Court suspended final three years of manslaughter and child neglect sentences for a mother who delivered a baby in a clinic toilet.

An Chuirt Chuarda

The Circuit Court.

South Eastern Circuit County of Waterford

Bill Number; WDDP0022/2020 [2022] IECC 6

Between

The People (at the suit of Director of Public Prosecutions)

Prosecutor

And

Caitlin Corcoran

Accused

Sentencing Remarks of His Honour Judge Eugene O'Kelly delivered on 5th of July 2022

1) Caitlin Corcoran was convicted on 15 October 2021 by a jury on 2 separate counts,

a) by an unanimous verdict of the manslaughter of her infant baby daughter Sophie

Elizabeth, and

b) by majority verdict of 10 to 2 of child neglect on the same date.

These offences occurred in the early hours of the 22nd. April 2018 in a toilet cubicle in the

CareDoc facility on the Cork Road in Waterford. This is an out of hours GP service operated

by the HSE.

2) The circumstances in which these offences were committed are as follows. Miss

Corcoran, in the company of her mother and grandmother, arrived by appointment at the

clinic. At 2:17 AM she and her mother were seen by Dr Abdul Razak, the doctor on duty that

night.

Miss Corcoran complained of severe back pain and constipation, Dr Razak gave her a

container and asked that she would go across the corridor to the toilet so as to provide a

urine sample. Miss Corcoran left the surgery office and went to the toilet. CCTV footage

from within the clinic shows that she spent approximately 13 minutes in the toilet. She

returned to the doctor's office and indicated she was unable to pass urine, and the doctor

wrote a referral letter to University Hospital Waterford. He informed both Caitlin Corcoran

and her mother that a blood test would be carried out for further investigation and that

they should go to the hospital straightaway.

3) The court in sentencing Miss Corcoran for the offences for which is been convicted is

principally concerned with what happened in the toilet cubicle during the 13 minutes that

she was in there. Miss Corcoran delivered a full-term baby girl, which by her account fell

into the toilet bowl. She retrieved the baby, held it for some time and before leaving the

cubicle, placed the baby, along with bloodstained tissue paper, within a black plastic bin

liner in the metal bin.

The alarm was raised when Miss Corcoran presented at the regional hospital, and it became

apparent to the medical and nursing staff treating her that she must recently have delivered

a baby. Initially she denied that she had done so, but eventually disclosed that she was

pregnant at around 24 or 25 weeks. An ultrasound was carried out and when she was told

that her uterus was empty Caitlin Corcoran responded that she must have had a

miscarriage. The medical staff found her vague, but she was adamant that she had not

delivered a baby. Dr Annie O'Leary, Senior House officer Obstetrics and Gynaecology,

conducted a physical examination and concluded that her initial impression of an early

gestation miscarriage was extremely unlikely. She contacted Dr Catherine McNestry, the

specialist maternity registrar who also conducted a physical examination. She told Ms

Corcoran that her examination was suggestive of recent childbirth but again Miss Corcoran

denied this. She did however give a history of going into the toilet to give a urine sample,

feeling a huge amount of pressure, the haemorrhage of blood vaginally into the toilet and

then relief of pressure pain. Dr McNestry had at this stage significant child protection

concerns and in consultation with her consultant, arranged for the gardai to be notified.

4) Dr. McNestry also contacted Dr Razak who was still on duty in the Caredoc facility. he was

asked to check the toilet which he did and reported that he had found a lot of blood and

bloody tissues in and around the toilet. This was at approximately 7.15 a.m. Dr. Razak did

not wish to disturb anything and had the room sealed off pending the arrival of the gardai.

The gardai were at the scene a short while later and Inspector Donal Donohue inspected the

bathroom area. he observed bloodstained tissue in the toilet and saw that the refuse bin

was lined with a plastic sack. when he started to lift the sack he realised that there was

some weight in it, he immediately stopped and exited the bathroom. Later on that day

Garda Scenes of Crimes examiners emptied the contents of the bin and found the body of a

newborn baby. This discovery was made at 13.25. Dr Sean McBrinn of Waterford Medical

Centre was called and he arrived 30 minutes later, he confirmed that the baby girl was dead,

finding that her body was a little stiff. He described the baby as full-term, found no obvious

signs of trauma and noticed an umbilical cord of about 2 inches, which was still in place.

