High Court refuses judicial review leave for asylum applicant who missed statutory five-day submission deadline.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe High Court refused leave to apply for judicial review against a deportation order made after the applicant failed to submit asylum submissions within a strict five-day statutory window. The applicant argued his solicitor did not receive a review form, but offered no explanation for the delay between the decision date and his first contact with legal counsel. The court held that the primary responsibility for meeting this urgent deadline lay with the applicant, and the lack of evidence regarding potential submissions meant the case lacked substantial grounds.
Legislator headnote
AI generateds. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000; s. 49(9) and (10) of the International Protection Act 2015: An applicant must take immediate action to meet statutory time limits for submissions, and failure to do so without a valid explanation precludes judicial review on substantial grounds.
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AI generatedFull text
[2018] IEHC 742
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
[2018 No. 1031 J.R.]
BETWEEN
H.A. (PAKISTAN)
APPLICANT
AND
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND IRELAND
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys delivered on the 17th day of December, 2018
1. The applicant was born in Pakistan in 1990. He lived in the U.K. on a student visa for a number of years from 2012 onwards. When
that expired he came to Ireland and applied for asylum on 5th June, 2015. He does not appear to have applied for protection in the
U.K.
2. On 29th July, 2016 the Refugee Applications Commissioner recommended refusal of the application. He appealed to the Refugee
Appeals Tribunal. Following the commencement of International Protection Act 2015, he applied for subsidiary protection on 8th
March, 2017. He was notified on 27th October, 2017 that there was an adverse recommendation in that regard and that the Minister
had refused permission under s. 49 of the 2015 Act. He was informed of a five-day limit for making any further submissions upon
receipt of an adverse appeal decision on the protection application (see s. 49(9) and (10) of the 2015 Act and the International
Protection Act (Permission to Remain) Regulations 2016 reg. 2).
3. The applicant then appealed to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal and on 1st August, 2018 was notified that the
appeals were being refused. He avers at para. 7 of his grounding affidavit that his solicitor at the time informed him that she did not
receive a review form with the IPAT decision. His solicitor wrote to the applicant on 9th August, 2018 asking him to contact her. The
applicant has not put forward any explanation as to why nothing happened between 1st and 9th August, 2018, which included the
crucial five-day period for further submissions. The applicant then did not contact his solicitor until 23rd August, 2018. No explanation
has been given as to why nothing happened between 9th and 23rd August. She wrote to him again on 29th August, 2018, and also
wrote to the State complaining that the review form had not been enclosed and asking whether the applicant was being dealt with
under the pre or post-2015 Act procedure. The review form is not a statutory form and an applicant is entitled to make submissions
independently of such a form.
4. A deportation order was made on 19th October, 2018. The applicant was required to leave the State by 19th November, 2018 and
failing that to present on 21st November, 2018. He failed to present and was arrested as an evader. The applicant is now in custody
in Limerick Prison and seeks leave to apply for judicial review to quash the deportation order. I directed that leave be sought on
notice. I have received helpful submissions from Mr. Paul O’Shea B.L for the applicant and Ms. Sarah Cooney B.L. for the respondent.
Leave application
5. The substantial grounds test for leave applies pursuant to s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. There are a number
of reasons why the application must fail.
(i). The evidence falls well short of establishing substantial grounds. No proper explanation for the failure to act within the
five-day period has been put forward. Even the hearsay comment by the applicant’s former solicitor in the form of a letter
exhibited by the applicant’s current solicitor does not explain why no submissions were made within that crucial five-day
period. That is not a situation that can be allowed to await replies to interesting legal queries made to the Department of
Justice and Equality. The five-day limit demands immediate action. The primary responsibility for that is on an applicant
himself or herself.
(ii). The second evidential black hole in the case is that the applicant has not averred that he would have had anything
to say if he had been given the review form. In the absence of such an averment, the point clearly does not overcome
the substantial grounds hurdle.
(iii). The fundamental problem with the application is that, even to this day, the applicant has never submitted any
information that would have triggered a review. Even if he did not make submissions in time for any good reason, which
has not been shown, he has not done anything since then at any time to make any further submissions or seek any form
of review of the decision on any reasonable basis, or on any basis whatsoever.
(iv). The fourth problem with the application is that it is out of time and no good and sufficient reason has been shown for
an extension of time. However I do not need to make a formal finding on this as the application fails on the merits.
6. Therefore leave should be refused as substantial grounds have not been shown.
Injunction
7. Pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Okunade v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IESC 49 [2012] 3 I.R. 153
[2013] 1 I.L.R.M. 1, the first criterion for an injunction is whether an arguable case has been shown; if not, the application should be
refused. In the regard of the application of s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, one has to consider the presence or
absence of substantial grounds in that regard, and on that criterion an injunction cannot arise where leave is refused, but if I am
wrong about that, the applicant has not shown adequate reasons in terms of the balance of justice and convenience as to why an
injunction should be granted in the particular circumstances of this case.
Order
8. For those reasons, leave is refused and an injunction restraining deportation is refused.