Legislator Case Law & Legislation
IEDC 1 ECLI:IE:DC:2019:1 AI generated

Court reduces permanent care orders to temporary supervision orders with phased family reunification plan.

Case Number IEDC 1
Court / Authority
Jurisdiction Ireland (IE)
Decision Date
Outcome Partially Allowed

Legislator summary

AI generated

The District Court reduced the original permanent care orders for two children to temporary orders expiring in August 2019, coupled with a supervision order. While the court acknowledged past findings of domestic violence and parental instability, it determined that a full 18-year removal was disproportionate and unnecessary given the parents' subsequent therapeutic progress and the eldest child's safe return home. Consequently, the court mandated a phased return to parental care starting in September 2019, supported by specific therapy and family support directives.

Legislator headnote

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Section 18(2) of the Childcare Act 1991; Section 18(5)(b) of the Childcare Act 1991; Section 47 of the Childcare Act 1991: The court must balance the need to secure child welfare against the proportionality of long-term separation, allowing for temporary care orders and supervision orders when evidence of parental rehabilitation suggests reunification is viable.

Keywords

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Childcare Act 1991 proportionality test family reunification supervision order welfare of the child phased return therapeutic intervention

Cited Legislation

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Full text

THE DISTRICT COURT, [LOCATION REDACTED]

BEFORE JUDGE MARIE QUIRKE

CFA

v.

IB & HB

This is an application pursuant to section 18 subsection 2 of the Childcare Act 1991. in relation to R and C B.

The Orders sought by the parties were by the Child and Family Agency Orders placing the children in care until their 18th Birthdays.

The Guardian Ad Litem supported the CFA Application.

The parents seek return of the children to their care and reunification of their family.

R was born in March of 2010, C was born in July 2012. Both are the children of I B and H B. Both are Irish citizens. This case was

heard over four days. Witnesses included the allocated social worker, a psychologist and two play therapists. One engaged with R and

one engaged with C. I B, Respondent mother, gave evidence, H B, Respondent father gave evidence and the family support

practitioner who was engaged to assist in relation to H, the eldest child (sister of the children the subject of this application) on her

return home to her parents gave evidence and the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the wishes of the children and to furnish

opinion on welfare gave evidence.

Just at the outset it is important to remind ourselves of the history of this matter. R and C together with their older sister, H, were

made the subject of emergency care orders by this Court in September 2014 and ultimately section 18 orders were granted in

February 2016. In relation to H who is the sister of R and C and the eldest child of IB and HB the order was made to expire in July

2017 and in relation to R and C the order was made to expire in October 2017. It's important to remind ourselves that the findings at

that time in relation to the circumstances was that there had been physical chastisement of H and of R and there had been domestic

violence and instability in the relationship between I and H B which was impacting on the children. It was also the finding of the Court

among its finding that H B’s first response mechanism tended towards anger and aggression and this could have a likely impact on his

children and the parenting of his children and that Mrs I B could not mitigate the risk this posed to the welfare of the children.

Furthermore, that I B was not always emotionally available to the children. A written decision was made by the Court on the findings

of fact at that time.

The parents at the time of the original care order presented in denial. They advanced to the Court during the course of those

proceedings and at one point in time that H the eldest child was telling lies. It is noteworthy now that since those times which

occurred in 2016 when the original care order was made the parents have since engaged in therapeutic work with a psychologist. H

has returned home to his/her parents and this court has not received any evidence of any childcare concerns about H at this time

after the return of this the eldest child to the care of this couple.

And it was acknowledged in evidence in these proceedings by the psychologist and the social worker that some progress has been

made by the parents. Furthermore, in the evidence presented to this court the parents acknowledged their past behaviours and this

time they were not seeking to deny the history of the experience of their children. Since those original dealings the parents have

cooperated fully with the family support practitioner allocated to them in their current home who was engaged to assist them on their

reunification with their eldest child. It is noteworthy also that the parents have worked positively with M. F. S. S. There's no evidence

to the contrary and the parents cooperated fully with the parenting capacity assessment that was conducted by the psychologist. In

addition, the parents have participated fully in these proceedings and have been unwavering in their desire for reunification of their

entire family, their eldest child now having been returned to their care.

