Court rejects admissibility of ministerial statements for statutory interpretation under Irish Health Act 1986.

THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal No 11 and 28/00

1990 No. 7308P

Denham, J.

Murphy, J.

Murray, J.

McGuinness, J.

Fennelly, J.

BETWEEN

DEREK CRILLY

PLAINTIFF

AND

T. & J. FARRINGTON LIMITED AND JOHN O’CONNOR

DEFENDANTS

AND IN THE MATTER OF AN ISSUE DIRECTED TO BE TRIED

BETWEEN

THE EASTERN HEALTH BOARD

CLAIMANT/APPELLANT

AND

DEREK CRILLY

FIRST NAMED RESPONDENT

AND

F.B.D. INSURANCE PLC

SECOND NAMED RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT delivered by Mrs Justice McGuinness on the 11th day of July 2001

I have had the advantage of reading the judgment which has been delivered by Mrs Justice Denham and also the judgment which has

been delivered by Mr Justice Murray and the judgment which is about to be delivered by Mr. Justice Fennelly. I agree, as do Mr

Justice Murray and Mr. Justice Fennelly, with the conclusions reached by Mrs Justice Denham in regard to the principal matter at issue

in this case - the interpretation to be given to Section 2 of the Health (Amendment) Act 1986 in regard to the manner of calculation

of the charges to be imposed by the Health Board under that Act.

I also agree with the conclusion of Mrs Justice Denham that insufficient grounds have been established for abolishing or qualifying the

established exclusionary rule concerning recourse to parliamentary proceedings as a matter of judicial policy at this time.

Mr Justice Murray in his judgment has provided a wide ranging and in-depth analysis of the latter issue - the admissibility of ministerial

statements or, more widely, parliamentary debates, as aids to the interpretation of Statutes. Mr Justice Murray reaches the

conclusion that recourse to ministerial statements as an aid to the construction of statutes is not sufficiently useful or efficient as to

outweigh, from a judicial policy point of view, the disadvantages or possible inconveniences of abolishing the exclusionary rule. He

does not, however, go so far as to say that this should be decided as a matter of principle in the present proceedings. I am in full

agreement with these conclusions.

Mr. Justice Fennelly in his judgment, having referred to a number of additional authorities also addressed the difficulties both in

principle and in practice of allowing the use of Parliamentary Debates in the interpretation of Statutes by the Court. I agree with his

conclusion that in the context of the present appeal the statement of the Minister should not have been considered.

In this short addendum to the judgments of my learned colleagues, I wish to stress that I entirely share Mr Justice Murray’s concerns

as to the constitutional impropriety of blurring the distinction between the legislative task of the Oireachtas in forming and enacting

the law and the judicial task of the Courts in interpreting the law as it has been enacted.

Apart from these concerns of principle, it seems to me that there are very real practical difficulties in the way of such reliance on

either ministerial statements or Parliamentary Debates in the construction of statutes.

The process of legislation by the Oireachtas is essentially collective. It is the Oireachtas as a whole which legislates. It would in my

view be a misleading oversimplification of this process to rely, in interpreting a statute, on ministerial statements alone. Particularly in

the case of more complex statutes, which pass through a lengthy Committee Stage, contributions come from all sides of both Houses

of the Oireachtas. The statute as finally enacted may well have been extensively amended and may differ crucially from the Bill as

introduced by the Minister’s initial introductory statement at the Second Stage. For the Courts to rely on ministerial statements in

interpreting statutes would not, therefore, reflect the will of the Oireachtas as a whole. Yet to search the entire Parliamentary

Debates for indications as to the proper interpretation of statutes would be both complex, time consuming and extremely difficult in

practice. Such a procedure would be open to all the criticisms voiced by both Mr. Justice Murray and Mr. Justice Fennelly in their

judgments.

The actual issue between the parties in the present proceedings can be decided without this Court making a decision in principle on

the use of parliamentary proceedings as an aid to the construction of statutes. I am, however, clear in my view that in the present

proceedings the statement of the Minister should not have been considered. The issue of admissibility of Parliamentary Debates is of

considerable importance and will, no doubt, arise again in the future. As a matter of general judicial policy, however, I share the view

of Mr. Justice Murray that at present insufficient grounds have been established for abolishing or gratifying the established

exclusionary rule.