Defamation discovery refused where truth defense relies on unstamped lease rather than fraud allegation.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe court refused an application for discovery in defamation proceedings initiated by solicitor McGrath against Mulrooney. Mulrooney sought documents regarding a 1999 lease, arguing it supported a defense of truth based on alleged tampering. The court held that the requested documents were irrelevant because the defamation claim concerned fraud on court proceedings, not the specific lease stamping issue.
Legislator headnote
AI generatedDefamation Act 1961; Land Act 1965: A defense of truth in defamation proceedings must directly address the defamatory imputations; documents relevant only to a collateral matter regarding lease stamping are not discoverable when the claim concerns fraud on judicial proceedings.
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[2019] IEHC 362
THE HIGH COURT
2019 No. 74 CA
Between:
DOLPH MCGRATH
PLAINTIFF
– AND –
WILLIAM MULROONEY
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Max Barrett delivered on 28th May, 2019.
1. Mr McGrath, a solicitor, has commenced defamation proceedings against Mr Mulrooney. Mr McGrath claims, inter alia, that Mr
Mulrooney attended at his offices on 31.10.2014 and claimed before various people that Mr McGrath had perpetrated a fraud against
Mr Mulrooney. Among the claims in Mr McGrath’s Defamation Civil Bill are that “The said utterances…were untrue, groundless and
were defamatory of the Plaintiff…in his calling and possession as a Solicitor and as an individual member of the public”.
2. Counsel for Mr Mulrooney contends that the Defence in the within proceedings is essentially a defence of truth. However, although
a defence of truth is offered, it is on a very specific ground, viz. by reference to an allegation that a particular lease dated
01.04.1999 was “tampered with while in the possession of the plaintiff”. No matter how liberal an interpretation one gives the verb ‘to
tamper’, it does not appear to the court to extend to what was claimed at the hearing of the within application, viz. that Mr McGrath
at some time in the past allowed court proceedings to proceed on the basis of a lease that was not stamped and/or in respect of
which a necessary consent under s.12 of the Land Act 1965 had not been obtained.
3. By notice of motion of 10 September 2018, Mr Mulrooney has sought discovery of:
“a. All documents, memoranda and/or notes concerning the application to the Revenue Commissioners and concerning
the stamping by the Revenue Commissioners of a lease dated 1 April 1999 made between Edward Malone of the one part
and John Mulrooney of the other part.
b. All attendances, documents, memorandum and/or notes concerning the recording of all or any instructions received
by the plaintiff for the application to the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine as successors to the Land
Commission for sub-division consent under Section 12 of the Land Act 1965 as amended and the granting of consent by
the said Department for the sub-division of the lease dated 1 April 1999 between Edward Malone of the One Part and
John Mulrooney of the Other Part”.
4. It will be clear from the court’s observations in para.2 that it does not consider the documentation referenced in para.3 to be
relevant to these proceedings as pleaded. Hence this application fails at the first: unless documentation is relevant it does not fall to
be discovered (see, e.g., the judgment of O’Flaherty J. in Stafford v. Revenue Commissioners (Unreported, Supreme Court, 27th
March, 1996)).
5. The application for discovery is respectfully refused.