Now, in relation to the latter I wish to comment as follows that in the course of the evidence of the psychological assessor it appears

to have been advanced to this court that there is no standardised methodology or structure that is guided by any professional

association as to how these assessments are to be conducted. There are guidelines in the UK and these are followed in some regards

in this jurisdiction with individual psychologists choosing their own particular methodology and no uniform methodology being guided to

psychologists in this jurisdiction. There is no one set of professionally recognised guidelines on how a psychological parenting capacity

assessment should be conducted that was drawn to the attention of this court in this jurisdiction. And in this case the professional

engaged had been previously engaged to carry out therapeutic intervention with the parents and this therapeutic intervention had

occurred over a period of 8 months beginning in October 2016, some 14 double sessions. At the conclusion of that therapeutic

intervention the psychologist concluded in the report at that time that the parents had demonstrated a readiness to engage and a

motivation to change and that they would benefit from 10 more sessions on how to deal with stress. It would appear from the report

advanced to the Court at that time and on the evidence, and there was no evidence to the contrary that both parents agreed with

the psychologist that they would attend any service recommended and in the case of Mrs B the service that would have to be

recommended would have to take into account her particular medical needs and medical conditions. No such services have been

engaged by the parents since that time, it would appear due to, in part, their relocation and travel and practical difficulties in

sourcing and attending same.

When the psychologist was asked to do the parenting capacity assessment on the evidence adduced to this court and the

psychologist so advised the Court in sworn evidence, certain tasks were delegated to a final year doctoral student including the initial

clinical interviews and the administration of some standardised tests. The psychologist also delegated to the fourth-year doctoral

student the observation of the parents with their children. It would appear that the psychologist reached her written report

conclusions on the basis of the information that had been gathered in this fashion without any clinical interview or observations by

the psychologists own self of the parents and/or the parents with their children. The final conclusion in the written report was that

neither parent was deemed to have the capacity to parent all three children. The written report included among its findings that Mrs I

B was not robust and psychologically sound and that Mr B was similarly not robust or psychologically sound. But, in evidence to this

Court, on cross-examination in the witness box ,when the psychologist was questioned among many matters on the methodology and

the conclusions , the psychologist averred that the final year doctoral student was reliable and that the psychologist was satisfied to

base an opinion on the information that had been gathered in the fashion that has been outlined including the clinical interview and

observations that had been conducted not by the psychologist own self. In the final opinion advanced to this court in the evidence

that the psychologist gave while giving testimony the psychologist concluded that, "Yes, I B and H B have the capacity to parent.

Yes, I.B. and H B have the capacity to nurture with some deficits but that they are psychologically stuck."

Now, I must comment that from my understanding of psychology, this is a behavioural science informed in the main by observation

and direct interview. And this has leaned this Court to the view that this court must query exactly what weight can and should be

attached to the psychological written opinion that has been advanced to the Court in the particular circumstances of this

assessment. It is accepted that it may have been legitimate to delegate the administration of standardised tests but this Court

queries the appropriateness and the correctness of delegating the clinical interview and the observation of the parents with the

children in a behavioural science of psychology which it is commonly understood has as one of its essential components the need to

observe, to interview and to have dialogue before informed opinions can be made and advanced to this court. So, this Court must

conclude that this Court has serious reservations about the methodology that has been engaged by the professional parenting

assessor on the facts of this particular case. It would appear that there is a contradiction in a professional psychologist advancing

opinion to this court on observations and clinical interviews that were conducted by another and the other is not available for

examination and cross examination to this court. It is difficult to accept that the written opinion advanced is the opinion of the

professional when no direct clinical interview and /or observation was conducted in person by the psychologist seeking to state it is

that psychologist’s opinion that is being written down and made available to the court. An additional disquiet has arisen for the court

due to the averment of the psychologist in direct sworn evidence that the psychologist was disappointed with the findings made

because the psychologist in the therapeutic relationship had found that this was a nice couple. It is a heavy duty that rests on this

court to decide on the long-term care of these children and an exacting standard of professionalism rests on professionals offering

opinion as to on what the opinion in fact is based in circumstances where life changing consequences may flow from this Court’s

decision.

This Court proceeds on evidence and on facts proven on the balance of probabilities and after reviewing all the evidence and the

reports this court accepts the psychological opinion that was advanced to this court in oral evidence which was to the effect that Mr

and Mrs B do have parenting capacity, and that they do have the capacity to nurture with some deficits and that they are

psychologically stuck in certain regards.

In regard to the play therapist's evidence that was advanced to this court. Two play therapists had been engaged to work with the

children R and C. This Court concludes that the evidence of the play therapists constituted a description of the presentation at a

particular time and a particular place of each child and this Court is attaching no weight to any opinions that may have been included

or proffered or advanced by the play therapists in any opinions they offered to this court as to what meaning should/could be

attached to the presentation of the children in play therapy sessions and/or what should occur in the best interest and welfare of the

children in the long term and in terms of what orders this court should make as regards the long term care of these children.

Now, in regard to the evidence of the social worker Mr M. H. who has dealt with this case for a very long time this court accepts the

analysis of Mr H when it was averred as follows, "This is not simple. This is complex." I accept the concerns that when under stress

difficulties still exist for these parents and difficulties may arise in the parenting capacities of both of these parents at times of stress

that could lead to a lack of nurture and emotional warmth with avoidant behaviour by the mother and impulsivity and possibly violent

tendencies by the father. This evidence is accepted.

This Court has noted and considered all of the evidence adduced in these proceedings and when reference is made to any particular

piece of evidence this is not to be taken by implication or otherwise that this Court has not considered all of the evidence that has

been advanced to this court.

The evidence of the guardian ad litem is noted. The Guardian ad litem’s role is to advice the Court of the wishes of the children and to

give opinion on their welfare. The Guardian ad litem was appointed under section 26 of the Childcare Act 1991. The Guardian ad litem

states that the children are clear in their wishes and the Guardian was categoric and unequivocal in this regard and was clear that

there is no ambivalence in what the children state as their wishes. R wants to go home, C wants to go home. They would like a

continuing relationship with their foster carers who they have come, it would appear on the evidence adduced to this court, to love

and who they trust.

The Child and Family agency’s case is that the children must remain in care until they are both 18. And the guardian ad litem has

proffered the same view to this court. In summary without diluting any of the matters that have been adduced in evidence the

concerns are in the main that the dynamics of the relationship of the parents could pose a risk to the children that they will not be

parented to a good enough standard and that there will be risks to their welfare. The concern also is that the parents when under

stress on the basis of past behaviour it is predicted that they will not parent to a good enough standard that will secure the welfare

and safety of R and C and their other child H who is not the subject of these proceedings. It is also advanced to this court that the

parents have not done enough during the last period of time to deal with the concerns of the social workers that the old behaviours

that led to the original events could reoccur when stress arises and this could lead to the children not being parented to a good

enough standard.

It is important again then to remind ourselves of three years ago or in or around when the opinions that were advanced to the Court

at that time were the same and at that time were the same in relation to the child H and a Request was made by the Child and Family

Agency to make care orders until 18th birthdays for all children including the eldest child, H. This position was also then entirely

supported by the Guardian Ad Litem who also some three years ago gave opinion that a Care Order was necessary and proportionate

for all three children including the eldest child H until their 18th Birthdays.

However, since that time and it is now the situation that the eldest child H has returned home and is at home since December 2017.

The child has been reunified with his/her parents. The parents have changed location and the child H is living with them in their new

home and attending school. There are no complaints or incidents of domestic violence that have been made known to this court since

the making of the original orders. The parents are currently co-parenting their eldest child. The evidence is that the parents have

worked well and productively with the family support practitioner allocated to them in their new area. The family support practitioner

who has engaged with the family in their new home and when H returned to the care of his/her parents in her evidence to this court

was positive about her engagements with this family to the point that she was satisfied that her work was completed and her service

was no longer needed. Furthermore, no evidence has been adduced to this court of any child protection concerns in relation to H and

it is the position of the parents at this point in time that they seek the reunification of their family and they seek the return of R and

C to their care so that the family can reunify and enjoy family life together.

This court finds that I B and H B have changed but not to the level and at the pace that professionals in this case who have given

evidence to this court would have liked. But, they have come to this court and admitted their wrongdoing. They have reunified with

their child H, they have worked positively with the family support practitioner in their new home and they continue to engage with the

M. F. S. S. They have worked with the Child and Family Agency albeit that there have been communication difficulties. This Court

believes and accepts the oral evidence advanced to this court by the psychologist that these parents do have the capacity to parent

and do have the capacity to nurture with some deficits. This Court is satisfied that the threshold for state intervention has been and

was reached in this case.

But, this now brings me to what is proportionate and necessary to secure the welfare of these children.

In considering the circumstances of this family and prioritising the welfare of the two children involved and treating each child

individually and having given individual consideration to each child and the circumstances of each child. It is noteworthy that in

making decisions about what is necessary and proportionate in terms of state interference in family life this court must be guided by

the law. And at article 42A of our constitution it states that, "In exceptional cases where parents fail in their duty towards their

children to such an extent that the safety or welfare of any child is likely to be prejudicially affected the state shall by proportionate

means as provided by law endeavour to supply the place of the parents. But, always with due regard to the natural and

imprescriptible rights of the child."

This Court is satisfied that in considering the welfare of these two children, R and C, this Court must be mindful of their constitutional

right to family life insofar as is possible and insofar as it can be supported and enabled by the state authorities who have a duty for

child welfare. This Court must be guided by the provisions of the constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights in

reaching a decision on the facts of this case as what is proportionate and necessary to secure the welfare of R and C B. On a

consideration of all the evidence and all the documents submitted to this court as part of the evidence to this court I am not satisfied

to make a care order for the full duration of these children's childhoods. This court does not believe that such an order would secure

the welfare of R B or C B and/or is a necessary and/or proportionate interference with family life in this case.

On the facts of this case This Court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities to make a care order in respect of each child, R and C.

to expire on the first day of August 2019.

This Court is satisfied if the Child and Family Agency so see fit to accede to a request pursuant to section 18 subsection 5(b) to

make a supervision order for such a period as the agency believe and prove may be necessary to secure the welfare of each child.

The following directions pursuant to section 47 are proposed.

1) The Child and Family Agency are to consider whether an application for a supervision order is to be made in this case.

2) The Child and Family Agency are to plan for and put in place a phased return of R and C B to the care of their parents to

commence full time from the second day of August 2019 so that the children can finish their current school year where they currently

attend school and start their school year in September 2019 from their parents' home.

3) The Child and Family Agency are to put in place the family support practitioner, preferably the practitioner with whom both parents

have a current relationship to assist this family in planning for and resuming the full-time care of R and C B. This may necessitate long

term intervention or intervention for a certain period of time as is decided by the Agency to secure the welfare of R and C B.

4) The Child and Family Agency are to source family therapy to the family and in particular as follows. a) They are to source therapy

to take place between the mother and the eldest child H. This relationship is very important in the household and this court has

concluded will have an impact on the two children the subject of this order. So, on this basis I'm directing that this occur.

b) In relation to therapy this Court directs the Child and Family Agency to source therapy to the mother to assist her self-esteem and

self-confidence and c) to source therapy to the father to assist his inclination to anger and how he may and can regulate and

improve his demeanour in any situations where he feels this may be occurring.

That is the decision in the matter. I recommend to Mr and Mrs B that they extend gratitude to the Social Worker for the priority

afforded to their children and the deep concern for the children which has motivated the social worker

And I invite Mr and Mrs B to thank the foster carers who have loved and cared for their children throughout the period of orders

herein.

Thank you to the parties and the legal representatives for their work.

Marie Quirke

Dublin Metropolitan District Court