IESC 77 · Supreme Court

THE SUPREME COURT

Record No. 341/01

McGuinness J.

Geoghegan J.

Fennelly J.

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 16 OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT 1947

BETWEEN

SUPERINTENDENT ANTHONY KENNELLY

Applicant

and

MARK CRONIN, CATHERINE CRONIN, AND MARIE CRONIN

Respondents

JUDGMENT of FENNELLY J delivered on the 18th day of December 2002

For the sake of clarity, it is appropriate to explain exactly which parts of the other judgments being delivered today I agree with.

Firstly, it is agreed that the first two questions in the Case Stated should be answered in the affirmative and the third in the

negative.

I do not see any difference between the reasoning of McGuinness J and that of Geoghegan J with regard to the second question. I

agree with both.

With regard to the answer to the third question, I agree with McGuinness J. In reality, the central point in the case is that the second

and third named respondents were entitled to be heard before they could be bound anew by the re-entry of the charges. That is a

point in common between the judgments of McGuinness and Geoghegan JJ. I would simply add that I believe that, in the ordinary way,

an order of a District Judge can indeed be recalled and altered in the course of the sittings in the circumstances mentioned in the

applicant’s submissions. That was not the problem here. It clearly could have been done, so long as the bails persons were permitted

to be heard.