Appeal Regarding Enforcement Order Limitation Period
France (FR)
Synthèse Legislator
Généré par l'IAAn appellant contested a judgment that dismissed his objection to an enforcement order, arguing that a five-year limitation period should have barred enforcement for the period after a specific date, based on the date the enforcement order was served. The court rejected this appeal, reasoning that the five-year period for issuing the enforcement order began running after the expiration of the fifteen-day period granted in the formal notice, as stipulated by the relevant Social Security Code articles, and since the enforcement order was served within that five-year window following the notice, the appellant's claim relying on the general civil statute of limitations, which was inapplicable in this context, could not succeed.
Regeste Legislator
Généré par l'IAARTICLE 2277 DU CODE CIVIL, ARTICLE 153 DU CODE LA SECURITE SOCIALE, ARTICLE 169 DU MEME CODE; Appeal Regarding Enforcement Order Limitation Period: The court rejected this appeal, reasoning that the five-year period for issuing the enforcement order began running after the expiration of the fifteen-day period granted in the formal notice, as stipulated by the relevant Social Security Code articles, and since the enforcement order was served within that five-year window following the notice, the appellant's claim relying on the general civil statute of limitations, which was inapplicable in this context, could not succeed.
Mots-clés
Généré par l'IADispositions légales citées
Généré par l'IADécisions connexes
Généré par l'IAQuestions juridiques clés extraites par Legislator
Généré par l'IACited in the reasoning to confirm the validity of the formal notice prerequisite to issuing the enforcement order.
Cited in the reasoning to establish the five-year period for issuing the enforcement order after the notice period expired.
Cited in the reasoning as the inapplicable legal basis invoked by the appellant regarding prescription.
Texte complet
SUR LE MOYEN UNIQUE : ATTENDU QU'IL EST FAIT GRIEF A L'ARRET ATTAQUE D'AVOIR DECLARE NON FONDEE L'OPPOSITION DE MOUGIN A LA CONTRAINTE QUI LUI A ETE SIGNIFIEE LE 1ER DECEMBRE 1971, EN DECLARANT QU'IL NE POUVAIT SE PREVALOIR DE LA PRESCRIPTION QUINQUENNALE POUR LA PERIODE POSTERIEURE AU 30 MARS 1966, ALORS QUE LA CONTRAINTE LUI AYANT ETE SIGNIFIEE LE 1ER DECEMBRE 1971, LE BENEFICE DE LA PRESCRIPTION LUI ETAIT ACQUIS JUSQU'AU 30 NOVEMBRE 1966 ;
MAIS ATTENDU QU'IL RESULTE DES MENTIONS NON CONTESTEES DE LA CONTRAINTE DU 14 JUIN 1971, QUE LA MISE EN DEMEURE, QUI VISAIT LES COTISATIONS EXIGIBLES DU 1ER AVRIL 1966 AU 31 DECEMBRE 1969, AVAIT ETE DELIVREE LE 16 FEVRIER 1971, CONFORMEMENT AUX DISPOSITIONS DE L'ARTICLE 153 DU CODE LA SECURITE SOCIALE ;
QU'A COMPTER DE L'EXPIRATION DU DELAI DE QUINZAINE IMPARTI PAR LA MISE EN DEMEURE ET, EN APPLICATION DE L'ARTICLE 169 DU MEME CODE, LA CAISSE DISPOSAIT D'UN DELAI DE CINQ ANS POUR DECERNER CONTRAINTE ;
QUE CELLE-CI AYANT ETE SIGNIFIEE LE 1ER DECEMBRE 1971 LE MOYEN, D'AILLEURS FONDE SUR L'ARTICLE 2277 DU CODE CIVIL, INAPPLICABLE A LA MATIERE, NE SAURAIT ETRE ACCUEILLI ;
PAR CES MOTIFS : REJETTE LE POURVOI FORME CONTRE L'ARRET RENDU LE 13 FEVRIER 1973, PAR LA COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS.