Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against 15-year manslaughter sentence citing extreme harm and poor prior record.

THE COURT OF APPEAL

[149/14]

Birmingham P.

Mahon J.

Edwards J.

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 2 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 199

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

RESPONDENT

v.

DERMOT GRIFFIN

APPELLANT

JUDGMENT (Ex tempore) of the Court delivered on the 11th day of June 2018 by Birmingham P.

1. This is an appeal against severity of sentence. The sentence under appeal is one of 15 years imprisonment which was backdated

to 2nd November 2012 that was imposed on 23rd June 2014 in the Circuit Court in Dublin in respect of the offence of manslaughter,

the offence having occurred on 1st September 2001.

2. This Court has already delivered a detailed judgment in the context of the conviction appeal and in the course of that judgment,

the facts are referred to in some considerable detail. It is not necessary at this stage to repeat that exercise. It is sufficient at this

stage to recall that the case involved the unlawful killing of a 12-year old boy when fire was set to a makeshift den. At the time, that

den was occupied by two boys. One succeeded in making an escape, but tragically, Stephen Hughes did not and he died in the fire.

The sentencing hearing heard very powerful and very moving victim impact evidence from Elizabeth Hughes, the mother of the

deceased, who made clear how the loss of her son had impacted on her and had impacted on many other family members every day

of the 13 years that had passed until the sentence hearing.

3. In terms of the background and personal circumstances of the appellant, he was born on 27th December 1959. He is the father of

four children. He had 39 previous convictions in all, and of these, some individual offences were quite significant. They included a 10-

year sentence, subsequently reduced to seven years on appeal, imposed in 1985 for a drugs offence. Also, that year, a sentence of

two years imprisonment for robbery. The offences continued up to 2012 when, in Cork Circuit Court, he received a sentence of three

years’ imprisonment in respect of an offence involving the supply of drugs. Also recorded was an offence in 1996, dealt with in the

Central Criminal Court, for which he received four years in respect of a number of firearms offences. The Court heard that in 2001, he

was addicted to Heroin, but his counsel told the sentencing Court that by the time of the sentence hearing, he had detoxicated, that

he had in fact rehabilitated, was not on Methadone and that he was clear of all drugs.

4. The Court was told that the DPP viewed the offence as falling within what was described as the severe category. Both prosecution

and defence counsel referred to case law, including the English case of R v. Nedrick in the case of the prosecution. That was a case

where a fatality arose from arson intended to frightened occupants of home. The defence drew attention to the case of Kelly and to

the review of sentences in manslaughter cases.

5. In the course of the appeal hearing, it was submitted that the trial judge attached undue and disproportionate weight to

authorities relied upon by the respondent and failed to have regard to authorities proffered and relied upon by the appellant. It said

that the judge failed to adequately address the assessment of culpability of the appellant and the relevant matters advanced in

mitigation and that the judge attached undue and disproportionate weight to perceived aggravating factors.

6. The judge is criticised also for not identifying a headline figure, though in that regard, it is fairly acknowledged that she was

sentencing before the establishment of this Court which has, since its creation, laid an emphasis in recommending a two-stage

approach which involves identifying where on the scale of gravity the offence lies, going on to nominate a headline figure and then

applying mitigation.

7. In the course of her sentencing remarks, the judge commented as follows:

“The aggravating factors which appear to the Court are the very, very serious nature of this charge and the effect that it

had on the family of the victim and the Court has taken into account and well into account the victim impact report of

Elizabeth Hughes who gave evidence to the Court on the last occasion. The mitigating factors which the Court can take

into account are the efforts that Mr. Griffin has made to rehabilitate himself, the efforts he has made to detox, the good

use of his time that he has spent in custody and the Court has taken into account his age now, at the time of the

commission of the offences and the age he will be when this sentence is completed. The Court has taken into account

the antiquity of the offence. The Court has been advised he has 39 previous convictions and the Court has been advised

that he has been in custody now since 2011.”

8. The references by the sentencing judge to an aggravating factor, being the very, very serious nature of the charge, are perhaps

not as clear as it might be. However, the Court feels that there can be little doubt that what she intended to communicate was that

the particular circumstances of this particular offence were very, very serious. That observation would be entirely appropriate.

Manslaughter can be committed in so many ways. It can involve cases that are right on the cusp of murder, and on the other end of

the spectrum, in cases where the offender is almost blameless.

9. This was a case that was very serious indeed. In terms of harm done, the killing of a 12-year old child means that it must rate very

high indeed on the scale of gravity. The moral culpability also was very high. It involved recklessness of a very extreme level indeed.

There was evidence before the Court of the propensity of local children to frequent the den and there was also the evidence of

Tracey Deegan, the former partner of the appellant, that he had left home twice on the evening, saying that he was going to burn

the hut. There was also evidence that he had said on the occasion of his first visit, that he had felt a foot.

10. Even taking the view most favourable to the appellant, that he my have felt that the hut had been vacated in the meantime, or

may have felt that any occupant would have had an opportunity to escape, one occupant did in fact succeed in doing so, it

nonetheless showed an utter disregard for the extreme risk to human life that he was creating. The mitigating factors that were

present were few and limited. The case had been fully contested. That was Mr. Griffin’s right, but it meant that the mitigation that

would have been provided by a plea and remorse was not available. As indicated earlier in this judgment, his prior record was very

poor.

11. All told, the Court is satisfied that the sentence imposed was one that fell within the appropriate range and the Court finds no

basis for intervening.

12. The Court will dismiss the appeal against severity. The Court would like to thank counsel for their assistance at this stage and at

the conviction stage.