Court of Criminal Appeal allows appeal against excessive manslaughter sentence, reducing fourteen years to eight years.

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

125/03

McGuinnness J.

Lavan J.

Ó Caoimh J.

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

.v.

GARRETT COONEY

APPLICANT

Judgment of the Court delivered the 27th day of July 2004 by McGuinness J.

This application for leave to appeal against severity of sentence arises from the manslaughter of one Christopher Farrell by

the applicant, Garrett Cooney, on the 1st January 2002 at Cloonmore Park, in Tallaght. The applicant was charged with

murder. He pleaded not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter and this plea was accepted by the Director of Public

Prosecutions. On the 27th June 2003 at the Central Criminal Court he was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. The

Director of Public Prosecutions entered a nolle prosequi on two lesser charges of possession of an offensive weapon and of

affray.

The killing took place in the early hours of the 1st January 2003 in the front garden of the applicant’s house at 13

Cloonmore Park, Tallaght, where the applicant lived with his partner of eight and a half years, Alison O’Neill, and their two

children. A New Year’s Eve party was taking place at the next door house, 15 Cloonmore Park. It appears that at midnight

the applicant, his partner Ms O’Neill and various neighbours came out to hear the bells ringing in the New Year and they

were invited to join the party at 15 Cloonmore Park. A very considerable amount of drinking had been going on on all sides

and the applicant appears to have been very drunk and getting drunker as time went on.

While the applicant and Ms O’Neill were attending the party their two young children were in bed at home. Ms O’Neill’s

brother, Mr Dermot O’Neill, remained in the house as a babysitter.

The course of events is more than a little confused. It appears that Ms O’Neill was enjoying dancing at the party and in

particular was dancing with a man named Gavin Murphy. The applicant was not very happy with this situation, particularly

as it appears that earlier in the evening he had proposed marriage to his partner, and on a few occasions he urged Ms O’Neill

to leave the party and come home with him. He himself went home briefly on a number of occasions to check on the

children. During one of these visits it seems that he got into an argument with his partner’s brother, Dermot O’Neill, about

Ms O’Neill’s failure to come home and her dancing with Mr Murphy. Arising from this argument the applicant attacked Mr

O’Neill with a knife and wounded his arm, causing considerable bleeding. This incident occurred in the sitting room of No.

123 Cloonmore drive, the applicant’s home. The full facts about this attack are not clear. The applicant’s memory of it is

clouded by drink and Mr O’Neill himself, with remarkable forbearance, has made no complaint to the authorities about the

incident.

Shortly after this incident the applicant returned to the party and again asked his partner to come home. A number of people

came out into the front garden of No. 15 including the applicant, Mr Gavin Murphy, and the victim Mr Christopher (Kit)

Farrell who, it appears, was previously quite unknown to the applicant. There was some altercation. The applicant crossed

back into his own front garden followed by Mr Farrell. According to the applicant (in reply to questioning by the Gardai) Mr

Farrell was “giving him cheek” and calling him a “a muppet”. On the evidence available to the Gardai the applicant and Mr

Farrell “went head to head” on the garden path. The applicant stabbed Mr Farrell in the stomach. It was a single stab

wound. Mr Farrell staggered out into the roadway and collapsed. The stab wound rapidly proved to be fatal.

Following the attack the applicant appears to have brought a duvet from the house and tried to assist the victim by covering

him with it. The Gardai were summoned. Immediately on their arrival the applicant admitted that it was he who had

attacked Mr Farrell and, despite a great deal of confusion about the actual sequence of events, he has always accepted his

guilt.

The investigating Gardai interviewed the applicant under caution several times. The interviews were recorded on video tape.

The memoranda of the interviews were accepted as correct by the applicant and signed by him. These memoranda were

before the sentencing court and are also before this court. They present a picture of drink-induced utter confusion in the

applicant’s mind as to the events of the night in question. The applicant appears to have confused his attack on Mr O’Neill

with his stabbing of Mr Farrell. He insisted to the Gardai that he had stabbed Mr Farrell in the sitting room rather than in the

garden and pointed out that there was blood in the sitting room which Ms. O’Neill had cleaned up. He recalled Mr Farrell

lying outside on the road and that he had fetched a duvet to cover him. He seemed to have little or no memory of the actual

stabbing but always accepted that he must have been the perpetrator. The knife used to stab Mr Farrell has never been

recovered but the applicant accepted in interview that he had fetched a steak knife from the kitchen from among unwashed

dishes in the sink.

