Supreme Court dismisses appeal striking out claim for abuse of process and scandalous pleadings.

THE SUPREME COURT

Record No: 213/00

Murray, J.

Hardiman, J.

Fennelly, J

BETWEEN

DENIS RIORDAN

Plaintiff

AND

MR JUSTICE LIAM HAMILTON, CHIEF JUSTICE, MR JUSTICE DONAL BARRINGTON, MR JUSTICE HENRY BARRON, MR JUSTICE

KEVIN LYNCH, MRS JUSTICE SUSAN DENHAM, MR JUSTICE FRANCIS MURPHY, MR JUSTICE RONAN KEANE AND MR JUSTICE

HUGH O’FLAHERTY

Defendants

Judgment delivered the 9th day of October, 2002 by Murray, J.

This matter concerns proceedings issued by the Plaintiff against members and former members of the Supreme Court in which he

seeks to impugn certain previous judgments and decisions of this court.

An application was successfully made in the High Court by the Chief State Solicitor on behalf of the Defendants, firstly for an

order striking out the Plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that it constitutes an abuse of the process of the court, secondly an order

striking out the claim on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and thirdly for an order restraining the

Plaintiff from issuing any further proceedings against the Defendants in the above type proceedings or any person holding the

office of a judge of the Supreme Court without leave of the court. Finally, the High Court ordered that the pleadings be struck

out as containing unnecessary and scandalous matter. The plaintiff appeals against the Order of the High Court.

The Plaintiff has issued these proceedings because he is dissatisfied with the final judgments given by this court in proceedings

in which he was a party and to which, it hardly needs to be said, the defendants were not a party. His dissatisfaction with

having his claims in previous proceedings rejected by the court is often expressed in the pleadings in language which is

intemperate and tendentious. One of the earlier findings of the court of which he complains in his Statement of Claim was that

he “appears to take the view that those who act in the manner inconsistent with his interpretation of the Constitution are not

only mistaken but corrupt.” (381/97). Unfortunately, this still appears to be the case, one example of which is to be found in

paragraph 18 of his Statement of Claim which states “Any judge who grants a divorce is a corrupt judge.”

However, the fundamental point here is that he seeks to challenge previous judgments of this court and obtain declarations

that they are wrong. Of this the Plaintiff said at the hearing of the appeal “that is the whole basis of my case plus I am

claiming damages.” He appears to have considered that by adding a claim for damages he was entitled to reopen those issues

in these proceedings. Of course that is patently wrong. The judgments and decisions of which he complains are final and

conclusive as regards the issues in those proceedings pursuant to Article 34.4.6 of the Constitution. Those issues cannot now

give rise to a claim for damages and in any event a claim for damages as an additional form of relief cannot affect the res

judicata nature of those decisions.

The learned High Court judge firstly had regard to Order 19, rule 28 which provides as follows: -

“The Court may order any pleading to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or

answer and in any such case or in case of the action or defence being shown by the pleadings to be frivolous or

vexatious, the court may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as may be

just.”

This is not the first occasion on which this Plaintiff has sought, unsuccessfully, to litigate once again issues which have been

the subject of a final order and judgment of this court. On reading of the long Statement of Claim delivered by the Plaintiff,

which raises issues already and finally decided in proceedings between the Plaintiff and other parties, it is manifest that the

Plaintiff’s action is both frivolous and vexatious and discloses no reasonable cause of action. Nothing which the Plaintiff has said

during the course of the hearing of this appeal (which essentially reflected the argumentative nature of the pleadings) disclosed

any ground for taking any other view.

In my view, the learned High Court judge was perfectly entitled to come to the conclusion which he did, namely that these

proceedings constitute an abuse of the process of the court and he was entitled to dismiss them on that basis.

Exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the court, the learned High Court judge also struck out the Plaintiff’s claim on the grounds

that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and had no reasonable prospect of success. In respect of that conclusion he

stated “The position here is that these matters have already been litigated. There is no new matter and this is an effort to re-

litigate the same matters and to effectively ask this court to review the decision of the Supreme Court or to ask another

judge to embark on a hearing at a later stage. In my opinion it is neither open nor would it be appropriate to do so in this

case.”

He had before him the affidavit of Lawrence A. Farrell, Chief State Solicitor, filed on behalf of the Defendants herein, to which

there was no replying affidavit and had regard to the Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff. The trial judge was perfectly entitled

to make that finding on foot of that affidavit and the Statement of Claim. In those circumstances he was correct in striking out

the Plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and has no reasonable prospect of success.

As regards the order restraining the Plaintiff from issuing certain kinds of proceedings without leave of the court, the learned

High Court judge relied on the dictum of Costello J. in McSorley -v- O’Mahony (The High Court, unreported) 6th November, 1996,

“It is an abuse of the process of the court to permit the court’s time to be taken up with litigation which can confer no benefit

on a Plaintiff. It is also an abuse to permit litigation to proceed which will undoubtedly cause detriment to a Defendant and

which can confer no gain on a Plaintiff.” While every citizen has a right of access to the courts, it is in the public interest and in

the interest of the proper use of public resources in the administration of justice that in exceptional circumstances this right be

regulated by the courts. In my view, in the circumstances of this case, the learned High Court judge exercised his discretion

properly in deciding to make such an order and I do not consider that any of the arguments made by the Plaintiff in this appeal

disclose a basis for impugning the exercise of that discretion.

Finally as regards the order striking out the statement of claim, the learned High Court judge correctly stated that “The purpose

of pleadings is to convey what the nature of the action is. Pleadings should not be used for an opportunity of placing

unnecessary or scandalous matters on the record of the court or as an opportunity of disseminating such matters when they

having nothing to do with any dispute between the parties. Allegations are not scandalous where they would be admissible in

evidence to show the truth of any allegation in the pleadings which is material to the relief claimed.” Like the learned High

Court judge I do not think it is necessary to spend time reciting the lengthy Statement of Claim but he was correct to regard it

as containing “contemptuous language and scandalous allegations” to advance a view which does not accord with “ fairness”,

“constitutional right or with any modicum of decency.”

For the foregoing reasons, I consider that the Plaintiff’s appeal should be rejected.

One other matter, the Defendants are incorrectly described in the title to these proceedings in the plenary summons issued on

the 13th day of September, 1999 and should, by order, be amended as in the title of this written judgment. There should also

be an order dismissing the Plaintiff’s appeal.