5) A post-mortem examination was carried out by Dr Michael Curtis,Consultant Forensic

Pathologist and Acting State Pathologist, he concluded that the baby appeared to be full-

term and healthy, with nothing to suggest any deliberate injury to the baby. There was

evidence that she had breathed after birth with air present in her lungs and stomach. He

described the lungs as being well aerated and the finding of the air in the babies stomach

suggested to him that the baby had gulped air as she achieved spontaneous respiration. The

cause of death was given as "inattention at birth ".

6) Following the discovery of the body of the new-born baby, Gardai returned to the

hospital and again spoke with Miss Corcoran. She was informed that the remains of a baby

girl had been found in the CareDoc facility and was asked if the baby found could be linked

to her in anyway and she said "no". A short while later while she was alone with Detective

Garda Deirdre O'Mahony, Ms Corcoran disclosed that the baby was in fact hers.

She explained that when she went to the toilet in CareDoc she sat on the toilet and when

the gush of blood came, she looked in between her legs and saw the feet of her baby. She

said she took the baby from the toilet, ripped the umbilical cord with her hands and put the

baby in the bin.

7) Following this disclosure Miss Corcoran made a statement to gardai on 22 April 2018 in

which she outlined the background to her relationship with the father of the infant. She

stated she did not fancy him and that she wasn't looking for a relationship, however she

engaged in consensual sex with him, towards the middle to end of October 2017. In her

words she described it thus; "it just happened… It was casual". In that statement she also

outlined that her parents lived together with her younger brother, and that she decided to

live with her grandparents 5 or 6 months previously because they are elderly. She stated;

"mom was upset when I moved out. I got on with my mum, but we fight sometimes, I clash

with my dad because we are very similar".

In relation to her pregnancy Miss Corcoran outlined the various deceptions she had engaged

in by tampering with her urine samples so as to give negative results, diluting one sample

with water, substituting another with apple juice, and asking a friend to provide urine so

that she might pass it off as her own. It must be said that her friend had the moral courage

to refuse that request. In relation to the actual delivery in the toilet, Miss Corcoran gave a

completely false account of what happened and concluded this by stating; "I don't think I

gave birth. I didn't feel anything, I didn't look into the toilet to see if I did."

8) The prosecution has laid great emphasis on the efforts which Ms Corcoran made to

mislead her family and friends as to pregnancy and the efforts to thwart valid pregnancy

test results. Reprehensible as these may be, it is important that this court does not treat

them as aggravating factors. It is not an offence to conceal one’s pregnancy, even from

one’s immediate family.

Her baby was full term when she was born, was healthy and despite it being an unassisted

delivery by a totally inexperienced woman, had achieved spontaneous respiration. The

evidence before the court from Prof McCallion, Consultant Neonatologist, Temple Street

Children’s Hospital was that the baby had well aerated lungs and there was no evidence of

any abnormality that would have led to death.

Accordingly, all of the deception which Caitlin Corcoran had engaged in throughout the

previous 9 months does not aggravate the offences for which she has been convicted. Had

the state brought a charge of infanticide, alleging the murder of an infant under 12 months

of age, then all of those lies and evasions would have relevance to the State’s case which

would require them to establish that Ms Corcoran intended to kill or cause serious harm to

her child. Such evidence would have formed part of the building blocks in making out the

case against her.

9) It is however important to remember that what Ms Corcoran was charged with and

convicted of was manslaughter and child neglect. It is accepted by the State that what they

prosecuted was manslaughter by gross negligence. Accordingly, it is acknowledged that they

do not suggest that there was an intention on Ms Corcoran’s part to kill her baby. Had she

cared for her baby once delivered, the evidence of Prof McCallion was that there was no

reason why the infant would not have survived. Had such care been given and had the

infant survived, then all the lies and deception during the 9 months of pregnancy would

have been nothing more than a matter of comment at how casually Ms Corcoran had

treated her pregnancy.

I make this point because her culpability and any factors that might aggravate it can only be

assessed from the time of delivery of her healthy baby. These convictions relate to the acts

and omissions of Ms Corcoran in the 13 minutes that she spent in the toilet cubicle and in

the immediate aftermath when she emerged from same and neither disclosed what had

happened or made any effort to seek help for her baby.

10) Gross negligence manslaughter is the doing of acts or the making of omissions that

substantially caused the death of the baby by someone who has a duty of care to the victim.

A sentencing judge must accept and respect the jury’s finding of guilt. Assessing the gravity

of the offending is an exercise in assessing the harm done and the culpability of the

particular offender. This assessment is necessary because the ultimate sentence must be

proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the particular circumstances of the offender.