The task of the Gardai in establishing the actual course of events was rendered more difficult by the fact that not only the

applicant himself but virtually all those present had been drinking heavily for some hours. However, both eye witness

accounts and forensic evidence made it clear that the stabbing of Mr Farrell took place as described above in the front

garden of the applicant’s home. In his interviews with the Gardai the applicant expressed extreme regret at his action and

this was confirmed by the Garda witness at the sentencing hearing.

The sentencing hearing

The applicant’s sentencing hearing took place in the Central Criminal Court before Carney J. on the 27th June 2003. The

evidence as to the facts was given by Detective Inspector Seamus Cane, who was examined in chief by Mr Birmingham on

behalf of the Director and cross-examined by Mr Mill-Arden for the defence. Mr Mill-Arden also expressed on behalf of the

applicant his extreme regret and remorse and his apology to the family of the deceased man.

A psychiatric report on the applicant by Dr. Brian McCaffrey, consultant psychiatrist, was handed into the court as was a

medical report on the applicant’s alcoholism. Reports on his school and work records were also handed in.

Detective Inspector Cane gave evidence of the applicant’s record. He had committed a number of minor offences, some

dating back to the Children’s Court in 1987. In the Children’s Court in 1987 he received a conviction in respect of a larceny

offence and was dealt with under the Probation Act. In the same court in 1988 in respect of a larceny offence he again

received the Probation Act. In December 1992 for attempted burglary he was bound to keep the peace for eighteen months

in Kilmainham District Court. In December 2001 he received a sentence of two hundred and forty hours community service

for offences of entering the curtilage of a building and larceny. None of these offences involved violence of any kind. While

the applicant was a heavy drinker he was not involved in drugs.

The applicant had a record of being a regular worker in a number of jobs and was very committed to his partner and his two

children. At the time of the hearing he and his partner had moved to Wexford and he was working as a handyman doing

flooring work for his brother.

At the hearing evidence was also given by Detective Inspector Cane that the wife of the victim Mr Farrell had previously

died in what was described by the Inspector as “another tragic event in the area” which was “unnecessary to describe to

the court” (Book B page 29 to 30). The couple had two children aged six and five years who were now orphans and being

cared for by their grandmother.

The victim’s father, Christopher Farrell senior, gave evidence to the court in regard to the family circumstances and in

particular the effect of the deceased’s death on his children. The victim’s brother Mr Philip Farrell also gave evidence. He

said that the family had fallen apart since his brother’s death. His sister had ended up on drugs and everything had gone

wrong with the family since then (Book B page 33).

Evidence was given on behalf of the applicant by his sister Ms Martina Cooney and by his brother Mr Joseph Cooney, for

whom the applicant was then working.

Following a speech in mitigation by Mr Mill-Arden, Carney J. pronounced sentence as follows:

“The transcript in this case is not going to be able to convey to any appellate court the large press of devastated and

weeping family members at the back of the court. The sentence in this case is going take account of the devastating effect

on a large family and also the creation of two orphan children aged five and six.

The facts of this case are fully set out in a transcript, I need not refer to them further.

When I came to the Bar and started practising in the Bridewell Criminal Courts nearly forty years ago, there

existed the concept of the fair fight and that, in the way, attracted a measure of respect from the District

Justices at the time. That has now completely gone. Case after case in this court is establishing that one of the

parties to a fight will either go to the kitchen and get the kitchen knife or go home and come back to the scene

with the kitchen knife and the sentences coming down from this court have got to indicate urgently that this

must stop.

I sentence the accused to fourteen years imprisonment.”

Submissions of Counsel

In addressing this court senior counsel for the applicant Mr Mill-Arden submitted that the learned High Court judge had

erred in principle in failing to provide cogent reasons for his decision in his sentencing judgment. The learned judge gave no

indication of having considered any of the matters raised on behalf of the applicant in his plea of mitigation. No reference

was made to his immediate and consistent admission of guilt, to his previous record, to the possibility of rehabilitation, or

indeed to any factor other than the effect on the members of the victim’s family and the general prevalence of knife attacks.

