continue beyond the term specified in that lease. That is what happened.

77. This is also the arrangement described by the plaintiff himself in his letter dated 7 February 2014 to Caroline Kelly of Tullamore Health Centre. The plaintiff wrote that he was leasing the farm from the deceased couple. The letter stated that he paid “an annual amount of €1000/year along with doing odd jobs like for example getting in turf and cleaning up around the yard, collecting prescriptions at the chemist, doing shopping, driving the deceased to the hospital etc. Along with this [the plaintiff] spend[s] approx. €2500 each year on reclamation and development work on the farm…”. Indeed, the plaintiff described himself as leasing the land as early as April 2012 when he signed a document stating that he was leasing 60 acres for the deceased.

78. The annual rent under the 2007 lease was €2,000 per annum. The plaintiff’s letter dated 7 February 2014 identifies a lower rent and additional duties for the plaintiff. In fact, the evidence was that the plaintiff paid no rent after the term of the lease expired. By February 2014 it was part or all of the consideration for the lease that the plaintiff would do certain “odd jobs” for the deceased couple. The evidence was that the plaintiff and in particular his wife Patricia did jobs for the deceased couple.

79. This is not a case concerning a dispute where a plaintiff suffered detriment as a result of spending money on the erection of premises on lands owned by the defendant where it would be unjust to deprive the plaintiff of his money or assets. In this way it can be distinguished from Smith v Halpin, where the plaintiff/son built an extension to the family home after his father promised him that he would inherit the house. I am satisfied that the works detailed in Mr Dunne’s report are works that were carried out by the plaintiff or his father for the benefit of their lease-holding and not works carried out in reliance on a promise that the plaintiff would one day inherit the farm. Put differently, even if there was no representation, the plaintiff and his father would have carried out those works anyway to acquire a herd number and to benefit the lease-holding.

80. I do not accept that the plaintiff contributed in any way to the work carried out by Mr Mahon in 2007. Those works were funded by the Disabled Persons Grant Scheme. Mr Mahon said that he was paid for the works by way of a cheque from Offaly County Council which was given to him by the deceased. He said he thought that cheque was for €10,500 but in cross examination he accepted it was for €11,993. Mr Mahon stated that the plaintiff helped him with the kitchen floor but he was extremely vague about any additional works and even more vague about any additional payments. In his oral evidence Mr Mahon had only a vague recollection of having carried out additional works at all. He certainly did not detail individual items of additional works or amounts of money relating to each or any additional item. He said he thought he might have been paid in cash in stages. He did not indicate amounts. There was no contemporaneous quote or invoice or receipt.

81. In contrast, a letter purportedly written by Mr Mahon dated 9 September 2016 is extremely clear and detailed. The letter purports to set out each item of work that was carried out pursuant to the Offaly County Council grant and separately each item of additional work, with a specific amount of money for each item of additional work. The letter said that the grant works were paid for “by a grant from Offaly County Council of approx. €10,500” and that the “extras were paid for by Mr. Jamie Flynn” in the sum of €4,143.62. No explanation was provided for why, in 2016, such a precise figure was available for (each item of) the additional work when only an inaccurate approximation was available for the works the subject of the grant.

82. Even allowing for the passage of time, I do not understand how Mr Mahon could have such a detailed recollection of the works on 9 September 2016, almost nine years after they were carried out and little or no recollection when he gave his evidence in January 2024. For those reasons I place very little weight on the letter dated 9 September 2016.

83. I find that the plaintiff’s father was in occupation of the farm pursuant to a monthly tenancy pursuant to clause 6 of the 2007 lease. The plaintiff to a large extent assumed the role of his father. That much is clear from the evidence including the written lease itself and the written documents signed by the plaintiff dated April 2012 and 7 February 2014. The assistance provided by the plaintiff and his wife Patricia to the deceased couple, other than the work on the farm were “odd jobs” as described by the plaintiff in the plaintiff’s letter to Ms Kelly dated

7 February 2004. Such services were part of the consideration for the lease as described in that letter. They cannot then give rise to a proprietary estoppel.

84. The plaintiff and his wife Patricia performed services for the deceased couple other than work on the farm. I have already found that these services were part of the consideration for the lease.

85. However, even if there was no lease I would not find that proprietary estoppel has been established. The evidence established that a genuine friendship developed between the plaintiff and his extended family on the one hand and the deceased couple on the other hand. The plaintiff and his wife provided some assistance to the deceased couple, particularly when either or both of them were sick. However, it worked both ways. The plaintiff lived in the deceased couple’s house rent free for at least some of the time after he returned from Australia in 2005. By all accounts, the deceased couple was generous and hospitable. The plaintiff and Patricia clearly enjoyed the deceased couple’s company.