The harm done is self-evident and grave, a young baby girl was born healthy, her chance to

have a long and happy life ahead of her was denied to her. Instead, she was neglected from

the moment of birth and left to die by the one and only person who knew of her birth, her

mother.

11) Prof McCallion was unable to say how long the baby survived but she did say that all the

baby needed to continue living was to be warmed and fed. She said without warmth the

baby would suffer from hypothermia and without food she would suffer from

hypoglycaemia. In her expert opinion all Prof McCallion could say was that the baby had

survived the first few minutes of life but that it was not possible to say more than that. She

was not able to say if the baby had cried after birth, but she did state that it is very rare for a

baby to stop breathing once it has achieved respiration and that in her opinion simple

management was all that was required to sustain her life. Under cross-examination Prof

McCallion stated that most babies will cry at birth, but it is not universal that babies will cry

immediately.

12) The culpability of Caitlin Corcoran is not so easy to assess, one of the complicating

difficulties being the apparent ease with which Ms Corcoran has told lies both before and

after the discovery of the baby. Clearly her actions and her failure to seek help or tell

anyone of her baby’s birth was a gross breach of trust. This breach of trust was made even

more grievous, because she who had deliberately concealed her pregnancy, had not told

anybody who would have been ready, willing and indeed obliged to assist her with the birth

and the baby. By hiding that fact, she assumed an even greater responsibility to her

defenceless child. Normally an expectant mother places herself in the experienced and

expert care of the medical and nursing professions but for whatever misguided ideas she

had, Ms Corcoran decided she could do it all by herself and then at the critical moment did

nothing.

13) A sentencing court must as a matter of law, accept as proven, all facts that are essential

to the jury’s verdict of guilt. The jury unanimously held that Caitlin Corcoran caused the

death of her baby through gross negligence. Here however there is a difficulty, because

manslaughter which is the unlawful killing of another person in circumstances where it is

not intended to kill that other person, covers a very wide-range of factual possibilities

leading up to the death.

The question is not whether the accused intended to kill or do serious injury, for if she did

she would be guilty of infanticide. The relevant intention in gross negligence manslaughter

is the deliberate doing of an act which is unlawful and which, judged by objective standards

is dangerous and results in the death of the victim, or in the alternative, not doing an act

which one has a duty to do and as a result of the omission to do it results in the death of the

victim, in other words a failure to behave as a reasonable mother would.

14) The jury must have accepted one or other of those alternatives and it is not possible to

determine by which course of reasoning they arrived at their unanimous verdict. They may

have felt that Ms Corcoran knew that her baby was alive and with callous disregard for her

safety but without an intention to kill her or cause her serious harm placed her in the bin, or

they may have adopted the alternative view that Ms Corcoran believed that her baby was

dead and that the gross negligence that they convicted her of, was her failure to seek the

help that she knew was just across the corridor in the doctor’s room in order to establish if

in fact her belief was correct.

15) A judge must not try to second-guess the logic of the jury and where there are obvious

factual alternative scenarios as to how they reached their decision this leads to uncertainty.

Where the uncertainty is such that it is impossible to make a finding to the criminal

standard, the sentencing court must adopt that version which is most favourable to the

accused.

Accordingly, where there is evidence as there is in this case that Ms Corcoran, irrespective

of what she might have thought initially, believed her baby to be dead when she placed her

in the bin, that makes her significantly less culpable than the alternative possibility that she

placed her in the bin at a time she knew her to be alive.

16) Ms. Corcoran has not made it easy for herself, she has persistently told lies even when

she made her admission that the baby was hers to Detective Garda O’Mahony, she persisted

with an illogical account which she eventually acknowledged to be untrue. It is not until her

final interview following her arrest and detention in August 2018 that she speaks anything

which, in the words of Miss Murphy S.C. for the prosecution, “come anywhere close to

having a ring of truth” about what she knew.

Ms Corcoran had been asked by the gardai, how long she was in the toilet, and she said 15

to 20 minutes, asked why that long? She answered because she was holding her baby.

The following are a number of questions and answers that followed;

Question; why did you hold the baby for 10 minutes?, Answer; I couldn’t leave her there.

Question; But you did leave her there, you put her in a black sack in the bin. We have

medical evidence she was alive? Answer; if I knew she was alive I would have called

someone.

Question; Tell us the truth? Answer; I am.

Question; Tell me what you did for the 10 minutes when you were holding that child in your

left hand, tell me what you were thinking? Answer; How beautiful she was. I was looking for

movement. I wanted her to cry. I wanted some sort of movement from her chest. I wanted

help, but I didn’t ask for it.