Mr Mill-Arden drew attention to the principles applicable to sentencing set out by this court (Walsh J.) in The People

(Attorney General) .v. O’Driscoll (1 Frewen 351) and by the Supreme Court in the People (Director of Public

Prosecutions) v M [1994] 3 I.R. 306. In that case the Supreme Court held that any sentence imposed must be proportionate

to the circumstances of the case having regard to the nature of the offence, its effect on the victim and the circumstances of

the convicted person. A relevant and necessary fact to be considered in this context was the prospect of successfully

rehabilitating the convicted person so that he would not have any propensity to re-offend.

Mr Mill-Arden accepted that the learned judge was correct in his sentencing judgment in giving weight to the impact of the

crime on the family of the victim but submitted that this was not in any way balanced by a consideration of any of the

mitigating matters, of the psychiatric report or of the applicant’s background and personal circumstances.

In regard to the quantum of the sentence Mr Mill-Arden drew the attention of the court to the recent judgment of this court

(McCracken J.) in Director of Public Prosecutions v Dillon (unreported: CCA, McCracken J. 17th December 2003) where

it was held that it was an error in principle to treat manslaughter with a knife as being in a different category from other

forms of manslaughter. In that case a sentence of fourteen years had been reduced by this court to one of eight years.

Senior counsel for the Director, Mr McCarthy, submitted that the decision in the Director of Public Prosecutions v Dillon

(cited above) dealt in the main with the fact that the learned trial judge in that case had per incuriam held that there was a

fixed minimum sentence of twenty years for this type of offence. There were, Mr McCarthy argued, gradations of

manslaughter. In the present case there was not the requisite intent for murder but this was an unprovoked attack on a

victim who was virtually unknown to the applicant. It was at the serious end of the gradations of manslaughter.

With regard to any possible concern felt by the court as to the lack of explicit reasoning in the sentencing judgment, counsel

suggested that it was open to the court to seek a report from the learned sentencing judge. This had on occasion been done

in the past.

In regard to the quantum of the sentence Mr McCarthy referred the court to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The

People (D.P.P.) v Conroy (No. 2) [1989] I.R.160. In that case it had been held by the Supreme Court that there was no

principle appropriate to the question of sentencing which would inhibit a court from imposing the maximum permissible

sentence for manslaughter merely on the grounds that such a sentence had not been imposed in recent times. It was also

held that to impose the same sentence in respect of a plea of guilty to manslaughter as would have been imposed had the

appellant being convicted of murder was not an error in principle. There was no presumption that a particular instance of the

crime of manslaughter could not, from a sentencing point of view, be as serious as, or more serious than, an instance of the

crime of murder.

The Law and Conclusions

Both the Supreme Court and this court have from time to time drawn attention to the factors that may properly be

considered by a court of trial in imposing sentence either on conviction or following a plea of guilty. Counsel for the

applicant has referred this court to two leading cases. In The People (Attorney General) v O’Driscoll the applicants, two

co-accused, committed armed robbery in the course of which violence was used. A number of concurrent sentences were

imposed on the various counts, the longest of which was nine years penal servitude. The applicants appealed against

conviction and sentence. Much of the appeal turned on identification evidence and other issues to which it is not necessary

to refer here. The judgment of the court was delivered by Walsh J. The relevant passage as regards sentencing occurs at

page 359 of the report:

“It is clear from the transcript that the Superintendent in question was somewhat exasperated with the applicants and

their family. It is equally clear that the learned judge in passing sentence had already formed a very adverse opinion (no

doubt based on experience) of the O’Driscolls and their relatives the Hogans. However that may be the applicants in this

case are answerable only for their own sins and not for the sins of their friends and relatives. Having regard to the age of

the applicants and their previous record the court is of opinion that the sentences passed of nine years penal servitude

and six years penal servitude and four years penal servitude and three years penal servitude are all grossly

disproportionate and must be set aside. The offences are, of course, extremely serious offences and are not mitigated by

the fact that only a sum of £20 was involved as the real nature of the offence of robbery with violence or robbery with

aggravation or any form of robbery is the fact of robbery rather than the value of the proceeds of it. The objects of

passing sentence are not merely to deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again but to induce him insofar

as possible to turn from a criminal to an honest life and indeed the public interest would be best served if the criminal

could be induced to take the latter course. It is therefore the duty of the courts to pass what are appropriate sentences in

each case having regard to the particular circumstances of that case – not only in regard to the particular crime but in

regard to the particular criminal. The sentences in the present case may have a very deterring effect on other people but

are not such as to induce these young men to turn from a criminal to an honest life. Regard must also be had to the fact

that this is the first crime of violence of which either of them has ever been convicted.”