86. It is also clear that, until Peggy had her stroke on St Stephens day 2013, the deceased couple were relatively independent. Mr PJ Grogan’ described the deceased as very independent and private. The common summary assessment report populated by the public health nurse on 17 December 2013 states that “until recently Peter was able to drive car, do own shopping and assist with dinner cooking and meal provision and self care to basic level”.

87. Several relations, neighbours and friends including the plaintiff provided assistance from time to time. The plaintiff’s wife Patricia provided care and assistance around the time that Peggy had her hysterectomy in 2012. The Molloys provided significant support, including in the period immediately after Peggy’s stroke, at the time of the first Fair Deal Scheme application and around the time of the deceased’s death. The plaintiff organised the deceased’s funeral. The first defendant assisted Peggy with a second Fair Deal Scheme application after the death of the deceased. However, apart from the odd jobs carried out pursuant to the lease, I am not satisfied that any of that assistance was provided as part of a contract or quasi contract.

88. If any assistance was provided other than that provided in consideration for the lease, it was of the type Murphy J in McCarron described as “work…done or humanitarian services provided on a purely neighbourly or charitable basis for some person in need”. Hogan J in Coleman v Mullen found that work of a purely neighbourly or charitable character could not ground a claim in quantum meruit.

89. This is not a case where “any reasonable person with knowledge of the [parties] such as a friend or relation would have assumed that the intention at all material times was that the entire house would become the property of the plaintiff upon the deaths of” the deceased, as described by Geogheghan J. in Smith v Halpin. Indeed, a number or Peggy’s relations and neighbours gave evidence of having no knowledge of such an arrangement. The first defendant said she met the plaintiff’s father. She said the deceased told her that the plaintiff’s father was leasing the lands. She said she never heard anything about the deceased couple leaving the house to the plaintiff. Ms Clare Farrell said she often saw the plaintiff about the farm. She said it was clear the plaintiff was running the farm but there was no indication that he was living in the house.

90. Based on the analysis above, I am not satisfied that the second or third limbs of the test in K v K, are satisfied. In particular I am not satisfied either that the plaintiff relied on representations or assurances by the deceased or that the plaintiff suffered a detriment in consequence of any such reliance. Although he may have believed the deceased intended to leave the farm to him, the plaintiff did not rely on that belief in any detrimental way. For these reasons, I dismiss the plaintiff’s case.

Counterclaim

91. The defendant advances a counterclaim under a number of headings. The first defendant said she couldn’t sell the property to raise funds because the plaintiff registered a lis pendens on the property. She said she got a loan from revenue and that revenue has put a penalty charge on the property. She is counterclaiming for €37,287.40 interest on that loan. There is insufficient evidence in relation to this element of the counterclaim. I have not seen any documentation in relation to the alleged loan or the charge. Nor has it been explained to me how that figure was calculated. Although there is evidence that an agreement to sell was entered into in 2017, Mr Southern’s evidence is that the value of the property may have increased by up to 25% since then.

92. It also is alleged that the plaintiff didn’t pay adequate rent for the farm. The first named defendant said that she is counterclaiming for €4,000 per year since 2017 which totals €28,000. She said that the plaintiff paid no rent to the deceased from 2012 onwards. It is common case that the plaintiff paid no rent to the deceased couple after the second written lease expired in 2012. According to the plaintiff, the deceased told him not to pay rent because “he had a few pounds”. However the plaintiff’s letter in support of the Fair Deal Scheme dated 7 February 2013 and the evidence in general establishes that consideration for the lease in 2013 was at least partly made up of assistance by the plaintiff. Furthermore, it has not been established, on the balance of probabilities the plaintiff has been in occupation of the Property since the death of the deceased. Accordingly, I do not believe this element of the counterclaim has been made out on the evidence either.

93. The first defendant includes property tax and electricity bills as part of the counterclaim. There is an unpaid electricity bill up to the 19th of February 2019 of €749. It is alleged that the plaintiff was powering electric fences. There is no evidence to support this element of the counterclaim. Neither is there any evidence of the counterclaim in respect of local property tax.

94. The total value of the counterclaim according to the defendant is €67,096.21. I do not accept any element of the counterclaim.

Conclusions

95. In conclusion, therefore, I hold that in the absence of an enforceable representation, the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain his claim for proprietary or promissory estoppel. I also hold that the counterclaim has not been made out. In the circumstances I dismiss the plaintiff’s claim and the defendants’ counterclaim.