Question; what did you think? Answer: I thought there would be a cry or whimper from her,

but there was nothing.

This is the factual basis by which I interpret the jury’s finding of guilt and on which I am

assessing the gravity of Ms Corcoran’s offending. Clearly the jury knew that the baby was

born alive. Most favourable view of their verdict is that they accepted that the baby was

dead by the time Ms Corcoran placed her in the bin.

17) The gravity of the offence. The Director of Public Prosecutions has indicated that she

places Ms Corcoran’s offences in the medium range of a notional scale of gravity and has

helpfully provided the court with the Supreme Court decision of Charlton J. in DPP and

David Martin [2019] IESC Charlton J. at paragraph 49 of that judgement, states;

“Covering, as it does, a broadband of conduct from intentional killing under provocation, to

excessive force in self-defence, to criminal negligence in the management of a machine or

car, to assault without intent to kill or cause serious injury, manslaughter is a notoriously

difficult crime on which to achieve an appropriate sentence… All sentencing exercises are,

essentially assessments of harm and culpability. With manslaughter the harm is the

inescapable and final one of extinguishing the life of the person. Of itself that constitutes

bringing about harm at a very high level. But the culpability to be attached to manslaughter

can range from conduct only short of that required for murder down to conduct which is

partly accidental, such as the fight between 2 friends which, while not seriously aggressive,

brings about death from a fall against a wall or a pavement. Hence, as the statistical

analysis has shown, sentences for manslaughter can range from life sentences or very long

determinate sentences, to, in the most exceptional circumstances, a non-custodial option.”

18) Charlton J. sets out appropriate sentencing guidelines for manslaughter falling into four

bands as follows;

Cases involving the highest level of culpability a sentence of between 15 to 20 years and a

life sentence.

Cases of high culpability tend to attract a punishment of between 10 and 15 years as a

headline sentence and tend to involve aggravating factors which may include previous

convictions and a history of violence between the accused and the victim or confrontation

involving a potentially lethal weapon.

Medium culpability cases have headline sentences between 4 and 10 years where there is a

high-level of culpability but where aggravating factors are either absent or are considerably

lesser than in the higher range.

Manslaughter cases which fall into the lowest category of culpability result in sentences of

up to 4 years imprisonment. The lowest sentences within this range tend to be handed

down where culpability is not especially high but where the accused is nonetheless at fault,

although the case is one without the aggravating circumstances which may be found in

cases falling into the higher ranges of culpability. Mr Justice Charlton goes on to say,

referring to cases in this lowest category;

“fully suspended sentences have been imposed in what may be regarded as indeed very

exceptional cases”.

19) In DPP versus Princs [2007] IECCA 142 the then Chief Justice, Murray C.J. stated;

“Only where there are special circumstances and context will a moderate sentence, or in the

wholly exceptional circumstances, a non-custodial sentence be warranted.”

20) I acknowledge the Director’s view of where on the scale she places Ms Corcoran’s

offending but with respect to her I do not agree with it for the reasons I have set out above.

I place the offending at the upper end of the low range of culpability. Ms Corcoran’s failure

to get help is, on the more favourable interpretation of the jury’s verdict, not an aggravating

factor but may indeed be the factual reason upon which the jury found the offence proven.

The appropriate sentence before mitigation is one of 4 years imprisonment.

21) Wilful neglect. The second offence of which Ms Corcoran was convicted of was a charge

contrary to section 246 (1) and (2) of the children act 2001. In this case the verdict was a

majority verdict of guilty by 10 to 2. The offence was that she did on the day her baby was

born wilfully neglect her in a manner likely to cause unnecessary injury to her baby’s health.

It is an offence which carries a maximum sentence of 7 years. Again, I must respect the

jury’s finding of guilt. Unlike however the gross negligence manslaughter I find that the

culpability of Ms Corcoran is higher for this offence than it was for the manslaughter charge

because it is not open to the same range of interpretations.

The neglect was wilful and it was shocking, particularly in view of the fact that medical help

was available literally a few metres away. To miss Corcoran’s knowledge the doctor was

there and was free and waiting to tend to her. She also knew that her grandmother was

immediately outside the toilet door and could have gone for assistance if Ms Corcoran

herself was unable to do so. I find this offence is in the mid-range on a scale of gravity and

while the maximum sentence is significantly lower than that available for manslaughter, the

culpability is higher.

The appropriate sentence, pre-mitigation, is 4 years imprisonment.