The court went on to quash the sentences and to reduce the maximum sentences to three years penal servitude.

A more recent consideration of the relevant factors in sentencing is to be found in the judgments of the Supreme Court in

The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v M 3 I.R. 306.

In that case the appellant, a teacher and member of a religious order, pleaded guilty before the Central Criminal Court to a

number of counts of buggery, indecent assault and sexual assault. The offences had been committed against a number of

young boys who had been under the appellant’s care in his position as their teacher. The trial judge imposed a number of

concurrent sentences, the longest of which was a sentence of eighteen years penal servitude in respect of three counts of

buggery. In imposing the sentences the trial judge expressed the view that in his opinion this was the worst case of its kind to

come before the Central Criminal Court.

In his judgment (page 313) Egan J. stated:

“There can be no doubt whatever but that the appellant committed very serious offences. The majority of the six children

involved have been disturbed and damaged and will require continued psychiatric counselling. It must also be

remembered that there was an appalling breach of trust by the applicant towards the parents of the boys and the six

innocent boys themselves. To my mind the most important mitigating factor in a case is the fact that the appellant

admitted his guilt promptly and has pleaded guilty at his trial. This court recognised that this was an important

mitigating factor in cases of rape: The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Tiernan [1988] IR 250.”

The learned judge went on to survey the personal circumstances of the applicant and continued (at page 314):

“As was stated in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in The People (Attorney General) v O’Driscoll [1972] 1

Frewen 351 and The People (Attorney General) v Poyning [1972] I.R. 402 an essential ingredient for consideration in

the sentencing of a person upon conviction, in any case in which it is reasonably possible, is the chance of rehabilitating

such persons so as to re-enter into society after a period of imprisonment. This is clearly not a case in which it could be

said that there is no reasonable possibility of the accused re-entering society as a rehabilitated member of it after a

substantial period of imprisonment.

One of the ingredients of that possibility of rehabilitation clearly would appear to be the maintenance during

the period of imprisonment involved an element of hope and of something to look forward to which gives

motivation for the self improvement and rehabilitation necessary. This has been described in some of the

literature as the light at the end of the tunnel.”

Denham J. in her judgment spoke (at page 316) of proportionality. She said:

“Sentences should be proportionate. Firstly, they should be proportionate to the crime. Thus, a grave offence is reflected

by a severe sentence…

The nature of the offences would attract immediate and long custodial sentences. Thus, the sentences imposed

by the learned trial judge are not intrinsically wrong in principle.

However, sentences must also be proportionate to the personal circumstances of the appellant. The essence of

the discretionary nature of sentencing is that the personal situation of the applicant must be taken into

consideration by the court.”

The learned judge then went on to refer to the passage quoted above from The People (Attorney General) .v. O’Driscoll.

Denham J. went on to refer to the effect of the crimes concerned on the victims (at page 317). She stated:

“Sentencing is neither an exercise in vengeance, nor the retaliation by victims on a defendant. However, the general

impact on victims is a factor to be considered by the court in sentencing.”

Denham J. referred to the effect of the applicant’s crimes on each of the victims, but went on to say:

“The nature of the crime, and the personal circumstances of the appellant, are the kernel issues to be considered and

applied in accordance with the principles of sentencing, for this is an action between the State and the appellant and not

an action between the appellant and the victims.

Sentencing is a complex matter in which principles, sometimes being in conflict, must be considered as part of

the total situation. Thus, while on the one hand a grave crime should be reflected by a long sentence, attention

must also be paid to individual factors, which include remorse and rehabilitation, often expressed inter alia in

a plea of guilty, which in principle reduce the sentence.”

Denham J. then carefully considered the various mitigating factors in that case including the applicant’s plea of guilty, his

personal circumstances and his possible propensity to commit similar crimes in the future. She concluded:

“Taking into account the previously related factors and viewing these very serious offences in their particular

circumstances I am satisfied that the learned trial judge did not take into account sufficiently the mitigating factors and

that he erred in principle in determining the length of sentences.”

She agreed with Egan J. as to the sentences to be imposed.

