Supreme Court dismisses appeal against High Court refusal of leave for judicial review due to procedural prematurity.

Murray J.

Hardiman J.

Geoghegan J.

137/1999

THE SUPREME COURT

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL AGAINST A REFUSAL OF THE HIGH COURT (MR. JUSTICE CARNEY) TO GRANT LEAVE TO APPLY

FOR ORDERS OF CERTIORARI/DECLARATION BY WAY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW RELATING TO STIOFÁN BREATHNACH

Applicant

and

HER HONOUR JUDGE LINDSAY AND GARDA FINBARR NOEL BRADY, 143E

Respondents

Judgment of Mr. Justice Geoghegan delivered 22nd day of February 2001

In another judgment, delivered today, I have criticised this appellant for purporting to join the High Court judge whose order is being

appealed against as a respondent to the appeal. As the appellant well knows that is wholly wrong practice. Accordingly, I would strike

out that part of the title in so far as Mr. Justice Carney has been purported to be joined as a respondent.

This was originally an application for leave for judicial review and Her Honour Judge Lindsay of the Circuit Court and Garda Finbarr Noel

Brady were named as respondents. The purpose of the application was to have an appeal to the Circuit Court quashed. Carney J., in

the High Court, made the following ruling:

“In so far as I am able to penetrate the inappropriate pseudo legal verbiage of this application, it appears to relate to

proceedings still pending before the Circuit Court and due to come up again for mention on the 15th of June, 1999. In these

circumstances it would be premature for me to find an excess of jurisdiction, an absence of jurisdiction or unconstitutionally

unfair procedures.

This application is premature and is refused.”

I agree with Carney J. that it is not easy to determine what exactly the issue is in this case, but as I understand it, the appellant was

continually arguing in the Circuit Court that the State was withholding documentary information which if produced would establish

that the offence was not a minor offence and that it therefore should never have been tried in the District Court in the first place. I

do not think that the Circuit Court had any function in this regard. The question of whether an offence is a minor offence or not is

determined at an earlier stage and certainly is never determined by the Circuit Court on a District Court appeal.

I also agree with the learned trial judge that, as the appeal had not yet been heard or embarked upon by the Circuit Court, the

question of certiorari did not arise.

The other grounds of appeal all relate to alleged misbehaviour on the part of Carney J. and the registrar in the High Court. But

although there are a number of separate allegations, they all relate to the appellant’s basic complaint that the prisoner applications

ought, from the very beginning, be heard in open court. I have already pointed out in another judgment, delivered today, in which the

same appellant is involved that the procedure adopted for prisoner applications in the High Court has been endorsed by the Supreme

Court in an appeal brought by this same appellant, and in a written judgment delivered by McGuinness J. The appellant is well aware

of this.

I would dismiss this appeal.