22) The mitigating factors. Mr O’Loughlin S.C., on behalf of Ms Corcoran, outlined the

mitigating factors which he saw in the case. Before setting out what I find in mitigation I

should firstly mention the one obvious mitigating factor which is conspicuous by its absence,

a plea of guilty to either of the counts. It is not for me to question why such pleas were not

entered. Had they been it would have been of significant assistance to the State, avoiding

what was a difficult and complex two-week trial before a jury and it would also have been a

clear indication of the remorse that Ms Corcoran now claims to have. Of course, it was

absolutely the accused’s right to let the State prove its case. While it does not in any way

aggravate her offending that she was convicted, it does mean that the significant mitigation

that is open to a person who pleads guilty and accepts responsibility for their actions is not

available to Ms Corcoran in this case.

23) Interpreting exactly how much remorse Ms Corcoran has, is made all the more difficult

by the manner in which her defence was run, in effect that the baby died because everyone

else was at fault but not Ms Corcoran. The defence case at trial was that this prosecution

was brought to cover the gross negligence of others, whom Mr O’Loughlin S.C. described as

the real culprits; Ms Corcoran’s own family, the medical staff and the Gardai, for a crime

that was in his words a stain on Irish society. The jury rejected this view of the case. It does

however now appear that after some initial hesitation when asked during the sentencing

hearing that Ms Corcoran is not going to appeal the jury’s finding which while not quite the

same as stating she accepts their verdicts, does suggest some remorse on her part.

24) In what was described as her letter of apology, being the undated letter handed into

court on her behalf by Mr O’Loughlin S.C. she makes very serious allegations against her

father, which certainly, while canvassed to some limited extent during the trial, were not

borne out by the evidence which I have heard. This letter appears more of an explanation as

to why she wished to conceal her pregnancy. For the reasons I have mentioned I am not

concerned with the concealment of her pregnancy.

Nonetheless, while not mentioning her baby once in her letter, Miss Corcoran does state; “I

was in such a state of denial and shock the night in question. I am living with the

consequences every day and will be for as long as I live… I deeply regret what happened and

wish things could have turned out differently.”

25) There is no doubt but that this sad and tragic case has had a devastating effect on Miss

Corcoran. Indeed, it has clearly had a negative impact on Miss Corcoran’s family and on the

father of the child who gave evidence at the trial. The fact that the victim impact statements

were not submitted cannot in anyway be taken to imply that the adverse consequences of

the baby’s death were not far-reaching.

26) I have carefully considered the consultant psychiatrist’s report of Dr, Gerulskis.

According to medical records, Ms Corcoran’s first contact with the mental health services

was on 23 April 2018 when she had been admitted to the Department of obstetrics

University Hospital Waterford after she was referred from CareDoc. There was no evidence

of cognitive impairment, psychotic or affective illness upon review and she denied any

features of depressive illness. Nil past psychiatric history was noted and she reported that

she had never been on psychotropic medication or received counselling previously.

The only stressors that her mother could identify in her background history is that Miss

Corcoran may have been affected by the death of her aunt, who was also her godmother,

when she was 8 years old. Ms Corcoran was diagnosed with acute stress reaction due to

traumatic pregnancy delivery, (following a concealed pregnancy) of the new born infant.

27) Ms Corcoran was discharged from the Waterford mental health service on 30 June 2020,

but her anxiety and depressive symptoms relapsed when she became aware in June 2021 of

her upcoming court trial. At that stage she presented with symptoms of moderate

depression, anxiety, very poor sleep pattern and features of post-traumatic stress disorder.

She reported that she felt bereaved, that she cries almost every day over her daughter’s

death, she reported a feeling of guilt and remorse over the concealed pregnancy and labour

and that she did not seek help. She reported having frequent flashbacks to the traumatic

event in the toilet.

28) Dr Gerulskis explored the effect of bullying which Ms Corcoran suffered in childhood and

for which she attended a counsellor. She reported that she learned somehow to deal with

negative and overwhelming aspects of the world by ignoring them and in Dr. Gerulskis’s

view this coping mechanism helped her escape from negative and overwhelming emotions

she was suffering. In his view she went into subconscious denial about her pregnancy like

she used to do in her childhood to deal with distress. Doctor Gerulskis found her vague in

describing how she felt when she realised that she went into labour in CareDoc. She

reported that she panicked, felt numb, lost and was in complete shock when she realised

that she had delivered a baby. The psychiatrist felt she was very vague and did not describe

how she felt and what she was thinking when she put the baby into the bin. She stated to

him that it was in 2018 and she could not remember every detail now which in the doctor’s

view was unlikely, as people usually develop sharp memories of stressful events.