Mr McCarthy has drawn the attention of the court to the case of the People (D.P.P.) v Charles Conroy (No. 2) [1989] I.R

160. A number of the conclusions of that case have already been quoted above. The personal circumstances of the appellant

in that case were that he had no significant previous criminal record and had pleaded guilty to the charge of manslaughter.

However in dealing with the sentence imposed by the trial court Finlay C.J. pointed out that his plea of guilty counted for

little given that he had pleaded not guilty in two previous trials for murder arising out of the same incidents. The first trial

had resulted in a disagreement and the conviction in the second trial was set aside by the Supreme Court on a point of law.

This was not a case where the appellant had pleaded guilty from the beginning.

The facts of that case were that the appellant was the eldest of four men who forcibly entered the house of an elderly

woman for the purpose of robbery. The woman was beaten and tied to a chair and the house was ransacked; a small

amount of money was taken. The four men then travelled together in the appellant’s car, stopping at a shop where the

appellant purchased some pairs of nylon tights to be used as masks. They forcibly entered a house occupied by two elderly

men. Each of the men was severely beaten. One of them died shortly afterwards as a result of his injuries, while the other

died in hospital some weeks later.

As noted above the court held that there was nothing wrong in principle in imposing the maximum sentence for

manslaughter. However despite the striking circumstances of the case the court held that a sentencing court must have

regard to the principle that an accused might be rehabilitated, if induced by the length of his sentence to expect to be

eventually returned to society. The court again referred to The People (Attorney General) v O’Driscoll (1 Frewen 351).

Having regard to the disparity between the sentences imposed on the appellant and his co-accused and to the necessity for

affording him some hope of rehabilitation and re-entry into society the court held that the sentence of penal servitude for life

was excessive and imposed a sentence of seventeen years penal servitude.

In the present case Mr Mill-Arden submits that the learned sentencing judge did not provide full or specific reasons for the

heavy sentence he imposed. It is true that in his brief sentencing judgment Carney J. refers only to the suffering of the

victim’s family, by which he was clearly much affected, and to the prevalence of knife attacks in recent times. He makes no

reference at all to the applicant’s plea of guilty, to his personal circumstances, or to any hope of rehabilitation. All these

matters had, of course, been brought to his attention by Mr Mill-Arden in his speech of mitigation and it may well be that

they were present in the judge’s mind at the time of sentence.

It cannot be said that as the law stands at present a sentencing judge is under an obligation to give reasons for the particular

sentence which he imposes. It is, however, in our opinion fair to say that it is a desirable practice. Public confidence in the

criminal justice system is enhanced when reasons for sentence are clearly expressed. From a practical point of view the

giving of reasons facilitates review of the sentence by an appellate court. An appeal court should be able to ascertain

whether the sentencing judge took into account such matters as a plea of guilty, the accused person’s previous record or

other relevant personal circumstances. In, for example, The People (D.P.P.) v Bambrick [1996] 1 I.R. 265, Carney J.

dealt with all aspects of the reasons for the sentence in that case in a lengthy and detailed judgment.

In his article “Sentencing – the Case for Recent Decisions” [1963] Crim. L.R. 243, D.A. Thomas comments:

“The immediate effect of an obligatory statement of reasons would be to remove certain obvious risks inherent in the

present system. The danger of sentences based on an immediate emotional reaction to some particular feature of the

offence would be avoided. The imposition of the intellectual discipline of formulating reasons, a discipline to which the

judge is accustomed, would assist the judge to ignore factors which are irrelevant but which might otherwise, perhaps

unconsciously, influence the choice of sentence. It is easy to understand the temptation to be influenced by the un-

cooperative attitude of the defendant or his offensive behaviour to the prosecution witnesses or even the judge himself,

but these are not factors which should affect the choice of sentence. To require a judge to formulate reasons for a

sentencing decision is to do no more than to require him to apply the normal process of judicial decision to the process

of sentencing: and where reasons are formulated, there can be no objection to a requirement that they should be stated.”

Reference was also made to the requirement of giving reasons for the imposition of a particular sentence in the case of

O’Mahony v Judge Thomas Ballagh and the Director of Public Prosecutions (Supreme Court unreported 13th

December 2001). In that case, the applicant, who had been convicted of drunken driving, sought judicial review of the

decision of the District Court judge on the basis that his trial in the District Court was not conducted in accordance with the

principles of constitutional justice in that the trial judge had failed to address a submission made by counsel on behalf of the

applicant.

In his judgment in the Supreme Court Murphy J. held:-

“I would be very far from suggesting that judges of the District Court should compose extensive judgments to meet some

academic standard of excellence. In practice, it would be undesirable – and perhaps impossible – to reserve decisions

even for a brief period. On the other hand, it does seem, and in my view this case illustrates, that every trial judge

hearing a case at first instance must give a ruling in such a fashion as to indicate which of the arguments he is accepting

and which he is rejecting and, as far as is practicable in the time available, his reasons for so doing.”

The factors to be considered in passing sentence have been clearly set out by the Supreme Court in Director of Public

Prosecutions v M. [1994] 3 I.R. 306 and that decision is, of course, binding on this court, as it is on the Central Criminal

Court. It is the view of this court that the learned trial judge in the present case did not properly consider the established

relevant factors which should be taken into account in imposing sentence but was overly influenced by the presence in court

of the various members of the victim’s family and by the evidence given by them. No reference was made by him to the

applicant’s immediate admission of guilt, which he maintained throughout, nor to the fact that he had never previously

committed an offence involving violence and had never previously merited a custodial sentence. No consideration appears to

have been given to the likelihood of his re-offending or to his expressed remorse, both of which were dealt with in the

psychiatric report of Dr. McCaffrey; nor was any reference made to the need for a “light at the end of the tunnel”. The

learned judge in our view fell into error in treating the matter as “an action between the appellant and the victims” rather

than as “an action between the State and the appellant”, to use the phraseology of Denham J. in the M case quoted above.

Thus in our view the learned judge erred in principle in imposing a custodial sentence of fourteen years imprisonment.

Having held that the learned trial judge erred in principle in his sentencing it now becomes the duty of this court, by reason

of section 34 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924, substituted by section 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1993, to “impose

such sentence or make such orders it considers appropriate, being a sentence or order which could have been imposed on

the convicted person for the offence at the Court of Trial…”

Manslaughter is, of course, an extremely serious offence, which in the majority of cases must result in a substantial custodial

sentence. Such sentences, however, even in cases of fatal stabbing, have varied considerably in severity. Variations have

arisen from the circumstances surrounding the crime and from the personal circumstances of the criminal. In recent years

sentences as long as fifteen to seventeen years and as short as three to four years have been imposed in different cases.

In the recent case of The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v John Dillon (Court of Criminal Appeal 17th

December 2003) the original sentence of fourteen years for manslaughter by stabbing was held by this court to be wrong in

principle because the learned trial judge in that case had put manslaughter by stabbing into a separate and more serious

category than other types of manslaughter. The sentence in that case was reduced to one of eight years imprisonment. In the

present case, while the learned judge did not specifically state that manslaughter by stabbing was a special category, he

undoubtedly laid great emphasis on the increase in stabbing offences in recent times, stating that “the sentences coming

down from this court have got to indicate urgently that this must stop”. He implied that stabbing cases were in a separate

category which must be treated more severely. This, too, was an error in principle.

It can be noted also that in the recent case of The Director of Public Prosecutions v Stephen Kelly (unreported Court of

Criminal Appeal 5th July 2004) in which the judgment was delivered subsequent to this court’s hearing of the present case,

a similar error of principle was identified in that a case of manslaughter by knife attack was treated as a special category of

offence. In that case, too, a sentence of fourteen years was reduced to one of eight years.

In the present case the applicant committed an extremely serious offence which had an untold effect on the unfortunate

relatives of the victim. On the other hand the applicant immediately admitted his guilt and never wavered from that position.

He had never previously committed an offence involving violence. Although he undoubtedly had a drink problem he had

never been involved in illegal drugs. While he used a kitchen knife on the occasion of this offence it is not suggested that he

habitually carried a knife as a weapon. He has shown remorse from the time of the offence. In his personal life he is a good

worker and is committed to his long term partner and his children. The opinion of Dr. McCaffrey is that he does not appear

to be a violent type of person in normal circumstances. There appears to be a reasonable hope of his rehabilitation.

Given all these considerations this court believes that the sentence in the present case was excessive. The court will treat the

application for leave as the appeal and will allow the appeal. The court will impose as the appropriate sentence a period of

eight years imprisonment.

DPP v Garrett Cooney