29) Dr Gerulskis came to the conclusion that Ms Corcoran has developed depressive illness

with features of post-traumatic stress disorder following the tragic outcome of the

pregnancy. Currently her depressive symptoms are in a moderate clinical level and are

managed by medication.

30) I have also considered the report prepared by Dr. Sylvia Murphy- Tigue, who is an expert

in concealed pregnancies and a lecturer in midwifery at the Department of Nursing and

Midwifery in the University of Limerick. This report is not of much assistance to the court as

the offence is not one of concealed pregnancy but particularly as Dr Murphy Tighe did not

meet or interview Miss Corcoran. I note counsel’s explanation as to why such a meeting did

not take place.

31) Ms. Sharon Kennedy a highly experienced probation officer has prepared a

comprehensive Probation report. She assesses the risk of reoffending to be low. In

discussing the case with Miss Corcoran Ms Kennedy found that Miss Corcoran could not

explain why she put the baby in the bin but that she understands how the general public

may view her actions. She expressed deep emotional pain and shame when discussing the

issue but could not offer any real explanation in order for Miss Kennedy to understand her

state of mind at the time. Miss Kennedy stated that there is a gap in her acceptance that her

in actions contributed to her daughter’s death and therefore she would benefit from

support to develop victim empathy in relation to her acceptance of culpability.

32) Other personal circumstances which are relevant to mitigation are that while Miss

Corcoran is now 23 years of age, she was just 18 at the time she became pregnant and 19

when she gave birth. She has no previous convictions, and she has not come to the adverse

attention of the Gardai, either before or after this offending. She has a good work history, is

now in a supportive relationship with a new partner whose family are also supporting her.

She no longer lives in Waterford and has moved to a different county. She is engaging with

psychiatric services. Ms Corcoran cooperated with the gardai at the time of the initial

investigation, to the extent of handing over her clothing to them, she provided voluntary

DNA sample for testing and did not invoke a right to silence when she was detained for

questioning.

33) The ultimate sentence. Taking into account the range of available sentences for

manslaughter, the factors bearing on culpability which I’ve already mentioned will I have

assessed the gravity of Miss Corcoran’s offending conduct as meriting pre-mitigation or

headline sentences of 4 years imprisonment in the very peculiar circumstances of this case.

For the mitigation that is available to her, I will give her a discount of 9 months, this reduces

her sentence to 3 years and 3 months.

34) She has a favourable probation report, and she has a complex and difficult psychological

profile. The question must be asked as to whether society benefits from such a person as

Caitlin Corcoran who came before the court with no previous convictions, serving that

length of sentence in full or whether it is one of those rare and exceptional cases where a

significant portion of the sentence should be suspended.

35) There are various theories on what criminal sentencing seeks to achieve, clearly

punishment and deterrence are understandable aims but to use the words of Edwards J. In

the case of DPP V Siobhan Maguire [IECA] 2018 there are certain cases that require a

reflective approach to how best to balance the objectives of sentencing. I am satisfied that

in this case a custodial sentence cannot be avoided but I am also satisfied that a nominal

period of actual custody is sufficient to achieve the objectives of proportionate sentencing

in this case. Because this offence goes so much against the natural instincts of any mother

or parent the need for deterrence is not particularly high and a short period of actual

imprisonment is sufficient to communicate the censure of the court.

36) I am also mindful that, as she acknowledges herself in her letter to the court, Miss

Corcoran will have to live with the consequences of what she has done and what she failed

to do, for her daughter Sophie Elizabeth Corcoran, for the rest for life. That itself contributes

to her punishment.

37) I also have regard for what Mr Hutchinson BL stated he believes will be the regime in the

prison that Ms Corcoran will have to go through during her sentence. Mr Hutchinson B.L.

states that it is believed that she will be forced to stay 24-hours a day in an isolation cell,

such will be the anticipated odium that other prisoners may have for her.

38) For that reason, I am prepared to suspend the final 3 years of both sentences for a

period of 3 years post-release, both sentences to run concurrently and be backdated to the

date she went into custody.

I am imposing conditions on the suspension of the sentences, that Miss Corcoran

1) continues to fully engage with the psychiatric services, and

2) is under probation supervision for the next 2 years and during that time engages in

structured offence focused program work and engages in identified counselling or therapy

to include family therapy.

She should enter into a bond in the sum of 100 euro to keep the peace and be of good

behaviour for a period of 3 years post-release.

Eugene O’Kelly